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Abstract: 
This thesis is an inquiry into the economics and ethics of residential integration.  Efforts to integrate 
otherwise segregated black and white households in the United States over the last 40 years has been met 
with legitimate skepticism.  Primarily, there is an absence of evidence as it relates to whether 
neighborhoods cause disadvantage (neighborhood effects) in addition to a lack of evidence related to 
whether “mixing” actually produces adequate social benefits for those being moved or for society as a 
whole.  I intend to move the conversation forward by presenting two additional considerations.  First, in 
the economic paradigm, it is useful to explore the issue of segregation through what has been described as 
adverse impacts occurring in the wake of a market failure (“subprime financial crisis”).  Second, there are 
ethical considerations relevant to the integration discussion that offer new norms by which to engage and 
advance our approach to residential integration and endeavors to mix.  This thesis makes a contribution to 
knowledge by explicating these two points and ultimately providing a more morally capacious evaluative 
framework by which to appraise this complex social issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*All Footnotes are numbered consecutively throughout the manuscript.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Divided We Stand 
 
America is segregated.  More specifically, it is residentially segregated.  The word “segregation” 
has referred to both racial and socio-economic segmentation between various sectors of society 
and, most often, the separation of black and white society.
1
  This term has a controversial history 
in American public discourse.  Within our nation’s relatively short history, the residue of the 
Civil War, Jim Crow Laws, and the post-civil rights era will not soon be forgotten.
2
  However, 
my usage of the term “segregation” is in a post-civil rights context, where segregation is not 
perpetuated by existing laws, but rather by social and economic forces.  By adding the adjective 
“residential,” I am referring to segregation in US housing arrangements understood in spatial 
terms.
3
  The US Census Bureau describes “residential segregation” as “the distribution of 
different groups across units within a larger area.”4  Here we are concerned not with the diversity 
of housing type, but with the diversity of citizens inhabiting homes within a given neighborhood.  
The conceptual opposite, then, of residential segregation is residential “integration.”5  The 
existing literature that addresses residential integration, or “mixing,” is often used in varying 
contexts—most often contexts of income or race.  For the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen 
                                                          
1
 In this thesis, I will use to term “minority” to refer to African-American individuals or households (unless 
otherwise noted).  Further, when I use the term “White”—I am referring to non-Hispanic Whites, as defined by the 
US Census.  Residential segregation can also refer to patterns of housing segmentation that include dimensions such 
as race and income in addition to age or ethnicity (See Iceland and Wilkes, 2006).  However, as I will make clear, 
this study specifically engages housing segmentation based upon race and, more specifically, the racial categories of 
black and white. 
2
 Jim Crow Laws, enacted in the post-Civil War reconstruction period, were laws that separated blacks and whites 
through various public institutions.  This included busing, schools, restrooms and drinking fountains.  This naturally 
fed into non-public institutions, such as restaurants and other shopping establishments. 
3
 The “space” I refer to is, in essence, neighborhood space.  This will be defined more clearly in Chapter 3 of the 
thesis. 
4
 "Housing Patterns - Chapter 2." Census Bureau Home Page. U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household 
Economic Statistics Division, 27 June 2005. Web. 13 June 2011. 
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/ch2.html>. 
5
 Integration, in a racial context, has been defined in many ways.  While I will provide a specific definition of an 
integrated or “mixed” community in Chapter 3, in a general sense it is best to understand integration as the absence 
of segregation. 
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to use the terms segregation and integration in a racially-based context and, more specifically, 
the racial categories of black and white.
6
  
The statistical measure most often referenced in the analysis of residential segregation is the 
dissimilarity index, which represents the degree to which blacks and whites are evenly spread 
among neighborhoods in a city.
7
  This index, described as the most widely used measure of 
residential segregation, ranges from 0 (complete integration) to 1 (complete segregation).
8
  
According to Massey and Denton (1993), scores above 60 represent high levels of segregation, 
and scores below 30 represent low levels of segregation.
9
  In the United States, measurements of 
dissimilarity began to occur as early as the post-Civil War reconstruction period.  Dissimilarity 
ranges of 38 to 59 are on record circa 1910, with a massive increase in dissimilarity in the range 
of 81 to 89 in 1940.
10
  In 1968, US President Lyndon Johnson created a committee to address the 
violence that was erupting through rioting in the nation’s distinctly African-American ghettos.  
Among other conclusions, the committee reported that the US was “moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”11 
After World War II, structural patterns of segregation began to emerge that would not only 
increase the trend of segregation, but ensure that this segmented living structure would become a 
blueprint for the future of US residential housing.  For example, conceived out of the US 
depression in the 1930s, the FHA (Federal Housing Administration) provided loan guarantees as 
an insurance mechanism to open up credit flow in the lending markets.  Traditionally, lenders 
required down payments for homes that were a significant proportion of the property’s price, 
prohibiting the greater portion of the home buying market from homeownership opportunities.  
However, while the FHA’s guarantee created a new paradigm for the otherwise insular segment 
of US homeowner’s, this assistance was not for everyone.  Indeed, FHA manuals were very clear 
that their offer of insurance did not extend to neighborhoods with a non-white presence.
12
  This 
                                                          
6
 Although I specifically focus on race, the implications for income and race are often interchangeable.  In other 
words, segregated African American neighborhoods are often income segregated neighborhoods, etc.   
7
 Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1993. Print. (Page 20) 
8
 Census Bureau, 2011. 
9
 Ibid., page 20. 
10
 Ibid., page 21. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
12
 Immargluck, Dan. Foreclosed: High-Risk Lending, Deregulation, and the Undermining of America's Mortgage 
Market. Ithaca/London: Cornell UP, 2009. Print. (pp. 48-49) 
11 
 
offered clear mobility advantages to white families who benefited from the FHA’s services, and 
with the help of burgeoning roads and highways, the modern suburban community was created, 
sequestering opportunistic white households from otherwise limited, city-bound African 
American households.  With such egregious structural discrimination, it comes as no surprise 
that in the 1970s, the pattern of a black core surrounded by a white ring defined the city to 
suburb relationship in the US.
13
  By early 1990s, nearly one quarter of all US African Americans 
could be found in 10 US metropolitan areas.
14
  This trend has not changed.  Although the US 
African American community grew by nearly 10 million individuals between 1980 and the year 
2000, a 27% increase in population, at the turn of the century 86.5% of African Americans still 
lived in metropolitan areas.
15
   
In the year 2000, the average white person in America lived in a neighborhood that was 80% 
white and only 7% black.
16
  Nearly 40 years after Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech 
on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, America still stands as a nation divided, inciting the late 
law professor John Calmore to write: “King's hope for racial integration has died its hardest 
death in the area of housing.”17  Such figures have led Massey and Denton to conclude in their 
landmark study of US segregation that African Americans are “unambiguously among the 
nation’s most spatially isolated and geographically secluded people, suffering extreme 
segregation across multiple dimensions simultaneously.”18 
One of the major issues related to segregation data is not simply where households are 
segregated from, but where they are segregated to—a theme this thesis will attempt to explore 
more deeply.  Researchers have found that low-income minority segregated families are more 
                                                          
13
 Massey and Denton, 1993, p. 67 
14
 Calmore, John O. "Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-Future Essay." North 
Carolina Law Review 71 (1993): 1487-518. Print.  This is an astonishing statistic given the fact that there were 
approximately 30 million African Americans in the US as of the 1990 Census (See 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-qr_name=DEC_1990_STF1_QTP1D&-geo_id=01000US&-
ds_name=DEC_1990_STF1_&-_lang=en&-format=&-CONTEXT=qt).  Similar to the 1990s, the 2000 census 
continues to find African Americans segregated in metropolitan areas (See 
http://www.censusscope.org/us/map_nhblack.html).  
15
 "Housing Patterns - Chapter 5." Census Bureau Home Page. 6 Dec. 2004. Web. 27 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/resseg/ch5.html>. 
16
 Logan, John, and Lewis Mumford Center. Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags Behind. Rep. 
2001. Print. (page 1) 
17
 Calmore, 1993, p. 1496 
18
 Massey and Denton, 1993, p. 77 
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likely to live in areas with dilapidated living structures and lower housing returns.
19
  Williams 
and Collins (2001) find that residential segregation of whites and blacks effects educational and 
employment opportunities, and thus creates a sizeable disparity in health outcomes among white 
and black citizens.
20
  Indeed, the educational gap between whites and blacks has been described 
as a “massive inequality” to which “segregation contributes in primary and secondary schools.”21  
In addition to the adverse economic, cultural, and political effects that social isolation has on 
African Americans, research cites segregation as a major predictor of homicide and robbery rates 
within isolated black communities.
22
  Income, jobs, education, and safety—fundamental features 
to secure stability in an advanced democracy—are disproportionately secured by white 
households relative to black households in a racially segregated nation.  Thus Massey and 
Denton conclude: “Segregation […] is the key factor responsible for the creation and 
perpetuation of communities characterized by persistent and spatially concentrated poverty.”23 
 
Addressing US Residential Segregation 
 
As Hartman and Squires (2010) write, “segregation remains a dominant reality in virtually all 
U.S. cities and their surrounding areas.”24  Moreover, there is a clear dissonance between current 
segregation statistics and the often cited US mantras of “Liberty and Justice for All” and “United 
We Stand.”  Should either of these phrases really be housed under the shelter of US ideology 
while housing arrangements remain highly segmented in reality?  This question has not gone 
unnoticed by legislators who have responded with efforts to integrate communities by attaching 
                                                          
19
 Flippen, Chenoa. "Unequal Returns to Housing Investments? A Study of Real Housing Appreciation among 
Black, White, and Hispanic Households." Social Forces 82.4 (2004): 1523-551. Print. 
20
 Williams, David R., and Chiquita Collins. Racial Residential Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial 
Disparities in Health. Rep. Vol. 116. Public Health Reports, 2001. Print. 
21
 Briggs, Xavier De Souza. The Geography of Opportunity: Race and Housing Choice in Metropolitan America. 
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005. Print. (Page 32) 
22
 Shihadeh, Edward S., and Nicole Flynn. "Segregation and Crime: The Effect of Black Social Isolation on the 
Rates of Black Urban Violence." Social Forces 74.4 (1996): 1325-352. Print. (Page 1345) 
23
 Massey and Denton, 1993, p. 118 
24
 Hartman, Chester W., and Gregory D. Squires. "Integration Exhaustion, Race Fatigue, and the American Dream." 
The Integration Debate: Competing Futures for American Cities. New York: Routledge, 2010. 1-8. Print.  For a 
unique portrayal of residential segregation in the US, see Appendix II: “The Segregation Parade.” 
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economic disincentive to segregation in addition to the creative use of policy tools.
 25
  Describing 
the underlying motivation for this policy, Sociologist John Logan writes: “Neighborhood 
integration has remained a goal of public policy and popular opinion because it is seen as proof 
of the American ideal of equal opportunity.”26  Over the past 40 years, we can identify four 
major overtures toward the integration of black and white housing: The Gatreaux dispersal 
program, the Moving to Opportunity dispersal project (MTO), the HOPE VI Initiative, and the 
Mount Laurel land usage legislation.
27
 
Support for residential integration rests on two primary assumptions, both emanating from the 
idea that segregation has “grave costs”28 and that integration can ameliorate the effects of 
segregation.
29
  The first assumption is the belief that low-income minorities are exposed to social 
ills as a function of their segregation.  In other words, if segregated black families are 
disadvantaged—we are assuming that where they live is a source of that disadvantage.30  The 
second assumption is that households would fare better if they were dispersed, or integrated, 
within better neighborhoods that reflect a greater diversity of race and income.  Despite a 
consistent imperative of “moving toward the goal of integrated living” that exists among a host 
of social scientists, there is a range of evidence in support of, and against, these aforementioned 
assumptions.
31
  This stalemate has led to what can be described as “integration exhaustion”—or 
the perpetual questioning of the value of integration.
32
   
If programs that aim to integrate black and white residential households are criticized for lack of 
effectiveness—it is appropriate to ask: “Lack of effectiveness in what?”   There are two primary 
modes of evaluation when it comes to assessing the effectiveness of residential integration.  In 
                                                          
25
 An example of this would be Fair Housing Act signed in 1985 which included the facilitation of forcing 
communities to provide a “fair share” of affordable housing for low to moderate income families—families that 
were otherwise prohibited from the community through exclusionary zoning tactics. 
26
 Logan, 2001, p. 1 
27
 Extensive detail of each of these programs, in addition to their effectiveness, will be covered in Chapter 2 of the 
thesis. 
28
 Hartman and Squires’ term (2010), p. 7.   
29
 Criticism of these assumptions originate from a wide variety of scholars, planners, politicians, etc.  However, 
these assumptions find their most cogent expression (in critical format) from the work of Paul Cheshire of LSE.  
Thus, I later refer to the argument against these assumptions as the Cheshirian Position. 
30
 Contrastingly, skeptics doubt that place doesn’t necessarily cause disadvantage—it simply reflects disadvantaged 
households. 
31
 Hartman and Squires, 2010, p. 7 
32
 This term is used in the opening of Hartman and Squires compilation of voices in “The Integration Debate”, 2010.  
The various voices throughout the book speak in favor of, and against, efforts to integrate and flesh out the nuances 
of this complex social discussion.  See Hartman, Chester W., and Gregory D. Squires (2010). 
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general terms, these can be described as considerations in overall welfare (a net increase in 
welfare for dispersed households and no reduction in welfare for households of the receiving 
neighborhoods) and considerations in cost-effectiveness (ensuring resources, such as tax-payer 
dollars, are utilized in a cost-efficient way).  In this thesis, I shall refer to the usage of these two 
general standards as the Evaluative Integration Framework.  More specifically, I define this 
framework as considerations in economic efficacy and the maximization of utility in an 
aggregate social context.  In the “integration debate,” as it has been described, this has been the 
primary paradigm for assessing the effectiveness of residential integration programs.
33
  We may 
appropriately understand the Evaluative Integration Framework as an economic paradigm, as it 
gives primary consideration to efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
I submit, however, that there are other economic arguments to be made.  Among other things, 
one could say that the current status of segregated residential living patterns is a failure of the US 
ideal of “fair housing.”34  Urban scholar George Galster provides a helpful definition of fair 
housing: “the opportunity to live in an environment where one’s life chances are not unduly 
constrained.”35  Galster describes what he calls “adverse impacts” or the “the implementation of 
a policy or practice that—though evenhandedly applied to all races—nevertheless results in 
disproportionately negative consequences for the minority and cannot be justified on grounds of 
business necessity.”36  Here, I utilize this term as it relates to consequences occurring within a 
given space (i.e., a neighborhood) as opposed to consequences experienced by an individual or 
household.  If one could identify the presence of adverse impacts experienced by a residentially 
                                                          
33
 Hartman and Squires 2010 collection of scholarly voices related to integration is titled “The Integration Debate.” 
34
 The original Fair Housing Act of 1968 was designed, primarily, to protect against African-American 
discrimination in the home buying, selling, renting, or overall financing process.  See "Fair Housing Laws and 
Presidential Executive Orders - HUD." HUD.Gov. US Department of Housing and Urban Development. Web. 13 
June 2011. <http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/FHLaws>.  
However, since its original passage in 1968, Galster writes that “subsequent court rulings and Federal policy 
pronouncements make clear that there are multiple goals.”  In his article on the evolving challenges of fair housing 
going into the new century, Galster points out three: (1) The elimination of differential treatment (discriminating on 
the basis of race), (2) The creation of stable, racially diverse neighborhoods, and (3) The reduction of ghettos 
occupied by poor minority households.  See Galster, George C. "The Evolving Challenges of Fair Housing Since 
1968: Open Housing, Integration, and the Reeduction of Ghettoization." Cityscape: A Journal of Policy 
Development and Research 4.3 (1999): 123-38. Print. (Page 123) 
35
 Galster, 1999, p. 124 
36
 Ibid.  It is important to point out here that Galster’s original usage of this term applies to individuals (as opposed 
to the spatial context I use it in).  However, this is not to suggest that its usage is inappropriate.  Galster himself 
utilizes the concept of adverse impacts in a spatial context in Galster, G., R. Mincy, and M. Tobin. "The Disparate 
Racial Neighborhood Impacts of Metropolitan Economic Restructuring." Urban Affairs Review 32.6 (1997): 797-
824. Print. 
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segregated black community, this would be consistent with the first assumption mentioned 
above: being exposed to social disadvantage as a function of where one lives.
37
  Adverse impacts 
provide an important perspective to the integration debate.  First, the benefits and drawbacks of 
residential integration are most often assessed post hoc, or after integration has occurred.  While 
this is an important question (What are the advantages of integration?), there is an equally 
important question related to the risks of inertia (What are the disadvantages of segregation?).  
Second, we may appropriately look for adverse impacts occurring in the wake of a market 
failure.  If segregated communities experience adverse impacts from a market breakdown, and 
those impacts are concentrated within a particular area, this will likely have a magnified effect on 
the community, creating a unique link between space and disadvantage. 
Exploring the value of residential integration through the lens of adverse impacts is, I submit, a 
valuable alternative economic vantage point.  However, this thesis makes an additional 
contribution by shifting the paradigm to consider the ethics of residential integration.  Economic 
considerations germane to the discussion naturally produce an economic evaluative standard, but 
this paradigm does not comprehensively capture all considerations in the residential integration 
discussion.  There are important ethical considerations inherent in this discussion which 
necessitates an ethically-driven evaluative standard as well.  Moreover, as I shall argue, 
presenting an issue with economic and ethical implications solely under the language of the 
former will potentially bracket-out considerations of the latter.  Ultimately, I aim to suggest that 
taken together, exploring residential integration through an economic and ethical lens is, I 
submit, a more comprehensive approach to this complex social issue. 
 
Thesis Aims and Contribution 
 
With this background in mind, there are two primary aims related to this thesis.  First, my 
intention is to explore the economics of residential integration.  More specifically, my 
contribution will be to explore segregation and the possibility of integration in the wake of a 
systematic market failure.  The “subprime financial crisis,” one of the strongest systematic 
market failures in US history, provides a unique vantage point by which to evaluate the notion of 
                                                          
37
 Further, the market would be considered less efficient if it does not reflect additional externalities accompanying 
adverse impacts. 
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adverse impacts on minority segregated communities relative to white segregated communities.  
I specifically engage in a study of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, in the United States—a metropolitan 
area that is considered to be highly segregated and was subject to significant disparate impacts 
from the subprime financial crisis.
38
  My exploration of the economic paradigm will specifically 
answer the following research questions: 
(1) How did segregated communities (both homogeneous white and black) fare in the wake 
of the subprime crisis and its accompanying “adverse impacts?”  Did segregation and 
“place” play a role in helping or harming social welfare for racially isolated households? 
 
(2) In light of the crisis, are there visible or presumed economic advantages that could be 
associated with residential mixing that may suggest a protective mechanism for otherwise 
vulnerable and segregated households?  Further, are these advantages considered socially 
efficient, where society benefits as a whole? 
After answering and considering these questions through empirical analysis, I pause to ask: What 
conclusions can we appropriately reach regarding residential integration?  What is my 
contribution to this discussion?   
Second, my aim is to flesh out the normative considerations, or the ethics relative to the 
residential integration discussion.  Further, I provide the necessary justification for this argument 
through a modified Rawlsian framework.
39
  After this, I will consider the implications of this 
framework, and in particular, the spatial implications. 
In the concluding chapter, I will bring together my conclusions from exploring the economic 
paradigm and the ethical paradigm so as to summarize what can reasonably be concluded from 
this study and to explore the spatial implications and the future of residential integration.  This 
                                                          
38
 As of the 2000 Census, the metropolitan area of Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, Ohio, which reflects the same general 
area as Cuyahoga County, Ohio, had a dissimilarity index of 79.7.  This was ranked 9
th
 on a list of 318 metropolitan 
areas for highest dissimilarity index in the United States.  See "CensusScope -- Segregation: Dissimilarity Indices." 
CensusScope: Census 2000 Data, Charts, Maps, and Rankings. Web. 14 June 2010. 
http://www.censusscope.org/us/rank_dissimilarity_white_black.html.  Regarding the subprime financial crisis in 
Cuyahoga County—over 10,000 homes were foreclosed upon during and after the crisis in Cleveland (major city 
within Cuyahoga County).  See "Local Response to Crisis Could Be Model for Others | Think." Case Western 
Reserve University - One of the Nation's Top Universities and the Best College in Ohio. Case Western Reserve 
University, 2011. Web. 13 June 2011. <http://www.case.edu/think/breakingnews/mortgagecrisis.html>. 
39
 A “Rawlsian” framework is based upon the late political philosopher John Rawls.  His work will be detailed in 
Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
17 
 
thesis makes a contribution to knowledge by explicating a specific normative element in the 
residential integration debate and re-envisaging the conclusions and implications of residential 
integration through the economic and ethical paradigms.  When compiled, these paradigms 
provide a distinct and innovative perspective by which to engage this issue. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
We may appropriately start this exploration with the following two premises: America is 
residentially segregated and efforts to integrate over the last 40 years have provided little 
evidence to substantiate the funding and resources for neighborhood mixing programs.  Chapter 
2 of the thesis will comprehensively cover the existing literature relative to segregation and 
neighborhood mixing as a policy tool.  More specifically, the chapter explores four major 
integration initiatives over the last 40 years—their origin, application, and subsequent 
outcomes—both positive and negative.  Yet while it is important to research the outcomes of 
integration, it is equally important to research the outcomes of segregation—assuming that low-
income segregated communities remain inert.  Attention is specifically given to segregated 
communities and how they fare in the wake of a market failure (specifically, the subprime 
financial crisis).  Thus, the chapter ends by describing the subprime financial crisis and its 
disproportionate impact upon segregated white and black households.  The multitude of factors 
leading to the crisis, in addition to its aftermath, makes it consistent with Galster’s definition of 
adverse impacts providing a unique viewpoint by which to assess the greater discussion of 
residential integration. 
In Chapter 3, I undertake my own empirical study to explore the risks of allowing racially 
segregated households to remain isolated.  I suggest that the analysis is consistent with the 
assertion that segregation plays a role in harming the social welfare of minority isolated 
households in the wake of a market crisis.  I attempt to explicate the link between a 
neighborhood’s spatial context (i.e., a segregated black neighborhood) and disadvantage 
emanating from adverse impacts.  Furthermore, my research seeks to answer whether there may 
be visible or presumed economic advantages associated with the dispersal of low-income 
minority segregated households (i.e., mixing with other white or diverse communities).  Chapter 
3 ends by describing the methodological limitations of integration research (including my own 
18 
 
study) and the contribution such limitations make to the ambiguity associated with this 
contentious issue.  While there are problems from within the framework being utilized to 
appraise integration outcomes—there are also problems with the framework itself.  In other 
words, viewing residential integration solely through the lens of the economic paradigm risks 
missing other important elements germane to the subject—elements of an ethical nature. 
Therefore, in Chapter 4, I introduce the “normative argument” and its relevance in residential 
social arrangements.  Ethical references to integration are often packaged in the language of 
justice.  This may provide the most natural entry-point for an ethical appraisal of residential 
integration, since issues related to segregation are often expressed as issues of justice or racial 
justice.  This paradigm, as I shall argue, is different in nature than the economic paradigm we 
find in the Evaluative Integration Framework.  The latter framework operates from more of a 
utility model, where the maximization of welfare and social benefits for all involved parties is 
the primary measure by which to gauge the effectiveness of residential integration.
40
   I begin 
with John Rawls whose work offers the seminal expression of liberal justice in our contemporary 
age.  Further, the Rawlsian approach to justice is best understood as a response to otherwise 
consequentialist approaches to social and economic arrangements in society.
41
  However, after 
pointing out intractable problems with the Rawlsian model, I offer what I submit to be a more 
supportive architecture to buttress the normative argument.  I submit that my modified, or 
“refurbished,” Rawlsian framework supports the normative argument for residential integration 
as a just and ethical social arrangement worth endeavoring toward.   
I end the thesis by reflecting upon both the economic paradigm and the ethical paradigm.  Taken 
together, we can conclude a distinction between “mix” and “mixing.”  Furthermore, I suggest 
that an ethical paradigm is not only helpful, but is necessary, to cover the gap between these two 
understandings in the residential integration discussion.  
  
                                                          
40
 I hesitate, here, to use the expression utilitarianism for various reasons to be spelled out more clearly later in the 
thesis.  In short, utilitarianism can be expressed in myriad ways—not simply the common expression of the sum 
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sought to be maximized.  Nevertheless, this does not diminish the value of an ethical paradigm and its 
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 The Evaluative Integration Framework would fall under this category. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Response 
 
This thesis is an inquiry into the economics and ethics of residential integration.  In order to 
explicate the value of my research and its contribution, it is important to survey the literature 
relating to the relevant areas of study.  For the purposes of this thesis, these areas include 
community mixing
42
 and residential integration, as well as the subprime financial crisis.
43
  It is 
important to point out that there is a wide range of information for each of these areas, and it is 
not within the realm of this study to present an exhaustive account for each topic.  Nonetheless, 
this review is comprehensive insofar as it provides a solid knowledge base of the work that has 
been done in each of these relevant areas.   
The following section will be structured as follows.  In Part I, I begin with a comprehensive 
description of the history of residential integration (“mixed communities”) in the United States 
including relevant research findings and recommendations.  In Part II, I complement this review 
with a short, yet insightful, survey of four major integration movements that have taken place in 
the US over the last 40 years.  These efforts embody the complex discussion that has gravitated 
around the issue of residential integration over the years, particularly the criticism that 
integration policy lacks the substantive evidence to validate its existence as a policy initiative.  In 
Part III, I explicate the evaluative criterion that has been utilized, based upon a survey of the 
literature, to support or dismiss residential integration ideology.  Next, in Part IV, I seek to move 
the conversation forward by borrowing from George Galster’s idea of “adverse impacts” where 
evenhandedly applied policies unevenly subject low-income minorities to unintended adverse 
consequences.  I argue that Galster’s presentation of this idea as an important aspect of “fair 
housing” naturally leads us to consider the consequences of neighborhood inertia, where no 
integration takes place and low-income minorities are subject to greater risks, vulnerabilities, and 
market consequences as a function of their segregation.  “Adverse impacts” provides a unique 
vantage point by which to alternatively appraise housing integration outcomes relative to the 
                                                          
42
 When referring to “mixing”—I use this term interchangeably with residential integration efforts—i.e., integrating 
otherwise segregated groups across space (neighborhoods, etc.).  The term “mixing” often refers to engineered 
income mix or racial mix or both.   
43
 While there is no literature specifically related to the ethics of residential integration—Chapter 4 will review some 
of the relevant literature in regards to my own construction of an ethical framework, particularly as it relates to 
justice. 
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work that has been done.  Here, I incorporate the recent subprime financial crisis as a 
contemporary lens by which to account for “adverse impacts” as it relates to neighborhood 
integration/segregation discussions.  Thus, before empirically studying this phenomenon, I 
conclude this chapter by providing a detailed description of the crisis, its origin and impact, and 
subsequent implications in Parts V and VI. 
 
PART I: Mixed Communities 
 
 
The term “mixed-community,” in a residential integration context, has been used 
interchangeably between both income and ethnic/racial mixing.  While this study is specifically 
addressing residential segregation and integration in a racial context (white and black), it is 
valuable to explore mixed-community efforts from both an income and racial standpoint.  Often, 
the policy implications for race and income are interchangeable.
44
  In a study examining the 
interplay between race and class, Iceland and Wilkes (2006) cite the Spatial Assimilation 
Theory, which asserts that differences in socioeconomic status and acculturation across racial 
and ethnic groups, together, help shape patterns of segregation.”45  Their research confirms that 
levels of segregation among African American households vary by their socio-economic status 
(SES).
46
  Thus, often times, neighborhoods segregated by income are also segregated by race, 
and vice-versa.
47
   
 
The landscape for mixed community literature is deep and wide.  Thus, this section aims to deal 
with specific aspects of mixed-communities in a residential segregation context.  First, my aim is 
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 In my empirical study, I specifically operationalize “segregation” in a racial context, although direct implications 
for income are unavoidable. 
45
 Iceland, John, and Rima Wilkes. "Does Socioeconomic Status Matter? Race, Class, and Residential Segregation." 
Social Problems 53.2 (2006): 248-73. Print. (Page 249) 
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 Ibid., page 268.  The authors point out that while socioeconomic differences are associated with patterns of 
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David Moberg. "Moving From the 'Hood: The Mixed Success of Integrating Suburbia | The American Prospect." 
Home | The American Prospect. 1 Dec. 1995. Web. 16 June 2010. 
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to draw on the existing research relevant to residential integration efforts.  While I am 
specifically looking at residential segregation in a US context, it is valuable to survey the 
transatlantic work done in this area, particularly as the findings have been very similar.  My hope 
is that an explication of the voices and research related to mixing will highlight the present 
conflict in the advancement of residential integration.  In particular, this survey of work will 
emphasize the critique of policy efforts towards integration being principle- or “faith-based.”  
Specific attention will be given to Paul Cheshire, Professor Emeritus of Economic Geography at 
the London School of Economics.  Cheshire’s critique of integration policy is one of the more 
lucid articulations of residential integration skepticism.
48
  After this, I will specifically review 
four residential integration efforts in the United States over the last 50 years: the Gautreaux 
mobility plan, the Moving to Opportunity residential dispersal effort, and the HOPE VI Panel 
Study.  Related to this, I will also explore the Mount Laurel exclusionary zoning legislation, as 
this was a principle foundation for “fair share” housing legislation in the US.  Exploring the 
nature of these integration efforts, their outcomes, and what knowledge has been gained as a 
result of them will be of particular value.  Reviewing the voices relevant to the topic of 
residential integration will help to highlight my contribution to the argument. 
 
 
Residential Mixing: An Unsupported Intuition? 
 
As authors Dreier and Moberg (1995) suggest, integration policy once accommodated bipartisan 
support as a means to address US poverty and segregation.  They summarize the issue well: 
As politicians and policy analysts revisited the thorny problems of urban poverty in 
recent years, they seemed to be arriving at a rare consensus: Poor people are hurt by their 
concentration in large, inner-city neighborhoods that further social isolation and racial 
segregation.  In this view, it would be better to disperse poor people and minorities, 
putting them in closer proximity to jobs, decent suburban schools, and safe communities.  
                                                          
48
 Cheshire, Paul. Mixing Communities: A Faith-Based Displacement Activity? Proc. of 54th Annual North 
American Meetings of the Regional Science Association International: Savannah 8-10 November 2007. London: 
London School of Economics, 2007. 1-33. Print. 
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This idea of helping individuals, rather than funneling aid to localities, came to be known 
as helping "people, not places."
49
 
This, in essence, is at the heart of the integration idea.  The idea, in short, is that segregation is 
the cause of myriad social ills and integration is a key remedy to this problem.  Residential 
segregation is a staple of the social and economic landscape in the US, and the suggestion that 
the segregation of low-income minorities has exacerbated poverty and reduced overall life 
chances remains a widely-held view.
50
  Thus, there is a natural assumption that dispersing poor 
minorities from low-income, highly-segregated metropolitan areas will improve their life 
chances and enhance their overall welfare and wellbeing.  Briggs (2005) states the issue of 
integration in terms of access to opportunity: “the real priority is creating access for all, 
regardless of race and class, to communities of opportunity—whether neighborhoods or entire 
municipalities—with good schools, public services, and economic prospects.”51   
This intuition, however logical it may seem, has not been unequivocally demonstrated through 
empirical study.  In other words, the question of whether or not individuals who are segregated, 
racially and economically, will have better life chances and greater hope of upward mobility if 
they are desegregated has not been clearly answered.
52
  Unfortunately, we cannot look to the 
market to answer this question for us, because social interactions tend to move in the direction of 
categorization and homogeneity, as some researchers have suggested.
53
  For example, “White 
flight” from the city to the suburb reflects a preference for racial homogeneity on the part of 
whites.  Kirp et al. (1997) write: 
When these families left behind the cities, with their crime, decaying infrastructure, poor 
public schools, congestion, and pollution, they were voting with their feet, opting not 
only for a modern house with more space and amenities than they had ever known but 
also for an entirely new way of living.  The new towns were a tangible representation of 
deep changes in attitudes about raising families, the relationship between work and 
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 It has been argued that the lack of a definitive answer is an answer itself indicating that residential integration 
policy cannot be supported and defended. 
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 Kearns, Ade, and Phil Mason. "Mixed Tenure Communities and Neighbourhood Quality." Housing Studies 22.5 
(2007): 661-91. Print. (Page 664) 
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leisure, the importance of like-mindedness among one's neighbors, and, indeed, the very 
idea of community.
54
 
However, it would be a mistake to simply attribute the status quo of residential segregation to 
mere market forces.  Black-white dissimilarity indices still remain highly uneven when 
controlling for differing levels of income.
55
  In other words, income alone is a poor explanatory 
device for why people are segregated.
56
  Further, African American preferences for integration 
are historically much higher than whites.  Massey and Denton’s (1993) research suggests that the 
vast majority of African Americans express strong support for integration.  On surveys, when 
asked about whether they favor ‘desegregation, strict segregation, or something in-between’ they 
have answered ‘desegregation’ in large numbers.57  Based upon this data, attributing residential 
segregation to mere market preference would miss a much larger phenomenon at work.  While 
market interactions may widen the gap between races, residential segregation has also been 
explained as a function of policy choices—a gap that “has been brought about and maintained by 
rules of a game that operates as a subtle apartheid.”58  Cashin (2004) points to four “crucial 
public policy choices” made over the last half-century that helped contribute to a racially-divided 
landscape.
59
  These include a system of autonomy for local government, FHA loan insurance for 
single-family homes in majority white neighborhoods, highways that cut through black 
neighborhoods creating walls that spatially defined the “black sides of town” and, finally, federal 
government policies that displaced black housing arrangements in the name of progress and the 
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elimination of blight.  This last policy choice, contends Cashin, “created the modern 
phenomenon of concentrated black poverty.”60 
Political or market forces aside, there exists a widely held assumption that segregation in itself 
creates consequences for those inhabiting the segmented area.  In fact, it has been described as 
the definitive source responsible for the perpetuation of black poverty in the US.
61
  In addition to 
segregation demonstrating a deleterious effect on housing values for black segregated areas,
62
  it 
has been positively associated with increased unemployment, poorer educational results, and 
neighborhood crime.
63
  Further, Collins and Williams (2001) link segregation to low socio-
economic status (SES) and in turn show the strong association between SES and racial 
differences in health.
64
  In addition to the catalogue of social ills associated to residential 
segregation, outcomes for blacks are substantially worse, both in absolute terms and relative to 
whites, in racially segregated cities.
65
  Beyond the suggestion that social maladies occur as a 
function of segregation, Galster et al. (1999) cites other motivations for addressing concentrated 
low-income minority segregation.  This includes the stigmatization that may accompany 
segregation and lead to the withdrawal of private and public capital.
66
   
Yet the problem has not gone unaddressed.  Political efforts toward integration have been 
attempted in numerous forms for several decades.  From a policy standpoint, there are three 
primary strategies to help engender residential integration among otherwise segregated black and 
white households. These have been described as dilution, diversity, and dispersal.
67
  Dilution is 
the attempt to reduce the significance of social rented housing within an existing neighborhood 
or locality.  This may be done by the sale of rented homes to tenants, or by the development of 
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homes for market sale (community revitalization; “gentrification”).  Diversity aims to ensure that 
all new housing developments or new communities have a reasonable proportion of social rented 
homes included within them.
68
  Dispersal initiatives offer an alternative approach to dilution.  
This strategy consists of using a variety of policy instruments to relocate residents in deprived 
areas to non-poverty neighborhoods.  One of the leading examples of a dispersal strategy is the 
Moving to Opportunity Project in the U.S.  This last policy effort, dispersal, seems to be the tool 
of choice in the United States for residential integration.  Rowland Atkinson (2005) has 
suggested that the area effects understood as being related to concentrated poverty have 
contributed to dispersal policies in the US.  He writes:  
The US studies and experiments associated with mobility take as their starting point a 
growing body of evidence that has measured the role of concentrated poverty in 
exacerbating the problems of labour-market reconnection, educational achievement, 
health impacts and public services.  These 'area effects' suggest that areas of concentrated 
poverty have an additional impact on their residents that is in addition to that provided by 
the condition of individual or household deprivation.
69
 
The idea of dispersal, then, is to “deconcentrate” poverty by dispersing the poor throughout a 
metropolitan region by providing them with rental vouchers for use in privately owned 
housing.
70
  Dispersal has been contrasted with dilution or diversity in that dispersal moves low-
income minorities to more affluent neighborhoods, where dilution and diversity create situations 
where affluent or more advantaged members of society cohabitate areas with poor minorities.
71
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Despite the government’s use of these various integration measures, to classify such policy as 
being informed by empirically verified research evidence would be a mistake.  The results of 
such initiatives, and thus the substance of the overall enterprise of mixing households, have been 
called into question.  Initial reactions to social segregation are to “behave and apply policies as if 
it were a fact that the separation of different types of people and households into distinct and 
segregated neighbourhoods generated specific social costs, additional to those generated by 
inequality itself.”72  This intuition has been a guidepost when it comes to integration policies: “A 
common guiding principle appears to be that concentrations of lower-income, disproportionately 
ethnic minority households need to be replaced by mixed residential environments that will 
provide superior social opportunities for the disadvantaged group.”73  Ultimately, it is claimed, 
the enterprise of mixing communities rests on the belief that mixing is good and offers utility for 
those inhabiting the same space, particularly the disadvantaged.  Hardman and Ioannides (2003) 
write: 
The value of neighborhood interactions has attracted policymakers' attention and led to 
policy initiatives intended to take advantage of positive externalities associated with 
mixing households of different income levels in neighborhoods.  Yet we know 
surprisingly little about the degree of economic mixing or segregation within US 
neighborhoods, certainly much less than we know about racial segregation.
74
 
Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997) advise that while housing policy that encourages mix is a recent 
trend, the effectiveness of such policy remains questionable until a more robust understanding of 
social benefits, costs, and preconditions can be sufficiently answered.  Until then, they write, 
advocacy of mixed-housing will be based “largely on faith.”75 
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This last point is important, as there appears to be considerable disdain for policy that is simply 
guided by principle-based intuition, i.e., “faith.”  Kearns and Mason (2007) argue that mixing 
communities on principle as a policy initiative is “too crude a mantra” given the difficulty in 
weighing benefits and disadvantages for those involved.
76
  In other words, while it is possible to 
tease out isolated measures of advantage and disadvantage as an outcome to mixing, policy 
efforts toward integrated neighborhoods must deliberately account for which mechanisms of 
neighborhood effects are involved.  In particular, there is ambiguity around causation, degree, 
and the appropriate composition formula as it relates to engineering residential mixing.  
Unfortunately, programs often do not specify what mix is appropriate, but rather they are 
conceived and sustained based upon the belief that mixing is good.
77
  
Perhaps no one has accused mixed-community policy of being belief or principle-based in nature 
more explicitly and in a more pejorative fashion than Paul Cheshire.  In his scholarly address on 
the subject, Cheshire refers to the practice of mixing as a “faith-based displacement activity.”78  
In his introduction, Cheshire writes: “But careful examination of the evidence suggests that such 
[mixing] policies are more a matter of faith than anything else.”79  Ultimately, Cheshire reduces 
the idea to a simple argument about whether there is a benefit for poor people to live alongside 
rich people.  In his report to the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Cheshire calls this argument a 
“belief” more than a fact, as “there is scant clear-cut evidence that making communities more 
mixed make the life chances of the poor any better.”80 
He concedes that poor people live in areas of deprivation and that these less than desirable 
environments are disadvantageous for the poor: “living in the most deprived neighbourhoods is 
by definition not a life-enhancing experience.”81  However, he cites the key issue as resting in the 
direction of causation.  In other words, Cheshire challenges the implicit notion that poor 
neighborhoods cause lower incomes, poor health, and the exacerbation of poverty.  Rather, he 
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suggests that neighborhoods may simply reflect disadvantage and poverty.  This argument has an 
extensive history in the greater residential integration discussion.  The lynchpin of the argument 
is based upon the presence of what has been called “neighborhood effects.”  For clarity, I borrow 
from Oakes (2004) in defining neighborhood effects: “[It is] the independent causal effect of a 
neighbourhood (i.e., residential community) on any number of health and/or social outcomes.”82  
In the social science literature, neighborhood effects are measured under social and economic 
contexts.  Sociological models often contain research related to identifying contagion effects and 
peer-to-peer or peer-to-group influences.  Economic models focus less on a neighborhood’s 
influence on personal behavior and more on its influence of their socio-economic outcomes.  
Further, neighborhood effects can be understood as endogenous or exogenous, and can be 
measured as a positive or negative effect.
83
   
In the housing discussion, a “neighborhood effect” would amount to identifying a causal 
relationship between neighborhood and the outcomes of individuals inhabiting the 
neighborhood.
84
  There is little doubt that low-income, minority segregated neighborhoods are 
highly associated with a wide range of disadvantage.  This, however, is far different from the 
suggestion that neighborhoods cause the disadvantage often visible in segregated neighborhoods.  
Cheshire’s second major argument is that policy ‘acts of faith’ where legislative programs 
engineer race or class integration through various tools (dispersal, dilution, etc.) have not 
unequivocally demonstrated that benefits are associated with mix.  Consequently, he concludes 
that spending time and resources toward integration policy before understanding neighborhood 
effects of homogeneous and heterogeneous communities is, by definition, an act of faith and, 
more or less, a waste of money and resources.
85
  In contrast, he cites income inequality as the 
root issue at stake when discussing improving life chances of the poor—not place.  Cheshire 
writes:  
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However, we do know that the rich can always outbid the poor for nicer neighbourhoods 
because the desirable attributes of these neighbourhoods are fully reflected in the prices 
of houses within them.  To the extent that this is true, social segregation in cities must 
largely reflect economic inequality rather than cause it.  Forcing neighbourhoods to be 
mixed in social and economic terms is, therefore, mainly treating the symptoms of 
inequality, not the causes.
86
 
This challenge to integration—what I shall hereafter refer to as the “Cheshirian position”87—is a 
generalized representation of the wide range of skeptical voices relating to residential integration 
programs and their effectiveness.  Thus, we might characterize the Cheshirian position as 
follows: 
(1) The fact that neighborhoods are deprived does not suggest that neighborhoods cause 
deprivation—it may simply reflect it.  There is no evidence to disprove the latter. 
(2) There is little evidence to demonstrate that residential integration actually benefits those 
being dispersed or the neighborhoods that receive them.  The lack of evidence in relation 
to neighborhood effects in addition to other reasons for skepticism that residential 
integration works suggest that integration programs are not substantiated by the costs 
involved.
88
 
Perhaps a more succinct way of stating the issue is as follows:  Based upon the evidence, or lack 
thereof, we cannot assert that “place” is the cause of social disadvantage (argument #1).  
However, even if we could make that assertion, it is unclear whether residential integration is the 
appropriate solution to the problem (argument #2).  Before considering US integration overtures 
over the last 40 years, it is helpful to take a closer look at some of the research supporting the 
two aforementioned arguments.   
 
                                                          
86
 Ibid. 
87
 I will use this term (“Cheshirian position”) throughout the remainder of the thesis to refer to Cheshire’s two 
aforementioned arguments.  While the “Cheshirian position” offers a helpful summary of integration effectiveness 
as it relates to empirical evidence, it is important to make a distinction between two types of relevant empirical 
studies.  Some studies focus on effects within metropolitan areas based upon metro-wide segregation where others 
more specifically focus upon effects within the neighborhood (“neighborhood effects”). 
88
 This argument primarily takes on the form of whether the programs actually work.  Naturally, if the program 
cannot said to be a success, then it is not “cost effective.” 
30 
 
 
Argument #1—the Presence of Neighborhood Effects 
 
As mentioned, policy aimed toward mixing otherwise race or class segregated households is 
“founded on the belief that neighbourhoods have a strong and independent effect upon the well-
being and life-chances of individuals.”89  Such a belief presumes the presence of “neighborhood 
effects.”  There is little question that many low-income, minority segregated neighborhoods are 
deprived, and that there are disadvantages associated with this.  Residential segregation often 
confines minorities within a metropolitan area to older, more dilapidated homes with lower 
appreciation rates accompanied by lower-tier public services and school systems.
90
  Bramley and 
Karley (2007) find that concentrated poverty aggravates poor educational performance.
91
  This 
point is further emphasized by Quercia and Galster (2000): “Moreover, the neighborhood has 
broader social importance inasmuch as it is the crucible in which behaviors such as the 
propensity to participate in the labor market, engage in illegal activities, bear children as teens 
out of wedlock, drop out of secondary school, and use illegal drugs are encouraged or 
discouraged.”92 
Thus, arguments for spatial integration can be presented based upon a contagion phenomenon, 
stemming from the belief that healthy social behaviors (or social problems for that matter) are 
believed to be “contagious” and, thus, close proximity and healthy interaction can improve the 
life chances of neighborhood inhabitants.  Vartanian, Walker, and Buck (2007) refer to this 
effect as a part of their “Theory of Neighborhood Advantage” where “the greater the resources 
and other advantages of good neighborhoods during childhood, including exposure to positive 
role models and institutional resources, the better the adult outcomes.”93  Neighborhoods, 
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according to their research, play a significant role in the formation of one’s “cognitive 
landscape”, i.e., their perception of general life opportunities.94  While the literature is extensive 
regarding the associated disadvantages of segregated, low-income neighborhoods—there is a 
distinction between a high correlation among segregated, deprived neighborhoods and 
constrained life chances and the assertion that neighborhoods cause such constraints.  
Furthermore, proving the latter is a challenging empirical task: “Indeed, although large in 
volume, much of the literature quantifying neighbourhood effects can be challenged on 
methodological grounds.”95 
 
In trying to understand neighborhood effects, Sociologist Stephen Steinberg provides a helpful 
distinction between the “fact” of concentrated poverty and the “theory” of concentrated poverty.  
The concentration of poverty is a well-documented fact: there exists a very high concentration of 
impoverished households from a spatial standpoint.  However, the “theory” of concentrated 
poverty, contends Steinberg, holds far less collective agreement.  He articulates this theory as an 
unsubstantiated belief that spatially concentrated poverty “takes on causal significance of its 
own, leading to the familiar litany pathologies: drug use, violent crime, high school dropout 
rates/poor school performance, out-of-wedlock childbirth, low labor force participation, and 
‘oppositional culture.’”96  In addition to criticizing this theory as being “deeply flawed” due to its 
sheer speculation, Steinberg argues that integration efforts may very well harm low-income 
minorities in a far greater measure than the social benefits they may reap.
97
 
Similarly, Cheshire states three key questions as it relates to determining neighborhood effects:
98
 
1. Do rich households concentrate in rich and expensive neighbourhoods because they can 
afford to buy into the amenities and superior public goods such neighbourhoods give 
access to? 
2. Do poor households equally concentrate in deprived and unattractive neighbourhood  
because their incomes do not allow them to buy into better neighbourhoods? 
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3. Or, does living in a poor neighbourhood cause people’s incomes to be lower, so the 
poor—and particularly their children—tend to become even poorer? 
Cheshire holds that the direction of causation in the first and second key question has been 
persuasively evidenced.  He concludes that “social segregation is a manifestation of voluntary 
sorting, conditioned by income.”99  Cheshire concludes: “If neighbourhood choice is conditioned 
by income, poor neighbourhoods exist because there are poor people and we live in an unequal 
society; and, as is explained […] we may be collectively and individually better off, living in 
neighbourhoods with other similar households, whether rich or poor.”100  Thus, Cheshire asserts 
that segregation is symptomatic of market sorting and income inequality.  Further, the 
implication is that poor neighborhoods do not cause low income (although they are closely 
associated).  Bolster et al. (2007) write: “Nevertheless the results support the idea that the main 
sources of low incomes are to be found in earnings, employment and demographics, not in 
neighbourhood characteristics.”101   
Thus, Cheshire, in addition to many others, asserts that there is still much to be learned about the 
advantages and costs that neighborhoods impose on their inhabitants.  It should be pointed out, 
however, that the belief that neighborhood deprivation and the disadvantages of its inhabitants is 
correlational, not causal, has not gone unchallenged.
102
  However, even if there was a widespread 
consensus related to the presence of neighborhood effects, the implications for policy to legislate 
mix remains unclear.  This is the second argument in the Cheshirian position. 
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Argument #2—Problems with Residential Mixing 
 
Supposing there was scholarly consensus relative to the presence of neighborhood effects—
would this, in turn, suggest integration efforts are the solution?  A major part of this problem 
relates to what researchers point out as being a common mistake in logic: ‘causation in’ is not 
necessarily ‘causation out.’  In other words, even if a causal mechanism is identified—its 
opposite will not necessarily resolve the issue.  Wolff and De-Shalit (2010) write: “To use a 
well-known example, if someone is run over by a steam roller, then the cure is not to have the 
steam roller reverse back over them.”103  For our purposes, we might state that even if 
neighborhoods cause a certain degree of disadvantage for its inhabitants, there is reason for 
pause at the suggestion that de-concentrating disadvantaged households is the necessary solution.  
Indeed, a great portion of research bears out this latter claim. 
Among other challenges, defining mix is a problem in itself.  Blasius et al. (2007)—after making 
a sufficient case for mixing policy based upon equity (i.e., improving the plight of the 
disadvantaged)—write that the optimal mix of advantaged and disadvantaged households must 
be defined differently for various national and community contexts.
104
  Further, while it is not 
necessarily difficult to measure an increase in segregation—it is more difficult to measure an 
increase in ‘mix.’  Such measurements, therefore, have often been avoided.  Andersson et al. 
(2007) write: “However, such [programs for integration] seldom make clear what mix is 
desirable and appropriate, only that mix is good.  Therefore, clarifying what mix matters is seen 
here as an important task for social science research.”105  In working to define the degree of mix 
that “matters”—Andersson et al., after explicating several policy initiatives both in the US and 
abroad to engender social mixing, write:  
What typically has been left implicit in this set of policy initiatives is what aspect of 
neighbourhood mix is deemed crucial for expanding opportunities. Is the domain of mix: 
socio-economic? National origin or ethnicity? Housing type and tenure? Within a 
domain, is it the percentage of a certain ‘disadvantaged’ group or the percentage of 
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‘advantaged’ groups that is more important? Or is it the balance of these two groups? Or 
is it diversity per se across all groups comprising a specific domain that is crucial?
106
 
 
In addition to defining the proper “mix” that should comprise a particular neighborhood or 
community, another problem with residential mixing efforts is that neighborhood effects lead to 
differing results that can equally point towards support or suspicion, depending upon one’s 
criteria.
107
  Loretta Lees documents this well in studying the effects of gentrification, or urban 
revitalization, in low-income areas.  In this context, gentrification aims to improve the conditions 
of a low-income area to attract middle-income households, a strategy that Lees finds 
questionable.  Even though the evidence is scant that this initiative will actually produce positive 
results, government policy still advocates it.  Lees writes: “…despite fierce academic debate 
about whether or not gentrification leads to displacement, segregation and social polarisation, it 
is increasingly promoted in policy circles on the assumption that it will lead to more socially 
mixed, less segregated, more livable and sustainable communities.”108  However, Lees finds that 
gentrification often results in social segregation and polarization, which leads her to speak to the 
faith-based nature of supporting such diversity initiatives: “Social mix policies rely on a common 
set of beliefs about the benefits of mixed communities, with little evidence to support them and a 
growing evidence base that contradicts the precepts embedded in social mix policies that should 
make policy-makers sit up and take note.”109 
Similar to Lees, Kearns and Mason (2007) conclude that the government’s objectives of 
“sustainability” and “social inclusion” could not be fully supported through housing 
diversification within an area.  They argue that mixed communities are not “founded upon 
knowledge of which neighbourhood processes operate in what circumstances, nor on how the 
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positive gains to some people and communities are weighed against the disbenefits that mixed 
communities may bring to others.”110   
Furthermore, while de-concentration of race and/or poverty has been, and continues to be, a 
popular method of creating spatial integration, dispersal methods often leave the existing 
neighborhood in worse condition than before, due to the methodological flaw
111
 of (re)moving 
the more advantageous and resourceful members from the community.  Atkinson (2009) writes:  
The US studies barely consider the impacts of these policy vehicles on the 
neighbourhoods that recipients exit.  In other words, if those with relatively greater 
existing opportunities and advantageous personal characteristics move out, is there a 
reinforcing or further residualising effect on the neighbourhoods that they leave behind 
with even greater concentrations of disadvantage?
112
 
Although low-income and high-minority concentrated communities may be lacking in adequate 
public resources, they may also display strength in local social capital within their own 
communities.  While this should not be justification for allowing the existence of segregated 
low-income communities, areas with high social capital can better support one another, share 
resources, and provide job insights.  Dispersal efforts, where low-income families are placed 
within a middle- to higher-income neighborhood have shown outcomes that reveal the dispersed 
families are less likely to engage the social resources around them thus resulting in lower social 
capital.  Also, dispersal candidates have been found to be less likely to talk to their new 
neighbors about jobs.  Thus, from this perspective, dispersal efforts may not necessarily be 
effective in promoting social ties that provide for wider opportunities.
113
 
This brings up an important and unavoidable question: if there is an absence of measurable 
benefits as it relates to integration, is there a detectable presence of benefits related to 
segregation?  In other words, are there benefits associated with segregated, homogenous areas—
even if they are poor?  One can naturally assume that benefits exist for higher-income white 
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segregated areas.  However, do benefits exist for homogeneous low-income minority areas?  
Cheshire presents the term “specialized neighbourhoods” which simply accounts for areas of 
income and ethnic/racial segregation.  Economically speaking, however, Cheshire outlines the 
benefits of such segregation, beginning with labor market benefits.  Bayer et al. (2005) studying 
Boston in the US finds that people living in a particular census block are more likely to work in 
that census block.  They conclude that neighborhood social interactions between people similar 
to each other are a significant factor in the operation of urban labor markets and how individuals 
in those markets actually find jobs.
114
  Moreover, Cheshire speaks to the labor benefits of 
specialized neighborhoods through networking of similar individuals.  For example, in a 
hypothetical Polish neighborhood in Chicago, relational networks might be stronger among those 
of a Polish background and thus provide a more robust support system than a diverse economy.  
Such “agglomeration economies,” contends Cheshire, are buttressed by larger cities because they 
can support a greater range of specialized neighborhoods—neighborhoods Cheshire refers to as 
being a “fertile source of effective job matching.”115 
In addition to labor market advantages, Cheshire contends that consumption benefits exist by 
living in segregated neighborhoods.  This argument, although more intricate, presents the idea 
that consumption is a function of relative wealth and not simply absolute wealth.  As Hardman 
and Ioannides (2004) point out, neighbor’s incomes and other characteristics are market-driven 
outcomes of individual choices for the majority of US households.  They cite urban economic 
models predicting that incomes in market driven neighborhoods will be homogeneous.
116
  Thus, 
working from this idea, Cheshire writes:  
Specialised neighbourhoods provide direct consumption benefits both because they 
increase the range of choice for people with respect to the types of neighbourhood in 
which to live; and people and families of similar incomes, tastes or points in life cycle 
tend to consume similar goods and services and require similar amenities.
117
 
                                                          
114
 Bayer et al. (2005) as cited by Cheshire, 2007b, pp. 14-15 
115
 Ibid., page 15 
116
 These models include the Tiebout model and the Monocentric City model.  See Hardman, Anna, and Yannis M. 
Ioannides, 2003, p. 370   
117
 Cheshire, 2007, p. 16 
37 
 
Thus, homogeneity of race and income may provide less anxiety for individuals relative to those 
living near to them and with whom they associate (i.e., they don’t have to “keep up” with the 
lifestyles of more affluent neighbors around them).  Cheshire cites Luttmer’s work in this area118 
and the “powerful” reinforcing effect this has on skepticism of mixing policy.119  Thus, 
households trying to maintain a standard of living similar to their neighbors with higher levels of 
income compensate by working more and spending less time with their family.  This, as 
Cheshire puts it, “causes them to feel themselves to be worse off and have lower reported 
welfare.”120 
Finally, while integration efforts seek to address the problem of concentrated poverty, another 
potential problem remains related to concentrated dispersal.  John Goering’s early work on racial 
tipping in neighborhoods stands as a sobering reminder that there exists a market threshold for 
white-migration once the proportion of non-whites “exceeds the tolerance for interracial 
living.”121  The canonical model for this is the one proposed by Economist Thomas Schelling, 
which suggests that under “white flight” the first members to leave a mixed-neighborhood are 
those with the strongest preference for racial homogeneity, eventually followed by those with a 
weaker preference.  This, according to Schelling, eventually leads to a segregated equilibrium.
122
  
While this theory has been empirically disputed,
123
 the Schelling model is a reminder of the 
implicit notion that racial preferences differ from person to person, and that such a preference 
will have an effect on neighborhood composition as desire for racial homogeneity, whether 
implicit or explicit, will inevitably be reflected in housing markets.
124
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This second argument of the Cheshirian position casts doubt upon the enterprise of social 
mixing—even if one were to concede the presence of neighborhood effects.  Ultimately, when 
these two arguments are given full consideration, Cheshire concludes that efforts to mix are not 
cost effective, given the time, money, and resources involved in engineering social mix.  He 
writes:  
It is perfectly possible that any neighborhood effect—if it exists—is comparatively small 
and that the cost of policies to address it effectively is so great compared to the costs of 
other policies to improve the welfare of poor people that attempting to achieve ‘mixed 
neighbourhoods’ is simply not cost effective.125 
 
Spatial Equality and White Condescension—Defining Spatial Equality Apart From Residential 
Integration 
 
Even outside the canopy of the Cheshirian position, there are reasons for pause or skepticism as 
it relates to neighborhood integration.  More specifically, this form of skepticism comes from 
within the African American community.  John Calmore, an African American and former law 
professor, has called into question mainstream efforts toward social and racial integration as a 
means of equality.  Citing a lack of integrity in this approach, he criticized “spatial equality” as a 
euphemism for “white ethnocentrism.”  He writes: “Spatial equality does not presume that 
benefits automatically are associated with integration, and it does not denigrate black capacity.  It 
sees ‘nonsegregation’ as an alternative to integration.”126  Quoting Robert Forman, he goes on to 
write: “Nonsegregation implies both the right of people to remain indefinitely where they are, 
even if in ghetto areas, and the elimination of restrictions on moving into other areas...Only 
white ethnocentrism could lead to the belief that all blacks would want to live in predominantly 
white areas.”127   
On the surface, Calmore’s criticism of racial pretense in residential integration seems to 
contradict the African-American preferences for integration as spelled out by Massey and 
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Denton (1993).  In contrast, Calmore’s sentiments mirror a growing trend in what has been 
described as the “self-segregation hypothesis.”  This hypothesis, while conceding that housing 
discrimination in the past strongly contributed to residential segmentation, asserts that current 
levels of segregation reflect the preference of African Americans to live together.
128
  However, 
after assessing multiple studies related to African American preference for neighborhood 
composition, Robert DeFina concludes: “The evidence provided suggests that self-segregation, 
especially for positive reasons, helps little in understanding racial housing segregation.”129  Keels 
et al. (2005) in researching the Gautreaux dispersal program in Chicago, found that preference 
for racial composition in a neighborhood was consistent with previous research that indicated 
black preference to reside in mixed-race neighborhoods.
130
  Further, they found that the limited 
cases of re-segregation that occurred were not economically related.  Rather, the participants 
who initially moved to predominantly white, higher-income neighborhoods subsequently 
relocated to neighborhoods that were less white but still affluent.
131
 
However, such conclusions do not dismiss the validity of Calmore’s claims as it relates to spatial 
segmentation.  Calmore was concerned that integration efforts would threaten the “blackness” of 
lower-income African Americans who, according to him, often “value black community 
attachment and affiliation at the expense of integration.”132  This suggests that the idea of “spatial 
equality” does not necessarily lead to the solution of integration, and vice-versa.   
Calmore’s implicit point is an important one: black preference for living together cannot be 
divorced from the social consequences that often accompany segregation, or spatial inequality.  
Such consequences may not be as evident for homogeneous white communities that have higher 
median income levels and a greater abundance of local resources and amenities at their disposal.  
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For example, the Mount Laurel exclusionary zoning case in New Jersey (detail forthcoming) 
involved low-income blacks vigorously working to share space with the otherwise homogeneous 
white communities contiguous to their neighborhoods.  Thus, two issues existed: an issue of 
spatial equality and an issue of integration.  Calmore’s work suggests that the latter has been 
inappropriately confused with the former.  This is evident in his sentiment that spatial equality 
should be a “moderating force to the pursuit of integration at all costs.”133  Indeed, Cashin 
(2004)—in describing five primary influences that contribute to the residential separation of 
black and white households in America—lists “integration exhaustion” for African Americans.  
She writes: 
African Americans are increasingly reluctant to move into neighborhoods without a 
significant black presence.  They prefer places that are recognized as being welcoming to 
blacks and seem less willing than in the past to be integration pioneers and move into 
neighborhoods that might be hostile to their presence.
134
 
Thus, Cashin and Calmore remind us that federally facilitated dispersal programs packaged as 
“spatial equality” are not necessarily equal distributions of spatial opportunity.  This is 
articulated well by Imbroscio (2004) who presents a case for the liberty of “choice” in the 
context of place, i.e., neighborhood or community.
135
  Choosing where one wants to live is a 
fundamental human freedom, and remains a positive human right for all human beings, contends 
Imbroscio.  However, he recognizes that both political and market forces prevent against 
integration, and he opts for what Gordon Clark has called “community integrity.”136  Integrity, in 
contrast to the goal of integration, upholds the right to travel or stay put as a tenet of the US 
constitution and as the “fabric of American life.”137  Imbroscio (2008) contrasts “right to 
place”—or RTP—with traditional dispersal notions that merely involve giving housing residents 
“the ability to exit their current neighborhoods (and enter others).”138  Similar to Calmore, 
Imbroscio presents an idea more true to the definition of spatial equality: “Real freedom of 
residential choice should be conceived of as dyadic, expanding both the exit/entry opportunities 
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for the urban poor as well as possibilities to stay put; it should, consequently, be constituted by 
policy efforts to facilitate mobility as well as efforts to make inner cities more livable.”139  These 
important points provide the sobering reminder that efforts to socially integrate often come at the 
expense of cultural and ethnic identity, thus complicating the already muddled subject of how to 
socially integrate communities, in addition to the importance of appropriately acknowledging 
and pursuing “spatial equality.”   
 
PART II: US Dispersal Efforts 
 
As mentioned, within the US, we can find several policies directed toward racial and socio-
economic deconcentration over the last 40 years as a means to mix communities with the 
intended outcome of increasing or enhancing life chances of low-income minorities.  In 
surveying the myriad housing dispersal programs in the United States, Goetz (2003) provides a 
useful table where forms of housing assistance are distinguished between “Tenant-Based 
Approaches” and “Unit-Based Approaches.”140  This section aims to review two tenant-based 
approaches that are technically classified as mobility programs (Gautreaux Program; Moving to 
Opportunity) and two unit-based approaches (HOPE VI; Fair Share Housing).
141
  As discussed 
earlier, the tenant based dispersal programs have had mixed results, leading to conclusions such 
as Galster and Zobel (1998), who state that evidence from dispersal has been “thin and 
contradictory.”142  However, these programs continue to generate discussion to this day.143 
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The purpose of exploring these efforts and their results is to highlight the nuances of the efforts 
made to residentially integrate otherwise segregated white and black households, and reflect 
upon the larger discussion regarding residential social arrangements in the United States.  All 
four dispersal efforts reflect a degree of effectiveness related to residential mixing.  However, we 
also find evidence consistent with the arguments articulated in the Cheshirian position 
(highlighted above), casting a shadow of skepticism on the validity of these programs.   
 
The Gautreaux Program 
 
In 1966, a series of class action lawsuits were filed against the Chicago Housing Authority 
(CHA) in the US and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) where it was 
alleged that the housing authorities deliberately segregated low-income African-Americans 
through tenant and site selection.
144
  As a result of the lawsuit, a new program named after 
plantiff Dorothy Gautreaux was created in 1976 that offered vouchers and rent subsidies 
allowing for eligible families to move to desegregated areas throughout the region.
145
  The 
program was run by a local nonprofit organization, where staff worked with local landlords and 
families to ultimately facilitate moving the eligible family to a desegregated community.  Thus, 
the Gautreaux Program, as it came to be known, was one of the first major US dispersal efforts. 
James Rosenbaum, whose extensive study of the Gautreaux program stands as a definitive 
research resource, describes the unique benefit Gautreaux offers to researchers and policymakers 
alike: “Because of its design, the Gautreaux program presents an unusual opportunity to test the 
effect of helping low-income people move to better labor markets, better schools, and better 
neighborhoods.”146  In other words, relatively little is known about black families who break 
residential barriers into white suburbs; that is to say, it can only be theorized whether those 
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families themselves are exceptional people or whether the suburb acts as a force to assist them 
with jobs, education, and social ties (i.e., positive ‘neighborhood effects’).  Thus, Gautreaux 
participants, as Rosembaum puts it, “circumvent the ordinary barriers to living in the suburbs, 
not by their jobs, personal finances, or values, but by getting into the program.”147  This setup, in 
addition to participants being assigned to random suburban locations, creates a “quasi-
experimental design.”148 
In 1998, 22 years after the program was enacted, the Gautreaux Program had placed 7,100 
families with over half of those moving to affluent suburbs where the majority of the households 
were white owned.
149
  Rosenbaum (1995) has conducted three studies of the program and 
examined the outcomes.  The first study dealt with adult employment (“Can low-income blacks 
get jobs in the suburbs?”), and the second (1982) and third (1989) study interviewed school-aged 
children (ages 8-18) and followed up with them 7 years later as adolescents and young adults.
150
  
Rosenbaum found that after moving, eligible participants relocating to the suburbs were more 
than 25 percent more likely to have a job than those who moved to the city.
151
  Although there 
was not a statistically significant difference in wages between suburban and city movers, 
Rosenbaum concludes from his study that employment rates of suburban movers surpassed those 
of city movers, particularly for those without prior employment.
152
  Regarding the school aged 
children study, while there was difficulty in transitioning from the city to the suburbs for the 
suburban movers, the 1982 study found that suburban movers had grades and overall school 
performance commensurate with their classmates.
153
  Further, suburban movers had smaller 
classes, higher satisfaction with teachers and courses, and a better overall attitude about school 
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than city movers did.
154
  The follow up study in 1989 showed promising results associated with 
the suburban movers.
155
  These results included lower dropout rates than city movers, higher 
grades,
156
 and higher college enrollment for suburban movers, particularly for four-year 
colleges.
157
  Finally, Rosenbaum found that social interaction was just as high among suburban 
movers as city movers, with suburban movers being accepted by their peers and feeling as 
though they “fit in.”158 
Also comparing suburban and city movers, Keels et al. (2005) provides evidence that the 
Gautreaux program produced “large and persistent improvements in neighborhood quality.”  
They found that two-thirds of families who initially moved to the suburbs continued to live there 
6 to 22 years after their initial moves.
159
  These results elicited new attention towards the 
program and mobility efforts in general to address urban poverty.  Goetz (2003) notes that the 
Gautreaux program “convinced many that mobility programs that integrate landlord recruitment, 
tenant counseling, and placement services could begin to overcome patterns of residential 
segregation and improve the lives of poor families.”160 
Despite the promising nature of these results and his conclusion that Gautreaux provides a clear 
example of a program that helps families escape areas of concentrated poverty and improves 
educational, economic, and labor prospects, Rosenbaum warns that the Gautreaux housing 
mobility program is not a nationwide panacea for concentrated poverty.  He is very clear that this 
program was specifically designed for Chicago, one of the most racially segregated metropolitan 
areas in the United States at that time, and cautioned against utilizing the same program in a 
different area as this may have different effects.
161
  Where Rosenbaum exercises caution when 
reviewing Gautreaux outcomes, Jeff Crump (2003) displays greater skepticism in attempts of 
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generalizability due to “significant flaws in the research design.”162  Crump criticizes the self-
selection process, the survey sample (only those who found suburban housing participated in 
post-move surveys),
163
 and the fact that a majority of the participants were not actually former 
housing residents, but were eligible for vouchers nonetheless.
164
   Further, Crump notes that the 
evidence for higher employment among the suburban movers is flawed because employment 
opportunities decreased in the city.
165
 
Equally critical, Imbroscio (2008) uses the term DC (“Dispersal Consensus”) as a pejorative 
description of dispersal advocates who cling to the principle and logic of poverty 
deconcentration, but have failed to pay attention to its “messy reality.”166  This reality, writes 
Imbroscio, involves a lack of “freedom of choice” for voucher residents, imputed interests on 
behalf of the poor (directing the poor to where they will live), and repressive counseling.  
Freedom of choice, according to Imbroscio, is at worst a remarkably restricted choice and at best 
a misrepresentation of market freedom.  Citing the Gautreaux program, he writes: “But the 
context in which these decisions were made—such as, most notably, while facing a difficult life 
in neglected, crime-ridden neighborhoods with substandard housing—is left out of the 
picture.”167  Second, he criticizes the Gautreaux results as suggesting that all low-income 
minorities desire to move from inner-cities, citing numerous studies that suggest that African 
Americans prefer to stay near the inner-city.  Thus dispersal to suburban communities implies, 
according to Imbroscio, an imputed desire of what is “best” for the urban poor, which may or 
may not be an accurate representation of their interest.
168
  Finally, Imbroscio suggests that given 
the high costs of counseling programs related to dispersal, such programs can divert scarce 
resources away from the voucher program, which would reduce eligible families being served 
and would further create restricted choice for eligible families.
169
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In summary, there is widespread consensus that Gautreaux a) provides an example of a “natural 
experiment” with positive outcomes, although some of the conclusions drawn are inflated and b) 
the generalizability of Gautreaux is severely flawed due to limitations of self-selection and heavy 
screening, a high number of participants who were not current public housing residents, and the 
fact that nearly 80% of the families that came through the program never moved, suggesting that 
the families that did move were more determined and motivated.
170
 
Thus, while Gautreaux is not necessarily a random sample, its design has produced interesting 
results and insights into suburban effects relative to city movers, with positive effects being 
associated with suburban movers both in life chances and upgraded neighborhood tenure.  
However, the flaws in the overall research design leads Imbroscio and a host of others to dismiss 
the Gautreaux mobility program as nothing more than “oversold evidence.”171 
 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
 
Planners were inspired by preliminary results from the Gautreaux program, and this evidence 
informed expectations for Moving to Opportunity.
172
  Thus, the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
program was created in the early 1990s as a longitudinal effort combining “tenant-based rental 
assistance with housing counseling to help very low-income families move from poverty-
stricken urban areas to low-poverty neighborhoods.”173  The intent of MTO was to overcome 
some of the shortcomings of Gautreaux by using the poverty rate of the receiving neighborhood 
rather than its racial composition as the dispersal criterion.
174
  Families living in poverty-stricken 
areas were eligible to receive counseling and apply for assistance to move to a low-poverty 
neighborhood.
175
  The goal of this program was to “develop more effective mobility strategies 
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for recipients of tenant-based housing assistance in metropolitan areas throughout the nation.”176  
In his assessment of residential integration outcomes, Paul Cheshire specifically chose to analyze 
the MTO project and its results because it is “equally the best source of evidence for identifying 
any beneficial effects of constructing mixed neighborhoods.”177 
The MTO experimental model, which took place in five major metropolitan areas,
178
 consisted of 
three distinct groups: the MTO treatment group (experimental group), the Section 8 comparison 
group, and the control group.
 179
  The treatment group, in addition to receiving counseling 
assistance, was provided with housing vouchers that allowed them to move to areas of low-
poverty.  The section 8 group was also given vouchers for moving, but they had no restrictions 
on where they could move (i.e., they could move to an area of high-poverty if they chose) and 
they did not receive counseling.  Finally, the control group, who continued to live in public-
based housing without counseling, was drawn into the experiment for comparison purposes.
180
   
This experiment generated several positive outcomes in its initial phase.  Such outcomes for 
relocated households included better schools and school performance, a safer perception of the 
neighborhood accompanied by a greater sense of general well-being, and a slight decline in 
juvenile crime behavior.  Short-run impacts revealed improvements in mental and physical 
health for the experimental group, in addition to an enhanced sense of safety and reduced 
likelihood of victimization or injury.
181
  Perhaps one of the more comprehensive reviews of long-
term effects comes from Briggs, Popkin, and Goering in their 2010 book which assessed the 
MTO experiment and its outcomes.
182
  The “initial achievement,” and perhaps one of the more 
positive outcomes of the MTO project, was that many MTO families were removed from 
dangerous high-crime, high-poverty environments.
183
  Consistent with other studies, relocation 
through MTO meant moving to security.
184
  The authors write: “On this front [safety], MTO has 
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been enormously successful, with the main caveat being that many families struggled to stay out 
of high-risk neighborhoods after initially escaping them.”185   
Unfortunately, studies of long term effects reveal that safety and an enhanced sense of wellbeing 
were the limited positive outcomes evidenced in this program.  Although Goering and Feins 
offered the conclusion that early research of MTO’s effects on families “demonstrates that 
beneficial, statistically significant changes have occurred in families’ lives within two to four 
years of their participation in MTO,”186 long-term evaluations are ambiguous at best.  Gautreaux, 
it is concluded, was a “limited guide” insofar as being the driving model for the Moving to 
Opportunity dispersal project.
187
  Where Gautreaux showed positive advantages for the suburban 
group over the city group for educational results as well as gains in the labor market, MTO 
suffered in its attempt to replicate these results.  In fact, it was found that school choice was 
based upon a limited set of factors, and often children were relegated to lower quality, less 
effective school districts.
188
  Regarding labor, the expectation of employment gains centered on 
the mechanisms of “space, networks, and norms.”  However, spatial mismatch189 and isolated 
social networks due to a lack of cross-network integration with neighbors and short tenure in 
integrated communities
190
 prohibited the realization of gains in the labor market as a function of 
location.  Further, while girls and mothers experienced reductions in stress and anxiety as well as 
a reduction in “risky behavior”—adolescent boys did not experience a decrease in sexual 
pressures and related risks, but they did experience more hostility from local teens in their new 
low-poverty neighborhoods.
191
  Further, adolescent boys were more likely to smoke, be arrested 
for property crimes, and showed no difference than their control group counterparts as it related 
to incidences of violent crime.
192
  Thus, a survey of the range of positive and negative outcomes 
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qualifies the conclusion reached by Briggs et al. (2010): “MTO was a relocation-only 
intervention.”193 
MTO’s inability to reproduce gains observed in Gautreaux can also be attributed to research 
limitations.  Indeed, Goering and Feins (2003) observe that there were significant research 
limitations to the MTO project.  In the same vein as Cheshire, the authors conclude that while 
positive evidence for the experiment is available, little is known about why and how such 
changes occurred.
194
  Popkin et al. (2000) point out that MTO participants suffer from the same 
self-selection bias problem encountered in Gautreaux, where families volunteered for the 
“experiment” and therefore may differ in unknown ways from the rest of the public housing 
population.
195
  Further, where Gautreaux was criticized for drawing evidence from the program 
participants that moved, as approximately 80% of them did not,
196
 MTO only had approximately 
half of its families find a unit in what was considered a low-poverty area.
197
  Thus, similar to 
Gautreaux criticisms, positive findings may only reflect the results of “motivated families.”198  It 
was also found that the MTO program participants had no significant increase in wages earned 
relative to their jobs in public housing, a similar finding to Gautreaux participants.
199
  When 
these issues are accounted for, the generalizability of positive MTO outcomes is minimized. 
 
HOPE VI 
 
Where the Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity programs specifically dealt with the dispersal 
of low-income minorities, the HOPE VI initiative was a hybrid approach to residential 
integration in that it combined dispersal practices with the renovation of low-income public 
housing to create residential mixed-income and mixed-race housing environments.  The program 
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was launched in 1992 and facilitated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) with the following stated objectives:
200
 
1) Improve the living environment for residents of severely distressed public housing 
through the demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, and replacement of obsolete 
projects. 
2) To revitalize sites on which such public housing projects are located and contribute to the 
improvement of the surrounding neighborhood. 
3) To provide housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of very low-income 
families. 
4) To build sustainable communities. 
The HOPE VI program was developed as a result of recommendations from the National 
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing.  The commission, in their report, made 
recommendations relative to the issue of eradicating blighted public housing units.  These 
recommendations addressed the physical improvement of public housing, management 
improvements, and the inclusion of social and community services for resident needs.
201
  
However, Popkin et al. points out that HOPE VI has not been a singular program such as 
Gautreaux or MTO, but alternatively has evolved over time throughout the implementation 
process toward a greater emphasis on building economically integrated communities in addition 
to giving residents more choice in the private housing market.
202
  Thus, the multi-faceted nature 
that evolved from original HOPE VI legislation make singular evaluations toward its 
effectiveness difficult.  Such ambiguity is enhanced as HOPE VI programs are interspersed in 
municipalities throughout the country, often relegating research on outcomes to site specific 
contexts that cannot be easily transferred from area to area and prohibit generalizability.   
Ambiguity aside, there have been numerous advantages observed with the HOPE VI initiative, 
helping to substantiate the 6 billion dollars in funding the program has received to date.  Further, 
the HOPE VI initiative was regaled with the “Innovations in American Government” award in 
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2000
203
 for “generating a new level of civic culture and serving as an engine for neighborhood 
renewal.”204  However, such accolades and assessments must be tempered with the stream of 
skeptical voices as it relates to HOPE VI.  Similar to Gautreaux and MTO, the program’s 
observed benefits must also reconcile its conspicuous drawbacks.  In her testimony for the 
hearing on Academic Perspectives and the Future of Public Policy, Susan J. Popkin, an expert on 
HOPE VI, proclaimed the initiative to be a “bold effort to transform public housing communities 
and demonstrate that housing programs could produce good results for residents and 
communities.”205  However, she makes the important distinction between changing public 
housing, and changing resident outcomes inhabiting these structures through voucher programs 
and counseling.
206
  Perhaps what is most contentious in the HOPE VI debate, and in the 
metanarrative of residential segregation, is based upon what HOPE VI presumes relative to the 
idea of “concentrated poverty.”  The assumption is that pockets of concentrated poverty both 
cause and exacerbate a collection of social dysfunctions.  Popkin et al. (2004) write: “A central 
premise of HOPE VI—and of the broader public housing transformation effort that began in the 
1990s—was that the overconcentration of profoundly poor, nonworking households was a major 
contributor to the high levels of social problems in distressed public housing.”207   
In one of the most comprehensive HOPE VI reports available, Popkin et al. (2004) survey the 
program’s impact on housing development, the residents, and neighborhood conditions based on 
examining the myriad studies of various locations impacted by HOPE VI.  One of the “most 
basic goals” of HOPE VI was to transform dilapidated and distressed public housing areas into 
improved living environments where families would “choose to live.”208  Here, the authors 
conclude that completed HOPE VI sites have “dramatically improved the aesthetics of public 
housing,”209 a sentiment echoed in Popkin’s 2009 testimony.210  This statement is based on a 
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reduction in density, connecting new structures to public resources through sidewalks and street 
grids, safety changes, and improved exteriors.
211
  Further, such improvements would often have 
a significant effect on the surrounding area.  For example, locations throughout the country 
experienced a high degree of real estate property increase once a “blighted area” was demolished 
and replaced with newly renovated and higher quality dwellings.
212
 
However, the demolition and removal of low-income public housing has also introduced a new 
set of problems.  First, only half of the original stock of subsidized units was to be replaced,
213
 
forcing the families inhabiting those structures to find a new residence.  Although often equipped 
with a voucher and counseling, this transition has been problematic as some families have simply 
been moved to neighborhoods with an equal (or worse) level of concentrated low-income 
minorities.  Further, the replacement housing for demolished public housing has often lagged in 
some sites, leaving relocated families vulnerable to the ever-changing demands of the private 
market housing sector.  Even with possession of a housing voucher, securing private market 
housing accommodation has proven a difficult task for many families.  Popkin et al. (2004) 
write: “Discrimination against minorities and families with children and the negative stigma 
attached to being a former public housing resident also affects relocatees’ ability to secure a unit 
with a voucher.”214  Thus, it becomes evident that HOPE VI initiatives cannot escape additional, 
often uncontrollable, factors that threaten its objectives. 
One of the more explicit criticisms of HOPE VI efforts comes from Sociologist Stephen 
Steinberg, who claims that the HOPE VI acronym (Housing Opportunities for People 
Everywhere) is nothing more than a “hypocritical” term.215  Community revitalization, according 
to Steinberg, is analogous to America’s ugly history of “Indian removal”—only to be replaced in 
this instance with an equally offensive term: “Negro removal.”216  He writes: “To my eyes, 
HOPE VI looks like Negro Removal, and Negro Removal looks like Indian Removal, though 
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dispossession and displacement are more ingeniously camouflaged today than in times past.”217  
What is being camouflaged, it is suggested, is the cleansing of a black urban underclass in the 
name of engendering mixed-income and mixed-race housing.
218
 
There is little, if any, criticism that redeveloped areas from public housing to mixed-income 
settlements has not improved the aesthetics of such an area.  In this sense, HOPE VI achieved its 
aim of “changing the physical shape of public housing.”219  However, the argument becomes 
more contentious when exploring the effects on the public housing residents.  Perhaps one of the 
most often cited criticisms of the HOPE VI program and its effects on housing residents is the 
increased likelihood of residents experiencing homelessness or being “precariously housed.”220  
Although McInnis et al. (2007) conclude from the available data that less than two percent of 
original residents experienced homelessness and only five percent were precariously housed, 
they did find that a major factor for housing security, or lack thereof, related to the success or 
failure of the housing management authority overseeing the HOPE VI jurisdiction.  For example, 
in studying the HOPE VI results in the Durham, North Carolina area, the high rates of those who 
experienced homelessness (4%) and precarious housing (6%) could be attributed, according to 
the authors, to the management and implementation of the local housing authority.
221
 
The HOPE VI Panel Study revealed that a high percentage of residents removed from 
replacement-eligible public housing expressed a preference for moving back to the site after it 
was completed.  However, the data reveal that less than twenty percent of former residents were 
found to be living in a revitalized HOPE VI development.
222
  Moreover, the residents relocating 
to the private market expressed new, often difficult, challenges.  These challenges included 
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unstable housing and difficulty paying rent and utilities.
223
  In a study of HOPE VI families, it 
was found that 40 percent of the respondents who were relocated to private neighborhoods 
reported problems in paying rent and utilities, with approximately half expressing that they were 
having difficulty affording food.
224
 
While many families ended up in better neighborhoods with lower poverty rates, due to the lag in 
redevelopment, tight rental markets or other exogenous factors (cost of living, discrimination, 
etc.), many residents were forced to relocate to equally distressed communities relative to their 
former public housing residency.  Even with the knowledge that many families in HOPE VI 
relocation programs did successfully integrate into communities with low-poverty, this success 
must be balanced with the fact that low-income minority families continue to live in racially 
homogeneous areas.  Popkin et al. (2004) write: 
While former residents are living in neighborhoods that are at least somewhat less poor, 
findings from both the HOPE VI Tracking Study and the national analysis of 
administrative data show that most are still living in census tracts that are predominantly 
minority.
225
  
Finally, it was found that many relocated residents cited a loss of social ties and support systems, 
which jeopardized their ability to cope with material hardship.
226
  Susan Greenbaum, referencing 
a HOPE VI site in Tampa, Florida, writes: “many…expressed feelings of loss and nostalgia for 
the neighborly relations they had in the public housing complexes where they used to live.  In 
addition to enjoyment, patterns of mutual assistance and exchange among the residents had made 
survival easier on their very low incomes and offered a sense of community.”227  Thus, 
Greenbaum suggests that one of the most negative consequences of HOPE VI is the loss of 
community and social ties.
228
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Yet amidst the steady stream of substantial skepticism relative to HOPE VI, one cannot simply 
ignore the positive findings of this initiative as it relates to public housing residents.  There is 
clear evidence that a large portion of successful relocations moved residents into areas of lower 
poverty.  Further, the HOPE VI tracking study found that relocated households perceive 
substantial improvements in their neighborhood conditions, in addition to lower crime, better 
services, and safer amenities.
229
  In addition to relocation and renovation efforts, HOPE VI funds 
have been used for community revitalization such as community centers, baseball fields, and 
libraries.
230
  Further, HOPE VI renovations, as mentioned, have improved real estate values in 
contiguous areas outside of the HOPE VI community, and is therefore often met with positive 
perception by residents in other communities who benefit from a real estate appreciation 
standpoint.
231
 
Ultimately, HOPE VI aimed to address “bricks-and-mortar problems in severely distressed 
public housing developments…[and] the social and economic needs of the residents and the 
health of surrounding neighborhoods.”232  Regarding the former objective, Popkin testifies that 
there is “no question” that HOPE VI has changed the face of public housing for the better.  
However, and in addition to a host of others, she exercises caution as it relates to declaring 
success on the latter point.
233
  This fact, to a degree, can be attributed to a lack of clear data.  In 
2004, approximately a decade after the program’s genesis, Popkin et al. concluded that, 
unfortunately, the information is limited regarding how original relocated residents have fared.  
They write: “The lack of consistent and reliable administrative data on housing and 
neighborhood outcomes for the original residents has muddied the debate about the performance 
of HOPE VI, and makes it difficult for policymakers to reach informed decisions about whether 
and how the implementation of the program should be approved.”234 
Difficulties aside, policymakers have still pushed for HOPE VI housing policies and its 
necessary funding.
235
  While the program and its goals have shifted to some degree, the HOPE 
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VI program has been reauthorized each year since 2003 in the HUD appropriations bill,
236
 
though its critics still remain.   
 
Mount Laurel Doctrine 
 
In contrast to most dispersal initiatives addressing residential segregation, the Mount Laurel 
doctrine
237
 decisions regarding land usage stemming from a small municipality in New Jersey, 
was not a pre-planned legislative attempt to integrate.  Rather, Mount Laurel represents rulings 
from the 1970s and 1980s declaring that “municipal land use regulations that prevent affordable 
housing opportunities for the poor are unconstitutional.”238  These existing regulations 
effectively “zoned out” low-income minorities from the area, relegating them to a more crime-
ridden metropolitan environment.  Zoning, historically, is decided by a town’s current resident 
base.
239
  Thus, Mount Laurel, a “home for families and businesses,”240 leveraged this local 
planning privilege to exclude undesirable neighbors from living within the town through 
regulation mechanisms that low-income families could not afford.  Such regulations included 
acreage minimums, lot frontage and width requirements, square footage requirements, and other 
forms of “growth control.”241  Kirp et al. (1997) conclude: “The community willed the changes 
                                                          
236
 Couch, Linda. "NLIHC: National Low Income Housing Coalition - Public Housing: HOPE VI." NLIHC: 
National Low Income Housing Coalition -. Web. 30 June 2010. 
<http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id=6068&id=19>. 
237
 Defining this term, Bernard K. Ham writes: “The Mount Laurel doctrine, therefore, has come to signify the 
judiciary’s efforts to desegregate New Jersey’s suburban communities, which have existed as enclaves for the 
wealthy white population.”  Ham, Bernard K. "Exclusionary Zoning and Racial Segregation: A Reconsideration of 
the Mount Laurel Doctrine." Seton Hall Const. L.J. (1997): 577-616. HeinOnline. Web. 13 July 2010. (Page 580) 
238
 "Mount Laurel Doctrine." Fair Share Housing Center. Web. 03 July 2010. <http://fairsharehousing.org/mount-
laurel-doctrine/>. 
239
 Such “local autonomy”, according to Ham, is a necessary part of decentralizing state planning to create economic 
efficiency and local political participation.  He writes: “Local autonomy leads to an economic efficiency when 
individuals make their choice of residence based on the bundle of services and taxes a municipality offers; that is, 
individuals will shop for a community that will best meet their needs and that they can afford as home-buying 
consumers” (Page 582).  However, such economic incentive is problematic as it relates to zoning because localities 
and their public service quantity and quality are driven by the tax base.  Thus, from an economic perspective, a local 
municipality has little, if any, incentive to include low income tenants in their area. See Ham, 1997. 
240
 This is how the town bills themselves on their website: Mount Laurel, New Jersey - Official Website. Web. 03 
July 2010. <http://www.mountlaurel.com/>. 
241
 Haar, Charles M. Suburbs Under Siege: Race, Space, and Audacious Judges. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996. 
Print. (Page 15).  In addition to this, James Clingermayer cites additional characteristics of exclusionary zoning and 
its inevitable effect on the poor: “Land-use controls such as minimum lot sizes, restrictions on multi-family 
dwellings and mobile homes, and architectural design specifications often have substantial impacts upon the 
57 
 
upon itself and made them happen.  It got exactly what it wanted: tract housing, economic 
growth—and nothing for the poor.”242 
In 1970, a group of African Americans had petitioned for the town to build low-income garden 
apartments.  Unfortunately, this request was denied, and was accompanied by the following 
advice delivered to the applicants who had made the request: “If you people can’t afford to live 
in our town, then you’ll just have to leave.”243  This precipitated a lawsuit, and in 1972, the trial 
court judge overseeing the case ordered that local officials work with the plaintiffs “in 
identifying housing needs and crafting an ‘affirmative program’ to meet those needs.”244  
Unfortunately, such ambiguity in the ruling led the Mt. Laurel municipalities to do nothing, and 
in 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the lower court decisions.  This was a historical 
decision in land use reform, as there was no precedent for state intervention related to residential 
integration in local municipalities.  Regarding this historical decision, Charles Haar writes: “No 
federally funded inducement comingled the burdens of cities and their surrounding suburbs, 
prompting them to form partnerships that might ease the transition to a nondiscriminatory 
housing market.”245  This ruling, referred to as Mount Laurel I, may have been historical on 
paper, but it was widely disregarded in practice.  For nearly a decade after the ruling, most 
municipalities openly refused to implement the dictates of Mount Laurel I.
246
  This led to Mount 
Laurel II, a ruling in 1985 specifying that every town must provide a “fair share” of low- to 
moderate-income (LMI) housing.
247
  This ruling engendered public-private cooperation in 
addition to cooperation between the suburbs and the cities to rehabilitate urban housing as a way 
of meeting their fair share requirement.  This cooperation came to form what was called a 
Regional Contribution Agreement (RCA).
248
  Fair-share determinations were eventually under 
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the jurisdiction of COAH (Council on Affordable Housing)—an entity created from the Fair 
Housing Act of 1985, which was another piece of legislation passed as a result of Mount Laurel 
rulings.  COAH served as the executive branch alternative to judicial enforcement of the Mount 
Laurel doctrine,
249
 and their responsibilities included “fair-share” planning for each municipality 
in addition to signing off on the Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs) before it could go 
into effect.
250
 
In 1997, Wish and Eisdorfer released one of the most comprehensive surveys of Mount Laurel 
impacts to date.  They noted the core goals of the Mount Laurel legislation emanating from the 
judicial decisions and legislation:
251
 
1) To increase housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income households. 
2) To provide housing opportunities in the suburbs for poor urban residents who had 
been excluded by past suburban zoning practices. 
3) To ameliorate racial and ethnic residential segregation by enabling blacks and Latinos 
to move from the heavily minority urban areas to white suburbs. 
The study sought to “assess the extent to which these three goals have been achieved.”252  
Reviewing data from the Affordable Housing Management Service (AHMS) database,
253
 they 
found that the Mount Laurel legislation has had mixed effectiveness in the subsequent years 
since the original legislation.  Regarding the first goal, the authors of the study were able to 
affirmatively conclude that Mount Laurel legislation and the work of COAH have resulted in the 
creation of approximately 50,000 units of affordable housing for LMI households.  Further, over 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Kean, who referred to the fair share policies as “socialist,” was accused of simply wanting to keep black people in 
the cities and out of suburbs.  Abuses of the RCAs became evident: the authors write, “Regional contribution 
agreements (RCAs) allowed such a community to transfer up to half of its fair-share obligation, typically to a 
distressed city, for a modest cash outlay.  Also, by counting housing for seniors and recent rehabilitations of 
dilapidated housing, a town could reduce still further the number of new units necessary to satisfy the quota.” (p. 
154)  
249
 Kinsey, David N. "Has the Mount Laurel Doctrine Delivered on Smart Growth?" Planning & Environmental Law 
60.6 (2008): 3-9. Print. 
250
 Haar, 1996, p. 113 
251
 Wish, Naomi B., and Stephen Eisdorfer. "The Impacts of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the 
Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants." Seton Hal Law Review (1997): 1268-337. HeinOnline. Web. 13 July 
2010. (Page 1276) 
252
 Ibid. 
253
 The AHMS database, as of April 1996, contained housing records for approximately 43,500 households, 
including the demarcation between urban and suburban households.  (Page 1281) 
59 
 
6,000 existing homes have been renovated as a result as well.
254
  This led the authors to 
conclude: “…housing units in the AHMS database—including units in suburban 
municipalities—do genuinely appear to be serving households in need.”255 
However, in regards to the latter two goals of Mount Laurel (suburban housing opportunities for 
the poor and the amelioration of racial segregation in housing), the results of the AHMS study do 
not support the assertion that Mount Laurel has effectively succeeded in achieving these two 
initiatives.  The study found that only fifteen percent of previous urban households relocated to 
the suburbs, and of this percentage, only a small portion of those households were African 
American.  Further, the disparity between black and white households in the cities and suburbs 
20 years after the original Mount Laurel rulings remains amazingly stark.
256
 
One of the few visible successes of the Mount Laurel doctrine is the real estate growth that took 
place as a result of its legislation.  Since 1983, approximately 660,000 houses have been built, 
about 20% of New Jersey’s total housing as of 2008.  Further, approximately 53 million square 
feet of retail space and 84 million square feet of office space have been completed since 1995.
257
  
Haar (1996) writes: 
Between 1987 and 1992 zoning revisions allowed for the construction of rehabilitation of 
54,000 additional low- and moderate-income housing units in the suburbs; of these, 75 
percent were formulated under the aegis of the courts, the balance occurring under 
COAH's jurisdiction.  In approximately five years, New Jersey either built, rehabilitated, 
or voted for one-third as many low-income units as it had produced in the previous six 
decades.
258
 
However, Professor David Kinsey questions whether this growth has actually been “smart 
growth,” a term that emerged out of the rulings of Mount Laurel II.259  Kinsey defines this term 
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as “patterns of development that are environmentally and economically sustainable and socially 
equitable.”  Kinsey concludes that the goal of “smart growth” remains elusive. 260   
From its inception, Mount Laurel rulings were never adopted by local municipalities, and their 
operationalization turned from principle-based decision making to economic calculation at the 
local level.  COAH, whose primary purpose was to create and enforce a fair-share formula for 
each municipality, became notorious for red-tape and a lack of activity.  Further, the Regional 
Contribution Agreements (RCAs) turned into nothing more than exchange transactions 
characterized by power imbalances.  COAH was required to approve of the RCA before it could 
go into effect, but as far as the actual agreement, it was between the sending municipality and the 
receiving municipality to create a deal. This led, unfortunately, to poor municipalities competing 
for the sending municipalities' money—which drove down the price.  The major charge against 
RCAs was that it perpetuated racial stratification and segmentation in metropolitan areas, which 
was counter-productive to one of the major goals of the original Mount Laurel Doctrine: racial 
heterogeneity. 
However, it has been suggested that the Mount Laurel failures do not singularly stem from its 
judicial formulation, but rather, from its administrative application.
261
  Further, the Mount Laurel 
doctrine was, and continues to be, a landmark case in land usage, as a number of other states 
have adopted fair-share formulas in the construction and rehabilitation of housing.
262
  David 
Imbroscio notes that urban experts contend that “smart growth” is not going away, and that this 
real estate ideology will continue to exert influence in the years to come.
263
  Despite these 
encouraging patterns, and the discouraging evidence surrounding it, Mount Laurel doctrine 
remains a part of the greater discussion of residential integration to this day.  Troutt (1997) 
points to Mount Laurel’s value and its prophetic focus on suburban growth in the years to come 
in New Jersey.  However, he writes, “What remains far from clear is how the most marginalized 
communities in the state can participate in this larger dynamic.”264 
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PART III: Residential Integration—Assessing the Outcomes 
 
Thus far, a collection of various arguments has been presented both for and against the 
plausibility of organized spatial integration.  Arguments against societal integration through 
residential means often fall into one or both of the two major arguments from Paul Cheshire, 
which I have referred to as the Cheshirian position.  To recap, his first argument is that there is 
little evidence of adverse neighborhood effects, or the idea that neighborhoods cause 
disadvantage.  His second argument is that there is little evidence that policies and programs 
aimed at mixing otherwise racially and socio-economically segregated households will improve 
the lives of these households.  If the programs do not work, then they cannot be said to be cost 
effective (i.e., they are a waste of real resources).  Furthermore, a detailed account of major 
integration initiatives such as Gatreaux, MTO, HOPE VI, and the Mount Laurel rulings help to 
support, whether explicitly or implicitly, the arguments in the Cheshirian position.  
Based upon this summary, we can conclude that residential mixing policy is not unequivocally 
supported upon reviewing the existing evidence base, and has thus been largely evaluated, or 
perhaps criticized, as a principle- or “faith-based” initiative.  However, if the consensus is that 
we cannot support residential integration based upon the evidence, it is necessary to identify the 
standards being used to make this assessment.  Thus we ask: “what criteria are being employed 
to evaluate the evidence?”  Based upon the existing literature, I would submit that two major 
evaluative criteria seem to emerge and re-emerge in integration assessments: economic efficacy 
(financial gain) and the maximization of utility (does overall utility increase?).
265
   
To be clear, when I refer to economic efficacy, I refer to evaluations that are situated within a 
financial paradigm.  Most often this comes in the form of cost-benefit analysis where the 
benefits, whether tangible or intangible, are meant to outweigh the financial outlays.  
Considering the fact that dispersal programs, such as the aforementioned initiatives, often require 
significant public funds, this is an understandable and appropriate criterion.  The second 
evaluative mechanism is not altogether different from the first.  More specifically, when 
“benefits” are explored insofar as outweighing the costs, these benefits refer to measures of 
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utility.  However, there is a second notion to this area of evaluation, and that is the consideration 
of the aggregate social whole when gains and losses in utility are weighed.  This, in a very basic 
form, can be housed under general utilitarian ideology.
266
  For the purpose of this thesis, I use the 
term utilitarian in its broadest, consequentialist sense.  In other words, the evaluative criterion of 
‘utilitarian welfare’ is a standard that looks at the outcomes of integration and assesses the 
presence or absence of welfare and utility thereof.  Furthermore, this perspective considers the 
utility of the singular social unit, which encompasses the welfare and utility of all parties.
267
  I 
shall refer to this framework as the Evaluative Integration Framework, which I understand to be 
considerations of economic efficacy and the maximization of utility in an aggregate social 
context. 
Dispersal program criticism, or support for that matter, has cited and continues to cite these 
standards for their justification.  Indeed, Gautreaux “evidence” seemed to hover around school 
results, dropout rates, labor opportunities, college attendance, and neighborhood stability.  
Support for Gautreaux and MTO was packaged as producing a range of positive outcomes.
268
  
Furthermore, evidence against dispersal programs cites disutility, economic inefficiency, and 
high costs.  Gautreaux drew criticism as it was not clear that the lowest-income tenants 
experienced economic benefits in the relocation process.
269
  Gautreaux has also been criticized as 
being too expensive, as “going to scale” for the program would require greater Section 8 
assistance (housing vouchers) thus enhancing the costs greatly.
270
  Very similar points have been 
made regarding the Moving to Opportunity initiative.  For example, in his assessment of MTO, 
Cheshire points to the expensive nature of the project, as MTO had estimated costs of $3,000 US 
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dollars per person involved.  Thus, in his opinion, the minor benefits that surfaced from MTO 
still could not be supported from a cost standpoint, and should therefore be abandoned.
271
   
Similarly authors Goering and Feins reference the criterion of expense calculations in their book 
Choosing a Better Life: Evaluating the Moving to Opportunity Social Experiment when 
evaluating the merits of MTO.
272
  Although they appear more optimistic than Cheshire in their 
assessment of MTO, after citing problems in determining causation, sample size, and varying 
externalities at each MTO location, they appeal to the standard of economic efficacy in their 
evaluation of integration policy: “For MTO to be counted a clear policy success, it would need 
then to demonstrate major long-term effects achieved in a cost-effective manner.”273  In contrast, 
de Souza Briggs et al. (2010) actually interpret MTO as a “cost effective” assisted housing 
mobility effort.  However, they similarly give evidence of a cost-benefit perspective in their 
evaluation of MTO design and outcomes: “The costs and risks are low, particularly when viewed 
as preventative investments and when compared to the costs of crisis intervention.”274  Crump 
(2003), in assessing Gautreaux and MTO, writes: “The results of these demonstration projects 
indicate how expensive and difficult it can be to integrate the suburbs via programs that support 
the residential mobility of low-income African-Americans.”275 
Similarly, in his condemnation of HOPE VI, Steinberg criticizes HOPE VI efforts as only 
providing relief “for a select few”—implying that not enough individuals are assisted for the 
cost.
276
  Indeed, with “billions” of federal dollars set aside for HOPE VI initiatives,277 critics 
maintain that the “HOPE VI program spends too much public money per unit.”278  HOPE VI 
supporters, equally positioning their case on an economic platform, argue that it is necessary to 
look beyond the development in question to include the economic benefits and “spillover 
effects” in the surrounding neighborhoods.279 
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While not escaping the evaluative standards of economic efficacy and utility based outcomes, the 
Mount Laurel doctrine is unique in that its inception stemmed from the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s ethical impetus that “every municipality in state-designated growth areas has an 
affirmative constitutional obligation to provide realistic opportunities for the creation of 
sufficient housing affordable to low-and moderate-income households.”280  Haar (1996) writes: 
“Moral considerations shaped the Mount Laurel propositions.  In the original case, Justice Hall 
introduced the doctrine in fundamentally ethical terms, explaining it as a self-evident 
philosophical principle embodied within the state constitution.”281  Thus, Mount Laurel rulings 
and doctrine were constructed under the “equality of opportunity” mantra—or, more specifically, 
an equality of housing availability for all members of society.
282
  Interestingly, this ruling 
challenged the notion of local autonomy where local, municipal decision-making was understood 
to be a mechanism by which to improve “economic efficiency” in communities.283  Thus, racial 
and economic integration, based upon the notion of constitutional civil rights, initially drove the 
Mount Laurel rulings.   
However, the implementation and evaluation of the Mount Laurel doctrine eventually cascaded 
into an economic and utilitarian framework over time, further removing it from its ethical and 
moral origin.  Compliance with the Mount Laurel rulings and accompanying legislation was 
lacking and implementation was considered inefficient.  The program came to “[rely] on 
incentives and disincentives, rather than regulation.”284  When lawsuits between builders, 
municipalities, and COAH began to flood the market, the original doctrine began to take the 
shape of a “compromise” where affordable housing initiatives moved from suburban integration 
to urban redevelopment: “Practitioners and scholars both tend to cynically view this development 
as the compromise that ultimately subverted the very meaning of Mount Laurel.”285  A further 
compromise was that extremely poor households ceased to even be targeted in integration.  The 
Wish-Eisdorfer study found that low-income households as well as large households were 
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unrepresented.
286
  In the legislature, complaints of excessive density and congestion, destruction 
of small-town character, and the overall “spoiling of suburban atmosphere” began to emerge.287  
In addition to Mount Laurel being critiqued as a “failure” for not addressing root causes such as 
crime, poverty, and poor education, this failure was also a “costly one.”288  Troutt (1997) 
comments: “Preoccupation with ‘costs’ appears to be a hallmark of many dominant narratives 
with respect to resource sharing and economic inequality.”289 
All in all, the observation that integration outcomes have been evaluated by assessing their 
ability to demonstrate economic efficiency and the maximization of utility should come as no 
surprise.  This is because the intended outcomes are often stated in terms that match such 
evaluative criteria: “affordable housing”; “job creation”; “educational opportunities”; and overall 
“welfare.”  Even stated goals that sought to disperse racially segregated communities with the 
subsequent intention of integration came as a response to ameliorate the “social costs” perceived 
to be inherent in racial segregation.
290
  HOPE VI was specifically designed to address the “social 
and economic needs” of the residents and the “health of surrounding neighborhoods.”291  The 
very title of “Moving to Opportunity” aims at utility-based welfare enhancement, and both MTO 
and Gautreaux fall under the architecture of what has been referred to as the “geography of 
opportunity.”292  As mentioned, the initial “goal,” if that term can be used, of the Mount Laurel 
rulings consisted of racially integrating suburban life.  However, the achievement of this goal has 
been measured through the dubious and vague math of whether more housing has been produced 
in New Jersey in the aftermath of the Mont Laurel rulings and its legislation.
293
   
Thus, whether it is Cheshire’s clear outlining of the expensive nature of economically 
unsubstantiated integration policy such as MTO or John Calmore’s disdain for racial 
condescension in “spatial equality,” the differing arguments are often packaged in economic 
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language where teleological ends of individual utility and cost effectiveness dictate the direction 
taken on these important issues.  This is not to suggest that such language is invalid, indeed, it 
isn’t.  Research informed policy utilizes such measures daily and is often the raison d’ etre for 
the volumes of legislation seeking to shape, mold, and organize our contemporary society.  To 
summarize, the Evaluative Integration Framework is, in its essence, an economic framework by 
which to appraise the extant evidence base in the existing residential integration initiatives, and 
is, moreover, an appropriate framework given the original aims of the various residential 
integration initiatives.
 294
   
 
PART IV: Evaluating Residential Integration in Light of “Adverse Impacts” 
 
Up to this point, I have reviewed the current scholarship and literature as it relates to residential 
integration.  Further, I have pointed out the evaluative criteria utilized to make judgments about 
the success or failure of integration efforts.  These criteria include considerations in economic 
efficacy and the maximization of utility.  A telling summary of this criterion base is given by 
Cheshire:  
If, however, making communities more mixed (or less segregated) does not improve the 
welfare of poorer people and reduces the welfare of richer people—or just makes no 
difference to either group—then it is a waste of real resources…”295 
As mentioned, this sentiment reflects the aforementioned literature review of scholarship over 
the last quarter-century and is a concise summary of what I have called the Cheshirian position.  
To summarize, upon consideration of the literature and the four major integration overtures in 
the US over the last 40 years—the evidence of positive outcomes to support desegregation or 
dispersal efforts are limited, particularly when held side by side with the “costs.”   
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In addition to this, however, one must consider the often less emphasized alternative, which is 
allowing segregated communities to remain inert.  In a sentence: What are the costs of allowing 
for segregated black communities to persist?  On the surface, an immediate response to this 
would be to reference the aforementioned ambiguity around determining the causal mechanism 
in disadvantaged neighborhoods—Argument #1 of the Cheshirian position.  Again, this would 
simply suggest that segregated black neighborhoods reflect disadvantage—they do not 
necessarily cause it.  However, in light of the contentious nature of “proving” the presence of 
neighborhood effects, there are counter-responses to the arguments found in the Cheshirian 
position.  Here, I shall provide two which are closely related to each other. 
 
The first argument originates from the work of Wolff and De-Shalit (2010) in their exposition of 
“disadvantage.”  The authors research the nuances of disadvantage, and among other findings, 
they assert that disadvantage “clusters.”296  Claiming that disadvantage is pluralistic in nature and 
“irreducible to a single currency”—the phenomenon of collected disadvantage is one of their 
primary findings: “Disadvantage and risks compound each other and cluster together.”297  The 
presence of disadvantage that yields further disadvantage is referred to as “corrosive” 
disadvantage.
298
  Here, the authors are clear that they are not suggesting the identification of 
causal relationships between disadvantages—they write: 
 
[A next step] would be to look at causal relations between disadvantages, to try to 
understand why patterns of disadvantage form and persist.  Clustering on its own refers to 
'joint frequency' of different disadvantages—poor or insecure functionings in different 
categories.
299
 
 
While the identification of specific causal pathways between disadvantages requires further 
research, their suggestion that disadvantage clusters and compounds other disadvantage is 
intuitive.  Thus, even if we cannot definitively make the claim that neighborhoods cause 
disadvantage, the idea of clustered disadvantage is itself a spatial problem.  If disadvantage does, 
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in fact, cluster—then the spatial implications are unavoidable.  Indeed, Blasius et al. (2007) 
write: 
 
The evidence here suggests that it is not mix per se but the absolute proportion of a 
disadvantaged group (defined in various possible ways) that is the single most common 
and powerful predictor of negative neighbourhood effects.  This may suggest more 
emphasis on […] a ‘dispersal’ of the disadvantaged among strong neighbourhoods, not a 
‘dilution’ of concentrated areas of deprivation with a few upper income homeowners.300 
 
In other words, if “clustered disadvantage” were to be unclustered (from a spatial standpoint, i.e., 
residential integration via dispersal)—we might ask: are there disadvantages that will diminish as 
a result of relocating?  While we might assume that some disadvantages remain if a segregated 
low-income minority household were to be dispersed, would dispersal remove or ameliorate 
other disadvantages?  This brings up a second, important response. 
 
The second response considers the social costs of allowing for continued patterns of concentrated 
deprivation in the wake of a market crisis.  Overtures toward residential mixing have been 
evaluated based upon their benefits, or the absence of benefits, that are occurring or meant to 
occur throughout the course of the program or legislation.  However, another appropriate lens by 
which to view this complex social issue relates to the vulnerability or risk of segregated 
households as it relates to market shocks.  Such a perspective has clear spatial implications.  
Furthermore, this offers a unique means by which to tease out an aspect of adverse 
“neighborhood effects.”301  We ask: Are segregated communities put at risk in the wake of a 
market failure by virtue of their segregation?  Would the deconcentration, or unclustering, of 
disadvantaged segregated households remove or ameliorate otherwise clustered disadvantage? 
302
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These are important questions.  Moreover, we have a lens by which to make such an assessment: 
“adverse impacts.”  Galster offers an expanded definition of “fair housing” that suggests “the 
opportunity to live in an environment where one’s life chances are not unduly constrained.”303  In 
his argument, he introduces the term “adverse impacts,” defined as “the implementation of a 
policy or practice
304
 that—though evenhandedly applied to all races—nevertheless results in 
disproportionately negative consequences for the minority and cannot be justified on grounds of 
business necessity.”305  He concedes that housing markets increasingly function in such a way so 
as to produce adverse impacts, particularly for low-income minorities.
306
 
Thus we ask: if segregated communities persist, what risks of “adverse impacts” are low-income 
segregated minorities being exposed to?  Following the thread of Galster’s argument, can we 
really label housing as “fair” when both political policies and market-based outcomes aggravate 
the social disadvantage already present in precarious, segregated communities?  Are the life 
chances of segregated minorities “unduly constrained” because of their exposure to adverse 
impacts?  These considerations are important for two primary reasons.  First, if costs are to be 
measured, then consideration must be given to the costs associated with segregation; not just the 
costs of integration.  Second, as it relates to the continuing debate of whether neighborhoods 
cause or simply reflect deprivation and social ills—if it can be demonstrated that low-income 
segregated minority communities are more vulnerable to “adverse impacts,” particularly in the 
wake of a market crisis, then this would suggest the presence of a causal mechanism for social 
disadvantage as a function of “place,” and not simply a reflection of existing inequalities.  
Furthermore, if low-income minority groups experience greater risk and volatility simply 
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because of where they live, then perhaps their quality of life can be improved through mixing 
(less exposure to risks that have resulted from various market consequences). 
As these questions arise, we live in an opportune time by which to answer them.  We are now in 
the wake of what has been described as one of the worst systematic market failures in the history 
of the US, with significant impacts still very present today both domestically and internationally.  
While the storm of the crisis has been developing for several decades, the impact of the crisis, 
referred to as the “subprime financial crisis,” was felt most strongly between 2007 and 2009.307  
At this point, I will provide detail of the origin of the crisis followed by its inevitable impact.  
Concluding this chapter, I will suggest that the crisis embodies Galster’s definition of “adverse 
impacts,” and thus offers a useful viewpoint by which to assess the greater discussion of 
residential integration. 
 
PART V: Subprime Origins—What Happened? 
 
Contrary to the belief that the subprime crisis was simply an abundance of poor lending, a 
multitude of factors must be recognized as playing an involved role in fueling the fire that has 
and will continue to sear both the U.S. and international economy.  The term “subprime” is 
terminology that Americans have only recently become familiar with.  Awarded the 2007 “word 
of the year” by the American Dialect Society, the term refers to lending or investing of a lower 
quality, higher risk nature.
308
  Perhaps the best way to understand subprime lending is to 
recognize the attributes of a subprime borrower, or subprime “mortgager.”  According to the 
2001 Interagency Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs,
309
 a subprime borrower 
displays the following characteristics: 
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 Possessing two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12 months or one or more 60-
day delinquencies in the last 24 months.
310
 
 Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 months. 
 Bankruptcy in the last 5 years. 
 High default probability evidenced by a lower credit bureau risk score (FICO or Beacon) 
of 660 or below (Most banks recognize scores of 740 or higher as “prime” credit). 
 Debt to income ratio of 50 percent or greater (limited ability to cover household expenses 
after deducting total debt requirements from monthly income).
311
   
 
As subprime lending increased, default percentages for subprime mortgages revealed their 
tenuous ability to perform as a loan and/or investment.  Default correlation research, such as 
Cowan and Cowan (2004), reveal that a strong correlation exists between subprime lending and 
defaults.
312
   
Yet default percentages for subprime loans only reveal their risk and inevitable repercussions; it 
does not answer why subprime lending escalated to an alarming degree and how it 
comprehensively permeated local and national economies both in the U.S. and abroad.  The 
initial question arises: what was the benefit of subprime lending?  While rationale for a subprime 
credit channel is multifaceted—two primary advantages to subprime lending emerge: increased 
homeownership and an expanded capacity for wealth accumulation.
313
   The prospect of 
homeownership, or the “American Dream”314 was extended to lower-income families through 
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subprime initiatives.  Further, for the typical American household, owning a home is a 
household’s best means to accumulate wealth as their real-estate property mortgaged is their 
largest principal investment.
315
  Both of these initiatives comprised a strategy to advance 
economic stimulation.
316
  However, the seemingly innocuous nature of homeownership benefit 
and economic stimulation belie the unintended consequences that have occurred as a result.  At 
this point I will turn my attention to the factors contributing to the expansion of subprime 
products in the marketplace, and the inevitable foreclosures that occurred as a result. 
 
Homeownership Policy 
 
The benefits of homeownership permeated political policy and led to several initiatives to gain 
homeownership in new markets.  Understood as having positive effects, new entrants to the 
housing market would ideally “stabilize communities, lay a solid base for family finances, and 
include habits of thrift and planning in children.”317  This became a policy initiative under the 
administration of President Clinton, whose national urban policies consisted of enabling lower-
income communities to “join the economic mainstream” and to create opportunities for upward 
mobility for all Americans.
318
  This initiative sought to increase homeownership for otherwise 
marginalized households as one of its central strategies, and it gained increased momentum as 
the condemnation of redlining and discrimination picked up in the 1990s.
319
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Thus, the need for affordable housing was advocated on behalf of low to moderate income, or 
“LMI” families.  Prophetically, Wyly et al. stated in 2001 that this “crucial requirement” was 
reason for concern: 
There is potential for the policies ultimately to fail because (a) they are overwhelmed by 
broader market forces that make housing too expensive for potential LMI home 
purchasers and (b) the policies themselves spur unintended consequences that undermine 
their stated goals.
320
 
Even preceding this comment, more specific warnings were given suggesting that expanded 
homeownership should not occur by means of more aggressive lending.
321
  Unfortunately, this is 
precisely what happened, erupting in myriad unintended consequences.  Josh Rosner of Graham 
Fisher and Co., at a meeting at the Harvard Club in 2007 addressing stagnant U.S. housing in the 
1980s and 1990s, offered a retrospective commentary on the forces leading up to the crisis:  
So what we saw actually was the largest public-private partnership to date, started as the 
National Partners in Home Ownership in 1994.  It was signed onto by the realtors, the 
home builders, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the mortgage bankers, HUD.  It was a massive 
effort, with more than 1,500 public and private participants, and the stated goal was to 
reach all time home ownership levels by the end of the century.  And the stated strategy 
proposal to reach that goal was, quote: ‘to increase creative financing methods for 
mortgage origination.’322  
At the advent of the new century, lending standards changed dramatically in unprecedented 
ways, with new creative arrangements of debt penetrating the market as never before.  Some of 
these products included “No-doc” loans where no income documentation was required by the 
borrower—they simply had to state their earnings.323  This expanded to customer collateral 
valuation methods, where formal appraisals were replaced by the customer’s estimated value of 
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their property.  While consumers typically had to meet a certain FICO or credit score threshold 
to qualify for this expedited underwriting, these loans became more available to subprime 
borrowers from 1999 to the year 2006.  The percentage of subprime customers who provided full 
documentation to procure their loan in 1999 was 69%, with a significant drop to 58% in 2006.
 324
  
Moreover, the loan to value percentages for subprime mortgages, a measurement of collateral 
risk, increased from 79% to 86% in the same period.
325
  While FICO scores did not decrease, the 
average FICO score from 1999 to 2006 was 615, well below the national average.
326
 
Complicating matters more, a proliferation of “ARM”, or “Adjustable Rate Mortgage” loans 
were released onto the market.  ARM loans, as opposed to FRMs or “Fixed Rate Mortgages,” 
typically begin with an initially low interest rate or “teaser” rate, and adjust accordingly after a 
period of time.  Such a product could be considered a quintessential example of a “creative 
financing method” for origination purposes.  ARM borrowers are typically found to have lower 
credit scores than fixed rate borrowers.
327
  In 2003, the National Association of Realtors 
estimated the median home price of an existing single-family home to be $180,200.  Thus, a 30-
year mortgage on this amount with an ARM rate of 5% would require a payment of $967.35.
328
  
However, if the ARM had an adjustment period of 2 years, then in 2005 the new payment would 
be adjusted to $1198.88, based upon a 2% interest rate adjustment.
329
  The extra $230 this 
customer is paying equates to $2760 of extra discretionary income the borrower must originate 
and pay towards the mortgage each year.  Some teaser rates began at a tempting 3.25%; a rate 
that would coerce refinancer and renter alike to capitalize on this attractive new product.
330
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By 2005, the policy goal of increasing homeownership was, statistically speaking, successful.  
The national rate of homeownership increased from the steady 64% in the 1980s and 1990s to 
69% by 2005.
331
  Further, these statistics do not speak to the massive volumes of refinancing and 
home equity loans that took place during this same period where consumers would enter into 
lower interest rate mortgages, or cash out the equity left in their home up to and above 100% of 
its value—thus freeing up greater discretionary income for spending.  The benefits to both the 
consumer and the economy were evidenced in greater purchasing power: 
Refinance stimulates family consumption and investment in two ways.  First, families 
benefit by paying lower mortgage rates, which saves about $10 billion per year in total 
mortgage interest costs.  Second, families have engaged in a record level of cash-out 
refinance, which serves as a cash infusion to a family’s balance sheet.  During 2002 
alone, families converted about $100 billion in home equity into cash at the time of their 
conventional mortgage refinance, which they have plowed back into the economy.
332
 
However, this increase in homeownership, as well as the proliferation of mortgage refinances, 
came at the expense of rapidly increasing delinquency.  The Mortgage Bankers Association of 
America reported in the third quarter of 2002 that subprime loans showed a delinquency rate 
over 5 times higher than that of prime loans.  Not surprisingly, foreclosures for subprime loans 
were 10 times higher than that of prime loans.
333
  In 2006, subprime ARM foreclosures reached 
record levels as “rate resets” were beginning to occur en masse.   According to Mortgage 
Bankers Association, the delinquency rate for one-to-four unit residential households was 5.82% 
for loans outstanding at the end of 2007.  This percentage does not include homes in foreclosure, 
which was 2.04%.  During the fourth quarter of 2007, subprime ARM loans only represented 7% 
of all loans outstanding, but represented 42% of the foreclosures during this quarter.
334
  In 2008, 
the delinquency rate rose to 7.88% on all loans outstanding, and the rate of foreclosed homes was 
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up to 3.3%.  Both of these numbers were record highs.  ARM loans continued to dominate the 
delinquency metrics.  According to MBA’s March 5th, 2009 report: 
Subprime ARM loans and prime ARM loans, which include Alt-A and pay option 
ARMs, continue to dominate the delinquency numbers.  Nationwide, 48 percent of 
subprime ARMs were at least one payment past due and in Florida over 60 percent of 
subprime ARMs were at least one payment past due.
335
   
Interestingly, these extraordinarily high delinquency rates began to evidence themselves in 2002, 
and yet, the weight of the subprime crisis did not fully reveal itself until late 2006.  We will now 
turn our attention to why the financial world had such a delayed reaction.  
 
Real Estate Appreciation 
 
Yale Economist Robert Shiller points to unprecedented real estate appreciation as one of the 
major factors of the subprime crisis.  Housing appreciation was considered to be a “speculative 
bubble,” but was dealt with more as a robust economic fact as opposed to a short-term trend.336  
Shiller points out that real home prices
337
 increased 85% between 1997 and 2006 in the United 
States.
338
  This is significant for several reasons.  First, it accelerates home purchases and 
refinances.  As mentioned, for the majority of Americans, their home is their largest investment 
asset.  Thus, rising real estate prices attracted investment speculators, or “flippers,” in addition to 
accelerated cash-out refinances.
339
  Also, increasing home values helped influence the 
proliferation of underwriting mortgage purchases and refinances as they led to lower CLTV 
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values, or the “combined loan to value,” serving to ideally mitigate losses from defaults.340  
Finally, increasing home values has a direct link to increased economic consumption as home 
equity has been shown to account for up to 50% of household wealth for one-half of all U.S. 
households.
341
  One study revealed that a $1 increase in housing wealth equated to a $.07 
increase in consumption.
342
    
Emerging out of this appreciation “bubble” was a new faith that home price appreciation would 
never cease, or more appropriately, burst.  By 2006, housing prices began what was to be a 
precipitous drop from the otherwise historic levels they had reached.  The Case-Shiller Home 
Price Index reveals a decrease of over 20% in U.S. home values between its peak in 2006 and 
fall of 2008.
343
  Economists estimate real national price drops between the 10% and 30% 
range.
344
  This lends itself to the argument that the lapse in home price appreciation was a key 
cause in the outbreak of foreclosures in recent years, as investors and subprime borrowers 
entered into contracts that were only viable if house prices continued to appreciate and the 
borrower could refinance based upon expected equity growth.
345
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The Role of Rates: The Federal Reserve Rate and Treasury Rates 
 
According to Randall Wray, it was not until 2001 that underwriting standards took a turn for the 
worse.
346
  At this same time, the Federal Reserve’s target rate reached a historic low.  This target 
is a short-term rate for overnight, inter-bank lending in the United States.  On January 3
rd
, 2001, 
the rate stood at 6%.  However, by the end of the year, on December 11
th
, it had dropped to 
1.75%.
347
  It has been argued that mortgage rates are not directly affected by the Federal 
Reserve’s target rate.  Tatom (2008) reveals that when the Federal Reserve’s rate began to rise to 
its peak in July 2007, the real mortgage rate still averaged 3.37%, a full percentage point below 
the 4.4% average during the previous 37 months when the Federal Reserve rates were lowest.
348
 
However, it would be misleading to completely absolve low Federal Reserve rates from 
contributing to the delinquency that would ensue.  Between June 25
th
, 2003 and June 30
th
, 2005, 
the Federal Reserve target rates ranged from 1% to 3.25% respectively.  In 2003, subprime 
mortgage growth was up 53% from the prior year, and in 2004, growth reached a remarkable 
59.8%.
349
  Then, in 2005, subprime originations fell to 23%.
350
  According to the raw numbers, 
these three years account for approximately 1.6 trillion dollars in subprime origination.  Further, 
1-year ARM rates for that same period (January 2003 to December 2005) ranged from 4.26% to 
5.37% with a low of 3.56% in March of 2004.
351
  When rates adjust on ARMs, the new 
calculation for their respective adjustment is typically determined by the Federal Reserve’s prime 
rate index + 3%, otherwise known as the “prime” rate of interest.  Considering that many cash-
out refinances were done to improve cash flow, one can easily recognize the danger in the ARM 
teaser rates during this period.  Not surprisingly, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke announced in 
January 2008 that 21% of subprime ARMs were 90 days or more delinquent, a sign of 
impending foreclosure, and that delinquency in general was on the rise.
352
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Housing values played a crucial role in the foreclosure spike as home appreciation rates began to 
drop during the time that many of these ARM rate resets were taking place.  This precluded any 
viable opportunity, assuming that the borrower’s credit attributes remained the same, for the 
borrower to refinance their house and their new, often unaffordable, rate position. 
The treasury rates also played a significant role in redirecting the global equity markets to new 
forms of investing for what appeared to be a good return and a seemingly safe investment.  U.S. 
Treasury bills and bonds, issued frequently for different terms, traditionally attract both domestic 
and global capital due to their low-risk nature.  However, FED changes to short-term interest 
rates influenced the yield curve nature of Treasury bills and bonds, and the bond market dropped 
to extraordinarily low interest rates from 2000 to 2003, with a slight increase taking place in 
2004 and 2005.
353
  
Figure 2.1: Treasury Rates 2000-2005 
 
This dip in rates, particularly evident in the shorter-term treasuries, redirected the attention of the 
investment world to new opportunities with a better yield.  Regarding the massive amount of 
global capital, Dan Immargluck writes: “On the capital markets side, a variety of forces created 
an excess of global savings that, in turn, led to an excess supply of capital looking for higher 
returns than had been available in more traditional, secure investments.”354  This was a key event 
as originators were now addressing demand from the international investment community rather 
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than singularly responding to the traditional demand for credit by domestic homeowners.  This 
“capital push”355 was yet another asymmetry between the multiple parties in the mortgage 
origination and securitization process.  This is because the excessive nature of mortgage-backed 
security demand lent itself to a deterioration of supply quality evidenced in Wall Street’s attempt 
to meet the seemingly insatiable demand for this product by the international investment 
community.  As the next section will demonstrate, the consequences of this demand, and the 
subsequent distribution of subprime mortgage-backed securities to accommodate it, would prove 
catastrophic. 
 
Securities 
 
Contrary to Shiller’s indictment of the housing bubble “being the major cause, if not the cause, 
of the subprime crisis and of the broader economic risk,”356 the distribution of blame should not 
be singularly concentrated around the spike in housing market prices.  Randall Wray writes: 
“Blaming the ‘bubble’ for the current crisis is rather like blaming the car for an accident—when 
we ought to take a good long look at the driver, and at the bartender who kept the whiskey 
flowing all evening before helping the drunk to his car after last call.”357  Wray likens the 
behaviors of the financial system’s leaders to a “bartender” who allowed the blurring of 
functions (drinking and driving) while “arguing that the invisible hand guided by self-interest 
can keep the car on course.”358 
Whether the greater part of the blame for the subprime crisis points to the housing bubble or poor 
financial administration, one major contributor to the problem is undisputed and clear: the 
securitization process of mortgages.  Securitization led to a loss of accountability and sustained 
the dysfunctional behaviors of the financial market until its demise.  When discussing 
securitization, a more appropriate description would be “asset securitization,” or “converting 
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illiquid assets into liquid securities.”359  Essentially, “securitizing” a mortgage involved 
packaging it with other mortgages, converting this bundle into a security or an investment, and 
selling it on Wall Street.  The securitization process is not necessarily new as it was common in 
the 1980s.  Further, the benefit of securitization for mortgages is a democratization of access to 
credit.
360
  This is because mortgages could be grouped into risk classes,
361
 and the loans would 
be packaged into CDOs or “Collateralized Debt Obligations” by investors who organized the 
mortgages into risk measured groups or “tranches” to suit the risk-benefit appetite of Wall Street 
investors.
 362
  Thus, the idea was to decrease market volatility and broaden credit availability.
363
 
Traditionally, a mortgage lending relationship was simply between the bank and the borrower.  
In addition to providing the loan money with appropriate interest, the bank would issue a 
promissory note
364
 to the borrower, and the bank would in turn receive payments from the 
borrower each month until the note, with full interest, was satisfied.
365
  This evolved into a far 
more complicated and nuanced procedure as securitization and a “secondary mortgage market” 
was introduced.  The new procedure still begins with a borrower and a lender, but a broker may 
also assist this interaction.  The broker markets to the borrower and thus brings the deal to the 
lender.  After the lender originates a mortgage with the borrower, the broker is typically out of 
the picture.
366
  At this point, the loan originator (lender) can either keep the loan, or now sell it 
onto the secondary mortgage market, where financial institutions will purchase the rights to 
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collect the interest from the loans, the collection of payments, and the right to foreclose should 
the borrower default.
367
  These “receivables” are sold onto the secondary market by converting 
them into SPVs (special purpose vehicles), an entity that is specifically created for the purpose of 
holding future financial claims.
368
  These claims were mortgage payments with interest, and the 
“pool” or collection of several mortgages are referred to as mortgage backed securities (MBS).  
The mortgage assets in the SPV are then classified into risk categories with appropriate return 
rates per category (higher risk/higher return).  Finally, this is sold to investors. While the SPVs 
were typically sold to Wall Street, the originator of the loan would often still function as the loan 
“servicer,” which meant they continued to manage the collection of payments.  Investors who 
purchased these securities included mutual funds, pensions, hedge funds, brokerage houses, and 
individuals.
369
   
The benefit of this process was that banks could now sell their assets and receivables off of their 
balance sheets and thus free up more of their capital while mitigating the risks associated with 
holding a mortgage until maturity and reducing the overall costs of origination.
370
  In the past, a 
$100,000 loan on a thirty-year mortgage would be a long-term receivable that lenders would not 
collect in full until all 360 months of payments had been made, unless it was paid off early by the 
borrower or refinanced by another lender.  This, understandably, would restrict cash flow for the 
bank or lender since receivable return was such a lengthy process. With securitization, however, 
what used to be a thirty-year capital restriction was limited to a matter of months.  This shift in 
the traditional lender-borrower relationship allowed for banks to collect significant fees without 
encumbering their capital.  This innovative arrangement resulted in lending that was 
“costless.”371  As of 2006, depository institutions only held approximately 30% of their 
outstanding mortgages, compared to approximately 75% in 1978.
372
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In 2006, the secondary mortgage market was described as the largest fixed-income market in the 
world.
373
  Unfortunately, this securitization boom included subprime loans.  This was a shift 
from the previous process, where typically only prime mortgage-backed securities were sold on 
the secondary loan market.  According to Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008), the ratio for 
subprime securities issuance (the conversion of a subprime mortgage into a mortgage backed 
security to be sold) increased from 46% in 2001 to 75% in 2006.  During this same period, 
subprime origination increased from 190 billion to 600 billion.
374
  
 
Flawed Incentive Structure and Credit Rating System 
 
Inevitably, the securitization process of “democratizing credit” became a vehicle for uniformly 
distributing financial poison.  Two other forces further complicated this process: a flawed 
incentive structure and an erroneous credit rating system.  According to Chomsisengphet and 
Pennington-Cross (2006), the majority of subprime mortgages were originated by non-depository 
or monoline finance companies.
375
  This means that these “pass through” institutions were not 
lending out of their own capital reserves (the traditional process of lending).  Rather, they would 
simply borrow money for capital to lend, originate a loan, and then quickly sell the loan off 
shortly after origination.  This created a new “atomized” relationship that compromised the 
original model of mutual interdependence between borrower and lender, and further lent itself to 
a flawed incentive structure creating an increase in faulty loans and a decrease in 
accountability.
376
  This model not only enhances consumer vulnerability, but it also creates a 
breeding ground for predatory lending
377
 by the brokers of non-depository and monoline 
institutions, who are compensated for loan origination, not loan performance.
378
   This flawed 
                                                          
373
 Keys et al., 2010, p. 314 
374
 Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008, p. 9 
375
 Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006, p. 7 
376
 Brescia, 2008, pp. 291-292 
377
 In 2002, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the U.S. Department of Treasury 
defined Predatory Lending as lending that strips home equity and places borrowers at an increased risk of 
foreclosure (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006). 
378
 Mortgage brokers are typically compensated from an origination fee paid directly by the borrower, or by revenue 
from the margin spread between retail and wholesale prices of loans.  See Anshasy, Amany, Gregory Elliehausen, 
and Yoshiaki Shimazaki. THE PRICING OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES BY MORTGAGE BROKERS AND 
84 
 
system of incentive led to the inevitable practice of brokers and originators who would “enter 
into as many mortgages as possible and get them into the market as securities as quickly as 
possible.”379 
Elizabeth Renuart of the National Consumer Law Center provides an example of this flawed 
incentive structure.  She describes a widowed, 81 year old African American in Washington D.C. 
who refinanced through a mortgage broker both in 1997 and 1999.  While no visible benefit for 
the borrower could be found upon reviewing the loan terms, the mortgage originator received 
over $12,000 in fee payments between the two refinances.
380
  This example is one of thousands 
that speak to the conflict of interest in broker compensation for loan origination.  Examples like 
this occur because “a broker has little or no incentive to worry about whether the information 
presented in the mortgage application is accurate as long as the information gathered is sufficient 
to cause the mortgage banker to fund the loan, triggering payment of the broker’s fees.”381  The 
result, not surprisingly, is a proliferation of inaccurate information and thus increased default 
potential for the borrower.
382
   Immargluck (2009) refers to this information asymmetry as 
“vertical disintegration,” meaning that “more contractual relationships were now required 
between originators, issuers of the securities, investors that purchased the securities, credit rating 
agencies, servicers, and other mortgage market participants.”383  The loss or manipulation of 
information from relationship to relationship only increased market myopia regarding what was 
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actually being funded, securitized, and purchased by investing consumers and firms both 
domestic and abroad. 
Had the traditional borrower-lender relationship been in place during the early period of 
subprime expansion, then perhaps the increase in loan delinquency as a result of this flawed 
incentive structure would have been identified, addressed, and corrected at its onset.  However, 
an erroneous credit rating system allowed for this process to continue and for the volume of 
securitized mortgages sent through the secondary mortgage market to reach unprecedented 
levels.  There is a need for an objective, third-party credit rating source because the individual 
investor may not be capable of assessing borrower credit-worthiness.
384
  Thus, the information 
provided by the credit rating agency is of great value to the investment world, but this makes the 
assumption that their methodology and subsequent output is sound and accurate.  This 
assumption would prove to be costly as loan performance in investor portfolios began to unravel. 
The failure of credit rating agencies to properly interpret and communicate the risk of security 
pools replete with subprime paper can be attributed to several significant factors.  First, 
information asymmetry was far more significant in subprime mortgage markets than in prime 
mortgage markets.  A clear lack of congruence between subprime loans and evaluation models 
led to information being lost as the mortgage traveled the cavernous road from the originator to 
the secondary market.
385
  Further, the data models being used to evaluate mortgage pools worked 
off of the assumption that past performance is a good indicator of future behavior.
386
  This was 
problematic because of unusually high home prices beginning in the mid-1990s and, moreover, 
because creative mortgage products like ARM loans with decreased documentation had no 
historical basis—particularly when it came to no-down payment, no-income documentation, and 
no-appraisal loans being underwritten. 
Further, rating agencies worked closely with mortgage underwriters and securitizers to ensure 
that the pooled mortgages would be sold into the appropriate market based upon its risk.  This 
relationship gave way to a conflicted incentive structure because rating agencies were 
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compensated fees of up to twice their normal amount for rating and marketing mortgages.
387
  
This was due, in part, to rating agencies being compensated to give their rating opinion by the 
arranger (underwriter or securitizer) and not the investor.
388
  Fueled by the assurances of large 
insurance companies who would supposedly back these securities should they fail,
389
 in addition 
to the robust housing market, credit rating agencies provided triple-A ratings to mortgage pools 
in which they had no basis for understanding or predicting future payment performance.
390
  Fed 
Chairman Ben Bernanke summarizes the problem:  
The complexity of structured credit products, as well as the difficulty of determining the 
values of some of the underlying assets, led many investors to rely heavily on the 
evaluations of these products by credit-rating agencies. However, as subprime mortgage 
losses rose to levels that threatened even highly rated tranches, investors began to 
question the reliability of the credit ratings and became increasingly unwilling to hold 
these products.
391
 
 
PART VI: Subprime Effect 
 
Up to this point, I have provided a description of the major causes of the subprime mortgage 
crisis to date.  I will now turn my attention to the more devastating effects that this crisis has had 
both domestically and abroad.  Relative to Galster’s aforementioned definition of “adverse 
impacts,” I am specifically interested in the distribution of negative outcomes resulting from the 
crisis and who shouldered the brunt of its impact. 
                                                          
387
 Charles Morris points out that between 2002 and 2006, Moody’s credit rating agency doubled its revenue and 
more than tripled its stock price.  See Morris, 2008, p. 77. 
388
 Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008, p. 3 
389
 Morris also points out that because bond defaults are rare, they traditionally require little capital by the insurance 
companies backing them.  Thus, when insurance companies began to back mortgage-backed CDOs, they could, for 
example, have up to $3.3 trillion dollars of insurance on investment instruments, but only $22 billion dollars of 
actual capital to cover those instruments.  Part of this was the assumption that these mortgage-backed CDOs would 
perform due to their Triple-A rating by credit agencies.  See Morris, 2008, p. 129. 
390
 The highest rating possible by a credit agency. 
391
 FRB Speech, January 2008 
87 
 
It is difficult to predict where the financial “dust” will settle when the crisis has fully 
materialized.  However, recognizing its impact to date reveals the devastating nature of the 
mortgage crisis and begs for a massive regulatory response.  According to realtytrac, which 
boasts the most comprehensive database of foreclosure statistics, 2006 foreclosure filing 
surpassed 1.2 million, a 42% increase from 2005.
392
  This number had nearly tripled by 2008, 
with approximately 3.2 million foreclosure filings being processed.
393
  Finally, the end of 2009 
saw foreclosure filings just short of 4 million.
394
  Foreclosure activity, particularly at this 
volume, impacts four major areas: mortgage lender/owner, financial markets, state and local 
government, and finally, the borrower and homeowner.  For our present purposes, attention will 
be devoted to the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent foreclosures relative to 
the borrower/homeowner. 
 
Borrower/Homeowner Impact 
 
As mentioned, for investors and lenders, foreclosures almost certainly mean a temporary loss of 
cash flow stream, and often a significant if not a total loss from an asset standpoint.
395
  
Unfortunately, the damage does not simply end with liquidity and assets.  For homeowners who 
foreclose, they must suffer “transitional costs” to vacate and move to a new household, even 
when renting.  Further, they will suffer near irreparable damage to their credit, hampering future 
opportunities to secure credit should an emergency arise.  Further, if they do qualify for credit, 
institutional risk-based pricing models make low-credit consumers more susceptible to higher, 
more prohibitive, interest rates on the lending spectrum, thus increasing their vulnerability to 
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future default.  This is in addition to the “psychological costs” that a foreclosure has on a 
household.  These include embarrassment and the loss of self-esteem and confidence for both 
parents and children.
396
  Finally, one must also account for the decline of local property values as 
a result of foreclosures, as concentrated foreclosure activity has a devastating reduction effect for 
homes with similar attributes in the immediate area.
397
  This will impact job availability in the 
area, which only reinforces the local problem of having enough income to afford one’s mortgage 
payment to avoid foreclosure. 
In describing the borrower or homeowner impact resulting from the crisis, there is an implication 
that all consumers are on an equal playing field and have suffered uniformly.  If this were the 
case, perhaps the outcomes of the financial crisis would be better absorbed.  However, a wide 
research base has suggested that subprime lending and foreclosures were not evenly distributed.  
Subprime lending has been found to be most prevalent in neighborhoods with high 
concentrations of minorities and weaker economic conditions (i.e., segregated neighborhoods).  
According to a 2008 joint report by several prestigious housing agencies, subprime lenders were 
found to have held a 20 percent market share in an examination of seven significant metro areas, 
compared to a 4 percent market share in predominantly white neighborhoods.  These figures 
mirror high-cost lending activity in lower-income neighborhoods, as subprime lenders held 
approximately 20 percent market shares in low-income neighborhoods compared against seven 
percent market share in upper-income neighborhoods.
398
  Similarly, in examining patterns where 
subprime mortgage products were sold, Immargluck (2008) cites evidence that minority 
households are more likely to receive subprime mortgages even after controlling for credit 
quality, suggesting the occurrence of discriminatory lending practices.
399
  The research of 
Squires, Hyra and Renner (2009) reveal identical findings, and also show that segregation alone, 
when controlling for other explanatory credit variables, is associated with the proportion of 
                                                          
396
 Tatom, 2008, p. 10 
397
 See Footnote #418 in Chapter 3 for a helpful summary of work to date addressing the effects of foreclosures on 
local housing values. 
398
 Bromley, Charles, Jim Campen, Saara Nafici, Adam Rust, Geoff Smith, Kevin Stein, and Barbara Van Kerkhove. 
Paying More for the American Dream: The Subprime Shakeout and Its Impacts on Lower-Income and Minority 
Communities. Rep. Woodstock Institute, 2008. Print. (Page 5) 
399
 Immargluck, 2008, p. 8.  Immargluck goes on to write: “Spatially concentrated subprime loans can result in poor 
outcomes for neighborhoods and local governments.  A number of studies have shown a disproportionate share of 
metropolitan foreclosures and increases in foreclosures in recent years to be in lower-income and minority 
neighborhoods” (Page 9). 
89 
 
subprime lending.
400
  Similarly, Been et al. (2009) find that residential segregation plays a role in 
shaping lending patterns, where low-income concentrated minorities are more likely to receive a 
high-cost, subprime loan.
401
  Calem et al. (2004), after controlling for a host of explanatory 
variables, finds that the percent of African-American homeowners is strongly and positively 
correlated with subprime lending.
402
 
Limited access to conventional financial services and inequality are inextricably linked.
403
  The 
irony is that public interventions in housing affordability were based upon the principles of 
homeownership as a means to increase utility for minorities and lower-income families.
404
  
However, sociologist Anne Shlay, whose research points to the tenuous nature of 
homeownership among lower-income families, describes the unfortunate mix of policy and 
product that led to an uneven distribution of economic disadvantage among low-income and 
minority homeowners:  
By increasing the number of low-income and minority homebuyers, policy is increasing 
the number of households at risk of being preyed upon by predatory lenders.  That is, 
policy designed to promote savings and asset accumulation by low-income families may 
be serving up potential customers for the subprime lending industry.
405
 
Thus, policy and market enhancements aimed towards increased homeownership for lower-
income and minority families have backfired in a devastating way.
406
  The “revolution of 
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mortgage finance”407 that sought to redefine lending, free up capital for financial institutions, and 
provide credit for a new, underserved market of households has displaced thousands of residents 
and accelerated the inequality already present in the American economic system.
408
   
What does this exposition on the subprime financial crisis tell us?  First, we may confidently 
claim that the crisis represents a violation in “fair housing” as the life chances of many 
segregated African Americans were “unduly constrained” based upon their environment.409  
Moreover, we see that the subprime financial crisis meets Galster’s definition of possessing 
adverse impacts (operationalized within a spatial context).  From the US government emphasis 
on homeownership for everyone to market phenomena such as mortgage securitization and the 
accompanying “vertical disintegration" in the mortgage process—segregated black communities 
suffered disproportionately negative consequences that could not be justified on the grounds of 
business necessity. 
Chapter 3 will provide a more in depth, empirical exploration of adverse impacts suffered by 
segregated black households in the wake of the crisis.  Moreover, the study will seek to identify 
advantages that might accompany mixing. 
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the subprime crisis.  Moreover, there are various suggestions as to why this occurred—including segregation itself.  
Since I do not necessarily provide a critique of this aforementioned research, a respondent might be skeptical of 
whether such studies have properly controlled for all factors that lead to default.  To counter this response, one 
would have to control for all variables that predict a large amount of variation in loan defaults—information that is 
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Chapter 3: Empirical Study 
 
This chapter aims to explore residential integration in an economic paradigm.  The chapter will 
be outlined as followed: Part I will retrace the major issues in the integration debate, followed by 
the intuition to explore integration through the vantage point of adverse impacts occurring in the 
wake of the recent subprime financial crisis.  From this, Part I ends with two specific research 
questions that arise.  Part II presents an analytical framework by which to evaluate the research 
outcomes.  Here I borrow from George Galster, tailoring his analytical framework of “equity” 
and “efficiency” as a means to evaluate my own research.  Part III briefly describes the intent to 
specifically research Cuyahoga County in the state of Ohio, and is followed by the research 
methodology and results in Part IV.  In Part V, I provide an evaluation of the research output 
utilizing my pre-defined Evaluative Criteria Framework.   
This chapter ends with a post-script that aims to summarize my contribution to the residential 
integration discussion as well as the conclusions that can appropriately be reached. 
 
PART I: Necessity of Study 
 
 
To retrace, the criticism of residential integration rests on two primary arguments:  The first 
argument is that there is little evidence to support the assumption that segregated minorities are 
exposed to social ills as a function of their segregation and place.  In other words, it is argued 
that there is little evidence of adverse “neighborhood effects.”  In this thesis, I have chosen to 
define neighborhood effects as “the independent causal effect of a neighbourhood (i.e., 
residential community) on any number of health and/or social outcomes.”410  In assuming 
neighborhood effects, one assumes that the neighborhood causes disadvantage, or advantage, for 
its inhabitants (as opposed to simply reflecting them).  The second argument is based upon 
whether segregated households would fare any better if they were dispersed, or integrated, with 
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other race and higher income neighborhoods.  It follows that if there is little evidence that mixing 
benefits society—then it is not a cost effective policy option.  The former argument has been 
debunked as mere “theory”411 while the latter has suffered due to a lack of unambiguous, 
definitive evidence.  In this thesis, I have referred to this as the Cheshirian position.  While stated 
succinctly by Cheshire, it is representative of the collective skepticism in the academic world 
relative to the effectiveness of residential integration initiatives.  These issues rest at the heart of 
the stalemate in the integration debate.  Cheshire summarizes the problem after his survey of the 
Moving to Opportunity evidence: “[MTO evidence] does not support the conclusion that 
neighbourhood effects are quantitatively all that important nor that moving the poor to affluent 
neighbourhoods overall improves their welfare.”412 
 
As mentioned, these measurements account for costs and welfare as it relates to dispersal or 
desegregation.  However, a more comprehensive assessment would additionally account for the 
costs and welfare of segregation, i.e., leaving our social arrangements as they are.  In light of our 
examination of the crisis and the disproportionate consequences shouldered by segregated, low-
income minorities, it is worth revisiting Galster’s definition of adverse impacts: “Adverse 
impacts refers to the implementation of a policy or practice that—though evenhandedly applied 
to all races—nevertheless results in disproportionately negative consequences for the minority 
and cannot be justified on the grounds of business necessity.”413  Based upon this definition, we 
can confidently assert that the subprime financial crisis matches the definition of an adverse 
impact, as housing policies aimed toward increased homeownership, in addition to risk-based 
pricing, poor regulation, and market distortions, disproportionately impacted segregated black 
communities in a devastating fashion.  To borrow a phrase from Mayer and Pence (2008) in 
relation to the crisis: “It was not supposed to work out this way.”414   
In light of adverse impacts, it is appropriate to ask what specific effect the impact of the crisis 
had on the segregated black community.  Second, we might ask whether benefits may be 
associated with mixed communities as a means to protect otherwise segregated, low-income 
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minorities, which is the content of the forthcoming empirical study.  This argument mirrors the 
one made by Massey and Denton in their seminal work American Apartheid (1993).  John 
Relman describes the relevance of adverse impacts in their argument: 
Central to their argument is the evidence that “hypersegregation,” or the extreme 
concentration of poor blacks in inner city neighborhoods, has left many minority 
communities vulnerable to a socio-economic “downward spiral” at the slightest turn of 
the economy.
415
 
The implication is that inherent risks and vulnerabilities exist as a function of segregation (and 
not simply the inequalities and social disadvantages reflected in segregated individuals).  Been et 
al. (2009) write: “High levels of segregation can create pockets of dense poverty within urban 
areas, magnifying the vulnerability of community members to the effects of an economic 
shock.”416  Furthermore, Immargluck directly connects the subprime crisis—an explicit example 
of an “economic shock”—and residential segregation.  He writes: “[The subprime boom was] 
reliant upon the exploitation of the geographies of social disadvantage and isolation.”417  Amidst 
skepticism of the neighborhood causing additional disadvantage for households in deprived 
areas—if low-income, racially segregated areas experience greater economic risk and volatility, 
then such evidence is at least consistent with the belief in a causal link between place and risk 
relative to those inhabiting that place.  However, there is a stark contrast between being 
consistent with a theory and proving a theory.  Proving adverse impacts as a function of place 
will require greater complexity.
418
   
One way of unpacking this complex argument relates to foreclosures occurring in the wake of 
the subprime financial crisis.  First, there is a question of how subprime loans and foreclosures 
were distributed across space and, moreover, unto whom.  If segregated black communities are 
more prone to receiving a subprime loan and subsequently foreclosing, this would appear as an 
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adverse impact resulting from the crisis that was disproportionately shouldered by the African 
American community—thus enhancing their risk and vulnerability.    
We might imagine a response to this, however.  Argument #1 of the Cheshirian position 
(skepticism of neighborhood effects) would contend that it has not been proven that the spatial 
isolation of black households increased their probability of receiving a subprime loan and 
subsequently foreclosing.  In other words, the same households that foreclosed could have been 
spread out, or desegregated through mixing, and this could have had no bearing on whether they 
would have received a subprime loan and subsequently foreclosed (i.e., if they foreclosed when 
they were segregated, there is nothing to suggest they would not have foreclosed had they been 
mixed).  Thus, according to this argument, the link between space and the adverse impacts of the 
crisis has not been established.   
Yet there is a counter-response.  In the wake of the crisis, we do know that foreclosure-prone 
households were concentrated.  Further, the negative relationship between foreclosures on 
property values has been well established (as the incidence of foreclosure increase, the value of 
nearby homes decrease).
419
  Thus, concentrating foreclosures (as opposed to a more equi-
distributional pattern of foreclosure incidence throughout a given area)
420
 has a far more 
deleterious effect on housing values and subsequent detrimental social and economic impacts on 
the local community.  This, then, is an argument that ‘space’ plays a role in exacerbating social 
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disadvantage (i.e., foreclosures have an enhanced effect when concentrated).  This would be an 
example of what has been referred to as a “threshold effect.”  Quercia and Galster (2000) provide 
the following helpful definition: “A threshold effect may be defined as a dynamic process in 
which the magnitude of the response changes significantly as the triggering stimulus exceeds 
some critical value.”  In other words, if the frequency of foreclosures within a given space 
exceeds a certain threshold, we might expect the magnitude of house value depreciation to 
escalate.
421
 
Related to this, if it can be demonstrated that integrated communities fare better in the wake of a 
market crisis than otherwise racially segregated communities, this would point to the possibility 
of “beneficial effects” from living in a mixed community.422  These two points of exploration, 
understood through the lens of the subprime financial crisis (adverse impacts), offer a unique 
response to the two arguments inherent in the Cheshirian position.   
Thus, to explore this empirically, I aim to create two separate studies for analysis.  First, I will 
construct a model which measures racially homogeneous white and black communities in the 
wake of the subprime financial crisis.  Further, this study is unique because it also attempts to 
create a variable for communities that demonstrate a “mixed” dynamic.  The crisis consisted of 
households receiving “high-cost” or subprime loans and is punctuated with the proliferation of 
foreclosures.  Thus, these two variables (subprime rates and foreclosure rates) will serve as 
dependent, or explained, variables in a multiple regression study.  This study makes a 
contribution by first exploring whether segregated black communities suffered adverse impacts 
in the wake of the subprime financial crisis and, second, whether such adverse impacts were 
magnified as a function of space.  Finally, this study aims to establish whether benefits might be 
associated with residential mixing in light of adverse impacts.  To clarify the term “benefit,” I am 
specifically measuring economic utility as a function of home-value.
423
  The subprime crisis, 
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among other things, ultimately led to significant foreclosure rates across the US.  While several 
tangible and intangible “costs” are associated with foreclosures, I am specifically focused on 
their economic impact as foreclosures are most notable for their erosion of local housing values. 
The first set of empirical models in my analysis will explore the adverse impacts of the crisis on 
segregated white and black communities in addition to communities that display mix.  Since I am 
exploring this in the wake of the subprime financial crisis, I am specifically looking at the 
percentage of subprime loans and foreclosure rates for segregated white, black, and mixed 
communities.  Next, I will construct a second round of models where I use the foreclosure rate to 
help explain the variation in home sale prices (a proxy for home values) for each of the racial 
categories: mixed, segregated white and segregated black.   
Ultimately, the study aims to answer the following questions: 
(1) How did segregated communities (both homogeneous white and black) fare in the wake 
of the subprime crisis and its accompanying “adverse impacts?”  Did segregation and 
“place” play a role in helping or harming social welfare for racially isolated households? 
(2) In light of the crisis, are there visible or presumed economic advantages that could be 
associated with residential mixing that may suggest a protective mechanism for otherwise 
vulnerable and segregated households?  Further, are these advantages considered socially 
efficient, where society benefits as a whole? 
This study defines “efficient” as policy where those who benefit gain more than those who do 
not benefit lose.  In essence, this form of allocative efficiency aims to maximize net welfare for 
all (not simply one group).  The first research question is distinguished from the second, as 
evidence of adverse impacts is altogether separate from the claim of social efficiency in 
integration.  For clarity, I will refer to the first set of empirical models as “Analysis 1” or A1.  
The second empirical study will be referred to as “Analysis 2” or A2.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mixing are most often economic or utility-based arguments, so specifically measuring an economic variable seemed 
both relevant and useful for the purpose of this analysis. 
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PART II: Employing a Framework 
 
Before engaging in the empirical research, it is useful to employ a framework by which to 
evaluate the results.  As detailed earlier, the evaluative voice in the integration debate has used 
the criteria of economic efficiency and the maximization of utility.  In other words, if mixing can 
enhance economic efficiency and outcomes for both the dispersed households as well as the 
receiving neighborhoods, and if total net-utility is advanced once the aggregate gains and losses 
are weighed, then mixing, in general, is to be supported.   
At this point, then, I have chosen to incorporate an analytical framework proposed by George 
Galster (2007) that both mirrors the existing evaluative criteria for integration support or 
dismissal and prescribes a scaffold by which to navigate my own empirical research.
424
  As 
mentioned, I have referred to this framework as the “Evaluative Integration Framework.”425  
Paraphrasing Galster, and employing my own research study, we can ask: “does the extant 
evidence base provided in the study of the subprime financial crisis provide justification for the 
widespread adoption of policies to increase neighborhood social mix and, if so, on what 
grounds?” 426  In this framework, Galster provides two conditions upon which mixing can be 
substantiated,
427
 depending upon how policy makers weight each condition or hold one or the 
other “paramount.”428  The conditions are considerations in “equity”429 and “efficiency” and are 
used in relation to two groups: advantaged and disadvantaged.  Equity is defined as being evident 
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if one of two conditions is met: (1) disadvantaged group members lose well-being by residing 
with other members of their group and/or (2) gain well-being by residing with members of the 
advantaged group.
430
  Separate from equity, efficiency is improved when the social welfare of 
both groups (advantaged and disadvantaged) exhibit a positive gain.  In other words, “if a policy 
alters (positively or negatively) the well-being of various individuals in either groups or both 
groups, it can be justified on efficiency grounds if in the end it registers a higher level of social 
well-being when the individual changes are appropriately weighted and aggregated.”431   
While Galster does not directly define, by title at least, the type of “efficiency” he is referring to, 
we might appropriately place his usage of the term under the more formal title of “allocative 
efficiency.”  Allocative efficiency requires that an economy should produce up to the point at 
which the benefit its consumption provides to society (often called “marginal social benefit”) is 
equal to the cost its production poses on society (“marginal social cost”).432  In the context of 
residential housing integration, allocative efficiency can be understood as an equality of the 
social benefit gained from the dispersed group relative to the social cost incurred by the 
receiving group.  Under this rationale, if the gain were to exceed the loss, we would claim 
efficiency; if the loss were to exceed the gain, we would not.  In other writing, Galster refers to 
this as “social efficiency.”  He writes: “Social efficiency is achieved when a particular activity is 
undertaken at a level such that net social benefits (i.e., total benefits minus total costs to all 
parties who directly engage in this activity or indirectly are affected by it) are maximized within 
the constraints of resources available.”433 
The two aforementioned research questions each exhibit a component of Galster’s framework.  
Question #1 is an exploration in equity: Do segregated members suffer a deficit of well-being by 
residing with other members of their group or, conversely, gain well-being by living in tracts that 
display mix?  We can analyze the results from both A1 and A2 to assist us in answering this 
question.  A1 will provide an understanding of the distribution of subprime and foreclosure rates 
for each racial category.  A2 endeavors to show the asset depreciating effect of foreclosures and 
the consequences of concentration for any of the given groups.  Here, for our purposes, we 
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would look for the following as a necessary condition for equity justification as it relates to 
mixing: 1) Do subprime and foreclosure rates cluster or concentrate for low-income minority 
segregated neighborhoods (A1) and if so, do those communities suffer economic disadvantage, 
specifically defined by house value depreciation, by remaining in their community?  Conversely, 
would those households stand to gain by residing with members of mixed or segregated white 
neighborhoods (A2)?  If we can answer “yes” to either of these questions after exploring the 
analysis from A1 and A2, then we have met the necessary condition to claim equity. 
Question #2 specifically focuses on the efficiency aspect of Galster’s framework, as the study 
will seek to explore whether economic advantages might be associated with dispersal.  Here, we 
can make the claim of “efficiency” if a positive gain is realized for all racial categories should 
dispersal occur.  To explore efficiency, I will use the output from A1 and A2 as follows.  A1 will 
show how subprime rates and foreclosures are concentrated among particular racial categories.  
A2, stratified accordingly by racial category, will allow us to predict the asset depreciating effect 
the foreclosure percentage per neighborhood might have.  Assuming foreclosures are 
concentrated in Low-Mix Black communities,
434
 is the net cost of foreclosures for the greater 
area
435
 less if foreclosure-risk households were to be dispersed as opposed to being 
concentrated?  In other words, we might hypothetically assume that a segregated black 
household who experienced a foreclosure would also have foreclosed if they had been in a non-
segregated neighborhood.  Therefore, would the dispersal of foreclosure-prone households have 
a net-positive effect on society?  Would a more spatially even distribution of foreclosures 
register aggregate consequences less severe than concentrating foreclosures as it relates to home 
values? 
 
Regarding his original framework, and his own measure of social welfare by which to gauge 
gains or losses in equity and efficiency, Galster writes: 
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Even though it is unlikely that key housing and urban planners have an explicitly, 
mathematical formula for SW [Social Welfare] that they apply when assessing alternative 
policy proposals, it is probable that they employ some implicit, imprecise ‘rule of thumb’ 
in this exercise.  It will be shown that different rules of thumb are associated with 
different evidentiary requirements and conversely, that extant evidence only supports 
policy decisions favoring neighborhood social mix if the rules of thumb being employed 
(although implicitly) are of a certain nature.
436
 
Galster notes that his hope is that this framework will result in more attempts to make explicit 
what is implicit.
437
  Similarly, I aim to utilize this framework, tailored to my research, as a means 
to employ equity and efficiency “rules of thumb” insofar as exploring adverse impacts in the 
wake of the subprime financial crisis.  The Evaluative Integration Framework being utilized is, 
therefore, a means by which to assess whether mixing can be substantiated by exploring the 
distribution and consequences of adverse impacts resulting from the subprime financial crisis.  
This framework is valuable in that allows us to address the questions: “should we mix?” and “on 
what grounds?” 
 
PART III: Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio) 
 
To conduct the study, I chose to focus on Cuyahoga County in the state of Ohio, where the city 
of Cleveland is located.  Cleveland is considered a “rust belt” city in the Midwest, United States.  
It has been described as “the quintessential blue-collar working class city” due to its significant 
manufacturing base.
 438
   
There were several reasons for choosing Cuyahoga County for empirical research.  First, as a 
county, it is highly segregated, and this is not a recent phenomenon.  Ironically, Cleveland’s 
period of lowest segregation was around the time of the Civil War, when they were referred to as 
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the “immigrant city.”  However, beginning in the 1870s, the phenomenon of “ghettoization” 
began and the “immigrant city” was replaced with the title of the “segregated city.”439  By 1890, 
Cleveland was the second most segregated US city, and third most segregated both in 1940 and 
1990.
440
  Today, Cleveland still ranks within the top ten most segregated cities with a 
dissimilarity index of 79.7 out of 318 eligible metropolitan areas.
441
  Although Cleveland has 
historically been segregated, its black population was relatively small in 1910.
442
  However, after 
World War I, Cleveland’s manufacturing industry grew significantly.  This growth attracted 
large numbers of African Americans from the rural south for employment.  Between 1910 and 
1940, the black population in Cleveland grew by approximately 8% annually.
443
  As African-
Americans migrated to Cleveland, the racial structure became increasingly segregated.  
Beginning in the 1950s, many Cleveland families began to leave the city, first to Cleveland 
suburbs and eventually to other regions or states.
444
  Between 1940 and 1970, the dissimilarity 
index measuring African American segregation showed percentages in the high 80s to low 
90s.
445
  Although segregation in Cleveland has decreased since 1970, the spatial separation 
between blacks and whites continues to be stark.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the segregated nature of 
the city:
446
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
439
 Dillman, Jeffrey D. Subprime Lending in the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. Rep. Columbus: Kirwan 
Institute: The Ohio State University, 2010. Print. (pp. 2-3) 
440
 Cutler, David M., and Edward L. Glaeser. "The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto." Journal of Political 
Economy 107.3 (1999): 455-506. Print. (Page 473) 
441
  This is based upon a dissimilarity measure of white to black.  See "CensusScope -- Segregation: Dissimilarity 
Indices." CensusScope: Census 2000 Data, Charts, Maps, and Rankings. 
442
 Approximately 2% of the population was black in Cleveland at this time.  Cutler and Glaeser, 1999, p. 491 
443
 Ibid. 
444
 Dillman, Jeffrey D. Subprime Lending in the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. Rep. Columbus: Kirwan 
Institute: The Ohio State University, 2010. Print. (Page 1) 
445
 Ibid., page 3 
446
 Source: NEO CANDO (http//necoando.case.edu/)—Prepared by the Center on Urban Povery and Community 
Development, Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences, Case Western Reserve. 
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Figure 3.1: Percentage Black Cuyahoga County 
 
 
The intuition to research Cleveland was also due to the substantial fallout they experienced from 
the subprime financial crisis.  Jeffrey Dillman (2010) reveals that foreclosures in Cleveland more 
than tripled from 4,335 in 1994 to 14,946 in 2007.
447
  Indeed, the Federal Reserve Bank in 
Cleveland, in June 2010, described the situation in dire terms: “Cuyahoga County—one of the 
epicenters of the nation’s foreclosure crisis—has served as a striking example of the devastation 
                                                          
447
 Dillman, 2010, p. 14.  Dillman notes that it is important to account for the decline in manufacturing, and 
increased poverty that took place during this time.  However, he makes the point that this foreclosure growth 
occurred irrespective of the change in the county’s unemployment rate, which displayed increasing and decreasing 
patterns during this period. 
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wrought by the mortgage lending meltdown.”448  In addition to the social costs of high 
foreclosure activity,
449
 the decrease in home values in Cleveland has been significant in the wake 
of the crisis.  Figure 3.2 illustrates the distribution of foreclosures in Cuyahoga County from 
2006 to 2008.
450
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
448
 Coulton, Claudia, Kathryn W. Hexter, April Hirsh, Anne O'Shaughnessy, Francisca G.-C. Richter, and Michael 
Schramm. Facing the Foreclosure Crisis in Greater Cleveland: What Happened and How Communities Are 
Responding. Rep. Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2010. Print. (Page 2) 
449
 Dillman (2010) writes: “The rise in foreclosures has contributed to a widespread decline in the quality of life in 
many Cleveland and Cuyahoga County neighborhoods, as foreclosures lead to increases in vacant and abandoned 
property which contribute to crime and other social costs.  According to an estimate from Cuyahoga County 
Treasurer Jim Rokakis, in 2009 there were approximately 15,000 vacant properties awaiting demolition in the 
County, with 10,000 to 11,000 of those in the City of Cleveland.”  This lengthy quote provides insight into the 
multiplicative effects of foreclosure activity on city, municipality, and household alike.  For example, Lisa Nelson of 
the Federal Reserve in Cleveland writes: “Vacant homes affect more than the property values of remaining 
properties” because individuals see vacant properties as a sign of neighborhood decline.  Further, continues Nelson, 
“Vacant properties also provide a powerful disincentive to real estate developers, since vacant properties signify 
weak market demand.”  See Dillman, 2010, p. 16.  Also see Erickson, David, Carolina Reid, Lisa Nelson, Anne 
O'Shaughnessy, and Alan M. Berube. The Enduring Challenge of Concentrated Poverty in America: Case Studies 
from Communities across the U.S. Richmond, VA.: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 2008. Print. (Page 40) 
450
 Source: NEO CANDO (http//necoando.case.edu/), Cuyahoga County Auditor; Prepared by the Center on Urban 
Povery and Community Development, Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences, Case Western Reserve. 
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Figure 3.2: Percentage Foreclosures Cuyahoga County 
 
 
While the greater subprime and foreclosure fallout is found in states such as Florida, California, 
and Nevada, Ohio did not experience the dramatic home price variability that these states did, 
and yet the economic impact has been substantial.  Thus, the segregation inherent in Cuyahoga 
County, coupled with the difficulty the county suffered in the wake of the subprime crisis make 
Cleveland (Cuyahoga County) a research-worthy region, particularly when exploring the effects 
of adverse impacts with consideration to integration.   
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PART IV: Methodology & Results 
 
Analysis 1 & Results 
In A1, I conduct an investigation of tract-level subprime lending and foreclosure patterns in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  I am specifically testing for associations with dummy coded black and 
white segregated tracts, as well as mixed tracts, while controlling for other predictor variables in 
a multivariate regression framework.    
I aim to explore the impact of the subprime crisis as it relates to both black and white 
communities.  More specifically, A1 explores how racially-stratified communities (segregated 
and mixed) fare—particularly in the wake of a market crisis (i.e., subprime crisis) and the 
accompanying adverse impacts.  The forthcoming regression models are not intended to be a 
study in risk or discrimination, where “empirical specifications employ measures of borrower 
and location characteristics that are hypothesized to affect the loan’s risk through their expected 
impact on mortgage loss attributable to default.”451   However, the models are a study in adverse 
impacts, stratified by racial category, and the additional question of whether adverse impacts 
created additional disadvantage based upon their spatial concentration. 
 
Outcome (Dependent) Variables 
 
My aim is to compare the differences between spatially segmented neighborhoods, as defined by 
census tracts, for both homogeneous white and black communities, and their association with 
percent of subprime or “high-cost” loans and foreclosure rates.452   Subprime loans are 
                                                          
451
 Such was the study of Calem et al. (2003).  See page 396. 
452
 Using a Census Tract as a proxy for a neighborhood has been criticized.  For example, Ade, Kearns, and Mason 
(2007) quote Friedrichs et al. (2003): “The problem of spatial scale is similar to that faced by US neighbourhood 
effects research, where census tracts which are fairly homogenous areas of around 4000 people are used as the 
spatial unit of analysis.  An overview of this field of research stated that ‘such tracts might be too large in scale to 
measure accurately the variables of ‘local neighbourhood’ that actually are affecting residents.’”  See Ade Kearns & 
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particularly important as a dependent variable because of their close association with what is 
considered to be a “predatory loan.”  Aalbers (2009), borrowing from others, notes that predatory 
loans have one or more of the following features:
453
 
1) Higher interest and fees than required to cover the added risk of lending to borrowers 
with credit imperfections; 
2) Abusive terms and conditions that trap borrowers and lead to increased indebtedness;454 
3) Failing to take into account the borrower’s ability to repay the loan; 
4) Violating fair lending laws by targeting women, minorities, and communities of color. 
As Squires (2008) writes: “Clearly not all subprime loans are predatory, but virtually all 
predatory loans are in the subprime market.”455  In addition to observing the distribution of 
subprime loans and foreclosure percentages among white and black segregated tracts, I am also 
interested in their distribution in neighborhoods that display a mix of both white and black 
households.
456
 
For the census tracts in the study, the mean percentage of subprime was nearly 31% with a 
standard deviation of over 19%.  Foreclosure rates for these same tracts had a mean value of over 
8%, with a standard deviation of 5.6%.  The outcome variables were not normally distributed, 
thus they were transformed into their natural log in the regression analysis.
457
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Phil Mason (2007), page 674.  However, in addition to census tracts being the standard research proxy for a 
neighborhood, there is good reason to utilize a tract as representative of neighborhood conditions.  According to the 
US Census Bureau, census tracts are “small, relatively permanent geographic entities” that, when established, are 
“as homogeneous as possible with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions.”  
See "Geographical Areas Reference Manual." US Census Bureau, 13 July 2011. Web. Summer 2011. 
<http://www.census.gov/geo/www/garm.html>.   
453
 Aalbers, Manuel. "Geographies of the Financial Crisis." Royal Geographical Society 41 (2009): 34-42. Print. 
(Page 38) 
454
 Jeffrey Dillman points out the irony in risk-based pricing, where subprime rates are meant to place a price 
premium on the risk being incurred, but in reality, such a premium actually increases the probability of a loan 
default due to affordability.  He writes: “The higher interest rate of a subprime loan makes the loan more expensive 
overall, generally with higher monthly payments and other onerous terms, which themselves make default more 
likely.”  See Dillman, 2010, p. 6 (Italics his) 
455
 Squires, 2008, p. 4 
456
 Each of these dependent variables would be considered a bounded continuous variable.  This is because the 
variable is expressed as a percentage, but conceptually speaking, the variable is binary: either a household gets a 
subprime loan or they don’t; either a household forecloses or they don’t.   
457
 The outcome variables appeared to be normally distributed after the log transformations. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Data of Outcome Variables 
 
Predictor (Independent) Variables 
 
Nine total predictor variables were utilized in the regression model.  Below is a short description 
of each: 
Tract Level Median Income: This dollar figure represents the median household income per 
census tract, where half the households in the tract have a number above it and half have a 
number below it.  This figure is taken from the 2000 census, and is assumed to remain relatively 
unchanged by tract level in the analysis.  Income is a necessary predictor variable for receiving a 
high-cost subprime loan in addition to foreclosing as it is an important credit variable for 
approval in addition to a practical variable as to whether or not the loan payment can continue to 
be paid.
458
 
Education:  Squires et al. (2009) found in a similar study that the percent of individuals with a 
bachelor’s degree in a particular area had strong predictive value as it related to the probability of 
a household receiving a subprime loan.
459
  However, this study differs in that the education 
                                                          
458
 While I am exploring absolute income, credit approval for mortgages takes a relative view by looking at the “debt 
to income ratio,” i.e., how much monthly income is used to service household debt.  Unfortunately, this statistic was 
not available for the study, as such information is often under bank or lender ownership. 
459
 See Squires et al., 2009.  Dan Immargluck (2008) has a similar finding as it relates to education.  He writes: 
“Higher educational attainment is negatively related to the growth of subprime share in a statistically significant 
way.  A one standard deviation increase in education attainment (increasing metropolitan area residents with at least 
a college education by at least 6%, compared to a mean of approximately 26%) is associated with a decrease of 
 
Statistic 
 
% Subprime by 
Tract 2004-2006 
(Purchase and 
Refi) 
 
Unduplicated 
Residential Mortgage 
Foreclosures Filings, 
Percent (2006-2008) 
 
Mean 30.8 8.1 
Median 25.5 7.0 
Mode 10.0 2.0 
St. Deviation 19.6 5.6 
Range 74.0 22.0 
Minimum 1 1 
Maximum 75.0 23.0 
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variable, also a representation of individual’s with a bachelor’s degree (%), is a tract level 
variable, where Squires et al. specifically measured the metropolitan and micropolitan statistical 
areas. 
Income Ratio: This variable is the ratio of the percentage of white household median income to 
black household median income.  While there is already a variable for income in the model, this 
variable makes the contribution of controlling for the ratio of white to black income so as to hold 
constant income inequalities in each racial category in the regression model. 
Percentage White: A continuous measure of the proportion of white households by tract. 
Percentage Black: A continuous measure of the proportion of black households by tract. 
Dummy-Coded Variables—White, Black, and Mixed: Categorical (Dummy) Variables were used 
in the regression model as a measure of segregation in addition to a continuous variable as a 
measure of segregation (% White and % Black).  A dissimilarity index is the most common 
equation utilized to measure segregation.  However, for the purposes of the study, there was 
necessity in creating a variable at the tract level, and while this could be done with a dissimilarity 
index, it would not necessarily represent segregation in a measurable way.
460
  Regarding the 
measurement of segregation, urban scholar Douglas Massey writes:  
In theory you could compute a segregation index measuring block-level segregation 
within different census tracts, but this is probably not what you want.  Segregation really 
occurs at the metropolitan level and is expressed at the tract level by a high concentration 
of minority group members.  [It is best] to measure the percentage black or percentage 
minority in each census tract.
461
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
approximately 1.9 percentage points in subprime share (with a mean of 11.1% and a standard deviation of 5.8%).”  
This is important because “it suggests that subprime lenders achieve greater penetration in markets with weaker 
educational attainment, and that some growth in subprime lending may result from successfully marketing these 
loan products to less sophisticated borrowers.”  See Immargluck, 2008, p. 3.  The relevance of education in 
subprime lending and the negative linear relationship present (higher education is associated with lower rates of 
subprime) helps to explain why some studies suggest that more than half of the subprime loans went to what would 
be considered “prime” borrowers.  See Aalbers, 2009, p. 36. 
460
 Two initial continuous measures were attempted: a measure of dissimilarity (bi/Bi) – (wi/Wi) and the absolute 
value of segregation ABS (B-W).  The former measurement is not necessarily an accurate measurement of tract-
level segregation, and the latter measurement did not prove to be statistically significant.  Hence, the natural log of 
% black or % white by tract was used as a continuous measure by tract. 
461
 Massey, Douglas. "Segregation Index Question." Message to the author. 24 Mar. 2010. E-mail. 
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Three separate dummy variables were constructed for regression analysis: segregated white 
neighborhoods (“Low-mix White”), segregated black neighborhoods (“Low-mix Black”), and 
mixed communities (“High-Mix”).462  To begin, I took the standard deviation and the mean of 
whites and blacks for each tract in Cuyahoga County.  This produced the following: 
Table 3.2: Central Tendency Measures for % Black and % White by Census Tract 
For each tract, if the group was within .5 standard deviation of their mean, a value of “TRUE” 
would be returned.  If not, no value would be returned.
463
  Thus, for each tract, I was specifically 
exploring Pw(42.44≤x≤79.93) & Pb(14.80≤x≤53.22).  If both black and white categories were 
within .5 standard deviations of their mean tract percentage, then the group would be classified 
as “High-Mix.”464  For tracts where the % of white was above the upper .5 standard deviation, 
and within the same tract % black was below the lower .5 standard deviation, this tract would 
return a value of “Low-mix White.”  If the opposite were true, it would return a value of “Low-
mix Black.”465  In sum, this methodology returned 44 tracts displaying “High-Mix”, 230 tracts 
that were “Low-Mix White” and 159 tracts that were “Low-Mix Black.”  This left 68 tracts that 
did not fit into one of the three aforementioned categories.   
Dummy-Coded Variables—Percentage of White and Black by Category: Finally, to observe if a 
“tipping” effect was present, I created categories representative of the percentage of each race.  
                                                          
462
 Dummy Variable Methodology is k-1, where k equals the total number of categories.  Thus, the “reference 
group” in the regression is understood to be tracts that did not display high-white segregation, high-black 
segregation, or mixed-communities.  It is important to note that using “other” as the reference group is not advised 
by Hardy (1993).  However, she also writes: “Readers should keep in mind that, on statistical grounds, the choice of 
reference group is arbitrary; assuming one follows appropriate procedures of interpretation and inference, no choice 
can be ‘wrong.’” See Hardy, Melissa A. Regression with Dummy Variables. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 
1993. Print. (Page 10)  Further, Andy Field (2009) provides an example of dummy coding in SPSS where the 
reference group was “no affiliation,” similar to an expression of “other.”  Thus, coding is important, but more 
important is an accurate interpretation.  See Field, Andy P. Discovering Statistics Using SPSS. Los Angeles [i.e. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009. Print. (Pp. 254-256) 
463
 Computations were made with Excel’s IF function. 
464
 This method helps to account for the overall racial composition of Cuyahoga County, which is approximately 
69% White and 28% Black.  See the NEO CANDO website through Case Western Reserve University: CAN DO - 
Redirection Page. Case Western Reserve University. Web. Summer 2009. <http://neocando.case.edu/>. 
465
 The SPSS functions of “Transform” and “Recode into a different variable” were specifically used to create the 
dummy variables for the regression analysis. 
Race  Mean % Standard 
Deviation 
White 61.2 37.5 
Black 34.0 38.4 
 
110 
 
The variables were dummy-coded under categories of 21 to 40%, 41 to 60%, 61 to 80%, and 81 
to 100%.  This procedure was done for both race categories: white and black.
466
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Summary Statistics for Non-Dummy Predictor Variables 
 
Finally, missing variables of potential value would be credit score and housing value in order to 
determine a “loan-to-value” ratio.  Unfortunately, neither variable could be obtained due to 
proprietary constraints in ascertaining credit score information aggregated at the census tract 
level and the difficulty in properly assessing a housing value for a given property, as loan-to-
value ratios are not collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requirements.
467
  
However, other studies have attempted to use proxy-figures representative of these two ratios, 
and while they have been found to be statistically significant, their coefficient values do not 
suggest that their absence would affect the model outcome or its value in addressing the 
aforementioned research questions.
468
  The absence of these key variables will be addressed in 
the post-research analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
466
 Naturally, no tipping variable could be made for communities displaying a racial mix.  A tract may become 
increasingly white or increasingly black, but it is difficult to measure increasing “mix.” 
467
 The data in the regression analysis is sufficient to explore the distribution of subprime rates and foreclosure rates 
and the association with different racial groups (High-Mix, Low-Mix White, and Low-Mix Black).  However, 
without credit score data and loan-to-value information, we cannot make assertions about whether the neighborhood 
“caused” varying households to receive those loans.  For example, regardless of whether a particular household is 
segregated or not, having poor credit or perhaps a high loan-to-value ratio would likely lead to the household 
receiving a subprime product. 
468
For an example, see Squires and Hyra, 2009. 
Statistic 1999 Tract Median 
Income 
% of Individuals with BA by 
Tract 
% White by 
Tract 
% Black by 
Tract 
Valid 446 446 446 446 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean $41,947.56 23% 64.5% 31.8% 
Median $38,852.50 17.3% 83% 10.8% 
Mode $19,375.00 5%a 96.6%a .32a 
St. Dev. $22,184.36 18.11% 36.8% 37.8% 
Range $191,263 79.9% 99% 99% 
Minimum $8,738 0.0% .56% 0.0% 
Maximum $200,001 79.9% 99.6% 99% 
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Data Screening 
 
Cuyahoga County has a total of 501 census tracts.  Before running a regression on all variables, 
it was important to screen the data as some tracts may possess certain characteristics that would 
exclude it from eligibility in the data analysis.  The following criteria were utilized to assess 
eligibility.  They are as follows: 
1) Tracts were excluded from the analysis where conventional mortgages were less than 
75% of total loans.   
2) Tracts with 35 originations or less were excluded as such a small sample of mortgages 
could skew the ratio of subprime loans to regular prime loans.   
3) Tracts where rental units comprised over 90% of the total available households within a 
given census tract were excluded. 
Criteria #1 was utilized due to the fact that subprime loan percentages were specifically drawn 
from conventional loan data.  Thus, if a high percentage of mortgage loans by tract were not 
conventional, this could misrepresent subprime lending in the area.   Fortunately, there were no 
tracts where conventional loans were less than 75% of total HMDA loans for the years 2004-
2006.
469
  Criteria #2 is a trimming method to ensure that tracts with a small loan volume were 
not included as, similar to criteria #1, the proportion of subprime loans in the tract may be quite 
high even though the absolute volume of lending is low.  This would misrepresent neighborhood 
subprime lending and foreclosure rates.  The number 35 was chosen as this is the lower 10% of 
all conventional home purchase and subprime originations from 2004 to 2006.  Finally, criteria 
#3 was utilized as some neighborhoods were dominated by rental units as opposed to single 
family residences.  Thus, including these tracts would have also misrepresented both the 
subprime lending percentage and foreclosure rates.  In total, 55 census tracts were excluded from 
the regression analysis after the aforementioned screening criteria were employed.
470
 
                                                          
469
 For conventional loans, I am specifically looking at “home purchase loans” and “home refinance loans.”  Home 
purchase loans are intended for the purchase of a property and home refinance loans are intended to utilize the 
equity in one’s residence as a means to refinance the loan (i.e., for a lower rate, cash out of equity, credit card 
consolidation, etc.). 
470
 These tracts are listed in the appendix. 
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Statistical Method 
 
Using PASW/SPSS 17, I constructed a multivariate OLS
471
 regression model to investigate the 
relationship between the proportion of subprime loans and foreclosure rates with the predictor 
variables.  The procedure is a cross-sectional study of explanatory social factors and their ability 
to predict whether a census tract household will a) obtain a subprime or “high-cost” loan and b) 
foreclose on the property.   
Fourteen regression models are utilized in A1, and the equations for each are expressed for the 
dependent variable subprime rate (Table 3.4) and dependent variable foreclosure rate (Table 
3.5).
472
 
The estimated regression equation is: Y=b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + …+bnxn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
471
 “Ordinary Least Squares” is a method used to develop the estimated regression equation that best approximates 
the straight-line between dependent and independent variables.  See Anderson, David R. Essentials of Statistics for 
Business and Economics. [S.l.]: South-Western, 2008. Print. (Page 535) 
472
 For the null hypothesis for each model, I utilize the p-value approach and thus reject Ho if the p-value ≤.  For 
all 14 models, every F-test value was significant at the .001 level.  Thus, we can conclude that a significant 
relationship exists between dependent variables (subprime rate and foreclosure rate) and the corresponding 
independent variables.  Individual contributions towards significance are provided by t-tests (table below). 
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Table 3.4: Models 1-7—Dependent Variable: Subprime Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBPRIME RATE REGRESSION EQUATION NULL HYPOTHESIS 
Model #1 Log of % Subprime=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Log % White) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #2 Log of % Subprime=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy White) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #3 Log of % Subprime=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy 21% to 40% White) + b5(Dummy 41% 
to 60% White) + b6(Dummy 61% to 80% White) 
+ b7 (Dummy 81% to 100% White) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #4 Log of % Subprime=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Log % Black) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #5 Log of % Subprime=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy Black) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #6 Log of % Subprime=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy 21% to 40% Black) + b5(Dummy 41% 
to 60% Black) + b6(Dummy 61% to 80% Black) + 
b7 (Dummy 81% to 100% Black) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #7 Log of % Subprime=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy Mixed) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
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Table 3.5: Models 8-14—Dependent Variable: Foreclosure Rate 
 
Operationalizing “Segregation” 
 
While I am specifically looking at racial segmentation in housing and thus defining “mix” in a 
racial context, the implications for income seem to mirror the terms for racial segmentation and 
mix.
473
  The graph below shows the median income associated with racial category.  As 
evidenced, mixed-race communities also display a median income between Low-Mix White and 
Low-Mix Black tracts.  However, for the sake of the forthcoming research, I will continue to 
define segregation and mix/integration in a racial context. 
                                                          
473
 It should be noted that separate regressions with dummy variables for “white”, “black”, and “mixed” identified 
by income, not race, were tested.  However, they were not found to be statistically significant.  Nevertheless, I have 
defined from the onset residential segmentation in racial categories, not income, although the overlap of the two is 
present and the two categories are often used interchangeably in the literature. 
FORECLOSURE 
RATE 
REGRESSION EQUATION NULL HYPOTHESIS 
Model #8 Log of % Foreclosure=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Log % White) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #9 Log of % Foreclosure=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy White) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #10 Log of % Foreclosure=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy 21% to 40% White) + b5(Dummy 41% 
to 60% White) + b6(Dummy 61% to 80% White) 
+ b7 (Dummy 81% to 100% White) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #11 Log of % Foreclosure=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Log % Black) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #12 Log of % Foreclosure=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy Black) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #13 Log of % Foreclosure=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy 21% to 40% Black) + b5(Dummy 41% 
to 60% Black) + b6(Dummy 61% to 80% Black) + 
b7 (Dummy 81% to 100% Black) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
Model #14 Log of % Foreclosure=b0 + b1(Log Income) + 
b2(Log Education) + b3(Log Income Ratio) + 
b4(Dummy Mixed) 
Ho: b1=b2=…=bp=0 
Ha: One or more parameters≠0 
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Figure 3.3: Tract Median Income by Race 
 
 
Before attempting to address my research questions through the regression analysis, I first 
explored the distribution of the following variables among mixed (High-Mix), segregated white 
communities (Low-Mix White), and segregated black communities (Low-Mix Black).  Tables 5-
7 summarize the categories below with specific attention towards foreclosure and subprime 
percentage, tract median income, the percent of housing burden by tract,
474
 the percent of 
individuals with a bachelor’s degree by tract, the ratio of credit denial to credit approval by tract, 
the percent of white and black by tract, and finally the absolute value of the difference between 
the proportion of white and black by tract.   
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 The burden of paying for housing is measured by comparing housing expenses and household income. When the 
cost of the housing is 30% or more of the household income, this is considered a “housing cost burden.”  The 
number and percent of owner households paying 30% or more of their household income for gross rent is provided.  
Selected monthly owner costs include mortgage payments, real estate taxes, insurance on the property, utilities, and 
fuels.  Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census derived from NEO CANDO system, Center on Urban Poverty and 
Community Development, MSASS, Case Western Reserve University (http://neocando.case.edu). 
 
116 
 
Table 3.6: Attributes of Mixed Tracts 
 
Table 3.7: Attributes of White Segregated Tracts 
 
Table 3.8: Attributes of Black Segregated Tracts 
 
These tables illustrate the variation in characteristics between groups, particularly as it relates to 
the mean percentage of subprime loans and mean foreclosure rates.  White segregated 
neighborhoods displayed the lowest levels of subprime and foreclosure percentages at 16.6% and 
4.1% accordingly.  On the other end of the spectrum, black segregated communities had the 
highest mean percentages: 54% subprime and 13.9% foreclosure.  Finally, communities that 
displayed a “mix” of both races had a mean subprime percentage of 29.7% and mean foreclosure 
Race Category Mean 95% CI: Lower 95% CI: Upper St.Deviation Range
Foreclosure % 8.7% 7.5% 10.0% 4.7% 20.0%
Subprime % 29.7% 25.8% 33.6% 15.1% 59.0%
Tract Median Income 36,136$            31,746$                      40,527$                    16,995$                    64,201$              
% Housing Burden 23% 21% 26% 10% 56%
% of Individuals with BA 27% 22% 32% 21% 70%
Credit Denial to Credit Approval (HMDA 2004-2008) 15.4% 13.6% 17.1% 6.8% 32.0%
% White by Tract 64.2% 61.5% 66.8% 10.3% 35.5%
% Black by Tract 28.8% 25.7% 32.0% 12.2% 38.3%
Absolute Value proportion white - proportion black 36.6% 31.6% 41.6% 19.3% 61.0%
Race Category Mean 95% CI: Lower 95% CI: Upper St.Deviation Range
Foreclosure % 4.1% 3.8% 4.5% 3.0% 15.0%
Subprime % 16.6% 15.5% 17.8% 8.9% 50.0%
Tract Median Income 53,820$            50,789$                      51,248$                    23,022$                    180,765$           
% Housing Burden 21% 20% 22% 4% 33%
% of Individuals with BA 30% 28% 33% 17% 78%
Credit Denial to Credit Approval (HMDA 2004-2008) 9.3% 8.7% 9.9% 4.6% 22.0%
% White by Tract 94.2% 93.6% 94.7% 4.4% 18.9%
% Black by Tract 3.0% 2.5% 3.5% 3.5% 14.5%
Absolute Value proportion white - proportion black 91.2% 90.1% 92.2% 7.7% 30.0%
Race Category Mean 95% CI: Lower 95% CI: Upper St.Deviation Range
Foreclosure % 13.9% 13.3% 14.6% 4.0% 20.0%
Subprime % 54.0% 51.8% 56.2% 12.6% 53.0%
Tract Median Income 27,331$            25,470$                      29,191$                    10,680$                    56,762$              
% Housing Burden 32.9857 31.1947 34.7768 10.2808 59.68
% of Individuals with BA 11% 9% 13% 9% 48%
Credit Denial to Credit Approval (HMDA 2004-2008) 26.0% 25.0% 27.0% 6.4% 33.0%
% White by Tract 11.4% 9.0% 13.7% 13.4% 41.4%
% Black by Tract 87.5% 85.0% 90.0% 54.5% 44.5%
Absolute Value proportion white - proportion black 76.1% 71.3% 81.0% 27.7% 84.0%
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rate of 8.7%.
475
  In addition to income disparities, another difference was education: black 
segregated tracts showed the average percentage of individuals with a bachelor’s degree to be 
11%, where white segregated and mixed tracts had mean percentages of 30% and 27%.  Credit 
quality is, on average, lower in black segregated communities as evidenced by the ratio of loan 
approvals to denials. 
These mean percentage tables reflect outcome disparities between these three neighborhood 
categories (High-Mix, Low-Mix White, Low-Mix Black).  However, to understand the 
association between neighborhood attributes and subprime and foreclosure rates, we utilize a 
multivariate regression model.  Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present the results from the analysis of 
models 1-7 with the percentage of subprime by tract as the dependent variable, and models 8-14 
with the percentage of foreclosures by tract as the dependent variable.   
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 This evidence matches research from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  Describing this research, Jeffrey 
Dillman writes: “the neighborhoods with the highest foreclosure rates had the highest percentage of high-cost loans 
and the highest percentage of African American residents.”  See Dillman, 2010, p. 15 
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Table 3.9: Regression Output—Dependent Variable: Subprime % by Tract: 2004-2006 
 
 
Predictor Variable: β Standard 
Error β 
 Model #1 (Adj. R-Squared=.748)  
Income -.499*** .063 
Education -.296*** .034 
Income Ratio -.039 (N.S.) .050 
% White -.164*** .017 
 Model #2 (Adj. R-Squared=.762)  
Income       -.314***        .066 
Education -.373*** .031 
Income Ratio -.109** .047 
Dummy White Segregation -.490*** .045 
 Model #3 (Adj. R-Squared=.789)  
Income -.313*** .063 
Education -.348*** .031 
Income Ratio -.069 (N.S.) .045 
Dummy % White 21-40% .099 (N.S.) .079 
Dummy % White 41-60% -.133* .079 
Dummy % White 61-80% -.405*** .060 
Dummy % White 81-100% -.624*** .056 
 Model #4 (Adj. R-Squared=.810)  
Income -.246*** .058 
Education -.359*** .028 
Income Ratio -.070* .042 
% Black .200*** .013 
 Model #5 (Adj. R-Squared=.769)  
Income       -.470***        .060 
Education -.315*** .032 
Income Ratio -.048 (N.S.) .047 
Dummy Black Segregation       .522*** .045 
 Model #6 (Adj. R-Squared=.792)  
Income -.390*** .059 
Education -.364*** .031 
Income Ratio -.057 (N.S.) .045 
Dummy % Black 21-40% .228** .074 
Dummy % Black 41-60% .541*** .075 
Dummy % Black 61-80% .703*** .070 
Dummy % Black 81-100% .518*** .051 
 Model #7 (Adj. R-Squared=.691)  
Income -.599*** .071 
Education -.391*** .037 
Income Ratio -.152** .054 
Dummy Mixed .040 (N.S.) .062 
   
NOTE: *p≤.05. **p≤.01. ***p≤.001. N.S.=Not-significant 
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Table 3.10: Regression Output—Dependent Variable: Foreclosure Rate % by Tract: 2006-2008  
 
Predictor Variable: β Standard 
Error β 
 Model #8 (Adj. R-Squared=.583)  
Income -.561*** .092 
Education -.245*** .049 
Income Ratio -.078(N.S.) .073 
% White -.179*** .025 
 Model #9 (Adj. R-Squared=.639)  
Income       -.266***        .092 
Education -.325*** .046 
Income Ratio -.142** .066 
Dummy White Segregation -.689*** .063 
 Model #10 (Adj. R-Squared=.646)  
Income -.268** .092 
Education -.311*** .046 
Income Ratio -.122* .067 
Dummy % White 21-40% .155(N.S.) .111 
Dummy % White 41-60% -.090(N.S.) .116 
Dummy % White 61-80% -.316*** .088 
Dummy % White 81-100% -.762*** .082 
 Model #11 (Adj. R-Squared=.700)  
Income -.189** .083 
Education -.307*** .040 
Income Ratio -.090(N.S.) .060 
% Black .271*** .018 
 Model #12 (Adj. R-Squared=.604)  
Income       -.527***        .090 
Education -.264*** .047 
Income Ratio -.085(N.S.) .070 
Dummy Black Segregation .579*** .068 
 Model #13 (Adj. R-Squared=.639)  
Income -.416*** .088 
Education -.332*** .047 
Income Ratio -.099(N.S.) .067 
Dummy % Black 21-40% .339** .111 
Dummy % Black 41-60% .643*** .113 
Dummy % Black 61-80% .891*** .105 
Dummy % Black 81-100% .561*** .077 
 Model #14 (Adj. R-Squared=.534)  
Income -.626*** .099 
Education -.372*** .052 
Income Ratio -.213** .075 
Dummy Mixed .187** .087 
   
NOTE: *p≤.05. **p≤.01. ***p≤.001. N.S.=Not-significant 
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Most models reflect robust findings.  When interpreting log transformations for both dependent 
and independent variables, bp or “beta” is the elasticity
476
 of Y (Dependent Variable) with a 
change in X (Independent Variable).  Thus, a one unit change in the explanatory variable leads to 
a “b” percentage change in the dependent, or explained, variable.  It should be pointed out that 
the dependent variables being interpreted were originally percentages as well (subprime percent; 
foreclosure percent).  Thus, while they are elastic and can be interpreted as such, we must not 
confuse interpreting a percentage point increase in subprime or foreclosure rates (correct 
interpretation) with a percentage increase in subprime or foreclosure rates (incorrect 
interpretation).   
After including other predictor variables, the models reveal that the percentage of both white and 
black individuals by tract is strongly associated with whether or not a given household will 
receive a subprime loan.  The same is true in predicting foreclosure rates.  A one unit increase in 
the percentage of white households by tract will decrease subprime and foreclosure percentages 
by .16 and .18.  However, when we utilize a dummy coded variable as a predictor, the slope 
coefficient is far greater: moving from 0 to 1, or going from a non-white segregated tract to a 
white-segregated tract decreases subprime and foreclosure percentages by .49 and .69 
accordingly.  The exact opposite can be said for black segregated tracts, as the percentage of 
African Americans by tract and dummy-coded black segregated tracts are strongly and positively 
associated with subprime and foreclosures.  A one unit increase in the percentage of African-
Americans by tract will increase subprime and foreclosure percentages by .20 and .27.  Further, 
moving from 0 to 1, or going from a non-black segregated tract to a black-segregated tract 
increases subprime and foreclosure percentages by .52 and .58.   
To test for tipping, models 3, 6, 10 and 13 utilize dummy-coded variables representing 
neighborhoods reflecting a particular percentage of a given racial category.  Tracts with 
percentage white between 41-60%, 61-80%, and 81-100% were found to be statistically 
significant and negatively associated with both subprime and foreclosure percentages.
477
  Insofar 
as predicting subprime, neighborhoods with percentage of whites between 21-40% were not 
found to be statistically significant, but the coefficients for 41-60%, 61-80%, and 81-100% were 
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 Elasticity is the ratio of the percent change of one variable to the percent change in another variable.  It is 
considered a unit free measurements used to compare coefficient. 
477
 For foreclosures, only 61-80% and 81-100% were statistically significant.   
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-.13, -.41, and -.62 accordingly.  In other words, the more white segregated tracts became, the 
more negative the association with subprime percentages.  The same phenomenon is present with 
foreclosures.  While tracts with white percentages between 21% and 60% were not statistically 
significant, the coefficients for 61-80% and 81-100% were -.32 and -.76 accordingly.  To 
summarize, segregated white tracts show an increasingly negative association regarding the 
likelihood of receiving a subprime loan or foreclosing. 
For dummy-coded black percentages by tract, we see a positive relationship between higher 
percentages and subprime and foreclosure rates.  Tracts with the percentage black between 21-
40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, and 81-100% were all statistically significant and positively associated 
with both subprime and foreclosure percentages.  Regarding subprime, neighborhoods with 
percentages of blacks between 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, and 81-100% showed corresponding 
coefficients of .23, .54, .70 and .52.  With regard to foreclosures, coefficients for dummy-coded 
categories of 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, and 81-100% were .34, .64, .89, and .56.  While 
increasing percentages of African-Americans by community are positively associated with 
subprime and foreclosure, an interesting finding is that the hyper-segregation of blacks (tracts 
where % black is between 81-100%) show a substantial coefficient decrease in subprime and 
foreclosure—even lower than the previous two-dummy coded levels of 41-60% and 61-80% for 
both subprime and foreclosures.  Thus, hyper-segregated African-American tracts, although still 
positively associated with subprime and foreclosure rates, reflect a lower likelihood of a given 
household receiving a subprime loan or foreclosing on a property.  In general, however, the more 
black segregated a tract becomes, the greater the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan or 
foreclosing. 
The other aim of this model was to create a dummy-coded variable for communities that display 
a “mix” of both white and black households.  As it relates to subprime, moving from a 0 (not 
mixed) to 1 (mixed) community is not statistically significant.
478
  However, as it relates to the 
likelihood of a household foreclosing, moving from a 0 (not mixed) to 1 (mixed) is statistically 
significant and positively associated with foreclosures (coefficient .19).  Although this 
coefficient is not as high as a black-segregated community (.58), it is still positively associated 
with foreclosures.  To summarize, tracts displaying racial mix have higher subprime and 
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 Interestingly, though, the coefficient is positive at .04, although somewhat negligible due to its size. 
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foreclosure percentages than white segregated tracts and lower subprime and foreclosure 
percentages than black segregated tracts.   
 
Analysis 2 & Results 
 
The results from A1 reveal a large disparity in subprime lending and foreclosure rates between 
white and black segregated communities.  Living in a black segregated community is strongly 
associated with subprime and foreclosures.  While living in a segregated minority neighborhood 
strongly predicts the likelihood of receiving a subprime loan and subsequently foreclosing, we 
are restricted from claims of discrimination or subprime lending as a function of place due to 
limited data to control for in the model (credit scores/loan to value ratio).  Thus, to effectively 
measure for equity and efficiency, Analysis 2 is conducted to allow for a more comprehensive 
interpretation of these results. 
In A2, my aim is to explore the relationship between foreclosure rates and home sale prices.  
Moreover, I look at block groups stratified by the aforementioned racial categories: High-Mix, 
Low-Mix White, and Low-Mix Black.  In 2006 and 2007, foreclosures in Cuyahoga County 
totaled 28,889.  The explanatory variable is foreclosure rate by block group to show an incidence 
of foreclosure (proportion of mortgages that foreclosed).
479
  Further, I include median income by 
block-group as an explanatory variable.  For the dependent variable, A2 takes median home sale 
data from 2006 to 2008 at block group level
480
 where the “sale” is a standard warranty deed of 
trust representing a normal market transaction.
481
   This study is important to measure the effect 
that foreclosures have on a given area.  Specifically, I am interested in detecting a foreclosure 
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 Swanstrom, Todd, Karen Chapple, and Dan Immargluck. Regional Resilience in the Face of Foreclosures: 
Evidence from Six Metropolitan Areas. Working paper no. 2009-05. Berkeley: Berkeley Institute of Urban and 
Regional Development, 2009. Print. 
480
 Block groups are a more granular measure of space.  They are tracts within a census tract typically consisting of 
approximately 600 to 3,000 individuals. 
481
 Thus, this leaves out any sheriff sales or auctions where foreclosed properties are sold.  Data was retrieved from 
Northern Ohio Data and Information Services (NODIS). 2006 to 2008 Home Sale Prices Cuyahoga County, Ohio. 8 
July 2009. Raw data. Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs (Cleveland State University), Cleveland. 
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threshold rate, where once the foreclosure percentage has reached a certain point within a 
neighborhood, an accelerated asset depreciating effect is noticeable. 
To be clear, the context by which I am operationalizing the terms ‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’ is 
related to the adverse effects of foreclosures.  While foreclosure effects can take on various 
forms, I specifically aim to measure the effect foreclosures have on household values (and values 
of homes within the area) related to aforementioned racial categories.  For dispersal strategies to 
be substantiated on equity grounds, we must show that segregated black households are 
disadvantaged by remaining in their community, or conversely, that they would be advantaged 
by being dispersed.  The claim of efficiency is more complicated.   Since we cannot control for 
credit score data which is an important variable in determining if a household receives a 
subprime loan, even if we were to assume that the same segregated black households at risk of 
foreclosing would foreclose if they were dispersed, we ask: Would being in a mixed or even 
predominantly white neighborhood protect the home values for all by ameliorating the asset 
depreciating effect of foreclosures due to being in a more economically stable neighborhood?  
Second, would this be considered socially efficient?  In other words, if we assume that 
segregated households that foreclosed in the crisis would still foreclose if they had been 
dispersed into High-Mix or Low-Mix White neighborhoods, would the gains experienced by the 
Low-Mix Black households exceed the losses experienced by the High-Mix or Low-Mix White 
households?  To test for this, we are specifically looking to see if there is a non-linear 
relationship between foreclosure rates and home sale prices.  Presumably, a non-linear effect 
would be illustrated as follows: the foreclosure rate would have a negative linear relationship to 
home sales (as foreclosure rate goes up, home sale prices go down).  However, we can square 
foreclosure rates in order to magnify the effect and include this as a variable (quadratic term).  
Specifically, we are interested in the quadratic term displaying a non-linear shape where after 
exceeding a particular foreclosure rate threshold, the effect on home sale prices is accelerated 
and ceases to be a linear negative relationship.  From a policy standpoint, this is important 
because if the quadratic equation is not statistically significant (assuming linearity), then 
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advocating dispersal would simply amount to redistributing foreclosure problems to other areas 
(mixed or segregated white areas).
482
  Graph 3.1 illustrates this concept: 
 
Graph 3.1: Foreclosure Rate & Home Sale Prices—Illustration of Non-Linear Effect  
 
 
To provide an example, suppose a 10% foreclosure rate had an asset depreciating effect of 
$500,000 in total value on other homes within a black segregated neighborhood.  If these 
households were redistributed across segregated white and mixed neighborhoods in the city, and 
assuming they still foreclosed, would the effect be as high as a $500,000 loss?  If redistributing 
would create a loss as high as $500,000 (or higher), then dispersal as a means to ameliorate the 
effect of concentrated foreclosures is simply a ‘zero-sum’ arrangement and would not be 
considered socially efficient.  However, if it can be demonstrated that non-black residentially 
segregated communities may offer a protective mechanism for home values (loss < $500,000) of 
otherwise vulnerable and segregated households through dispersal, then we can claim efficiency 
assuming that in the end such transfers register a higher level of gain for Low-Mix Black 
households than the loss experienced for High-Mix or Low-Mix White neighborhoods.  This 
would represent an economic benefit to mixing. 
To measure this, I utilize a quadratic regression equation: 
Y=a + bX + cX
2
 + d 
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 However, it is important to note that a linear relationship would still constitute an argument for adverse impacts 
(research question #1), although we would not be able to make the claim of social efficiency based upon the 
evidence. 
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Where: 
Y=Home Sale Price (Value) 
X=Foreclosure Rate 
X
2
=Foreclosure Rate squared 
d=Median Income for Block Group 
The regressions, stratified by racial category, produced the following results: 
Table 3.11: Quadratic Analysis Regression Output (A2)—Dependent Variable: Home Sale Price (Value) 
 
High-Mix and Low-Mix White communities explain a relatively high percentage of the variation 
in median home sales from 2006 to 2008 in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  While we see less of the 
variation explained in the Low-Mix Black category, all three categories were statistically 
significant at the 99% level (<.001).  Most notably, we would have expected the coefficient of 
foreclosure rate to be negative (as it is) but we would not necessarily have expected the 
coefficient on the quadratic term to be positive.  This does indeed suggest a non-linear curve, but 
not necessarily in the shape we would have originally predicted.  Instead, the coefficient on the 
quadratic function suggests the following shape:
 483
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 Graph 2 represents data for all block groups.  The graph begins with the assumption that a home value is $100k, 
and utilizes the regression output to compute the marginal impact of a 1 percent increase in foreclosure rate from 0% 
to 13%.   
Racial Category R-Squared (A)Constant  (B)Foreclosure 
Rate (β) 
(C)Foreclosure 
Rate Squared 
(β) 
(D)Household 
Income (β) 
      
High-Mix .599 83,709.60*** -12,911.60*** 401.84*** 2.06*** 
Low-Mix White .642 44,467.39*** -22,758.31*** 1468.45*** 3.06*** 
Low-Mix Black  .372 86,536.34*** -13276.37*** 481.19*** 1.64*** 
      
      
NOTE: *p≤.05. **p≤.01. ***p≤.001. N.S.=Not-significant 
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Graph 3.2: Foreclosure Rate & Home Sale Prices—Illustration of Non-Linear Effect from Output  
 
 
This implies that as a foreclosure rate increases within a particular neighborhood, each additional 
percentage of foreclosure has only marginal diminishing effect.  This finding is consistent with 
Rogers and Winter (2009) who, after studying the effects of foreclosures on home values in St. 
Louis, Missouri, found that foreclosures have diminishing marginal impact within a given time 
period.  Similar to my study, when they introduced a quadratic term into the regression model, it 
had a positive coefficient (while the foreclosure coefficient was negative).  They concluded: 
“This result is somewhat surprising because it suggests that neighborhoods are self-stabilizing, at 
least with respect to foreclosures, which is in contrast to the scenario of neighborhood tipping 
points.”484  They go on to write: 
Most significantly, our findings suggest that there does not appear to be a tipping point 
where at some threshold the neighborhood sales decline rapidly.  In fact, the marginal 
impact of foreclosures seems to decline with an increase in the number of foreclosures, 
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 Rogers, William H., and William Winter. "The Impact of Foreclosures on Neighboring Housing Sales." Journal 
of Real Estate Research 31.4 (2009): 455-79. (Page 473) 
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suggesting that at some point neighborhoods are self-stabilizing; although, we are unable 
to control for causality.
485
 
We can use simple calculus to determine the turning point (lowest point of the parabolic curve) 
for each racial category.
486
  Using the parameters from the regression analysis in A2, consider 
the following table for Low-Mix Black communities: 
Table 3.12: Estimated Y for Low-Mix Black Communities
487
 
 
The formula B/-2C2 tells us that we see a diminishing marginal impact of foreclosure rates from 
0% to 13.8% (the turning point).   
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 Ibid., pages 473-474. 
486
 The formula is B/-2C2.  See Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Introductory Econometrics: a Modern Approach. Mason, 
OH: Thomson/South-Western, 2006. Print. (Page 715) 
487
 The “scale” is a foreclosure rate of 0 to 23%, as this mirrors the scale of the rate of aggregate foreclosure from 
2006 to 2007.  The “turning point” foreclosure rate is highlighted.  For tables 12, 13, and 14—Y=Housing Sales 
(Value), a=Y-intercept, b=FR 2006 to 2007, c=FR 2006 to 2007 (squared), and d=median household income. 
IF FR is FR-squared A B C D Bx1 Cx2 Estimated Y
0 0 86536 -13276 481 2 0 0 86538
1 1 86536 -13276 481 2 -13276 481 73743
2 4 86536 -13276 481 2 -26553 1925 61910
3 9 86536 -13276 481 2 -39829 4331 51039
4 16 86536 -13276 481 2 -53106 7699 41131
5 25 86536 -13276 481 2 -66382 12030 32186
6 36 86536 -13276 481 2 -79658 17323 24202
7 49 86536 -13276 481 2 -92935 23578 17181
8 64 86536 -13276 481 2 -106211 30796 11123
9 81 86536 -13276 481 2 -119488 38976 6027
10 100 86536 -13276 481 2 -132764 48119 1893
11 121 86536 -13276 481 2 -146040 58224 -1278
12 144 86536 -13276 481 2 -159317 69291 -3487
13 169 86536 -13276 481 2 -172593 81321 -4734
14 196 86536 -13276 481 2 -185870 94313 -5018
15 225 86536 -13276 481 2 -199146 108268 -4340
16 256 86536 -13276 481 2 -212422 123185 -2700
17 289 86536 -13276 481 2 -225699 139064 -97
18 324 86536 -13276 481 2 -238975 155906 3468
19 361 86536 -13276 481 2 -252252 173710 7996
20 400 86536 -13276 481 2 -265528 192476 13486
21 441 86536 -13276 481 2 -278804 212205 19938
22 484 86536 -13276 481 2 -292081 232896 27353
23 529 86536 -13276 481 2 -305357 254550 35730
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For Low-Mix White communities, this turning point occurs much earlier.  Using the parameters 
from the regression analysis in A2, consider the following table for Low-Mix White 
communities: 
 
Table 3.13: Estimated Y for Low-Mix White Communities 
 
Low-Mix White communities display a negative marginal effect on housing values for 
foreclosures rates between 0 and 7.75% (turning point).  Interestingly, we see the most “linear” 
effect of foreclosures in neighborhoods that display mix.  Using the parameters from the 
regression analysis in A2, consider the following table for High-Mix communities: 
IF FR is FR-squared A B C D Bx1 Cx2 Estimated Y
0 0 44467 -22758 1468 3 0 0 44470
1 1 44467 -22758 1468 3 -22758 1468 23181
2 4 44467 -22758 1468 3 -45517 5874 4828
3 9 44467 -22758 1468 3 -68275 13216 -10588
4 16 44467 -22758 1468 3 -91033 23495 -23068
5 25 44467 -22758 1468 3 -113792 36711 -32610
6 36 44467 -22758 1468 3 -136550 52864 -39215
7 49 44467 -22758 1468 3 -159308 71954 -42884
8 64 44467 -22758 1468 3 -182066 93981 -43615
9 81 44467 -22758 1468 3 -204825 118944 -41410
10 100 44467 -22758 1468 3 -227583 146845 -36268
11 121 44467 -22758 1468 3 -250341 177682 -28188
12 144 44467 -22758 1468 3 -273100 211457 -17172
13 169 44467 -22758 1468 3 -295858 248168 -3219
14 196 44467 -22758 1468 3 -318616 287816 13670
15 225 44467 -22758 1468 3 -341375 330401 33497
16 256 44467 -22758 1468 3 -364133 375923 56261
17 289 44467 -22758 1468 3 -386891 424382 81961
18 324 44467 -22758 1468 3 -409649 475778 110599
19 361 44467 -22758 1468 3 -432408 530110 142173
20 400 44467 -22758 1468 3 -455166 587380 176684
21 441 44467 -22758 1468 3 -477924 647586 214133
22 484 44467 -22758 1468 3 -500683 710730 254518
23 529 44467 -22758 1468 3 -523441 776810 297840
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Table 3.14: Estimated Y for High-Mix Communities 
 
Foreclosures in High-Mix block groups display a negative marginal effect on housing values for 
foreclosures rates between 0 and 16.07% (turning point).  Assuming neighborhood foreclosures 
were to increase, this table suggests that communities displaying mix have a more linear asset-
depreciating effect than Low-Mix White or Low-Mix Black block groups.  With this 
information, we can now explore the implications of the empirical analysis on our research 
questions and evaluate claims of equity and efficiency for Cuyahoga County. 
 
PART V: Conclusion & Discussion 
 
The Evaluative Integration Framework, and more specifically the considerations of equity and 
efficiency borrowed from George Galster, reminds us that we can support mixing on equity 
grounds if the disadvantaged group, which are segregated black tracts for the purposes of this 
IF FR is FR-squared A B C D Bx1 Cx2 Estimated Y
0 0 83710 -12912 402 2 0 0 83712
1 1 83710 -12912 402 2 -12912 402 71202
2 4 83710 -12912 402 2 -25823 1607 59496
3 9 83710 -12912 402 2 -38735 3617 48593
4 16 83710 -12912 402 2 -51646 6429 38495
5 25 83710 -12912 402 2 -64558 10046 29200
6 36 83710 -12912 402 2 -77470 14466 20708
7 49 83710 -12912 402 2 -90381 19690 13021
8 64 83710 -12912 402 2 -103293 25718 6137
9 81 83710 -12912 402 2 -116204 32549 56
10 100 83710 -12912 402 2 -129116 40184 -5220
11 121 83710 -12912 402 2 -142028 48623 -9693
12 144 83710 -12912 402 2 -154939 57865 -13363
13 169 83710 -12912 402 2 -167851 67911 -16228
14 196 83710 -12912 402 2 -180762 78761 -18290
15 225 83710 -12912 402 2 -193674 90414 -19548
16 256 83710 -12912 402 2 -206586 102871 -20003
17 289 83710 -12912 402 2 -219497 116132 -19654
18 324 83710 -12912 402 2 -232409 130196 -18501
19 361 83710 -12912 402 2 -245320 145064 -16545
20 400 83710 -12912 402 2 -258232 160736 -13784
21 441 83710 -12912 402 2 -271144 177211 -10221
22 484 83710 -12912 402 2 -284055 194491 -5853
23 529 83710 -12912 402 2 -296967 212573 -682
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study, lose well-being by residing with other members of their group and/or gain well-being by 
residing with members of the advantaged group (represented by High-Mix or Low-Mix White 
tracts).  This framework also reminds us that mixing can be supported on efficiency grounds 
when the social welfare of both groups (black segregated and white segregated communities) 
exhibit a positive net gain in the mixing process. Thus, to determine “efficiency”—we are 
specifically looking for a greater level of social well-being when the benefits of mixing are 
weighed for both groups. 
 
Question #1: Measuring Equity 
 
The results of the empirical study reveals disparate impacts between both segregated black 
communities and segregated white communities, implying a very clear risk associated with 
segregated communities.  This is consistent with the Galsterian definition of adverse impacts in 
addition to the literature that asserted the influence of “place” in exacerbating disadvantage in the 
subprime financial crisis.  “Low-Mix Black” tracts were found to be statistically significant and 
positively associated with higher percentages of subprime loans and higher percentages of 
foreclosures.  
For illustrative purposes, we might suppose that homes within a segregated black neighborhood 
are each worth $100,000.  Using the parameters provided in the regression model in A2, we can 
illustrate the impact of an increasing foreclosure rate by racial category as follows: 
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Table 3.15: Regression Parameters by Racial Category for Hypothetical Example 
 
   
This table illustrates that as foreclosures are concentrated in Low-Mix Black areas, we see a 
rapid asset-depreciating effect.  While there is no evidence here of a threshold effect as we might 
have expected—it is clear that as foreclosures rise in a given area, housing values decrease.488  
A1 clearly showed that increasing foreclosure rates are positively associated with the increasing 
percentage of black segregation in Cuyahoga County (i.e., they are not evenly distributed among 
the racial categories).  Figure 3.4 shows the differences in mean foreclosure rates by racial 
category for Cuyahoga County (2006-2007): 
 
 
                                                          
488
 Caution must be exercised, however, before concluding this is clear evidence of an adverse impact for Low-Mix 
Black tracts.  Indeed, concentrated foreclosures in Low-Mix Black neighborhoods display a greater asset-
depreciating effect than neighborhoods with lower foreclosure rates.  However, economists are often more interested 
in exploring the marginal impact, and based upon this, Low-Mix White areas would be more vulnerable than Low-
Mix Black areas should they happen to have a higher foreclosure rate.  For example, based upon the parameters 
above, if all three racial categories had equal mean foreclosure rates of 5%, Low-Mix White neighborhoods would 
have the highest asset-depreciating effect.  Thus, while there is indeed a larger mean value of foreclosures in Low-
Mix Black neighborhoods, when we consider the marginal analysis based upon the parameters then a legitimate case 
could be made that Low-Mix White neighborhoods, should they have a higher mean foreclosure rate, suffer greater 
adverse impacts than Low-Mix Black or High-Mix neighborhoods. 
LOW MIX BLACK
FR
Median Home 
Value     
(assume 100k)
0 100,000
1 87,205             
2 75,372             
3 64,502             
4 54,594             
5 45,648             
6 37,665             
7 30,644             
8 24,585             
9 19,489             
10 15,355             
11 12,184             
12 9,975               
LOW MIX WHITE
FR
Median Home 
Value
(assume=100k)
0 100,000            
1 78,710             
2 60,357             
3 44,941             
4 32,462             
5 22,920             
6 16,314             
7 12,646             
8 11,914             
9 14,120             
10 19,262             
11 27,341             
12 38,357             
HIGH MIX
FR
Median Home 
Value
(assume=100k)
0 100,000
1 87,490
2 75,784
3 64,882
4 54,783
5 45,488
6 36,997
7 29,309
8 22,425
9 16,345
10 11,068
11 6,595
12 2,926
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Figure 3.4: Foreclosure Rates in Cuyahoga County by Racial Category
489
 
 
Thus, assuming a Low-Mix Black neighborhood were to experience the mean foreclosure rate 
(11.31% rounded down to 11%), then homes in that area would experience a loss of equity in the 
amount of $87,816 ($100,000 – $12,184).  Therefore, a given household is disadvantaged by 
being in a Low-Mix Black neighborhood where mortgage foreclosures are clustered thus 
enhancing the asset depreciating effect for both foreclosed and non-foreclosed households.  
Granted, as mentioned earlier, there is a diminishing marginal effect with increasing 
foreclosures.  However, assuming an average foreclosure rate of over 11% for Low-Mix Black 
communities, we can anticipate a significant loss in housing stock value.  Here, then, we have an 
                                                          
489
 It may be noted that these figures vary, slightly, from the household attributes found in Tables 6, 7, and 8 of this 
chapter.  However, the difference is that Figure 4 reflects block groups and Tables 6, 7, and 8 reflect census tracts.  
Thus, although the same methodology was used for determining Low-Mix White, Low-Mix Black, and High-Mix 
racial categories—moving from one spatial level to another accounts for the small differences.  Nonetheless, 
whether in a census tract or block group, the Low-Mix Black racial group has a disproportionately larger foreclosure 
rate than the other categories. 
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equity argument for mixing on the grounds of being disadvantaged by remaining in a Low-Mix 
Black neighborhood (by virtue of being in an area with concentrated foreclosures).   
Further, the claim of equity can be made if a given household in a Low-Mix Black neighborhood 
were to be dispersed to a High-Mix or Low-Mix White neighborhood.  Suppose we choose the 
latter—assuming a Low-Mix White neighborhood were to experience the mean foreclosure rate 
(2.99%)—then based upon the same assumptions, homes in that area would experience a loss of 
equity in the amount of $55,059 ($100,000-$44,941).
490
  Therefore, according to this criterion, 
the household that is disadvantaged by living in a Low-Mix Black neighborhood would also gain 
advantage by living in a Low-Mix White neighborhood as there would be less foreclosures in the 
neighborhood they would be dispersed to (Low-Mix White), thus better protecting housing 
values and neighborhood stability for all inhabitants.  To summarize, households in Low-Mix 
Black neighborhoods experiencing a higher concentration of foreclosures have a much greater 
probability of suffering economic hardship by remaining in that area and/or gaining economic 
security by being dispersed to an area with less concentrated foreclosures.  
These findings challenge the Cheshirian sentiment, held by a host of other social scientists and 
urban planners, proclaiming that low-income segregated neighborhoods do not cause additional 
social costs, they simply reflect a greater archetype of socio-economic inequalities present in the 
US.  An earlier provided quote by Paul Cheshire reflects this sentiment: “[We] behave and apply 
policies as if it were a fact that the separation of different types of people and households into 
distinct and segregated neighbourhoods generated specific social costs, additional to those 
generated by inequality itself.”491  While the above findings do not prove the specific size, scope, 
and impact of a “neighborhood effect”—they do suggest a link between adverse impacts and 
space.  In other words, the adverse impacts of the crisis (foreclosures) were magnified by virtue 
of their concentration in segregated black communities. To be clear, a black homeowner could 
have received a subprime loan due to poor credit, high loan-to-value, or a high debt-ratio 
reflected on his or her loan application.  Furthermore, they could have foreclosed for various 
reasons unrelated to the neighborhood they lived in.  However, if foreclosures occur for enough 
                                                          
490
 In reality, the safety net would most likely be stronger in Low-Mix White neighborhoods.  This example sets 
each household equal to $100,000 value, but this would not necessarily be the case between the different racial 
categories.  Presumably, higher-income white-segregated neighborhoods would have housing values above 
$100,000 and lower-income minority-segregated neighborhoods would have housing values below this figure.   
491
 Cheshire, 2007, p. 3 
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of these families, and they occupy the same space, then there is a social and economic cost 
“additional to those generated by inequality itself.”  Although the effect diminishes with the 
percentage of foreclosures per tract, A1 and A2 have demonstrated that clustered foreclosures, 
regardless of their linear or non-linear effect, devalue foreclosed and non-foreclosed homes 
within the same spatial region, thus heightening neighborhood instability and eroding overall 
housing stock value.  To conclude, adverse impacts associated with residing in an African-
American segregated tract help to substantiate the notion of dispersal and thus mixing on the 
grounds of equity in Cuyahoga County.  
 
Question #2: Measuring Efficiency 
 
Addressing his framework, Galster asserts that unless policy-makers strictly base their 
integration legislation on equity, it should be accompanied by a measurement in efficiency.  This 
measurement, the content of research question #2, is less clear unlike the aforementioned equity 
deliberations evident in question #1.  In light of the adverse impacts occurring in the wake of the 
subprime financial crisis, the study sought to determine if economic advantages were associated 
with mixing, should we hypothetically assume residential integration through dispersal.  If 
integration were to occur, are the aggregate gains and losses considered to be socially efficient?  
To claim efficiency, economic advantages gained by the disadvantaged group (Low-Mix Black) 
must be tempered with the losses incurred from mixing in the advantaged group (Low-Mix 
White).  A net gain would imply social efficiency.   
As mentioned, the results of A1 clearly demonstrate a higher probability of subprime and 
foreclosures in segregated black neighborhoods.  With this information in mind, and using the 
data from A2, we now have the means to measure efficiency.  To do this, it is best to assume a 
hypothetical city where we there are 10 total neighborhoods each with 10 homes (100 homes 
total in the city).  Further, assume that each home in each neighborhood is worth $100,000.  The 
composition of this hypothetical city is as follows: 1 Low-Mix Black neighborhood, 2 High-Mix 
neighborhoods, and 7 Low-Mix White neighborhoods.  Further, we will also assume that each 
home is equally affected by the observed change in median home sales for their respective 
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neighborhood stratified by racial category.  Finally, we will suppose that the foreclosure rate in 
this city is 10%. 
Suppose that all foreclosures were concentrated in one neighborhood, and this neighborhood is 
considered to be a Low-Mix Black neighborhood.  Using table 15, we estimate that all 10 homes 
would be hurt by $84,645 (100,000-15,355).  Thus, total losses in the neighborhood would be 10 
homes x 84,645=$846,450.  Now, if we were to assume that the households foreclosing would be 
dispersed throughout the city in such a way as to have a 1% foreclosure rate per neighborhood 
(10 neighborhoods; 1% foreclosure rate each neighborhood), and 7 of the neighborhoods were 
Low-Mix White while the other 2 were considered High-Mix, the new cost to the city would be 
computed as follows: 
WHITE: 70 homes X $21,290 ($100,000-$78,710) =$1,490,300 
MIXED: 20 homes X $12,510 ($100,000-$87,490) =$250,200 
BLACK: 10 homes X $12,795 ($100,000-$87,205) =$127,950 
Summing the losses, the total cost to the city in the dispersal scenario would be $1,868,450.  
Thus, using the parameter estimates from A2 translated in table 15, this hypothetical example 
suggests that the total social cost to dispersal is much higher than the cost when foreclosures are 
concentrated, assuming the foreclosure rate is held constant.  Based upon this data, we would not 
be able to make the claim of efficiency for dispersal in Cuyahoga County.  Moreover, according 
to this model social efficiency suggests ghettoizing foreclosures, which would lead us to promote 
segregation policy, not dispersal policy, should our aim be to mitigate the asset-depreciating 
effects of foreclosures in the wake of the financial crisis.
492
  To conclude, the results of A2 and 
our hypothetical city example suggest that we cannot support mixing on the grounds of 
efficiency in Cuyahoga County.  
This issue is further complicated based upon the dummy-coded tipping variables output from A1.  
The more hyper-segregated “Low-Mix White” communities are—the more negative the 
association to subprime loan and foreclosure percentage.  In other words, there appears to be an 
                                                          
492
 Furthermore, a “zero-sum” arrangement would suggest that should mixing occur, the losses would still be equal 
to the losses experienced should foreclosures be concentrated ($846,450).  However, dispersing foreclosures would 
more than double this loss—suggesting that mixing via dispersal would be worse than zero-sum. 
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economic advantage to living in hyper-segregated white communities (tracts where 81 to 100% 
of households are white) because they are more closely correlated with low subprime lending 
and foreclosure activity.
493
  However, one of the most interesting findings in the study was that 
there appears to be economic advantage to hyper-segregation in “Low-Mix Black” communities, 
similar to white segregated communities.  Figures 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate this effect: 
 
Figure 3.5: Subprime Coefficients for Low-mix Black Neighborhoods 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
493
 I do not suggest here that living in a Low-Mix White neighborhood would cause lower subprime and foreclosure 
rates.   
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Figure 3.6: Foreclosure Coefficients for Low-mix Black Neighborhoods 
 
As the percentage of African Americans inhabiting a given tract increases, we see a 
proportionate increase in subprime lending and foreclosure activity.  However, when 
neighborhoods reach a point of hyper-segregation, where at least 80% of the households in the 
tract are African American, we see a significant decline in the coefficient strength, both for the 
percentage of subprime as well as the percentage of foreclosures.  Explaining this phenomenon 
would, at best, be considered mere speculation.  Presumably, interventionist programs target 
these neighborhoods and offer assistance, education, and mentoring to assist in the housing 
process and help to avoid adverse impacts.
494
  Regardless, we can see that there is an incentive to 
                                                          
494
 An example of this would be LISC’s (Local Initiatives Support Coalition) “Foreclosure Needs Score.”  LISC is 
the largest community development support organization in the country, and their “Needs Score” data are intended 
to provide a proactive tool “To help states and communities make informed decisions about how to allocate and 
spend their resources for foreclosure prevention and neighborhood stabilization.”  By aggregating subprime lending 
to a particular zip code, in addition to other proprietary information, they create risk assessments for zip-code based 
regions and provide this detail to “State and local elected officials, government agency staff, and community 
leaders” so that they can “use these Needs Scores to quickly assess relative needs within states and localities and 
allocate resources accordingly.”  See “LISC: About Us.” LISC. Web. 28 July 2010. 
<http://www.lisc.org/section/aboutus>. and “Foreclosure-Response.org | LISC Data.” Foreclosure-Response.org | 
Welcome! Web. 28 July 2010. <http://www.foreclosure-response.org/maps_and_data/lisc_data.html>.   
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hyper-segregate for both communities.
495
  This has significant implications for our evaluative 
framework, as social gain is evident for black households (albeit in hyper-segregated 
neighborhoods) when they segregate, or cluster, into racially homogeneous enclaves.  Therefore, 
this finding in A1 and A2 related to measuring social efficiency must be taken into consideration 
with the earlier claim of equity. 
Concluding this section of the chapter, the empirical study above represents an exploration in 
residential integration from an economic paradigm.  I shall now reflect on the implications of this 
paradigm, particularly as it relates to my aforementioned research questions.  After answering 
these questions, I will next consider the conclusions we can appropriately reach.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
More specific to Cleveland, Cuyahoga County has been described as having one of the more robust foreclosure 
prevention initiatives in the nation.  In “Regional Resilience in the Face of Foreclosures: Evidence from Six 
Metropolitan Areas,” Swanstrom et al. write: “Assets were redeployed from existing programs to address the crisis, 
creative forms of financing were tapped (DTAC), government agencies changed their routines and collaborated 
across bureaucratic lines of authority, and the public and nonprofit sectors coordinated their actions.  The initiative 
demonstrated horizontal collaboration among nonprofits and local governments as well as vertical coordination by 
the County.  The financing of the Early Intervention Initiative illustrates the broad collaboration that has emerged in 
Cleveland to deal with the foreclosure crisis” (Page 14).  The study found that a total of 1,497 foreclosures were 
“prevented” through loan modifications.  While the authors claimed that the program “only helps a small percentage 
of homeowners in distress,” it very well may have targeted households in hyper-segregated black neighborhoods 
which may help to explain the drop off of foreclosures in these areas.  See Swanstrom et al., 2009. 
495
 Clearly, though, the incentive is far greater in white-segregated communities than in African American-
segregated communities. 
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Chapter 3: Post-Script—Conclusions and Contributions 
 
In this post-script, my intention is to first summarize my contribution to the residential 
integration discussion.  To begin, I will revisit my research questions and my subsequent 
findings.  From here, I will address the methodological concerns related to this discussion.  This 
study explores residential integration from what I have called the economic paradigm.  However, 
it is important to flesh out some of the methodological concerns within this paradigm (both in my 
research and in the research of others).  After this, I go on to question the paradigm itself, and 
whether or not this is the most appropriate context by which to engage and evaluate the greater 
enterprise of residential integration.  I finish this post-script with conclusions that can 
appropriately be reached regarding residential integration. 
In light of the results of A1 and A2, we return to our research questions: 
(1) How did segregated communities (both homogeneous white and black) fare in the wake 
of the subprime crisis and its accompanying “adverse impacts?”  Did segregation and 
“place” play a role in helping or harming social welfare for racially isolated households? 
 
(2) In light of the crisis, are there visible or presumed economic advantages that could be 
associated with residential mixing that may suggest a protective mechanism for otherwise 
vulnerable and segregated households?  Further, are these advantages considered socially 
efficient, where society benefits as a whole? 
Research Question 1: There are risks associated with inert, segregated communities related to 
the subprime crisis.  The research of Cleveland reveals outcomes consistent with recent literature 
that suggests space and place played a role in disadvantaging segregated black communities in 
the subprime crisis.  Analysis 1 reveals significant disparities in receiving a subprime loan and 
subsequently foreclosing between black and white households.  Further, Analysis 2 reveals the 
asset-depreciating effect concentrated foreclosures have in segregated enclaves.  The question of 
whether “segregation” and “place” played a role in helping Low-Mix White or harming Low-
Mix Black neighborhoods is more difficult to establish.  First, while we see that lower rates of 
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subprime and foreclosure are associated with segregated white tracts and higher rates of 
subprime and foreclosure are associated with segregated black tracts—this does not necessarily 
establish cause (although it doesn’t rule out causation either).  Second, the inclusion of variables 
such as credit score and a loan-to-value ratio (based upon an appraised home value) would allow 
for a more accurate determination of whether “reverse redlining” had occurred.496  
Unfortunately, these variables were missing, thus prohibiting this assertion.  However, these two 
points alone do not prohibit an assertion of adverse impacts.  Even if segregated black 
households “deserved” a loan that was not, by definition, a “prime” loan (thus making it 
subprime)—the positive relationship between subprime loans and foreclosures still posits an 
adverse impact.
497
  That is, the market creation, production, and distribution of a product that, 
though “evenhandedly applied” under presumably fair lending guidelines, resulted in 
disproportionately negative impacts for segregated black communities in the form of 
concentrated foreclosures.  As a result, Low-Mix Black tracts saw a mean foreclosure rate 
exceeding 11%.  This accelerated home devaluation and threatened the economic continuity and 
overall welfare of their communities. 
This is a failure of the risk-based pricing system and puts segregated black communities at a 
clear disadvantage and loss in the wake of the subprime market failure.
498
  In addition to this, the 
subprime crisis also represented a failure in social welfare policy, given that an important goal of 
planning and public policy is “sustainable homeownership.”499  Yet the aftermath of the crisis 
reveals that homeownership sustainability, particularly among low-income minorities, was never 
realized and, more importantly, often left already vulnerable minority households in a more 
precarious position than before.
500
  Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz touched on 
                                                          
496
 Recall that “redlining” consisted of bracketing off areas from lending due to their African American presence.  
Thus, reverse redlining (See Chapter 2), a term that grew in significance amidst the subprime crisis, consisted of 
lenders, not avoiding, but targeting areas of isolated disadvantage (which often consisted of segregated black 
households) to sell subprime loans. 
497
 I used the term “deserve” based upon credit attributes.  If a loan applicant had a poor credit score, a high 
mortgage to equity ratio (LTV), a high debt-to-income ratio, or displayed any other factors that might compromise 
the quality of the loan, then traditional risk-based pricing models would offer a subprime product where the 
increased rate would assist to offset the risk. 
498
 Risk-based pricing is, ideally, meant to “price” higher risk through an interest rate premium.  However, I refer to 
this as a “failure” because higher premiums were unaffordable and potentially exacerbated default (the exact 
opposite of its intended purpose).  
499
 Immargluck, 2008, p. 12 
500
 HUD, in 2004, allowed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, both Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs), to count 
billions of dollars they invested in subprime loans as a “public good” meant to foster affordable housing for low-
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this principle when reflecting on the income reaped by corporate CEOs while homeownership 
and neighborhood vitality was virtually falling apart overnight: “The takeaway is that we have 
developed a peculiar form of capitalism, where the wizards of Wall Street walk away with the 
profits, and we the American people walk away with the losses.”501  The findings in the research 
above suggests, among other things, that this “peculiar” arrangement left segregated black 
communities with a concentration of foreclosures in Cuyahoga County.  Consequently, Low-Mix 
Black households were far more likely to suffer large amounts of home value depreciation 
(whether they foreclosed or not) due to the high foreclosure rates and their concentration in these 
neighborhoods.  From this perspective, the empirical study of Cuyahoga County lends itself to 
considerations for mixing based upon the ideal of equity.  Even if we were to assume that the 
households in Low-Mix Black neighborhoods that foreclosed would foreclose again in a 
different neighborhood, the mere redistribution of the foreclosure effect would lessen the 
concentration in otherwise segregated black neighborhoods and help to protect and sustain home 
values and homeownership.  Therefore, one aspect of well-being of disadvantaged Low-Mix 
Black neighborhoods would be enhanced if mixing via dispersal were to be instituted. 
Research Question 2: In light of the crisis, there do not appear to be visible or presumed net 
economic benefits associated with residential mixing.  High-Mix tracts—although displaying 
lower foreclosure rates than Low-Mix Black tracts—still have a positive coefficient for 
foreclosures.  Further, there is nothing to suggest that “mixed” areas are not simply comprised of 
foreclosure-prone households who would have received a subprime loan and foreclosed in any 
other neighborhood (Low-Mix Black or Low-Mix White).  Moreover, we must additionally 
account for the perceived benefits associated with segregation.  We see that low levels of 
subprime lending and foreclosures are associated with hyper-segregated white tracts.  
Surprisingly, we also see a decrease in the levels of subprime lending and foreclosures when 
black tracts reach a level of hyper-segregation (80%> tract is black).   
There is a presumed economic advantage to dispersing Low-Mix Black households to either 
High-Mix or Low-Mix White neighborhoods in order to deconcentrate their high incidence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
income and minority families.  See Leonnig, Carol D. "How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis." Washington 
Post [Washington] 10 Jan. 2008, A01 sec. Print. 
501
 Dognen, Chris, dir. "NOW on PBS: Credit and Credibility." Credit and Credibility. Prod. Ria Gazdar. PBS. New 
York, 22 Nov. 2008. Television. 
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foreclosure.  For homes that do not foreclose, this would help to protect home values within the 
area and offer greater stability.  However, this hypothetical scenario—while substantiated on the 
grounds of equity— would be far from socially efficient.  Rather, it would be quite inefficient.  
According to our hypothetical example drawn from the estimated parameters in A2, a uniform 
dispersal of foreclosures across space and the racial categories mentioned, given our 
aforementioned assumptions, would result in an additional 1 million dollars in total equity loss.  
Thus, the losses incurred by the receiving households would exceed the gains incurred by the 
dispersed households.  Dispersal would not benefit society as a whole under this scenario. 
Therefore, based upon Galster’s sentiment that housing policy aimed towards mixing should be 
able to provide evidence of both equity and efficiency under his analytical framework, we cannot 
support integration policy based upon the empirical study of Cuyahoga County.  Even if our sole 
criteria for mixing were based upon equity considerations, we would also have to account for the 
perceived benefits of hyper-segregation evident in Low-Mix Black communities. 
To further summarize, this study has sought to explore considerations in residential integration 
through the lens of adverse impacts.  In essence, I have sought to answer two primary questions 
related to adverse impacts (reflected in the above research questions).  First, were there adverse 
impacts from the crisis?  What were they?  How were they distributed?  My research has fleshed 
out the impact of subprime lending and foreclosures, both resulting from policy and market-
induced forces.  We might assume a particular response to this assertion—that households in 
these communities qualified or deserved subprime loans because their credit attributes 
necessitated that product.  However, even under the assumption that segregated black households 
“deserved” a subprime product,502 the strong correlation between subprime loan products and 
foreclosure rates place the recipients of these products, who are already concentrated, at greater 
risk.  A loan that increases the risks of sustainable homeownership and introduces additional 
burdens through foreclosure is a market failure and, furthermore, a violation of the 
                                                          
502
 It should be pointed out that even the assumption (which I am making for example’s sake) that a segregated black 
household “deserved” a subprime loan has been debated.  “Predatory lending” and “reverse-redlining” are primary 
examples that “race” and “space” were exploited in the crisis—leading to a new form of discrimination.  See 
Howell, Benjamin. "Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination." 
California Law Review 94.1 (2006): 101-47. Print. 
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homeownership initiative and risk-based pricing that creative lending products such as subprime 
loans were intended for. 
The second primary question related to adverse impacts sought to address whether such impacts 
were magnified as a function of space.  In other words, did space (i.e., a segregated 
neighborhood) play a role in aggravating social disadvantage in addition to, or by accelerating 
the presence of, adverse impacts?  This argument requires the demonstration of a spatial effect.  
Again, we might assume a natural response as suggesting that black households who foreclosed 
in a segregated setting may very well have foreclosed in a mixed setting—thus, there is no link 
between space and adverse impacts of the crisis.  However, if foreclosures are concentrated they 
can have a magnified house-depreciating effect (as opposed to being spread out).  Yet A2 
revealed that neighborhoods in Cleveland have a rebound mechanism as increasing foreclosures 
reveal marginal diminishing impact.  Thus, while it may be equitable to deconcentrate 
foreclosure prone households, it would be considered socially inefficient to do so. 
Thus, answering these research questions, while providing insight, does not necessarily offer an 
explicit direction relative to residential integration.  Similar to other voices in the social science 
world, there are some grounds for mixing (i.e., equity)—but there are very good reasons for 
skepticism as well.  At best, this study has provided a counter-response to the first argument in 
the Cheshirian position (no presence of neighborhood effects).  However, this must be tempered 
with the clear absence of substantive evidence to support mixing based upon perceived social 
benefits and efficiency.
503
  In summary, I have provided an argument for mixing, on the terms of 
equity, by exploring residential segregation through the adverse impacts occurring in the wake of 
the subprime financial crisis.  In contrast, we have no evidence to support efficiency.  Rather, 
achieving economic efficiency would support, not discourage, segregation based upon the 
evidence from A1 and A2. 
 
 
                                                          
503
 Moreover, while concentrated foreclosures in Low-Mix Black neighborhoods clearly put them at a disadvantage, 
we see based upon the parameters in A2 that the same could be said for Low-Mix White neighborhoods should their 
mean foreclosure rate have been higher.  Thus, if the claim of adverse impacts is to be made, it is a claim not limited 
to Low-Mix Black tracts. 
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Is Our Current Criteria Enough? 
 
When reviewing my research output, the Evaluative Integration Framework utilized was 
employed for two primary reasons.  The first was to have a framework to substantiate support (or 
a lack of support) for integration.  As Galster puts it, if integration is supported or not supported, 
a framework answers “on what grounds” such a declaration is made.504  However, and perhaps 
more importantly, the second reason for utilizing a framework, and in particular Galster’s 
framework, was to use an assessment tool that reflected and represented the evaluative criteria 
that has dominated the integration debate.  As mentioned, these criteria are standards of 
economic efficacy and the maximization of utility in an aggregate social context (“Does it work?  
Is it cost effective?” and “does it enhance welfare for everyone?”).505 
George Galster, in utilizing his criteria of “equity” and “efficiency” to determine mix policy, 
offers this conclusion when he employs this analytical framework relative to statistical data in 
Western Europe:  “Given the evidence base, they can be quite confident that a mix strategy will 
improve the well-being of the disadvantaged.”506  However, he quickly warns: “But what cost 
may the advantaged be incurring due to this strategy, and to what extent does their well-being 
also get weighed in the policy making process?”507  Thus, while mixing can be supported on 
equity grounds based upon his use of the term, Galster believes that equity alone does not 
account for total welfare considerations and should appropriately consider what is most efficient 
for producing the greatest amount of social welfare outcomes.
508
  This inevitably leads to Galster 
to ask: “Is equity enough?” and constitutes the addition of “efficiency” in his evaluative 
framework.
509
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This is an important question, but perhaps a necessary corollary follows: “Are equity and 
efficiency enough?”  If there is a notion to question the sufficiency of a singular framework of 
equity (improving the lot of the disadvantaged), perhaps there is value in questioning the 
sufficiency of equity and efficiency, and moreover, the evaluative criteria of economic efficacy 
and the maximization of welfare present in the greater narrative of housing integration.  My 
analysis, consistent with other related studies, provides no definable, indisputable, and 
unambiguous rationale for dispersal efforts to residentially mix otherwise segregated black and 
white neighborhoods.  Thus, is this the end of the story?  Are we left to simply accept the status 
quo?  If the evidence could speak, it would perhaps suggest that there is still a great deal we do 
not know as it relates to residential integration.  However, there is an even deeper question 
underlying this that begs to be addressed:  if all considerations in the Evaluative Integration 
Framework were sufficiently met—where economic efficacy and utility was maximized—and 
yet, our society was still completely segregated, would this be an acceptable social arrangement?  
Is this discussion merely about socio-economic equity among black and white households in the 
United States, or are there other important considerations that need to be included in the 
residential integration discussion? 
The sentiment of the latter questions originates from two important considerations.  First, there 
are problems within the economic/utilitarian paradigm as previously laid out as it relates to 
measuring neighborhood effects.  In other words, the economic paradigm can tell us a lot—but it 
cannot tell us everything.  Beyond this, however, we might ask whether an economic and utility 
based standard is itself a robust framework on which to base such social analysis.  In other 
words, is the economic paradigm the most appropriate framework by which to evaluate social 
arrangements in general?  Before dwelling on this latter claim, I shall first address the former 
consideration. 
 
Problems within the Economic and Utilitarian Paradigm for Evaluating Neighborhood Mixing 
 
Paul Cheshire’s argument against mixing, particularly given its costs, is based upon the premise 
of ambiguity both in perceived benefits of household dispersal and in the existence of 
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neighborhood effects in general.
510
  In this thesis, I have referred to this premise as the 
Cheshirian position.  While the outcomes of empirical research in this field (including my own) 
lend support to this premise, it is an argument that cuts both ways.  In other words, while the 
evidence for neighborhood mixing is ambiguous from an efficacy and utility standpoint, the 
evidence against mixing is also ambiguous.  The purpose of the forthcoming section is to reflect 
on this point and its implications.  To begin, my aim is to flesh out some of the methodological 
limitations relative to my own research (A1 and A2).  After this, I aim to cast light on an even 
wider set of problems in the literature, and more specifically, in the Cheshirian critique.  The 
purpose of explicating these issues is to give consideration to a more spacious evaluative 
framework as it relates to pursuing, measuring, and evaluating both the concept and practice of 
integration.  I will begin with some of my own methodological drawbacks.   
 
Methodological Limitations of A1 and A2 
 
To be precise, A1 and A2 represent cross-sectional analysis of secondary data or “official 
statistics.”  To assess the integrity and coherence of such a model, we are particularly interested 
in the criteria of reliability, replication, and validity.
511
  The issue of reliability is fundamentally 
concerned with consistency in measurement.  It asks: “Are the measures that are devised for 
concepts in the social sciences consistent?”512  Replication, related to reliability, is a measure of 
whether the study could be repeated again—perhaps even by another researcher.  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, validity deals with the integrity of the conclusions drawn from the 
research analysis.  “Internal validity” relates mostly to the issue of causality while “external 
validity” deals with the issue of generalization.513   
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Regarding the integrity of A1 and A2, there is less concern with issues of reliability and 
replication.  The data represent appropriate measures for their corresponding concepts and, 
moreover, the variables utilized match data from similar studies.
514
  With this said, one of the 
limitations of the usage of secondary data is the absence of key variables.
515
  In A1, a key 
variable that could not be included was “credit score.”  Credit scores are a necessary component 
of the loan approval process, and in particular, the decision as to whether a loan would be a 
prime or subprime product.  Without controlling for this variable, there was no way to truly trace 
whether a segregated area was a factor in receiving a subprime product.  The same can be said 
for loan-to-value data (LTV) at the time of the loan application—also a key variable absent from 
the study.  To provide an example, A1 outcomes revealed that segregated-black communities 
were much more likely to receive subprime loans than mixed or segregated-white communities.  
However, without being able to control for credit and the loan-to-value ratio, those same 
households may very well have received a subprime product had they been in a mixed 
neighborhood.
516
   As it relates to replication, the measures used in this study to conduct the 
regression analysis are well documented.  In general, as Bryman (2008) notes, “Replicability is 
likely to be present in most cross-sectional research to the degree that the researcher spells out 
[the appropriate procedures].”517 
This brings us to the issue of validity.  Before specifically looking at A1 and A2, causal 
inference is naturally limited in cross-sectional studies due to a lack of time-ordering in variables 
as well as the absence of experimental manipulation (no ‘before and after’ affect).518  This 
problem, in addition to determining causal direction, represents a greater problem in cross-
sectional measurement design in social science research, and is a common limitation in the 
measurement of mixed communities.
519
  Thus, regression analysis is used for the purpose of 
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determining association, but suggestions of causality must be used with great caution.  With this 
in mind, while the output from A1 and A2 is appropriate for inference and subsequent 
interpretation, several methodological problems must be addressed in order to properly, and 
resolutely, address the aforementioned “ambiguity” associated with mixed communities. 
First, A2 home sale data is from 2006 to 2008 (Dependent Variable) while foreclosure rate data 
is from 2006 to 2007 (Independent Variable).  While it appears that this one year lag time would 
capture the effect of foreclosures on home sales (home sales would decrease only after 
foreclosures increase), there is no way to be sure that this is the most appropriate match 
(foreclosure rate year and home sale price year mismatch?).  Future studies in this area would 
include earlier data to detail more of a home sale price trend.  This brings up a second, but 
related, issue: home sales (2006 to 2008) were recorded as a single variable.  While this is useful 
to draw associations between the two variables (Foreclosure Rates and Home Sale Prices), it is 
important to be sure what the outcome is communicating.  In other words, the relationship 
between foreclosures and home prices may simply be a reflection of an established pattern of 
home sale price and deprivation (as areas become more deprived, the housing values decline).   
A2 revealed a marginal diminishing effect of foreclosures on home sale prices (proxy for value) 
after a certain foreclosure percentage was reached in the neighborhood.  While one interpretation 
is that neighborhoods, or housing markets in general, self-stabilize over time, the diminishing 
impact may very well have more to do with inertia in the price system.  Measuring housing 
values using the sale price of a home in a given tract makes an assumption about constant home 
sale frequency.  However, the velocity of home sales is slowed by several factors.  One, 
homeowners are more likely to avoid the sale of their home if they believe they will receive a 
price below what they think the home is worth (or below what they originally paid for it).  
Second, homeowners cannot sell below their mortgage amount, as receiving this baseline value 
is necessary to pay off the bank.
520
  Both of these limitations can quell potential home sale 
listings or increase a given property’s time on the market (sale duration).  These factors make for 
a sluggish price decline and thus complicate measurement. 
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Related to this, if a homeowner sees homes depreciating around them rapidly, and assuming if 
they sell and can't get the amount to cover the mortgage, they are more inclined to simply leave 
the house (and not try to sell through traditional warranty deed of trust).  Thus, the house would 
go to Sherriff's sale auction where homes are often sold for a fraction of their original value.  
Because mortgages were easy to attain without down payments (or very low down payments), 
this probably occurred quite often, particularly as housing appreciation declined after 2006.  
When home values dropped, a large stock of housing was “underwater” where the value was less 
than the mortgage amount owed.  Thus, going through the traditional means of selling on the 
open market would make less economic sense than simply walking away (particularly if the 
reason for selling was an economic shock, i.e., a job loss).
521
 
Ultimately, if housing prices held a pure negative linear relationship between foreclosures and 
price (as foreclosures go up, home prices go down), we could see homes drop to a price of zero 
or possess no value should the foreclosure rate be high enough.  This, however, is unlikely.  
While homes are investments and can grow financial equity like any other security, they are also 
physical dwellings that people inhabit.  In other words, there is at least a fixed degree of utility 
gained from shelter, water, space, etc., for a home’s inhabitants.  Thus, it may be more 
appropriate to suggest that foreclosures affect only a certain portion of a home’s value (although 
it may be a significant portion).  This suggestion is reinforced by the output from A2. 
As it relates to external validity, the generalizability of A1 and A2 may be limited due to the 
specific sample of Cleveland.  As mentioned, Cleveland was chosen due to its high levels of 
segregation and its foreclosure problem in the wake of the subprime financial crisis.  However, it 
should be noted that both A1 and A2 show results that mirror those of other similar studies.
522
  
Nevertheless, using the same methodology employed in A1 and A2 for other various urban 
regions would be a necessary next step prior to making generalizations from the attributes noted 
in Cleveland. 
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Lastly, data in A1 and A2 were aggregated into census tracts and block groups accordingly.  
While this is a helpful proxy for analyzing neighborhoods, we must be careful not to draw 
inferences about individuals from findings in aggregated data.  This is referred to as an 
“ecological fallacy,” and can be a common mistake in cross-sectional studies where data is 
aggregated.
523
  For example, while there is a higher incidence of subprime lending in black 
segregated neighborhoods, we should exercise caution relative to the implication that any given 
black household in a segregated black neighborhood is more likely to receive a subprime loan. 
It should be noted that the empirical exploration of A1 and A2 specifically look at the economic 
disadvantages of segregation for Low-Mix Black tracts (adverse effects of subprime and 
foreclosures) and the economic advantages of integration for this same group as well as the 
populace as a whole.  However, to focus on these issues leaves the researcher open to the charge 
of outcome tunnel vision, as numerous other ‘outcomes’ could (and should) be measured in the 
mixing dialogue.  Outcomes may vary by their quantitative or qualitative nature in addition to 
their results in the short-run or long-run.
524
 
As summarized, A1 and A2 offer a glimpse of two different environments: both segregated, one 
more likely to receive a subprime loan and foreclose (Low-Mix Black), and one less likely to 
receive a subprime loan and foreclose (Low-Mix White).  Using regression modeling, we see 
that the hypothetical integration of these two worlds, while perhaps improving the lot of the 
former group, ultimately creates a sub-optimal economic situation for the overall society that 
both groups comprise.  However, the above survey of methodological limitations and 
accompanying interpretive precautions gives us a degree of pause before making definitive 
assessments of integration sub-optimality.  While A1 and A2 may not have fundamentally 
disproven the arguments in the Cheshirian position, they were not confirmed either.  Indeed, 
Cheshire himself encounters intractable methodological limitations that reinforce the issue of 
ambiguity, both in assertions for and against the endeavor to mix.  At this point, attention will be 
given to such limitations and the overall implications for erecting a framework for integration. 
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Empirical Limitations of the Cheshirian Position 
 
As noted, one of the most explicit critiques against the theory and practice of residential 
integration comes from Paul Cheshire.  Furthermore, the aforementioned summary points of 
Cheshire’s skepticism toward mixing echo the greater body of literature relative to this issue (See 
Chapter 2).
525
  As discussed, the Cheshirian position provides two primary arguments against 
residential integration.  The first is the lack of evidence that neighborhoods “cause” 
disadvantage.  Second, there is a lack of evidence that segregated households would fare any 
better if they were dispersed, or integrated, with other race and higher income neighborhoods.  
These arguments lead Cheshire to conclude that endeavors to mix, such as the Moving to 
Opportunity program, are a waste of money and resources.  At this point, I will explicate and 
discuss the more granular themes that support these two arguments.  These can be described as 
follows: 
1) Neighborhoods naturally move toward segregation (even when mixing has taken place, 
the dispersed families tend to re-segregate). 
2) Dispersal efforts ignore the benefits that might accompany segregation (“specialized 
neighborhoods”).526 
3) Determining causal mechanisms in the data. 
a. Unobserved characteristics that influence life chances 
b. Personal choices in choosing a neighborhood (self-selection bias) 
4) No evidence for perceived benefits to mixing (MTO) 
5) Neighborhoods, and accompanying amenities, price certain households out of the market. 
Points #1 and #2 seem to rely on one another: segregation has always existed and, moreover, we 
should not discount the benefits that may come with segregation.  The “benefits” Cheshire refers 
to come in the form of “specialized neighborhoods” where “households of a particular character 
tend to be concentrated.”527  Such homogeneity, for low-income segregated minorities, allows 
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for strong social ties which, it is suggested, support labor market matching for the poor or less 
skilled.  Another benefit Cheshire cites is a “consumption” benefit.528  He writes: “There is also 
the issue […] that peoples’ welfare does not only depend on the level of their own income but on 
the level of their income relative to others living near them and with whom they associate.”529  
Citing a related study (Luttmer 2005), he concludes that the results “point to that being a very 
powerful reason for choosing to live in, and policy re-enforcing the existence of, neighbourhoods 
segregated by income.  This is the very reverse of a policy of ‘mixed neighborhoods.’”530  
Cheshire concludes that the more specialized neighborhoods, the better off the total net welfare 
for the populous in general.
531
 
This seemingly symbiotic arrangement, however, ignores the disadvantages that accompany 
segregation and excludes them from being weighed into the equation.  As my empirical analysis 
shows, segregated minorities are far more likely to receive a subprime loan and subsequently 
foreclose than households in areas that are mixed or are white segregated (A1).  Further, 
concentrated foreclosures have a rapid asset depreciating effect in these neighborhoods.  
Although a rebound effect for house prices is present, owning a home in a Low-Mix Black 
neighborhood would increase your probability of considerable home value depreciation (A2).  
This is a significant financial shock considering that for most of these families the equity in their 
home is their greatest wealth instrument.  As pointed out, the results of A1 and A2 shed light on 
the “adverse impacts” disproportionately shouldered by segregated black communities.  Such 
considerations are conspicuously absent in Cheshire’s analysis.  Rather, his minor 
acknowledgment of “possible” neighborhood effects is overwhelmed amidst the benefits outlined 
in consumption and labor market matching presumed to originate from specialized 
neighborhoods.
532
  Further, his greater consideration is not simply for those who are segregated, 
but the utility of all measured through social efficiency: “Welfare of all would be improved if we 
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had neighbourhoods more segregated on the basis of income rather than less segregated.”533  
This, in essence, is a reference to “Pareto” optimality in cities and neighborhoods, where gains 
can be achieved for society’s advantaged citizens without harming, or negatively affecting, the 
lot of the disadvantaged.
534
  However, given that Cheshire turns the focus of the “mix” 
conversation toward income inequality, and not the presence of neighborhood effects, his 
aforementioned Pareto judgments could potentially undermine his concern with an unequal 
society.  Pareto and Utilitarian judgments have received philosophical scrutiny for some time, 
most recently, for example, from Amartya Sen.  Regarding Pareto judgments as a means to 
address welfare economics and inequality, Sen writes: “If the lot of the poor cannot be made any 
better without cutting into the affluence of the rich, the situation would be Pareto optimal despite 
the disparity between the rich and the poor.”  Thus: “The almost single-minded concern of 
modern welfare economics with Pareto optimality does not make that engaging branch of study 
particularly suitable for investigating problems of inequality.”535  Thus, if inequality is the more 
appropriate economic issue to address (as opposed to mixing), then Cheshire has not provided a 
very promising framework upon which to engage the issue.  As Sen writes, the lack of concern 
about the distribution of welfare between persons in utilitarian frameworks and Pareto 
considerations “tends to make utilitarianism a blunt approach to measuring and judging different 
extents of inequality even if the assumption is made that everyone has the same utility 
function.”536 
Cheshire’s third primary argument has to do with causal mechanisms and their presence in 
neighborhoods (“neighborhood effects”).  The “two major problems” include accounting for 
unobserved phenomenon and self-selection bias.
537
   Regarding the first problem, he provides an 
example: “There may be a genetic pre-disposition to suffer from dyslexia which then influences 
a whole range of other outcomes; people also vary in their motivation and aspirations, even their 
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luck.”538  This naturally contributes to the second problem of self-selection bias.  Goering et al.. 
(2003) state the problem well: 
Since people typically select their neighborhoods to match their needs and resources, 
researchers restricted to cross-sectional, nonexperimental evidence must try to separate 
the impact of personal factors affecting choice of neighborhood from effects of 
neighborhood.  But it is difficult if not impossible to measure all those socioeconomic, 
personal and local characteristics well enough to distinguish their effects.
539
 
Goering and Feins go onto say: “More often, the answers being sought are hidden in unmeasured 
factors and unexplained variation.”540  The participatory nature of voucher dispersal programs 
presents the self-selection bias problem which makes causal inferences difficult.
541
  If a program 
participant self-selects into a better neighborhood and experiences utility gains, it is difficult to 
determine whether the neighborhood itself was a factor in such gains or the personal 
characteristics of the family (motivation, education, support networks, etc.).  Such bias is often 
associated with cross-sectional studies where existing data is used and measured to determine 
associations.  As Sampson (2008) writes: “The specter of ‘selection bias’ has been raised to cast 
doubt on almost all observational research, a nuisance to be extinguished with what is widely 
claimed as the most scientific of all methods, the experiment.”542  Hence the advantage of the 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program, as this would provide more of an experimental design 
(control group, experimental group, and section 8 group—See Chapter 2) where moving is more 
engineered and comparisons can be more easily drawn between the groups before and after the 
moves (pre- and post-“treatment”). 
Here, Cheshire is resolute in his explication of the MTO results, leading to his fourth argument 
against mixing: insufficient evidence that mixing offers benefits.  Cheshire covers the nuances of 
slight gains in educational achievement and better health in children, but quickly notes that no 
differences in economic outcomes (income or job placement) were noticeable.  Reviewing short-
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term data, he concludes: “the modest initial success of the programme did not mean that it was a 
policy success.”543  Further, long-term results did little to change his perceptions about MTO:  
For none of the indicators, however, did they find any significant overall differences 
between the groups that moved neighbourhoods compared to the control group that was 
not helped to move.  For the age group as a whole some indicators were better and some 
were worse but, despite the large sample, none of these differences was statistically 
significant.
544
 
The problems of unobserved effects, self-selection bias, and mixed results from the MTO 
experiment leave little room for definitive policy recommendations stemming from robust 
empirical investigation.  However, while such measurement problems cloud the opportunity for 
research-informed dispersal policy, it would be equally puzzling to definitively announce, based 
upon MTO evidence, that mixing is a failure.  A more accurate statement would simply 
acknowledge that we don’t fully know.  Sampson, surveying the MTO evidence, writes: “It 
seems reasonable to conclude from all this that the MTO results are mixed rather than negative—
conditional on outcome and subgroup.  That is to say, sometimes neighborhood effects matter, 
sometimes they do not.”545  This leaves Sampson concerned with the “disproportionate emphasis, 
especially in public pronouncements, on the idea that MTO has disproven neighborhood 
effects.”546    
A more sound approach would simply be to recognize the drawbacks of the research and 
accompanying procedures towards overcoming these drawbacks.  While it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to attempt the latter, we may take note of some of the more salient problems that 
contemporary research has fleshed out as it relates to measuring neighborhood effects.  To be 
clear, in this thesis I have defined a neighborhood effect as “the independent causal effect of a 
                                                          
543
 Cheshire, 2007, p. 9 
544
 Ibid., page 10 
545
 Sampson, 2008, p. 193 
546
 Ibid., page 194.  One might appropriately remark that the burden of proof rests upon those who are promoting 
integration since they are advocating government funding.  While this is a true statement, one might reply that the 
government has a similar burden to substantiate what must be done in place of integration (assuming a stalemate in 
this area) to prevent or prohibit large sectors of society in greater positions of vulnerability or risk by virtue of their 
segregation.  Further, this is not even to consider broader social goals related to cohesion, diversity, and trust among 
all US inhabitants—issues related to, but not reducible to, economic considerations.  This will be explored later in 
the thesis. 
156 
 
neighbourhood (i.e., residential community) on any number of health and/or social outcomes.”547  
George Galster highlights what he describes as “six paramount challenges” related to the 
empirical investigation and measurement of neighborhood effects.
548
  These challenges include 
defining the scale of a neighborhood, identifying mechanisms of neighborhood effect, measuring 
appropriate neighborhood characteristics, measuring exposure to a neighborhood, measuring 
appropriate individual characteristics, and endogeneity (causal loop between explanatory and 
dependent variables).  Galster cites the first four problems as being closely interrelated.  Among 
other things, one issue that arises is the difficulty in knowing with certainty which mechanisms 
generate which outcomes.
549
  While Galster surveys burgeoning methods that offer hope and 
promise to address these limitations, he concludes:  
Prior attempts to meet these challenges, though representing vast methodological strides 
in a short period, nevertheless have been only partially successful.  The result is that the 
answer to the increasingly important question: How much independent causal effect does 
the neighbourhood have on individuals? Still remains uncertain within broad 
parameters.
550
 
Related, and more relevant to MTO, Sampson highlights major drawbacks in the experimental 
design and subsequent inference that suggests that pronouncements such as Cheshires’ are 
premature and, in some ways, unwarranted.  First and foremost, Sampson notes that MTO 
candidates comprise a very thin slice of the total society.  To demonstrate this, he reviewed 
profiles from households in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods 
(PHDCN).  The PHDCN database, which was supposed to be representative of the population of 
children growing up in Chicago, consisted of over 4,500 families with children under the age of 
18 at almost the same time MTO was selecting families in Chicago (1995).  Out of all of the 
families in the database, Sampson found that 139 families matched his “generous” definition of 
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an MTO eligible family, or 5%.  He concluded: “5% of the population does not a general test of 
neighborhood effects make.”551 
Further, Sampson points out that MTO families have lived in segregated poverty for most of 
their lives (and often for multiple generations), which raises issues about life-course timing and 
“the durability of neighborhood effects.”552  As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2, 
segregation is a complex US phenomenon that has developed over years, decades, and even 
centuries.  Thus, the timing scale of a program such as MTO makes the prospects of 
disentangling and disseminating socio-spatial patterns that have emerged over the course of US 
history naïve at best. 
Another problem relates to the measured outcomes—what are they?  Sampson writes: “Should 
we expect neighborhood effects on all manner of phenomena?”553  For example, Cheshire claims 
that no economic advantages were observed for dispersed households over time (that registered 
as being statistically significant).  Conversely, Sampson points out that some of the strongest 
MTO findings to date deal with crime and mental health.  Thus, are we to measure any 
neighborhood effect or specific neighborhood effects?  If the latter, which ones and why?  Based 
upon whose standard?  These are very important questions that must be answered before 
generalized labels of success or failure can be placed on dispersal projects such as MTO. 
Regarding causality, Sampson points to the flaw of “bundling” in neighborhoods.  He writes: 
“When MTO families move from one neighborhood to another, entire bundles of variables 
change at once, making it difficult to disentangle change in neighborhood poverty from 
simultaneous changes in other structural factors and social processes.”554  This is not necessarily 
a flaw of MTO; rather, it “speaks to the role of experiments in scientific research—experiments 
do not reveal causal explanation in any direct sense.”555  This leads to the issue of self-selection 
bias; a problem that MTO would ideally address head on.  Sampson acknowledges that MTO is a 
major advance in social science research as it relates to selection bias problems.  He writes: “The 
randomized design of MTO sets it apart from volumes of research published in our journals that 
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rely on ex post explanations, typically derived from regression models that load up on individual-
level control variables and leave undefined the causal counterfactuals under the study.”556  
However, Sampson points out what he refers to as an “included variable bias problem”557 where 
the interpretation of resulting estimates as a means of determining neighborhood effects makes 
the assumption that controls are pretreatment covariates (pre-move) unaffected by neighborhood.  
Intuitively, this is a troublesome assumption given the research on neighborhood development 
effects on individuals.
558
 
This, then, is the problem of using “endogenous” variables which leads to “the net result of 
distorting the multiple pathways by which neighborhoods may influence developmental 
outcomes, especially among children, and thereby inducing bias.”559  The challenge of 
endogeneity, as Galster puts it, is that some individual characteristics and associated 
neighborhood characteristics may be mutually causal.
560
  Another way of putting it would be to 
say that the variables attempting to explain an outcome, or the dependent variable, are also 
dependent upon that variable.  However, the social world “defined by the interplay of structure 
and purposeful choice”561 is reason for pause, not doubt, when making judgments about the 
experimental outcomes of MTO, hence Sampson’s conclusion that “nothing can be inferred from 
MTO about the success or failure of neighborhood-level interventions.”562  Quigley and Raphael 
(2008) offer similar MTO conclusions: “The experiment was generally unable to reject the null 
hypothesis of no effects of neighborhood poverty on employment.  However, our reading of this 
evidence is that the relatively small mobility effects of the program and the variance of the 
effect-size estimates cannot rule out neighborhood effects of the range implied by the existing 
non-experimental literature.”563  In contrast, Cheshire concludes that the MTO evidence “does 
not support the conclusion that neighbourhood effects are quantitatively all that important nor 
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that moving the poor to affluent neighbourhoods overall improves their welfare.”564  This 
potentially leaves Cheshire open to the charge of argumentum ad ignorantiam—a logical fallacy 
occurring when one believes a given proposition (“integration is a success”) must be false 
because it has not been proven true. 
Cheshire’s fifth argument against mixing is that neighborhoods naturally price certain 
households out of the market.  This implies that segregation is a function of a market-sorting 
mechanism.   The argument is based upon the premise of “positional goods”—which are goods 
that can only be consumed by living in proximity to their availability.
565
  This is important 
because access is not determined by absolute income, but by income relative to others who are 
competing for the same goods.
566
 
More importantly, such “positions” are bought, and this takes place through the housing market.  
Housing valuation is often analyzed through “hedonic” models where individual attributes of the 
home (square footage, number of bathrooms, etc.) are each considered independent variables 
used to measure the market value of the property.  Thus, a housing value can be constructed as 
the sum value of its individual attributes.  From a market perspective, households are often 
heterogeneous in nature which makes a hedonic study a natural model for explaining and/or 
predicting values.
567
  Similarly, Cheshire believes that housing prices reflect such hedonic 
attributes but of a certain type:  
What hedonic studies of housing markets show is that access to higher amenity open 
space, natural amenities like view or proximity to water, greater security from crime or 
better quality state provided education, costs a substantial amount.  The value of all such 
amenities and local public goods is capitalized into house prices.
568
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Thus, “positions” such as quality schooling, recreational amenities, community aesthetics, etc., 
are all dependent on the ability of a household to buy a house in proximity to those goods.  
However, the market for such goods does not necessarily follow the traditional supply and 
demand function that we often see in perfectly competitive markets.  In housing, the supply-
curve is finite (vertical) representing a fixed supply of housing for a given space.  This can be 
illustrated as follows: 
 
Regardless of the price of homes, the housing stock remains fixed.  Because of the fixed housing 
supply, this means “the ability to buy such goods is more determined by how rich a household is 
relative to other households competing for the same local amenities than it is by the household’s 
absolute income.”569   Thus, because positional goods are fixed (there is a finite number of good 
schools, parks, views of the river, etc.) and the housing stock is fixed, we see an increase in price 
as demand shifts.
570
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Thus, as income inequality continues and the rich become richer relative to the poor, then the 
rich will only price the poor out of nicer areas even more and ultimately residential segregation 
will be the “spatial articulation of income inequality in society.”571  This Cheshirian summary 
has merit insofar as articulating a potential market explanation of residential segregation (both 
racially and economically).  However, before adopting this explanation, it is important to 
exercise discernment as to what house prices mean (i.e., what is this communicating?).  While 
Cheshire may be correct that house prices point to the sorting mechanism in housing markets 
insofar as reflecting an observed pattern of spatial segmentation among the rich and poor (black 
and white), there are reasons to believe that this does not necessarily imply that housing prices 
accurately reflect consumer preferences.  Here I shall point out a few. 
First, Cheshire refers to residential segregation as the articulation of income inequality.  
However, even if this were true, we would be incorrect to assume that income equality would 
then lead to better life chances for the poor.  Such an assumption would need to be defended.
572
  
Further, and more relevant to the subject of mixing, this says nothing of the issue of racial 
integration, as some might consider this an end in itself.
573
  Even when controlling for income, 
social patterns still tend to move toward segregation “since social interactions and dynamics tend 
to produce segregated rather than integrated communities.”574  Further, consideration must be 
given to the argument that the causal mechanism for segregation cannot be reduced to an 
economic explanation.  Haar (1996) writes: “Contrary to the assertions of those who attribute 
segregation to economic and market forces or to long-term structural trends in the 
decentralization of population and employment, neither affordability nor preference of individual 
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households explains the high levels of segregation.”575  Therefore, we should exercise caution 
when assuming that housing prices accurately reflect all phenomena as it relates to household 
preference. 
Another reason that we may be skeptical that housing prices accurately reflect consumer 
sentiment is market myopia among the consumer base.  In other words, if we did consider racial 
integration as an end in itself as suggested above, would housing markets correctly price this 
value, particularly if the benefits were to take place in the long run? Part of that answer depends 
on how one defines “benefit.”  If labor mobility is a perceived outcome, then perhaps a study 
such as MTO (over a given period of time) may be of usefulness.
576
  Further, some argue for 
integration as a means of “social mobility, betterment, and ameliorating housing problems.”577  
Such outcomes at least have promise of being observed in a short-run period of time (1, 5, 10 
years, etc.).  However, others may define benefits differently.  For example, some have 
suggested that mixing enhances a community’s social capital and the components of “networks, 
norms, and trust.”578  Other endogenous benefits may come in the form of “contagion effects” 
where it is hoped that dispersed families may adopt more functional and healthier normative 
behaviors.  If these were intended outcomes, would they be readily observable in a short period 
of time, or moreover, even within this generation?  We might refer to such outcomes as long-
term benefits with inter-generational implications, which by their nature do not allow for short-
term declarations of success or failure. 
To go a step further, even if we were to suppose that both rich and poor households greatly 
desired to live together in mixed neighborhoods, it would not necessarily follow that the market 
would properly “sort” such preferences.  As mentioned earlier, housing markets have a vertical 
supply curve due to a limited supply of homes.  For the sake of example, suppose the following: 
1) All black households are poor 
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2) All white households are wealthy 
3) Both groups would gain utility by living among one another 
As demand for “mixed” residential environments increases, we would see a shift of the demand 
curve to the right, thus increasing the price of the homes.  The problem, however, is that higher 
prices would effectively limit low-income minority households from living in those 
neighborhoods and eventually the neighborhood would consist of white households who can 
afford the higher prices.  Thus, the market sorting process would not properly communicate the 
preferences of the households based upon our aforementioned assumptions.  This would be 
considered a market failure. 
Finally, while Cheshire presumes that housing price increases that effectively price the poor (and 
often minority groups) out of certain areas simply reflect consumer preferences, we must 
consider the structure of how such preferences are weighted.  It might be more helpful to think of 
the price mechanism as a voting system.  Yet this voting system operates differently from its 
otherwise ideal democratic context (1 person; 1 vote).  Rather, the finite housing stock and the 
inelastic nature of positional goods create a lopsided voting system.   In this system, a small 
proportion of society with high income may greatly value homogeneity among themselves.  By 
seeking limited positional goods (views, resources, schools, etc.) in a particular area, they drive 
up the price of housing values in that area and reinforce their desire for a homogeneous 
community.  However, the greater majority of that society may desire something quite different 
(say, integration) but such preferences would not be reflected in housing prices if their income 
base was substantially lower (less “votes”).  To summarize, if purchasing power were to equal 
votes, a very small portion of society may vote with large sums of money (thus giving them a 
“majority” vote), even though this may not comprehensively represent the desires of the 
“majority” population.  To provide an example, suppose a community is split 70/30 between 
black and white households, but white households hold 70% of the income base where black 
households hold only 30%.  Further, suppose that the black households preferred to socially mix 
with white households.  The white households, holding the majority of the income, may choose 
to live separately from black households based upon their purchasing power (votes).  However, 
those preferring racial mix (black households) do not have equal purchasing power and thus 
market values for homes will be lower in these communities (and higher in the white 
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communities).  This does not mean, however, that social mix is not desired and/or preferred by 
the majority—although this may appear to be the majority preference being communicated based 
upon observing the social arrangement.  All of these arguments call into question Cheshire’s 
conclusion that the evidence available “is consistent with the hypothesis that an increase in 
income inequality leads to a parallel increase in house price inequality” and that such results are 
“likely to reflect the pattern of preferences” for households.579 
 
Re-assessing the Evaluative Integration Framework 
 
In the writing above, I have provided some of the methodological limitations in my own research 
and in the wider body of research (particularly in Paul Cheshire) as it relates to measuring the 
outcomes of integration.  It is important to note that some of the very criticisms directed toward 
Cheshire’s interpretation of MTO results can be directly applied to my own empirical study as 
well.  The “paramount challenges” that obscure integration research and interpretation incite 
caution before making positivistic declarations from A1 and A2.   
Within the existing Evaluative Integration Framework where considerations in economic 
efficacy and the maximization of utility dominate the overall measurement for evaluating 
integration, my hope is that I have provided reasons to be skeptical, or at least very cautious, 
about the interpretation of outcomes based upon experimental or observational design, the 
perceived benefits (or lack thereof) to integrating, and the meaning of market prices in housing.  
This does not mean that we should dismiss such information.  Rather, it is to suggest that their 
meaning is more nuanced than perhaps initially imagined, presented, or often suggested. 
This conclusion brings us back to the aforementioned question in response to Galster: “Is 
‘equity’ and ‘efficieny’ enough when it comes to evaluating dispersal outcomes?  While there is 
reason for skepticism as it relates to the understanding of the traditional paradigm discussed 
above, we may go on to question the usefulness of the economic paradigm in itself.  Even if all 
of the aforementioned concerns were appropriately addressed, there are still problems related to 
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the appropriateness of such a framework.  Attention will now be given to these problems to 
address the overall usefulness of the existing Evaluative Integration Framework as the most 
appropriate means of understanding social arrangements. 
 
Preference Formation 
 
If a magic “social” wand could be waved that would fix all methodological issues in Cheshire’s 
criticism of integration, this would still fail to address the issue of “Preference Formation.”  If all 
of the failures, coordination problems, and sorting mechanisms of the market were to be 
addressed adequately, we may or may not see a strong ‘preference’ for segregated living or the 
Cheshirian appeal to specialized neighborhoods.  Assuming that we did, however, it is still worth 
inquiring as to where such preferences come from.  This issue speaks to a greater economic 
problem in measurement, as economists are admittedly less interested in the origin of preferences 
and more concerned with their consequences.
580
  Addressing this, Rizvi (2001) writes: 
Inquiries into preference formation have not made much headway in economics.  
According to a well-known dictum, changes in preferences, or explorations of their 
origins, are best left to another discipline.  On this approach, preference formation occurs 
but its study is not properly economics.
581
 
While trying to locate the origins of one’s preferences is much more nuanced and less clear than 
the study of the consequences of preferences (i.e., decisions, transactions, etc.), it is also 
“unreasonable to neglect the study of why people want what they want.”582  Wildavsky (1987) in 
a survey of the social science literature in addition to his own research locates the origin of 
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preferences through shared meaning cultivated through social interaction.
583
  This suggestion has 
enormous implications for social segregation in housing.  For example, a socially homogeneous 
community or racial category can breed social condescension, misunderstanding, or fear against 
another racial group.  This, then, creates a path dependency problem where growing up in a 
socially homogeneous community limits the repertoire of preferences for future generations as 
preferences are often “transmitted” from parents to children.584  In a unique study where the 
social context of urban neighborhoods was linked to the process of friendship selection, 
Huckfeldt (1983) found that the neighborhood environment was a significant factor in 
determining friendship group associations.
585
  Neighborhoods impose a particular social context 
and: 
Even though individuals demonstrate strong associational preferences, their contextually 
structured set of associational opportunities makes itself felt in the composition of 
friendship groups.  Thus, the social content of social networks is not solely a function of 
either the social context or individual choice; it is the complex product of individual 
preferences operating within the boundaries of a social context.
586
 
Thus, if social context influenced individual preferences, then how might our preferences be 
different if the US began as an integrated, and not a segregated, society?  There is research 
available to suggest that the outcomes would be different than what we see today.   One such 
study asks the question: “Does race exert an independent influence on racial residential 
segregation?”587  The study, conducted by Emerson et al. (2001) sought to overcome earlier 
methodological limitations related to this question and assessed the stated residential preferences 
of whites for African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians.
588
  However, as mentioned, it is not 
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simply the preferences displayed by racial groups, but why such preferences may vary (and how 
they might originate).  Thus they write: “Even if in-group preferences help explain racial 
segregation, we do not know why in-group preferences vary by racial group.”589  Their research 
found that Asian and Hispanic composition had no significant effect as to whether a white family 
would relocate or buy a home in that particular neighborhood.  However, the authors found that 
the composition of black households in a neighborhood had a significant effect even after 
controlling for proxy variables such as education, crime, housing values, and housing values 
relative to others.
590
  After comparing and contrasting the responses with the actual patterns of 
racial segregation, the authors concluded: “We have found that for black-white residential 
patterns, the effect of race goes far beyond the common reasons given by white Americans for 
not wanting to live with black Americans.”591 
This finding speaks to the complexity of where and how preferences originate, and the 
implications for residential segregation.  However, in a separate study, Emerson captures what 
could be a major part of the solution to this issue: contact.  Published in the book Divided by 
Faith, Emerson and Smith provide an in-depth analysis of evangelicalism relative to racial bias 
and segregation in America.
592
  They conclude that religion, as it is currently structured in 
America, is unable to make a great impact on our segregated society.
593
  This assertion is based 
on a comprehensive survey undertaken by the authors, where they found that most evangelicals 
frame the problem of racial inequality and segregation as overly simplistic notions of individual 
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level problems, and have failed to recognize the structural forms of racism that serve to maintain 
its existence.
594
 
Interestingly, Emerson and Smith found that individuals who had more contact with African 
Americans on a daily basis held views that were more sympathetic and reflective of the structural 
influences on contemporary racial segregation.  They were struck by the racial homogeneity of 
the white social world, where most contact was with other white members of society.
595
  
However, as mentioned, for the individuals who had greater exposure to African Americans in 
their daily lives, perceptions toward spatial equality and integration took on an entirely different 
form.  They presented this as being consistent with the idea of “contact theory,” which asserts 
that having contact with people from other groups can reduce prejudice and other fears that 
might be harbored under the guise of ‘preference.’596  The authors believe this illuminates 
causation:  
Our interviews with evangelicals help with the causality question.  The higher the contact 
with black Americans, the less likely our respondents attribute primacy to individual-
level explanations of the racial gap, and the more likely they are to attribute primacy to 
structural-level explanations.  This appears to result from increased contact.
597
   
This finding leads the authors to conclude that if whites and blacks were less racially isolated, 
they might assess race problems differently and work together toward broader-based solutions.
598
  
While their study deals with black-white inequality on a more general level, the implications for 
preference formation and residential segregation are powerful.  Based upon the notion of contact 
theory, if segregation is simply consumer preference reflected in market outcomes, then perhaps 
enhanced “contact” would alter preferences and potentially transform such outcomes.  If contact 
is a key to addressing segregation, then proximity is a natural means to achieve this.  Moreover, 
residential integration is a key to proximity.   Unfortunately, the Cheshirian framework has no 
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mechanism by which to address this issue as it primarily dwells on the consequences of 
preferences.
599
 
 
Morality and Ethics 
 
It is also questionable whether the economic paradigm properly explains the impetus to mix that 
seems to remain in light of contradictory evidence.  If the results of mixing have not met what 
have come to be the dominant standards of providing enhanced welfare for all involved parties 
done in a cost efficient way, then why does the impulse to mix still exist?  To provide an 
example, Imbroscio (2008) comments on the immediate reaction by social scientists and other 
housing and urban development experts in the midst of the Hurricane Katrina disaster several 
years ago.  After 200 scholars signed a petition calling for a “Move to Opportunity” type 
program for low-income, racially segregated victims of the hurricane, Imbroscio concluded: 
What such a strong academic endorsement of this controversial (and now strongly 
condemned) Katrina “Move to Opportunity” petition suggests, perhaps more than 
anything else, is how deeply and passionately many American housing policy experts 
hold beliefs and values impelling them to embrace deconcentration (or dispersal) 
policies.
600
 
Imbroscio himself, however, is skeptical.  The thrust of his critique is that such zeal often “leads 
many of its members to engage in suspect and problematic practices, both in their research and in 
their efforts to shape and prescribe public policy.”601  However, whether Imbroscio adequately 
establishes that the zeal for the “dispersal consensus”602 belies more disingenuous, ulterior 
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motives is at best arguable.
603
  Rather, it raises the important question of whether there may be 
value to principle-based policy recommendations.  While integration efforts on “principle” are 
often remarked upon in a pejorative way by researchers, it is worth dwelling on the value of 
principle as it relates to social policy.  In other words, is there a moral impetus when we speak of 
residential integration that can accompany economic and utilitarian criteria?   
If we accept the sentiment that a “moral and spiritual case can be made for integration”604 then it 
is natural to perceive that there may indeed be more to the conversation of residential integration 
than merely aggregating and netting out an equation in total welfare.  Such an implication is 
based upon the idea that there is something “wrong” or ethically unjust about segregation, and 
often doing what is “right” may not cohere with doing what is optimal, as some morally impelled 
actions may actually reduce utility or efficiency. 
One might respond that researchers have evaluated residential integration outcomes through a 
lens of economic efficacy and the maximization of utility because the issues they are trying to 
address are inherently economic and utilitarian considerations.  This is a partially accurate 
statement; integration vision, language/terminology, and stated goals all possess a trajectory 
toward the maximization of a particular social arrangement.  However, if this were universally 
true, would we be willing to accept a society that is fundamentally segregated although Pareto 
optimal for all parties?
605
   Assuming one is hesitant to answer in the affirmative, this question 
implies that there might be more to mixing than simple calculations of cost effectiveness and 
positive net welfare gain. 
To provide an example of this, one of Cheshire’s arguments against mixing is that the costs to 
address neighborhood effects, assuming they exist in some form, are too high given the small 
gains that have been observed (natural conclusion stemming from Argument #2 in the Cheshirian 
position).  Cheshire asks: “if living in a poor neighbourhood does make people even worse off 
than they would otherwise have been, is the impact sufficient that policy should specifically 
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address it?”606  Here, Cheshire exhibits a form of “cost-benefit” analysis rationale, where the 
benefits of any given endeavor must outweigh the associated costs of its implementation in order 
to substantiate its use.  Clearly, for Cheshire, the evidence of MTO and integration outcomes in 
general fails to meet this criterion.   
We must note, however, that cost-benefit rationale offers a very specific form of valuation and 
presupposes a particular outcome by which to measure the “cost.”  While Cheshire is not 
necessarily explicit here, he mentions addressing issues of inequality and welfare specifically (as 
opposed to integration).  The costs of MTO and other integration projects, he concludes, are too 
high given that mixing is only treating the symptoms of inequality, and not the root cause and 
that welfare is often, according to him, more apparent in specialized, or segregated, 
neighborhoods.  While such outcomes are common goals sought in integration research, it is 
important to note that what is being measured is utility as a function of mere spatial integration, 
and not social integration.  It is worth dwelling momentarily on this term.  Karst (1985) makes 
the important distinction between physical exclusion and social exclusion, i.e., exclusion from 
“belonging.”607  While one may be physically included in spatial terms, that does not necessarily 
mean they belong.  We might refer to this distinction as the difference between spatial 
integration and social integration.  While the latter requires the former, the former does not 
necessarily lead to the latter.  This has relevance in regards to how we understand and evaluate 
integration outcomes.  The research base has revealed evidence both for and against mixing, but 
such evaluations have taken place simply by virtue of studying people (both black and white) 
that live together.
608
  One limitation of such research is that living together (spatially) and 
integrating (socially) are two distinct outcomes.   
To provide an extreme example of why this might be problematic, the United States was most 
“integrated” based upon dissimilarity indices during the time of the Civil War, a period in US 
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history not prized for harmonious racial relationships.
609
  Dissimilarity Indices collected from a 
group of major metropolitan areas in both northern and southern US regions show racial 
dissimilarity between 29 and 46 around the time of the Civil War.
610
  However, this example of 
spatial integration, often occurring because African American slaves lived on the same land as 
their white owners, is far from any viable representation of social integration.  This example, 
albeit an extreme one, makes the point that measuring impacts occurring as a result of spatial 
integration may be a poor proxy for whether we should adopt or dismiss integration policy.  
Simply putting people together, measuring net utility gains for the dispersed and receiving 
households, and then concluding suspicion toward mixing is a poor methodology if the research 
is based on spatial, and not social, integration.  The measurement of outcomes relative to spatial 
integration can be captured within an economic paradigm; the measurement of outcomes in 
social integration demands a framework with greater scope to measure outcomes in utility in 
addition to considerations in equality, fairness, relationships, community, and solidarity—norms 
often articulated in contexts beyond the economic realm yet still possessing significant spatial 
implications. 
Second, supposing that we were clear on the outcomes being sought and measured for in 
integration research, how well could we compare such outcomes—which are often intangible—
against the associated outlays or “costs”?  For example, Cheshire (and a host of others) criticize 
the expensive costs of MTO—estimated to be approximately $3,000 per head.611  This figure 
leads Cheshire to conclude that the identification of neighborhood effects in MTO is 
“comparatively small” relative to the costs.612  However, this begs the question as to how such a 
scale is to be weighed.  What is the appropriate amount of welfare that must be gained?  What is 
the degree of neighborhood effects that must be identified as being present to sufficiently 
substantiate the costs to such policy?  It can be argued that such a determination is a value-
judgment in itself.  This point, in addition to the points mentioned above, lead to the suggestion 
that perhaps a flaw in the integration debate and its accompanying framework of evaluation is 
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that we have attempted to provide an economic measure to a social good that cannot simply be 
relegated to a singular form of calculation.  In other words, there exists a plurality of values as it 
relates to residential integration.   
Recent scholarship has addressed this very issue.  Since 1948, the BBC has hosted a series of 
radio lectures entitled the “Reith Lectures” that deal with “significant contemporary issues, 
delivered by leading figures from relevant fields.”613  In 2009, the guest lecturer was Michael 
Sandel, Professor of Government at Harvard University.  Among other lectures, Sandel offered 
thoughts on “markets and morals,” with his primary theme being that “markets leave their mark.” 
In other words, markets tend to change the nature of the people, places and things they 
encounter.
614
  Sandel echoed this sentiment in his 2009 book Justice where he points out that 
creating markets for otherwise aesthetically valued goods such as pregnancy/surrogacy, reading a 
book, civic virtue, etc., reduces the otherwise pluralistic values of such goods to mere utility or 
money.
615
   
Although this idea is not new,
616
 it was intuitive of Sandel to address this topic and in doing so 
validate it as a “contemporary” issue.  In his book, he concludes his chapter on markets with the 
question: “are there certain virtues and higher goods that markets do not honor and money 
cannot buy?”617  Here, we might extend this idea with a related question of our own: is social 
integration—the idea of racially heterogeneous neighborhoods—a “higher good” that cannot be 
reduced to an equation in aggregate utility?  At this point, my aim in the thesis will be to attempt 
to demonstrate that residential integration is such an ideal—a “higher good” that is often 
presented in the context of economic and utilitarian evaluations, and yet, can also transcend such 
a context.  The goal of this endeavor is to provide a more comprehensive evaluative framework 
by which to assess residential integration policy and outcomes, one that accounts for the social 
costs and net welfare gains in addition to the nature of society and integrated social arrangements 
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as a higher good.  Therefore, while this chapter and its subsequent discussion have explored 
residential integration through an economic paradigm, I will now introduce an additional, often 
unexplored vantage point by which to engage this discussion: the ethical paradigm. 
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Chapter 4: The Ethics of Residential Integration 
 
In contrast to the previous chapter, this chapter aims to explore residential integration in an 
ethical paradigm.  The chapter will be outlined as followed: Part I will provide a short summary 
of where this study has taken us upon reviewing the last two chapters.  Further, this section will 
introduce the “normative argument.”  While the normative argument is presented first and 
without initial qualification, the greater part of this chapter and post-script is dedicated to 
supporting the considerations of this argument.  In Part II, I introduce the work of John Rawls 
and relate his work to the normative argument and residential integration.  While Part II 
explicates the value of Rawls, Part III presents what I understand to be intractable Rawlsian 
problems as it relates to supporting the normative argument.  However, these problems do not 
suggest that Rawls should be dismissed altogether.  Therefore, in Part IV, I argue for an 
adjustment to the Rawlsian treatise that would have significant implications, particularly as it 
relates to the normative argument and the ethics of residential integration.  These implications 
are explored more closely in a post-script to the chapter.  Finally, the post-script ends by 
summarizing my contribution to the residential integration discussion as well as the conclusions 
that can appropriately be reached. 
 
PART I: Residential Integration—A Normative Approach 
 
Among other things, the previous chapters have provided the following insights in this 
exploration. 
(1) Segregated black households have suffered adverse impacts occurring in the market, as 
evidenced in the recent subprime financial crisis.  Further, an argument can be made that 
the effects of such impacts are exacerbated for segregated black communities as a 
function of their spatial concentration (i.e., concentrated foreclosures). 
(2) While there may be evidence of increased risk and vulnerability for segregated low-
income minorities in the wake of a financial crisis, the argument for mixing through 
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presumed dispersal cannot be substantiated based upon the evidence in Chapter 3.  
Further, there seems to even be evidence suggesting that segregation has its own 
economic benefits. 
(3) The empirical model and subsequent discussion reflect an exploration in residential 
integration through an economic paradigm.  This paradigm follows the worn path already 
tread by the existing social science world.  However, there are reasons for concern within 
this framework, and additionally, with the framework itself.   
The Evaluative Integration Framework I have referenced in the last two chapters is, in essence, a 
framework by which to gauge welfare considerations—both for segregated communities and 
their households as well as the aggregate social whole.  As the post-script to Chapter 3 attempted 
to articulate, there are methodological issues related to the nature of research that has taken place 
within this framework—including my own.  Supposing, however, that each methodological issue 
was satisfactorily addressed in US residential housing studies, would we have consensus on the 
benefits or drawbacks of integration?  Would our policy in this area be more transparent, clear, 
and uncontested?  At best, we might very well answer in the affirmative to these important 
questions.  However, suppose we offered an additional question: if every methodological 
drawback was appropriately attended to, would all considerations relative to US residential 
housing arrangements be addressed?  The answer, I submit, is “no.”  Beyond methodological 
issues in the empirical literature and within my own studies (A1 & A2), there are moral and 
ethical considerations that would remain unaccounted for should the Evaluative Integration 
Framework be our singular lens for evaluation and interpretation of residential housing 
outcomes. 
In this thesis, I have located the Evaluative Integration Framework under a general utilitarian 
ideology.  As mentioned, utilitarianism is far more multi-faceted and far-reaching than it is often 
credited for.  However, in this thesis, I utilize this term in its most general sense: the 
maximization of utility (the greatest “good”) in an aggregate social context (the greatest 
“number”).  This ideology is still very much appealed to in economic theory, even normative 
economics.
618
  As former Oxford economist Donald Hay suggests, economic efficacy can easily 
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be traced to earlier utilitarian sentiments of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain on behalf 
of the agent.  He writes:  “Seeking pleasure and avoiding pain is the same as maximizing utility, 
and all human efforts are directed towards that end.  This idea was transferred more or less 
without amendment into economic analysis.”619  Thus, to determine efficiency, the optimal 
arrangement is the one that provides maximum aggregate utility.  As mentioned, this is the 
skeletal system of the existing Evaluative Integration Framework for residential integration. 
I submit, however, that the multi-faceted nature of integration, community, and US race relations 
are not adequately captured in a utilitarian framework, given the singular aim of such a 
framework.  This statement begs the question: What facet(s) of residential integration is the 
utility framework failing to capture?  Here I offer two main ethical elements relevant to 
residential integration that have escaped the Evaluative Integration Framework as I have defined 
it.
620
  The first is the issue of societal fairness and social equity based upon the presence of 
enhanced risk and vulnerability in the wake of a market failure as a function of living in a 
segregated Low-Mix Black community.  To put it brusquely, we might state that it is unfair when 
sectors of society are more socially or economically vulnerable and “bear a disproportionate 
share of environmental risks.”621  While the efficiency model may be of great importance insofar 
as providing the optimal social arrangement for utility maximization, it fails to consider the 
distribution of this utility.  Sen writes: “The trouble with this approach is that maximizing the 
sum of individual utilities is supremely unconcerned with the interpersonal distribution of that 
sum.  This should make it a particularly unsuitable approach to use for measuring or judging 
inequality.”622  In the case of residential segregation, we have evidence that in the wake of the 
subprime crisis market failure, segregated African-American communities were 
disproportionately impacted and suffered aggravated social disadvantage from policies and 
business practices that were, in theory, “evenhandedly applied to all races.”623  Such adverse 
impacts, as mentioned, represent a failure of “fair housing” where citizens, whether black or 
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white, have the opportunity to “live in an environment where one’s life chances are not unduly 
constrained.”624  To summarize, we can describe the first ethical issue of the normative argument 
as a consideration in social equity. 
The second ethical element that the Evaluative Integration Framework fails to address is the 
issue of “social integration” as an end, and not necessarily a means to an end.  This speaks to the 
consequentialist nature of the Evaluative Integration Framework.  Velasquez (1982) suggests that 
the major drawback to a utility framework is its inability to deal with moral issues, and more 
specifically, the moral issue of justice (how utility is distributed).
625
  This is not to suggest that 
the Evaluative Integration Framework is amoral or devoid of ethical considerations.  However, 
they are ethical considerations of a very specific kind.  For example, as discussed, a normative 
criterion for Galster’s framework was a consideration in “equity” where disadvantaged members 
either lost welfare by residing with members of their own community or gained welfare by 
integrating with members of an advantaged community.  However, while this might be 
understood as an ethical consideration, the rightness of this ethic is based upon the consequence 
of the activity in question (integration = more welfare, etc.).  This consequentialist approach, 
commensurate with traditional economic cost-benefit discourse, seems to limit the full range of 
ethical considerations as it is still conceived under the greater paradigm of utilitarianism.   This is 
in contrast to an ethic that is not employed as a means to an end, but is rather an end in itself.  
Such an ethic asks: “Is it right?” in contrast to “Does it work?”  Cramp (1995) captures this idea 
very well: “[Consequence-based ethics] is symptomatic of utilitarianism's fundamental 
indifference to ethics conceived as concerned with what is right in itself.”626  This argument 
primarily addresses how we value integration.  We ask: should integration be valued for what it 
produces (consequentialist argument)—or is there an inherent value to residential integration in 
itself?  To summarize, we can describe the second ethical issue of the normative argument as a 
pluralistic valuation of integration (valued as both a means and an end). 
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The semantic shift from considerations in optimality and sub-optimality to right and wrong 
introduces a more explicit moral dimension to the integration discussion.  Thus, we shall refer to 
the two aforementioned ethical considerations relative to residential housing arrangements in the 
US as the normative argument.   This dimension has been notably absent in the existing appraisal 
of mixed-community initiatives.  As discussed, Paul Cheshire and others have critiqued 
residential integration as constituting nothing more than a “faith-based displacement activity.”627  
In response, we might ask: is there space for a normative element in our evaluative framework as 
it relates to residential social arrangements?  Can residential integration endeavors be 
substantiated on ethical values or principle?  While the absence of this line of inquiry in the 
existing literature might leave us skeptical as to the relevance of ethics in the residential 
integration debate, value-laden ideals and language can often be found in social mix discussions.  
A primary example of an appeal to the normative argument comes from Rowland Atkinson.  He 
writes: “If resident outcomes improve by virtue of living in more socially diverse areas then 
programs of dispersal should be given further support.  Nevertheless, can we accept forms of 
concentrated deprivation regardless of the evidence on measured impacts?”628   
Atkinson implies that there may indeed be more to the conversation of residential integration 
than merely aggregating and netting out an equation in total welfare.  Further, this suggests a role 
for principle- or faith-based
629
 investigation as it relates to the analysis of “resident outcomes.”  
The implication is based upon the idea that there is something wrong or ethically unjust about 
segregation and often doing what is “right” may not cohere with doing what is optimal, as some 
morally impelled actions may actually reduce utility or efficiency.  Indeed, while a survey of the 
literature related to residential housing arrangements offers no explicit ethical justification for 
reduced segregation, appraisals of why residential integration is necessary often cite ethical 
appeals to the principle-based notion of achieving racial justice.  
For example, Massey and Denton, in their seminal work on residential segregation, call for 
“moral commitment” and define such an ethical impetus in terms of “justice.”630  They write: 
“As racial inequality sharpens, white fears will grow, racial prejudices will be reinforced, and 
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hostility toward blacks will increase, making the problems of racial justice and equal opportunity 
even more insoluble.”631  Similarly, Hartman et al. (2010) comment that the diverse group of 
contributors for their recent work on the integration debate consists of “an extraordinary 
collection of researchers and activists…all of whom have a deep commitment to racial 
justice.”632  One author defines racial justice in housing as working to “ensure that people of 
color will have access to housing, and [promoting] the ideal of racial and ethnic diversity in the 
suburbs.”633  Further, it was the state supreme court of New Jersey responding to appeals for 
“social justice” on behalf of segregated black households who recognized the unethical nature of 
exclusionary zoning in Mount Laurel and “attempted to move people still further toward the 
recognition that society could no longer isolate itself from the evils of concentrating poverty in 
the urban ghettos of the metropolitan area.”634  Perhaps more explicit than New Jersey’s state 
supreme court justices, Pendall et al. (2005) refer to exclusion as “unethical” and in the case of 
exclusionary zoning, “illegal.”635  Thus, even in the midst of efficiency arguments and economic 
consequentialism, we hear faint cries of residential segregation being unjust, unequal, and 
unethical. 
Based upon this usage, we might properly interpret the appeal to justice as the fair and equal 
distribution of utility (i.e., welfare and well-being of members of society) in a given social 
arrangement.  This expression has a clear moral and ethical undertone.  Velasquez provides a 
helpful summary:  
Justice and fairness are essentially comparative.  They are concerned with the 
comparative treatment given to the members of a group when benefits and burdens are 
distributed, when rules and laws are administered, when members of a group cooperate or 
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compete with each other, and when people are punished for the wrongs they have done or 
compensated for the wrongs they have suffered.
636
 
Thus, as discussed in Chapter 2 and demonstrated in Chapter 3, the observation that large 
portions of society who find themselves more vulnerable to risks and adverse market impacts 
leads us to condemn such a social predicament as unjust.  Indeed, the long-standing American 
ethos of fairness and equality “with liberty and justice for all” is violated when sectors of society 
are disadvantaged as a function of their place (as in the case of the subprime financial crisis).  
Moreover, the egalitarian ideal of equality among US inhabitants is reinforced in our language to 
the point of being ubiquitous.  The repeated motto “United We Stand” has been proclaimed from 
revolutionary times up to our present context, and finds new commitment and momentum with 
our country’s war efforts and most recently in its reaction to the September 11th terrorist attacks.  
The U.S. pledge of allegiance to our nation’s flag contains the phrase “One nation, under God, 
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”  Further, our money reminds us of our unity, as the 
Latin “e pluribus unum” or “out of many, one” is embedded on each piece of US coinage.  Even 
the very idea of the “University” is an egalitarian overture implying “unity out of diversity.”   
Yet while US language is often dressed up in egalitarian ideals of fairness and equality, the 
social reality reveals a stark difference.  The disparity between language and reality has not gone 
unnoticed and unaddressed, however.  Integration efforts housed under language such as “spatial 
equality,” “smart growth,” or even program titles like “Moving to Opportunity” and “HOPE VI” 
stand as deliberate overtures toward US social justice.  The idea of social justice as an impetus 
for just social policy is not new, and had gained considerable momentum shortly after the great 
depression in the mid-1930s.  Indeed, many of the measures of President Roosevelt’s New Deal 
were driven by the ideals of social justice.
637
  Turner et al. (2009) trace this ethical line of 
reasoning spanning from Franklin Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson into the late 1960s: 
Harry Truman’s Fair Deal strove to continue the momentum of the New Deal.  Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society was to be great precisely because it elevated social and 
economic justice to explicit national policy.  Though far from having carried the day, 
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social justice was in play in the American psyche for the three decades from the onset of 
the New Deal through the cresting of the civil-rights movement in the mid-1960s.
638
 
 
PART II: Supporting the Normative Argument—Rawlsian Justice and Social Integration 
in Housing 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that utilitarian sentiments serve to support and justify the efficiency 
considerations present in the Evaluative Integration Framework.  If our aim is to incorporate an 
ethical component in the integration discussion as identified in the normative argument, such an 
argument would find support and justification in the field of justice.  To be sure, utilitarianism 
proper is not anathema to justice, and further, is considered a form of justice.  However, as 
mentioned, this particular brand of justice, as I have defined it, brackets out the ethical 
components identified as being necessary in our understanding of housing arrangements.  
Therefore, to give full support to the normative argument and flesh out its contributions relative 
to the integration discussion, I have chosen to begin with a conception of justice articulated 
against the backdrop of utilitarian ideology.  The seminal expression of such justice is found in 
the work of John Rawls.  Jon Mandle (2009) writes: “Although the term ‘justice’ is used in a 
[sic] many different contexts, justice as fairness addresses a fairly narrow topic, although an 
indisputably important one.  It is concerned with what we might call ‘basic social justice.’”639  
Rawls’ work is known for an array of important characteristics, but it is best understood as a 
response to utilitarian conceptions of justice, or what he calls the “predominant systematic 
theory” in modern moral philosophy.640  He identifies the brand of utilitarianism he is responding 
to: “The main idea is that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions 
are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the 
individuals belonging to it.”641   
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Rawls’ theory of justice offers a promising ethical framework for exploring the inequality of 
impacts relative to segregated black and white households occurring in the wake of the subprime 
financial crisis.  His approach is favored as possessing a greater degree of “egalitarian criteria”642 
for a system of justice and helps to concentrate the “variety of principles of equity, fairness and 
justice held and applied independently” by “ordering and prioritizing or tradeoff.”643  Further, his 
theory of justice provides a means to overcome otherwise consequentialist systems of 
determining what should or should not be done, a necessary step in the survey of fairness and 
justice in housing arrangements.
644
  It has been said that Rawlsian justice is employed where 
institutions “undertake to avail themselves of the accidents of nature and social circumstances 
only when doing so is for the common benefit.”645 
John Rawls was a political philosopher who wrote, spoke, and taught at the highest echelon of 
western universities before his death in 2002.  His contributions toward justice are far reaching 
and are best articulated in his seminal work A Theory of Justice.  Rawls argued against the 
utilitarian position that justice should be viewed as the outcome of utility.  In other words, he 
rejected the idea that the principle of utility is the correct view for society’s understanding of 
what is just.
646
  He further rejects the belief that an individual’s rationality is representative of all 
rationality.  He writes: "There is a sense in which classical utilitarianism fails to take seriously 
the distinction between persons. The principle of rational choice for one man is taken as the 
principle of social choice as well.”647  Rawls, in contrast, gives primacy to liberty and 
individuality in society so as to construct and seek their own ends. 
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Rawls’ theory of justice is based on the principle of social contract, or the idea of giving up 
certain rights and liberties so as to enhance social order.  However, this social contract is not 
necessarily an historical reality, but rather, it is an imaginary device used to discover our moral 
principles.
648
  The purpose of the contract is to elucidate what is just, and moreover, to arrange 
society around just ideals.  He writes: “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is 
of systems of thought.  A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it 
is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust.”649 
How does one go about determining what is just?  Rawls proposes that justice be constructed in a 
neutral state where the following question is considered: What principles would we live by if we 
knew we would have to live together in a society governed by these principles but did not 
necessarily know our place in society?  Rawls proposes a hypothetical state where individuals 
are unaware of their natural abilities, place, and position in the social hierarchy of society.  This 
hypothetical state is referred to as the “original position.”  He writes: 
By contrast with social theory, the aim is to characterize this situation so that the 
principles that would be chosen, whatever they turn out to be, are acceptable from a 
moral point of view.  The original position is defined in such a way that it is a status quo 
in which any agreements reached are fair.  It is a state of affairs in which the parties are 
equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary 
contingencies or the relative balance of social forces.  Thus justice as fairness is able to 
use the idea of pure procedural justice from the beginning.
650
 
It is in this equilibrium, according to Rawls, that societal decisions should be made.  Decision 
making without assuming one’s particular standing in society, class position, or social status is 
referred to as the “veil of ignorance.”651  The outcomes of decision-making in this equilibrium 
should be an acceptable standard to all parties for a just distribution of social goods such as 
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liberty, income, wealth, and opportunity.
652
  In other words, if one had no influence relative to 
where they were born, what abilities they were born with, and what future fortunes they would 
have, they must articulate what kind of society would they would choose to frame so as to ensure 
their standing in society and opportunities for advancement were equal, fair, and just, and not 
simply subject to the “luck of the draw” in a social lottery.   Furthermore, Rawls points out two 
important characteristics of the participants in the original position.  First, they are rational.  He 
writes: 
The concept of rationality invoked here, with the exception of one essential feature, is the 
standard one familiar in social theory.  Thus in the usual way, a rational person is thought 
to have a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him.  He ranks these 
options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan which will 
satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater chance of being 
successfully executed.
653
 
Second, parties in the original position are mutually disinterested.  He describes this attribute: 
The assumption of mutually disinterested rationality, then, comes to this: the persons in 
the original position try to acknowledge principles which advance their system of ends as 
far as possible.  They do this by attempting to win for themselves the highest index of 
primary social goods, since this enables them to promote their conception of the good 
most effectively whatever it turns out to be.  The parties do not seek to confer benefits or 
to impose injuries on one another; they are not moved by affection or rancor.  Nor do 
they try to gain relative to each other; they are not envious or vain.  Put in terms of a 
game, we might say: they strive for as high an absolute score as possible.
654
 
With participants understood as rational and mutually disinterested, this hypothetical exercise 
creates a healthy tension to move individuals away from the complications of self-interest and 
more toward an idea of social justice, which Rawls defines as: “the principle of rational prudence 
applied to an aggregative conception of the welfare of the group.”655  Thus, the veil of ignorance 
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is ultimately exercising rationality without exercising personal bias in the decision making 
process. 
The original position and the veil of ignorance, the conditions under which the hypothetical 
agreement is to take place, is the first element of Rawls’ thesis.  Next, Rawls suggests that his 
theories of justice would be chosen under this hypothetical contract.  There are two: 
“First Principle: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system 
of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.  Second Principle: 
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity.”656 
Rawls gives the first principle of liberty lexical priority over the second principle.  As Wolff 
(2006) writes, “It is no defence of slavery that it makes the slaves better off than they would be 
with their freedom.  The fact is that enforced slavery is inconsistent with recognizing equal 
liberty, and so must give way even if it has economic advantages for the slaves.”657  The second 
principle is where Rawls make a unique contribution.  Referred to as the “difference principle”—
Rawls allows for inequalities in a society based upon the condition that such inequalities actually 
improve the lives of the disadvantaged.  This is a conditional statement: “if an inequality is 
necessary to make everyone better off, and, in particular, to make the worst off better off than 
they would otherwise be, then it should be permitted.”658  Part (b) of the second principle simply 
states that everyone should “have an equal opportunity to qualify for the more privileged 
positions in society; in other words, morality prohibits discrimination.”659 
To understand Rawls’ second theory of justice, one must properly understand his position on 
desert.  The principles of justice, forged in the original position, are agreed upon without the 
knowledge of how natural and social advantages or disadvantages would be distributed.  For 
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example, as Velazquez explains, “Would such a group of rational, self-interested people [in the 
original position] agree to live in a society governed by a principle that allowed discrimination 
against blacks if none of them knew whether he would turn out to be a black person in that 
society?”660  Rawls believes that many advantages and disadvantages of the well-off and least-
off in society are, in fact, arbitrary.  Regarding the natural skills, talents, and success attributes 
we are endowed with at birth, he writes: "Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of 
natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so 
arbitrary from a moral point of view."
661
  This is somewhat of a response to market liberalism, 
where what is distributed is proportionate to merit.  The implication under this ideology is that 
individuals come from blank slates with equal starting points.  Thus, he critiques liberalism 
because “even if it works to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies, it still 
permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of 
abilities and talents.”662  For Rawls, liberalism would ideally propose that the advantages of 
those with greater natural endowments be limited to those that further the good of the less 
fortunate sectors of society.
663
   
This understanding of natural and social contingencies helps us to better understand Rawls’ 
second theory of justice.  While social and natural inequalities are arbitrary in one sense, ‘justice 
as fairness’ treats them each differently.  Fair equality of opportunity (principle 2-b) “prohibits 
social inequalities (such as different class backgrounds) from being transformed into unequal 
shares of social resources.”  However, regarding the difference principle (principle 2-a), this 
principle “allows natural inequalities in talent and ability to influence shares of social resources 
when doing so works to the advantage of the least advantaged position.”664 
One might legitimately ask why, in the original positions, these specific principles of justice 
would be chosen as opposed to a more utilitarian standard.  Rawls offers three primary responses 
to this.  First, he believes that the parties in the original position want what Rawls refers to as 
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“primary social goods.”  He writes: “The expectations of representative men are, then, to be 
defined by the index of primary social goods available to them.  While the persons in the original 
position do not know their conception of the good, they do know, I assume, that they prefer more 
rather than less primary goods.”665  Further, he identifies these goods as rights, liberties, 
opportunities and powers, income and wealth.
666
  Rawls believes that these are the things that 
rational, mutually disinterested people want (in addition to whatever else they might want).  
Wolff writes:  
That is, whether your conception of the good is a life of unadulterated pleasure, monastic 
virtue, hunting, shooting, and fishing, consciousness-raising, or whatever, Rawls’s 
primary goods are desirable.  You always want liberty, opportunity, and money, supposes 
Rawls, as all-purpose means to your personal ends in life.  Thus agents in the original 
position know that they want primary goods.
667
 
The second reason Rawls believes we would choose his two principles is because “the parties to 
the original position know they are to live in a society in which they must cooperate with each 
other, although there will be conflicts among themselves.”668  This is a demonstration of what 
has been referred to as “pure procedural justice,” where a just scheme that is pre-arranged and 
agreed upon is sufficient to bring about just outcomes, whatever they may be.  Lebacqz (1986) 
points out that pure procedural justice relates to Rawls’ theory in general: “whatever is chosen by 
the parties in the original position is just simply by virtue of being the outcome of the decision 
procedure.  Thus, if the parties do in fact choose Rawls’ two principles, then these are the 
principles that provide justice.”669  Pure procedural justice locates the burden of determining 
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justice in the process so that personal bias and individual interest do not cloud our debates 
regarding the outcomes. 
Third, the parties involved will choose rationally.  As Wolff (2006) points out, there are several 
differing models of rational choice theory.  This might include the maximization of expected 
utility (maximizing average value).  This theory involves the association of utility points or utils 
with a given choice.  Thus, we have an average figure of utility for each of our choices (where 
we live, what we wear, where we work, etc.) and we choose the option with the highest 
average.
670
  Rawls assumes, however, that such behavior is irrational.  Rather, he assumes that 
the parties in the original position, being rational and mutually disinterested, will choose not to 
maximize the maximum utility, but rather, will choose to maximize the minimum (“maximin”).  
The “maximin” rule is essentially choosing the circumstance, not with the greater potential for 
gain, but with the least potential for loss, when reviewing an index of decision making options 
from the perspective of the least favored.  Why would justice be considered from the perspective 
of the least favored?  Because in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance, one does not 
know if they will be born into a position of the least favored or not.  Wolff concludes: “We can 
now see that the burden of Rawls’ argument comes down to the claim that the rational principle 
of choice in the original position is maximin.”671 
 
Spatial Implications of Rawls 
 
As Chapters 2 and 3 have discussed, residential integration has been cast in a consequentialist 
framework which does not necessarily allow for the full expression of ethical considerations 
inherent in the discussion.  Rawls, however, might alternatively locate this issue under the 
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“circumstances of justice.”  He writes: “Thus, one can say, in brief, that the circumstances of 
justice obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons put forward conflicting claims to the 
division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity.”672  According to Rawls, the 
conditions of modern scarcity mean that “fruitful ventures must inevitably break down,” thus 
leading to the issue of how spatial goods are distributed.
673
  Rawls’ theory posits that the rational 
hypothetical exercise of the original position would reject a utilitarian framework for 
determining which distribution is just. 
As we have seen, utilitarianism would in principle allow the sacrifice of the basic 
liberties of some if this led to an increase in aggregate utility.  If we can establish that the 
parties would be especially concerned to protect their basic liberties (and less concerned 
with additional material gains beyond the minimum threshold level), this would provide a 
very strong argument for the two principles of justice over a utilitarian alternative.
674
 
To be clear, Rawls was not implying that natural distribution is just or unjust; natural distribution 
simply is a fact.  How these facts are dealt with, however, speak to the justice and injustices of 
society.
675
  Just as people naturally differ in their abilities (intelligence, skills, acumen, etc.), they 
naturally differ in their place, i.e., where they are born.  As Mandle points out, the problem with 
utilitarianism is that in aiming to maximize a particular good (say, housing values), it “must be 
indifferent to the distribution of that good except insofar as the total is affected.”676  As explored 
in this thesis, current research tells us such segregation may ultimately be optimal based upon 
certain utilitarian criteria.  However, according to Rawls, a utilitarian assessment such as this is 
problematic for producing normative ethical judgments.  Rawls calls for “redress” where natural 
inequalities are recognized and compensated for.  He writes: 
This is the principle that undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of 
birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow 
compensated for.  Thus the principle holds that in order to treat all persons equally, to 
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provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to those with 
fewer native assets and to those born into less favorable social positions.
677
 
Redressing the bias of contingencies has significant implications for spatial ethics.  As evidenced 
earlier, concentrated communities of low-income households are more vulnerable to systematic 
risks and market failures such as the subprime financial crisis.  The US dispersal efforts aimed 
towards integrating black and white communities such as Gatreaux, MTO, HOPE VI or even 
legislative attempts such as the Mount Laurel rulings may very well find moral and ethical 
support in Rawlsian theory.  The difference principle is not only considered ‘just’ by Rawls, but 
allows for the identification of what is unjust.  He writes: “Injustice, then, is simply inequalities 
that are not to the benefit of all.”678  Accordingly, a Rawlsian appraisal of residential segregation 
would label any arrangement where low-income segregated minorities are exposed to market 
risks and vulnerabilities as being unjust since this inequality does not benefit segregated 
households.  Why would one accept this line of reasoning?  Because persons in the original 
position acknowledge principles which advance their own ends as far as possible, even though 
they are unaware of such ends.  Rather, they are aware that they want to secure and maximize 
primary social goods such as liberty and opportunity.  Thus, rationally speaking, if you didn’t 
know whether you would be born black or white, rich or poor, and further, if you did not know 
what place you would be born in, would you construct a world where you could be born into an 
area where your primary social goods were compromised and at greater risk?  More germane to 
adverse impacts—would you construct a world where subprime loans and subsequent 
foreclosures were concentrated—risking that you might be born into such a community?  Rawls 
answers “no”—and thus submits that institutions should be constructed in such a way to correct 
for such an unfair distribution—which may very well include dispersal efforts such as MTO and 
HOPE VI. 
Wolff offers a contemporary understanding of the original position and the accompanying veil of 
ignorance: 
Suppose you have just woken up in a hospital bed.  First you realize that you are 
suffering from an extensive memory loss.  Looking down you see that you are swaddled 
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from head to toe in bandages.  You don’t remember your name, sex, or race, nor can you 
discover these by self-inspection (the tag on your bandaged wrist only has a number).  
Facts about your family, occupation, class, strengths, skills, and so on are all lost to you.  
You do recall some general theories you once learnt in economics and sociology classes, 
but you cannot remember anything from your history lessons.  In fact, you could not even 
say what century it was.  Then into the ward walks a man in a white coat.  ‘Good 
morning’, he says, ‘I am Professor John Rawls.  Tomorrow your memory will return, 
your bandages will be removed, and you will be free to leave.  So we don’t have much 
time.  What we need you to do is to tell us how you would like society to be designed, 
bearing in mind that, from tomorrow, you will be living in the society you have chosen.  
We want you to design society purely in your own interests.  Although you do not know 
what your actual interests are, I can tell you that you want as many primary goods as 
possible—liberties, opportunities, wealth, and income—and you should not consider the 
fortunes of anyone else.  I will come back this evening to see what you have decided.’  
Under these conditions, what would it be rational to choose?
679
 
We might take this very example and make a few adjustments for our purposes.  Suppose that we 
replicate this scenario provided by Wolff up to the point of Rawls entering the room.  However, 
he offers his question a bit differently:  
Tomorrow your memory will return, your bandages will be removed, and you will be free 
to leave…What we need you to do is to tell us how you would arrange residential 
housing in the United States, bearing in mind that, from tomorrow, you will be living in 
the society you have chosen.  Although you do not know what your actual interests are, I 
can tell you that you want as many primary goods as possible—liberties, opportunities, 
wealth, and income—and you should not consider the fortunes of anyone else.  I will 
come back this evening to see what you have decided.’  Under these conditions, what 
would it be rational to choose? 
Assuming this unique situation, this Rawlsian illustration makes a compelling case that we 
would not choose housing arrangements given under the status quo.  The fact that I do not know 
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my skin color (under the bandages) and yet must decide how I would arrange housing, leaves me 
open to living in a residentially segregated white or black neighborhood.  If I were to live in the 
latter, based upon the suggestion that minority-segregated neighborhoods potentially leave 
members more vulnerable and at risk in the wake of market failures, I would be compromising 
my desire to maximize primary social goods.   
Supposing one was to answer in a similar fashion, we might rightly call residential segregation 
unjust.  Because an unequal distribution of primary goods is not to everyone’s advantage in this 
particular arrangement, Rawls would suggest institutions should be designed in order to satisfy 
the principles laid out in his two theories of justice.  This, in turn, would result in redressing the 
bias in social contingencies as overtures toward equality.  As laid out in the literature review, we 
might properly understand efforts such as Gatreuax, Moving to Opportunity, HOPE VI, and 
legislation such as the Mount Laurel rulings as efforts aimed at the achievement of Rawlsian 
equality.   
Further, to relate the Rawlsian framework to Galster’s equity and efficiency considerations, 
Rawls would see the case for equity (conceded by Galster and evident in A1 and A2) as superior 
to the case for efficiency (whereas the existing Evaluative Integration Framework gives equal 
consideration to them both).  This is due to the principle of “maximin” where rational and 
mutually disinterested participants in the original position would choose to maximize the 
minimum in society, or the position of the least well off.  Further, efficiency is determined based 
upon net utility for all as an outcome of a given social arrangement.  In contrast, though, pure 
procedural justice does not focus attention on the outcome, but rather, on the procedure as the 
mechanism meant to wield justice.  A just procedure will inevitably produce a just outcome 
based upon this idea.  This leads to the famous Rawlsian suggestion of sharing in one another’s 
fate—whatever that fate may be: 
In justice as fairness men agree to share one another's fate.  In designing institutions they 
undertake to avail themselves to the accidents of nature and social circumstance only 
when doing so is for the common benefit.  The two principles are a fair way of meeting 
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the arbitrariness of fortune; and while no doubt imperfect in other ways, the institutions 
which satisfy these principles are just.
680
 
Thus, institutions should be arranged toward the considerations of justice and “maximin.”  In 
response to this, we may envisage a cry from members of society who would suffer the loss of 
utility based upon these arrangements.  The analysis of A1 and A2 revealed that, in Cleveland, 
aggregate housing values are likely to suffer more by re-distributing households with 
foreclosure-prone attributes.  Thus, while such an arrangement may offer advantages to Low-
Mix Black households and neighborhoods (equity argument), it would create disadvantages for 
Low-Mix White households and neighborhoods (efficiency argument).  Further, as we described, 
the disadvantages of Low-Mix White neighborhoods should dispersal occur would exceed the 
disadvantages of Low-Mix Black neighborhoods should dispersal not occur.  Thus, the dispersal 
arrangement may allow the Low-Mix White community to claim injustice.  However, according 
to Rawls, if such an arrangement is the outcome of pure procedural justice, or an agreement 
hypothetically advanced prior to societal arrangements, then such outcomes must hold.  As 
Mandel describes: “Even in a well-ordered society where everyone shares the same abstract 
conception of justice, we must expect that there will be reasonable disagreement over which 
specific laws or policies would be just.”681  MacIntyre offers a more acute description: “[For 
Rawls] justice generally has priority over efficiency.”682 
Based upon this background, I submit that a Rawlsian approach to housing policy would 
condemn concentrated pockets of neighborhood deprivation as unjust.  A social contract framed 
in a “veil of ignorance” would not support spatial segmentation where a portion of society finds 
itself exposed to the perils of market failures such as the subprime financial crisis.  A Rawlsian 
appraisal aims, as a social objective, to move the bar from the bottom where the weak and the 
vulnerable of society exist.   
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Part III: Is Rawlsian Justice—Just? 
 
This chapter began with the suggestion that a more morally capacious framework was necessary 
in order to account for the economic as well as the ethical considerations inherent in the 
residential integration discussion.  As mentioned, to assume a framework employing the former 
(Evaluative Integration Framework) is to risk bracketing out the latter.  Further, the specific 
ethical issues this model fails to recognize are considerations in social equity and a pluralistic 
valuation of integration.  Social equity is compromised when segregated sectors of society are 
more at risk and vulnerable in the wake of a market crisis such as the subprime financial crisis.  
Yet to only envisage integration as a means to produce more utility for those at risk is to miss 
other considerations relative to integration, i.e., that there is something wrong about partitioning 
ourselves off from one another in society and something right about increased contact and 
community among black and white households in our housing arrangements. 
To miss the ethical dimension in this discussion is to miss a particular application of justice.  The 
Evaluative Integration Framework, while employing considerations in economic efficacy and the 
maximization of a particular arrangement, does not give consideration to the distribution of 
utility leaving us to echo Atkinson’s ethical impetus that even if there is no evidence to benefits 
from mixing, “can we accept forms of concentrated deprivation regardless of the evidence on 
measured impacts?”683  Thus, the benefit and necessity of Rawls becomes apparent.  His theory 
of justice, conceived as a response to the dominant utilitarian paradigm, provides a framework by 
which to assess and engage the integration discussion in a more comprehensive fashion in order 
to provide space for ethical considerations within the terms of justice.  Yet a question arises, if 
the ethical elements of social equity and a more appropriate valuation of integration were 
missing prior to incorporating considerations in justice, are they now open and available after our 
usage of Rawls?  Does Rawlsian justice give full support to the normative argument and flesh 
out its contributions relative to the integration discussion?   
At its best, we might say that the Rawlsian exercise provides strong ethical rationale and support 
for the first consideration of the normative argument which charges the adverse impacts 
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disproportionately shouldered by segregated black households as a violation of social equity and 
fairness.  When made ignorant of their natural and social contingencies, rational and mutually 
disinterested persons in the original position would not choose to structure society in such a way 
so as to leave some members more at risk and vulnerable, particularly in the wake of a market 
crisis.  The Rawlsian framework makes for a compelling ethical argument as it relates to 
“maximin” and endeavoring toward social equity.  However, as we turn our attention to the 
second consideration in the normative argument, the same degree of support is altogether absent. 
Therefore, in the forthcoming section, my aim is to show that Rawlsian principles, while 
showing promise insofar as elucidating terms of justice outside and against otherwise utilitarian 
sentiments, still remain insufficient to properly buttress and support what I have called the 
normative argument, particularly as it relates to its second consideration.  I offer two intractable 
problems with Rawlsian justice that will, I argue, suppress the features of the normative 
argument’s latter claim.684  This suppression would prohibit full consideration to the ethical 
elements relevant to the integration discussion and leave us in an ambiguous predicament 
ironically similar to what we initially found ourselves in. 
   
Why Rawlian Justice Will Not Do Justice to the Integrated Housing Discussion 
 
Recall that the major ethical tenets of the normative argument included the following: 
1) Societal fairness and social equity are compromised when segregated sectors of society 
experience greater risk and vulnerability in the wake of market breakdowns such as the 
subprime financial crisis. 
2) We miss something of the nature of social integration when we define it merely in terms 
of costs and benefits (such as the utility model does).  To only see social integration 
through the eyes of the latter model is to limit the rightness of integration efforts to a 
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consequentialist cost-benefit equation and to improperly value the nature of social 
integration. 
As discussed, these issues, deemed as ethically important aspects within the integration 
discussion, can be left unaddressed and/or crowded out when only engaging neighborhood 
integration through a generalized utilitarian lens (Evaluative Integration Framework).  Where 
efficiency arguments within the integration discussion tend to rely on the support of the 
economic paradigm for justification, ethical arguments within the integration discussion require a 
similar framework of support.  Moreover, it is appropriate to look for such support in the 
expression of justice.  Yet Rawlsian justice, a justice understood as distinct from utilitarian 
sentiments, while seemingly providing a credible theory of justice to buttress the first 
consideration in the normative argument, on closer inspection reveals insurmountable problems 
which, I will argue, are an impediment to the full expression of the second ethical consideration.  
While there is a wide body of criticism against Rawls’ two theories of justice, this particular 
critique has less to do with his theory in general and more to do with the usage of Rawlsian 
theory as a framework for justice in the residential integration discussion. 
 
Problem #1: Rawlsian Justice Cannot Condemn Segregation, Only its Consequences 
 
The first intractable problem of Rawlsian justice is that his theories do not properly value 
integration as an end, which is the basis of the second consideration of the normative argument.  
Under Galster’s argument for equity, Low-Mix Black households have a justifiable case for 
dispersal should they be disadvantaged by remaining where they are or should they gain 
advantage by virtue of dispersal.  As mentioned in the last chapter, based upon this framework, a 
case can be made that Low-Mix Black families should be dispersed for equity reasons 
considering the argument of adverse impacts (suffering disproportionate disadvantage).  The 
features of Galster’s equity argument would find support in Rawlsian principles, and more 
specifically, in the principle of ‘maximin.’  Rawls suggests that rational and mutually 
disinterested individuals in the original position would choose to structure the basic institutions 
of society in such a way as to minimize the losses of those at the bottom (as opposed to 
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maximizing the opportunities for those who do not find themselves in the lower tiers of society).  
Thus, relative to the housing discussion, the status quo of residential segregation where damage 
left in the wake of a market failure disproportionately falls on one group as opposed to another 
(i.e. adverse impacts) would be considered an injustice and would call for redress.  Therefore, the 
Galsterian appeal towards equity as a means to residentially mix finds support in Rawls’ 
maximin, a principle “whereby the social objective is to maximize the welfare level of the worst-
off individual.”685   
Yet there seems to be something missing from this argument.  Galster’s usage of equity as well 
as Rawls’ usage of maximin both suggest that a given arrangement is justified when the situation 
of the least advantaged is maximized.  To put this into the perspective of housing arrangements, 
integration efforts are justified when they ameliorate otherwise precarious living standards 
and/or improve the welfare of the disadvantaged.  In ethical parlance, their theories suggest that 
it is wrong for sectors of society to be exposed to greater risk by virtue of their segregation.  Yet 
the rightness of integration is contingent upon the fulfillment of one of two particular outcomes: 
increased disadvantage in segregation or increased welfare in integration.  Thus we ask: would 
integration be wrong or would segregation be right if no welfare was lost under traditional 
segregated housing arrangements?  What if no welfare was gained by mixing—would this still be 
a valuable pursuit?  Should integration be valued for reasons beyond what it can produce?  
The Rawlsian model, as it stands, is inadequate to answer these questions in the affirmative.  By 
constructing the terms of justice through the sorting mechanism of pure procedural justice, Rawls 
demonstrates a deontological feature that can make for a rigid interpretation of justice.  An 
example may illustrate the problem.  Imagine a society where Low-Mix Black families are not 
susceptible to adverse impacts occurring in the market.  Further, they have equal access to jobs, 
resources, amenities, and other “positional goods” they may have otherwise been crowded out 
from in the market.  However, this society has a dissimilarity index of 100.  In other words, 
blacks are totally segregated from whites as it relates to neighborhood arrangements.  Is this an 
acceptable social arrangement?  Is this a social pattern society should aim toward?  Rawlsian 
justice, under the conditions provided in this illustration, would be satisfied.  In other words, 
there is nothing “unjust” about this particular arrangement.  Should someone be born into this 
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society without prior knowledge of the color of their skin, they could be satisfied knowing that 
they would not suffer adverse impacts, additional risk, or other disproportionate disadvantages.  
However, to identify such a society as being just or, more to the point, ethical, appears less than 
complete. 
The problem, perhaps, can be attributed to how we value integration.  For Rawls, the value of a 
particular social outcome in terms of achieving justice simply amounts to whether these terms 
were arrived upon under fair and impartial circumstances (original position).  This, however, is 
to miss a larger, more pluralistic and ethically enriched conception of human interaction as a 
function of integration.  Clearly, there are major ethical issues involved in residential segregated 
housing as it relates to risk, vulnerability, and welfare for low-income minority enclaves 
partitioned off from society.  As discussed, these issues can be addressed from a utility 
standpoint, but this does not consider how utility is distributed among people, households, 
neighborhoods, etc.  Thus, we may argue from a Rawlsian vantage point and claim that, under 
maximin principles, we should arrange society in such a way as to minimize such risks and 
vulnerabilities for the least well-off members of society.  However, this still does not capture the 
totality of ethical considerations relative to this topic, as we may envisage a society where all 
risks and vulnerabilities are eliminated for low-income minority segregated households, and yet 
still remain segregated.  Risk, vulnerability, foreclosures, low house values, etc., are all factors 
understood within the economic paradigm.  They are “ethical” insofar as we discuss their 
disproportionate distribution upon segregated black communities (point #1 of the normative 
argument).  However, in addressing these issues and thus addressing the economic problems and 
ethical considerations related to them, we still have not fully fleshed out all the ethical 
considerations of integration and its “higher norms.” 
This dissonance is best explained by Elizabeth Anderson, whose “expressive theory” asserts that 
there exist myriad ways of valuing things, and that this plurality must be embraced to properly 
understand the relationship between a particular thing and its mode of valuation.
686
  This is in 
contrast to a “monistic” or reductionist theory of value, which is similar to the practice of 
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asserting value by mere commodification.
687
  Essentially, the expressive theory attempts to locate 
the mode of valuation in its proper sphere based upon “rational action that adequately expresses 
our rational attitudes toward people and other intrinsically valuable things.”688  To help describe 
her theory, Anderson makes the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value.  Intrinsic goods 
are the things it makes sense for us to value in and of themselves; extrinsic goods are goods 
which we value only because we value some other important thing.
689
  Thus, valuing a 
relationship might be an intrinsic good, but valuing an old picture of a friend might be an 
extrinsic good but is valued because it points to the intrinsic good of friendship.  This approach 
to value is a challenge to utilitarian modes of valuation where “welfare states have intrinsic 
value.”690  Such a framework, contends Anderson, views people as “merely the extrinsically 
valuable containers for what is supposedly intrinsically valuable—states of affairs in which 
welfare exists.”691  Anderson asserts that states of affairs, understood as the “ends” we try to 
bring about in our actions, do not possess intrinsic value.  Rather, what is intrinsically valuable 
“is the object of a rationally favorable attitude.”692  This shifts the appropriateness of what to 
value from an action that maximizes future value in its consequence to simply valuing a 
particular thing based upon rationally assessing its context and expressive meaning.  For 
example, we don’t value a tool simply because it is a tool—its value is recognized and realized 
based upon the appropriate context of its use (its context defines its usefulness and subsequent 
value).
693
  Anderson’s expressive theory of value not only suggests a plurality in how and what 
we value, but it implicitly suggests that there are moral and ethical limits to the dominant 
paradigm of market commodification as a means of universal valuation.  It is here that Rawls is 
found wanting from a moral standpoint.  Granted, his theory does not directly support the market 
economy and is outspoken as it relates to the blunt approach of utilitarian distributive justice 
often found in market economies.  However, the ethical reach of Rawls would only extend to 
addressing the unfair distribution of risks and vulnerabilities in segregation, but there is nothing 
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in Rawlsian theory to support integration in itself, leaving its ‘value’ susceptible to market 
determinations. 
An alternative approach provided by Michael Walzer begins with the consideration that different 
goods exist in different “spheres”—and each sphere is governed by different principles.694  
Speaking in the context of distributive justice, Walzer writes: “But we must argue about the 
meaning of the good before we can say anything more about its rightful distribution.”695  
Whether we are discussing goods such as food and clothing, social goods such as education, or 
complex social and shared goods such as neighborhood communities and household 
arrangements among races, defining the nature of the particular good is a necessary first step in 
the articulation of its value.   
With this in mind, we ask: What sphere is congruent with the concept of neighborhood 
integration?  How should we go about determining the value of this good?  Neighborhoods, 
understood as a complex social and shared good, incorporate social interaction, security, and 
welfare, and often serve as an important mechanism for cultivating familial, political, and 
cultural identity.  While markets may play a role in the composition of neighborhoods, a 
summation of monetary values (homes, cars, appliances, incomes, etc.) would hardly capture the 
plurality of values inherent in the complexity of neighborhood attributes.
696
   
We might say, and rightly so, that a neighborhood exists in the sphere of interpersonal social 
goods—and a highly complex good at that.  Goods and services, understood in a basic sense, are 
valued based upon what they might provide to us.  Thus, “exchanges” are made to efficiently 
account for what we value from one another at a given place and time.  Anderson, however, 
makes the point that to express what she refers to as “higher” modes of valuation, two key 
factors must be present.  First, norms expressing higher modes of valuation must be distributive, 
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respecting the “separateness” of people.697  Second, norms expressing a higher mode of valuation 
must “tell us to be willing to sacrifice something of ourselves for the sake of upholding the 
relation between us and what we value.”  She writes:  
If meanings were reformed to wholly coincide with what maximizes our convenience and 
good fortune, there would be nothing left to contrast with lower modes of valuation, in 
which things are valued only for what they can do for our independently defined 
interests.
698
 
Perhaps another way of stating this is to say that we can recognize higher goods because we can 
also recognize lower goods—and a key attribute of lower goods is that value is determined by 
means of how it may gratify my own personal tastes, desires, and overall fortunes.  While a 
house may very well meet the definition of a lower good, I would submit that a neighborhood is 
more than simply a cluster of independent atomistic home sites.  Neighborhoods reflect social 
engagement, interaction, and overall “collective efficacy.”699  The very concept of 
“neighborliness” implies an attitude of hospitality towards those around you, signaling solidarity 
beyond the realm of mere cooperation for the sake of mutual beneficence.  Neighborhoods 
cultivate social capital, or the connections and social networks which include the norms of 
“reciprocity and trustworthiness.”700  The purpose, end, or goal of a community or neighborhood 
is multi-faceted.  Among other basic needs with commensurate values, community represents a 
“path to belonging.”701  John Calmore captures the nature of residential integration as it relates to 
community:  
Communities are based on things people hold in common.  A community implies that its 
members' relationships are solidified by ties providing a feeling of collective identity, 
self-awareness, and affiliation.  Because of persistently high levels of residential 
segregation, community cohesion is based primarily on racial homogeneity.
702
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Racial homogeneity resulting from residential segregation is one of the primary areas of concern 
as it relates to dispersal, deconcentration, and integration.  The value of this endeavor is 
multifaceted and has myriad economic implications.  Yet, the nature of this complex social good 
is beyond monetary evaluation and calculations of utility gains.  “Collective identity, self-
awareness, and affiliation”—speak to the “higher” nature of this good and thus demands an 
evaluative measure equally complex so as to avoid degrading the norms that define community, 
and most certainly community in the sense of what is sought to be achieved between black and 
white households.  Integration, from a valuation standpoint, should begin with the conception 
that relationships among community members are intrinsically valuable goods worth aiming for 
as an end.  Given this, we can see that to simply aggregate neighborhoods as a collection of 
households and to further aim to value them based upon the utility they provide to us is 
disproportionate to the nature of neighborhoods and would minimize both our understanding and 
our valuation of them.   
While neighborhoods and the communities therein deal with relationships, when we speak of 
residential integration we are addressing a very specific type of relationship: the relationships 
between black and white households.  Communities operate in much larger “social and economic 
contexts”703 and the social integration aimed for in US dispersal, deconcentration, and integration 
efforts would be mis-valued, and thus devalued, if it were to be understood as a blunt welfare 
mechanism.  The meaning of this particular good, the meaning of residential integration, 
necessitates a complex and multi-faceted understanding and approach as it relates to value.  For 
example, when Robert Putnam discusses the values of integrated busing
704—“familiarity, 
tolerance, solidarity, trust, habits of cooperation, and mutual respect”—he is describing attributes 
of integration further along the spectrum than what economic or utilitarian modes of valuation 
can reach or endorse.
705
  In the framework of Rawlsian justice, these goods are beyond the 
ethical reach of Rawls’ principles and would remain precariously unsupported should Rawlsian 
theory continue to exist as the groundwork of the normative argument. 
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This is not to suggest that Rawls is completely irrelevant.  The principles of maximin lend 
support to the first part of the normative argument: it is not right that some members of society 
should be put at risk—especially as it relates to the space they inhabit.  Thus, in constructing a 
proper valuation framework for residential integration, it is very important not to bracket out 
economic considerations.  While this risks the aforementioned perils of monistic evaluation 
related to higher goods, residential integration has implicit ramifications for equity, welfare, and 
well-being, and these important attributes are often understood in monetary terms.  Anderson 
reminds us: “Sphere differentiation should not be confused with complete sphere segregation.”706  
This is not to commodify the people, places, and things inherent in a community, but it 
recognizes that segregating minority households prohibits them from a source of economic 
security and segregates them to more precarious and insecure social and economic settings.  
Addressing this requires a very particular form of assessment, and places a very specific value on 
integration or the lack thereof in segregation—values that can easily be communicated in 
monetary language.   
Unfortunately, this is as far as Rawlsian theory can take us in support of the normative argument.  
To end our evaluative lens at this point is to miss a larger portion of what it means to be a 
community, and moreover, what it means to socially integrate black and white households in a 
community.  To borrow once again from John Calmore, we might understand the idea of 
neighborhood solidarity as “the need to be part of a larger community of meaning and purpose 
that lets us transcend the self-interested materialism of the competitive marketplace and situate 
ourselves in an ethically and spiritually grounded vision of who we are and who we seek to 
become.”707  This suggests a certain degree of impoverishment when we separate ourselves from 
each other—poverty that cannot necessarily be expressed in terms of wealth, house values, and 
foreclosure rates. 
Calmore’s depiction of the neighborhood captures the human element of community interaction 
and the higher goods of meaning, purpose, and identity.  The suggestion that an ethical value be 
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included in our understanding of segregation/integration recognizes the nature of the good in 
question (i.e., a higher good), and as Sandel suggests, there are moral implications to mis-valuing 
higher goods.  Rawlsian theory is at great risk of misevaluation and, thus, devaulation, and 
therefore leaves the very nature of social integration to be decided under an existing paradigm of 
market logic.  When market logic infiltrates the sphere of interpersonal social goods such as 
communities and neighborhoods, a great portion of how we define these goods is lost in the 
translation of value estimation.  This, according to Anderson, is the very definition of what it 
means to degrade.  She writes: “A practice is degrading when it expresses a lower valuation of 
something than it merits.”708  Neighborhoods are communities, and communities are people.  
Persons are naturally worthy of a higher mode of respect, love, care, and relationship.  To value 
persons as mere commodities degrades the opportunity to see people as trustworthy and lovable 
objects of affection and further undercuts the other as a source of self-realization.  A monistic 
mode of valuation will never fully capture these attributes, even though they fundamentally lie at 
the center of what it means to be in community.   
To summarize, residential integration efforts over the last 40 years in the US have been measured 
by what I have defined as the economic paradigm.  This is not altogether inappropriate and is 
necessary in many ways.  However, an economic paradigm cannot comprehensively address the 
plurality of values that are present in communities and neighborhoods.  Yet Rawlsian justice, 
representing the ethical arm of this discussion, is not enough to fill the holes in this approach.  I 
submit that a Rawlsian approach, even under the tutelage of maximin, does not escape this 
criticism.  While Rawlsian principles can claim that increased risk and vulnerability as a function 
of segregation is unjust, we cannot rely on his principles to claim that segregation, in itself, is 
unjust.  Rawls may value integration for the welfare it can provide (or the disadvantage it can 
prevent) for low-income segregated minorities, but it cannot value “collective identity, self-
awareness, and affiliation”—other ethically rich and morally important considerations relative to 
integration discussion.   
It is helpful to end this criticism by asking “why” Rawlsian justice offers little to no support to a 
more comprehensive value of integration.  First, it is important to look to the nature of the 
deliberation in the original position behind the veil of ignorance.  Rawls assumes that decision 
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makers are rational and mutually disinterested, and although this might produce the “conception 
of justice [that] characterizes our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium,”709 we are left 
skeptical as to how such an approach would engender and support the solidarity that Rawls 
envisages—men “share[ing] one another’s common fate.”710  Despite Rawls’ egalitarian 
language, his theories of justice have more to do with achieving an ethos of fairness than with 
cultivating relationship, solidarity, and community.  This otherwise platonic approach is aimed at 
producing principles that “free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their 
associations.”711  Even though Rawls posits justice as fairness as creating a society “as a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage,” his usage of pure procedural justice to achieve a just 
society finds the locus of justice in the realm of the actual procedure, not in the other person.
712
  
Thus, we are left devoid of an ethos of community, and the remaining ethos meant to motivate 
“men to act together so as to produce a greater sum of benefits and assigns to each certain 
recognized claims to a share in the proceeds” is that of fairness.713  
However, fairness, as a stand-alone ethos for justice, presents a formidable problem.  Understood 
within the liberal tradition, fairness is not enough to solve the problem of deciding between 
competing theories of justice.  Amartya Sen (2009) says that this is the problem of a “unique 
impartial resolution” to claims of justice.714  Rawlsian justice suggests that rational men will aim 
toward a society that is fair, and fairness requires impartiality.  However, the presence of 
impartiality alone will not solve the plurality of views towards deciding what is just.  Sen 
communicates this well in an illustration he calls “Three Children and a Flute.”  He writes: 
Let me illustrate the problem with an example in which you have to decide which of three 
children—Anne, Bob and Carla—should get a flute about which they are quarrelling.  
Anne claims the flute on the ground that she is the only one of the three who knows how 
to play it (the others do not deny this), and that it would be quite unjust to deny the flute 
to the only one who can actually play it.  If that is all you knew, the case for giving the 
                                                          
709
 Rawls, 1971, p. 182 
710
 Ibid., page 102 
711
 Ibid., page 11 (italics mine) 
712
 Ibid., page 84 
713
 Ibid. 
714
 Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2009. Print. (Page 12) 
207 
 
flute to the first child would be strong.  In an alternative scenario, it is Bob who speaks 
up, and defends his case for having the flute by pointing out that he is the only one 
among the three who is so poor that he has no toys of his own.  The flute would give him 
something to play with (the other two concede that they are richer and well supplied with 
engaging amenities).  If you had heard only Bob and none of the others, the case for 
giving it to him would be strong.  In another alternative scenario, it is Carla who speaks 
up and points out that she has been working diligently for many months to make the flute 
with her own labour (the others confirm this), and just when she had finished her work, 
‘just then’, she complains, ‘these expropriators came along to try to grab the flute away 
from me’.  If Carla’s statement is all you had heard, you might be inclined to give the 
flute to her in recognition of her understandable claim to something she has made 
herself.
715
 
Each child makes a separate claim appealing to a particular philosophical tradition.  Carla may 
receive the most sympathy from what Sen calls “no-nonsense libertarians”; Bob, in the name of 
fairness, would be awarded the flute from the egalitarian; providing the flute to Anne, the only 
one who can play it, would most likely find support from the utilitarian position.  This 
hypothetical dispute, according to Sen, represents how we arrive at principles that should govern 
the allocation of resources.  He writes: “They are about how social arrangement should be made 
and what social institutions should be chosen, and through that, about what social realizations 
would come about.”716  Such normative appeals to how society and its resources are to be 
arranged highlight the problem: “There may not indeed exist any identifiable perfectly just social 
arrangement on which impartial agreement would emerge.”717 
To summarize, Rawlsian justice holds fairness as the overarching social ethos to achieve justice.  
Fairness implies, and moreover, requires impartiality.  Yet impartiality, as evidenced by the flute 
example, does not necessarily provide a clear, uncontested choice of what is just.  On the 
contrary, it offers support to competing claims of justice—all of which yield differing outcomes.  
Sen writes: “It is not simply that the vested interests of the three children differ (though of course 
they do), but that the three arguments each point to a different type of impartial and non-arbitrary 
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reason.”718  The conclusion is that Rawlsian justice and its ethos of fairness are not enough to 
bring about a definable just solution.  Alasdair MacIntyre, who offers an example similar to 
Sen’s goes so far as to call the competing claims of justice, when viewed from the singular 
perspective of fairness, “incommensurable.”719  This problem poses a complex challenge to the 
conception or practice of neighborhood integration.  If we were to extrapolate these arguments 
out into what a just society would look like (utilitarianism, welfare and egalitarianism, and 
libertarianism), all would offer rationale that can each be defended impartially, leaving Sen to 
suggest that “if there is no unique emergence of a given set of principles of justice that together 
identify the institutions needed for the basic structure of the society, then the entire procedure of 
‘justice as fairness’…would be hard to use.”720 
In the context of housing arrangements, the Rawlsian ethos of fairness, while aimed at 
addressing some of the concerns of the normative argument, fails because it never defines and 
defends the very understanding of fairness it attempts to consign to the basic institutions of 
society.  In other words, such fairness is only supported by the “rational” pursuit to ensure that 
my own ends are not compromised, as deliberated upon in the original position.  However, 
fairness when left unqualified by an underlying sense of solidarity will not solve disputes but 
only engender them.  
 
Problem #2: Rawlsian Justice Presupposes a Conflict Society and Denigrates Community 
 
The criticism that Rawlsian justice will, at best, condemn the consequences of segregation (but 
not segregation itself) is the first intractable problem of Rawlsian principles as it relates to 
residential housing arrangements.  This becomes evident when we explore the nature of 
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Rawlsian procedural justice.  Under the original position, what is understood to be moral or the 
right thing to do is based upon what is “rational.”  In other words, we can “reason” as to how to 
arrive at the “correct procedure.”721  Yet this particular form of rationality is of the modern 
liberal flavor.  Regarding the original position, Velasquez writes: “They will be morally justified 
because the original position incorporates the Kantian moral ideas of reversibility (the parties 
choose principles that will apply to themselves), of universalizability (the principles must apply 
equally to everyone), and of treating people as ends (each party has an equal say in the choice of 
principles).”722  Further, he points out: “Rawls goes on to claim that the parties to the original 
position would in fact choose his (Rawls's) principles of justice, that is, the principle of equal 
liberty, the difference principle, and the principle of fair equality of opportunity.”723 
Thus, under the modern influences of Locke and Rousseau’s social contract theory and Kantian 
deontology,
724
 Rawls’ theory of justice is appropriately understood as operating within a larger 
liberal tradition where assumptions are made “regarding the role and place of the individual as 
the bearer of moral value” and reason is used as the grounds for creating theories of justice.725  
More specifically, Rawls’ justice is anchored by an unqualified premise of liberty.  Liberty is 
given lexical priority in Rawlsian principles of justice, and such a principle takes on the form of 
a “categorical imperative” in Kantian parlance.726  Rawls’ premise that basic institutions framed 
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from a veil of ignorance can “assign fundamental rights and duties” is conceived from the goal of 
establishing “equal basic liberties for all.”727  As discussed, liberty is what any rational, mutually 
disinterested parties would give priority to in the original position behind a veil of ignorance, and 
arranging society so that liberty is paramount is given priority.   
However, I submit that priority to liberty and rights leads to the second intractable problem as it 
relates to Rawlsian justice and residential integration: the priority of rights cannot build, but can 
only undermine, any overtures towards community.  This criticism naturally extends to the 
subject of social integration.  This is not to suggest that an appeal to basic human rights is 
immoral or amoral.  Understood abstractly, rights-based language has a clear moral undertone 
and is cited as an ethical baseline in myriad social, political, and economic settings.  However, 
we must look at the application of rights-based language and practice in the discussion of 
housing arrangements to truly understand its moral promise and/or recognize its moral 
deficiency.  I submit that when we appeal to ‘rights’ as the moral compass to guide our 
conversations in residential integration, its deficiencies in providing direction will become clear. 
Rawls’ appeal to liberty is recognized in the “rights” of an individual.728  Further, a just society is 
one in which the basic social institutions will equally distribute fundamental rights.
729
  Thus, a 
violation of an individual’s basic rights is unjust, according to Rawls, even if the other principles 
in his theory of justice are satisfied.  Therefore, in the context of residential segregation, a 
Rawlsian might conclude that the rights of Low-Mix Blacks in their pursuit of basic liberties are 
compromised by living in an enhanced state of risk and vulnerability.  Therefore, there is moral 
promise as it relates to the language of rights to recognize disproportionate impacts of the 
financial crisis on segregated black and white neighborhoods.  In other words, residential 
segregation that leads to enhanced risks and vulnerabilities in the wake of a market crisis for 
Low-Mix Blacks is “wrong” because it violates their rights as humans and citizens to secure their 
basic liberties. 
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Yet when we explore the context under which we aim to employ this Rawlsian construction of 
rights, we find that the moral promise of rights-based language is less than ideal to adequately 
understand the moral nuances of residential segregation and ultimately fails to fully flesh out the 
tenets of the normative argument.  The normative argument suggests that one of the overriding 
goals of neighborhood integration, in addition to welfare considerations, is that of “social 
integration.”  In other words, it is the bonding between blacks and whites where relationships, 
shared meanings, and a sense of common good is cultivated from a diversity of backgrounds.  
Social integration is shared space accompanied by inclusion and membership.  Yet the goals of 
cultivating a common good among humanity as well as securing individual rights cannot be 
accommodated by a liberal Rawlsian conception of justice.  Further, there is evidence that the 
aim toward the latter might undermine the success of the former.  Daniel Bell offers a critique of 
liberalism’s empty promise of justice for the common good and for individual rights: 
Yet, liberalism's justice does not live up to its promise; it does not deliver us from 
conflict.  The peace modern justice delivers is not true peace, but only a simulacrum.  It is 
the fortified peace (for the peace and justice of liberalism are always backed by the threat 
of force) that is better labeled a 'truce.'  Insofar as justice as the guarantor of rights entails 
a shift from functioning primarily as a unitive force that coordinates the pursuit of a 
common love to a distributive force overseeing the pursuit of private goods, it 
relinquishes its connection with a genuine peace that comes from the harmonious 
interaction of people who share a common good.  Even when successful, it does not pave 
the way for new relations among peoples, relations that might transcend the truce of 
mutual advantage.  Instead it keeps humanity trapped in an agonistic logic, where the 
mutual recognition of rights is constantly threatened by the pull of competing visions of 
the good.
730
  
To Bell’s last point, it is important to note that the absence of conflict is not equivalent to the 
achievement of solidarity.  Moreover, there is nothing in Rawls’ account of justice to provide 
such a communal outcome.  When justice is not conceived “as a general virtue concerned with 
nurturing a community’s solidarity in a shared love,” it can only, at best, be defined as a 
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procedure “for regulating the distribution and exchange of goods in a society now understood as 
an aggregate of autonomous individuals.”731 
The dissonance between rights and solidarity in a democratic society has a long history.  For 
example, in 1744, Rev. Elisha Williams, a rector at Yale, wrote: 
As reason tells us, all are born thus naturally equal, i.e., with an equal right to their 
persons, so also with an equal right to preservation…and every man having a property in 
his own person, the labour of his body and the work of his hands are properly his own, to 
which no one has right but himself; it will therefore follow that when he removes 
anything out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labour 
with it, and joined something to it that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property….Thus every man having a natural right to (or being proprietor of) his own 
person and his own actions and labour, which we call property, it certainly follows, that 
no man can have a right to the person or property of another: And if every man has a 
right to his person and property; he has also a right to defend them...and so has a right of 
punishing all insults upon his person and property.”732 
This quote reinforces Bell’s concern that liberal justice will not serve to ameliorate conflict.  
Williams suggests that certain rights are not only due to individuals, but that they should be 
defended against other individuals.  Thus, the very presence of rights-based language 
presupposes a certain degree of conflict within society; it is not a form of justice that presupposes 
community and solidarity.  This critique finds a powerful expression in the work of Karl Marx.  
In his essay, On the Jewish Question (1844), Marx presents the case that “granting people rights 
of the sort we hope to enjoy in liberal regimes is not enough to bring about a truly human 
society.”733  
Marx contends that the rights of man, expressed in North American and French constitutional 
documents,
734
 are best understood as political rights and are to be exercised within the “political 
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community.”735  The “rights” that Marx takes aim at include rights to liberty, equality, security 
and property (rights not too dissimilar from Rawlsian primary social goods).  The right to liberty 
is more or less understood as a right to freedom.  However, this freedom, contends Marx, is “not 
based upon the connection of man with man, but rather on the separation of man from man.”  
Liberty, then, is the “right to…separation.”736  Regarding the right to property, Marx writes: 
“The right of man to private property is therefore the right to enjoy and dispose of his property, 
at his will and pleasure, without regard for others, and independently of society: the right of self-
interest.”737  Moreover, “Each particular individual freedom exercised in this way forms the basis 
of bourgeois society.  It leaves every man to find in other men not the realization, but rather the 
limits of his freedom.”738  Thus, according to Marx, liberal society and its accompanying 
understanding of freedom as “the right to do and perform that which injures none” takes on a 
hyper-individualistic conception of civil society.  Thus, others within the community do not offer 
relational fulfillment and cooperative reciprocity, but rather, exist as a threat to securing “rights.”   
The right to “equality” reinforces the same problem: “Equality here in its non-political 
significance is nothing but the equality of the above described liberty, viz.: every individual is 
regarded as a uniform atom resting on its own bottom.”739  Marx cites Article 8 of the French 
Constitution of 1793 as it relates to the right to security: “Security consists in the protection 
accorded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his 
property."
740
  Thus, according to Marx, none of man’s rights can establish community because 
such rights indirectly promote and aim to protect a distinct form of “egoism” among mankind.  
Marx writes:  
None of the so-called rights of man, therefore, goes beyond the egoistic individual, 
beyond the individual as a member of bourgeois society, withdrawn into his private 
interests and separated from the community.  Far from regarding the individual as a 
generic being, the generic life, Society itself, rather appears as an external frame for the 
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individual, as a limitation of his original independence.  The sole bond which connects 
him with his fellows is natural necessity, material needs and private interest, the 
preservation of his property and his egoistic person.
741
 
Wolff (2002) offers a helpful summary of Marx’s liberal critique: 
Liberty is the right to do as you wish as long as you don’t harm others.  Equality is the 
right to be treated by the law in the same way as everyone else.  Security is the right to be 
protected from others, and finally, property is the right to extend this security to the 
enjoyment of your legitimate possessions.  To be a citizen is to enjoy these rights.  They 
are fought for and prized.
742
 
But these “rights”, important as they may seem, reinforce the belief that others exist as a threat to 
my rights, and not the fulfillment of them.  As Wolff’s description rightly shows, rights are 
“fought for” thus implying a distinct other who is fought against.  In other words, rights-based 
language presupposes conflict.  While this may very well be a true aspect of human nature 
manifest in society, the presupposition of conflict in rights will not ameliorate this problem, as 
Bell’s quote suggested, but only sustain and reinforce it, creating a greater degree of mistrust, 
conflict, and ultimately segregation.  Further, we may appropriately state that the goal of social 
integration in residential housing mix would find agreement with Wolff’s definition of a “human 
society.”  He writes: “In a properly human society we would find our freedom through our 
relations with other human beings.  A proper human life is one which is lived, at least in part, for 
the sake of others.”743 
Therefore, similar to the first intractable problem of Rawlsian justice as a means to support our 
normative argument, rights-based language has the ethical capacity to charge disproportionate 
outcomes stemming from residential segregation as being morally wrong.  However, the very 
same set of moral criteria (the language of rights), is insufficient to create a “human society,” or 
for our purposes, the intended outcome of social integration achieved through residential 
integration overtures.  Discussions regarding the nature of integration are ultimately discussions 
about the nature of community.  Thus, rights-based language would denigrate the very nature of 
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dispersal endeavors.  At best, then, citizens inhabiting a mixed community would have a more 
equal share of given rights, yet this risks a greater sense of trust, support, cooperation, and 
solidarity among mixed households. 
We find evidence of liberal justice’s failure to build community in the work of Iglesias (2007), 
who notes that no articles to date have explicitly explored a housing “ethic.”  He offers a 
framework for housing ethics where housing is understood as a “human right.”744  Such an ethic 
“focuses primarily on individual legal rights in the provision of housing itself” and often appears 
as “the cry of the poor, those who suffer discrimination and uninhabitable housing 
conditions.”745  Thus, according to Iglesias, the “normative thrust” under this ethic is that all 
people should have legal rights to housing.
746
  Similar to Rawlsian justice, such a housing ethic 
seemingly displays great moral promise as it relates to providing an ethical component to 
housing arrangement discussions.  Iglesias writes: 
Proponents of the ‘housing a human right’ ethic are ultimately committed to procuring 
universal housing rights, but their campaigns or strategies may focus on attaining housing 
rights for particular subpopulations, particularly those most politically or economically 
vulnerable.  For example, renters, low-income people, people of color, homeless people, 
persons with disabilities, and veterans have been the focal point of housing rights 
efforts.
747
 
However, and also similar to Rawls, Iglesias’ rights-based housing ethic does not escape the 
perception of a conflict society where others are viewed as threats to securing rights and 
therefore they must be vigorously protected.  As discussed, such a mindset naturally presupposes 
and thus sustains conflicts among societal members.  Relative to the rights-based language in 
housing, this conflict is evident in the courtroom.  Iglesias indirectly describes the weakness of a 
rights-based moral engagement of housing ethics: 
Housing rights are regularly litigated.  In contrast to the moral and intuitive character of 
lay discourse invoking housing as a human right, this discourse is quintessentially 
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‘legalistic,’ disputing what ‘right’ (if any) is created by a statute, defining who has 
standing to enforce the right, defending and extending the scope of a right, how it should 
be enforced, and what remedies are available.
748
 
He goes on to concede that the propagation of rights will naturally create conflict: “Of course, 
recognition of a legal housing right raises the likelihood of conflicts between housing rights and 
other legally recognized rights.”749  Iglesias sees this ethical approach toward housing as being 
difficult to achieve because courts and legislatures do not formally recognize an individual’s 
right to housing.
750
  However, even if an ethic concerning a “right to housing” was legally 
recognized to Iglesias’ satisfaction, this approach still does not escape the assumed conflict 
which is evidenced in increased litigation.
751
 
A more contemporary critique of liberal justice is made by Michael Sandel and other 
communitarians.
752
  While it is not necessary to flesh out all of Sandel’s arguments against 
liberal justice and, more specifically, Rawlsian justice, he echoes the tension Marx develops 
between individual rights and a greater awareness of the solidarity and engagement among 
community members.  Sandel writes: “For it is a striking feature of the welfare state that it offers 
a powerful promise of individual rights, and also demands of its citizens a high measure of 
mutual engagement.  But the self-image that attends to rights cannot sustain that engagement.”753  
The “self-image” that Rawls speaks to is the underlying assumption of man’s ability to 
rationalize outside of the culture, traditions, and location of which he finds himself.  As Bell 
explains, this conception of man transformed modern conceptions of justice: “Liberalism re-
imaged society as a teeming mass of individuals, each with their own interests, ends, and 
conceptions of what constitutes the good life.  Consequently, justice was reconfigured; in 
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contemporary parlance, now the right is given priority over the good.”754  This feature is a 
highlight of Rawlsian justice as he “wants to save the priority of right from the obscurity of the 
transcendental subject.”755  It is for this reason, according to Sandel, that Rawls’ project 
maintains a similar feature of other liberal doctrines, the priority of the right over the good.  This 
is because in the original position, Rawls envisages a picture of what Sandel calls the 
“unencumbered self”: “a self understood prior to and independent of its purposes and ends.”756 
The unencumbered self, a self that is understood to be unattached may only be able to depend on 
the distribution of individual rights as a means to correct for an injustice (negative) but is 
insufficient, I have argued, to provide an ethically rich account of justice (positive).  Moreover, 
Rawlsian justice understood within the liberal tradition, for these very reasons, will not give full 
support and/or expression to the second tenet of the normative argument in the residential 
integration discussion.  Rawls makes the assumption that “everyone has the capacity to be a 
normal cooperating member of society,” and as a result there will ideally be no “unfairness” 
among citizens.
757
   Yet he does not consider that in securing the primary goods he assumes will 
be sought in the original position, our “cooperation” will be little more than rules to protect our 
atomistic interests and will undermine the sense of community he presupposes, but fails to 
account for, in Justice as Fairness.  Thus, Rawlsian justice makes for a poor ethical framework 
when applied to any political, economic, or social context that seeks to build solidarity among 
peoples—the very aim of the second consideration in the normative argument (i.e., social 
integration).  This criticism is particularly appropriate, then, for the context of neighborhood 
integration, as neighborhood mixing requires a fundamental baseline of communal support and 
solidarity to create an environment of social, not simply spatial, integration. 
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Part IV: Thickening the ‘Thin’ Conception of the Good 
 
To summarize, I have outlined two intractable problems with Rawlsian justice as it relates to 
supporting the normative argument and, in particular, its second feature.  The first problem 
suggested that a Rawlsian framework could condemn the presence of risk and vulnerability 
experienced by segregated black households in the wake of a market crisis, but it could not 
necessarily place an intrinsic value on social integration.  In other words, Rawlsian justice can 
condemn the consequences of segregation as morally wrong but cannot praise integration, in 
itself, as morally right.  The second problem of Rawlsian justice concerns the origin of his 
framework as being drawn from the liberal appeal to individual rights.  As discussed, a society 
who seeks moral guidance for distributive principles based upon the language of rights has 
already presupposed a certain conflict among members of that society.  Further, this conflict is 
sustained, and perhaps exacerbated, in the appeal to one’s rights.  Thus, Rawlsian dependence on 
one’s rights would ideally provide each person the opportunity to secure basic liberties, but at the 
expense of enhancing a greater sense of community.  In the context of residential integration, this 
would denigrate one of the more fundamental ethical aspects of the integration endeavor: social 
integration among community members.  In a sentence, both intractable problems reveal that 
Rawlsian justice undermines the cultivation of community and the moral power of solidarity that 
is inherent in the normative argument and equally necessary to achieve the aim of socially 
integrating mixed neighborhoods. 
Thus, if one accepts these arguments and agrees that Rawlsian justice is devoid of a certain sense 
of community and solidarity—both relationally-based concepts—then it is worth exploring what 
the inclusion of relationship would look like for Rawls and the subsequent implications for the 
support of the normative argument in residential integration.  I submit that such an inclusion does 
not require a major overhaul to Rawlsian theory, but rather, can be envisaged in a minor 
adjustment of an earlier Rawlsian assumption.  To explore this, we revisit Rawls’ depiction of 
rational man found in the hypothetical original position. 
As explained earlier, the persons in the original position are considered to be both “rational” and 
“mutually disinterested.”  Most importantly, related to these two concepts is a person’s 
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conception of the “good.”  Here, Rawls bases his “theory of the good” on what he understands to 
be the most commonly accepted definition: “The main idea is that a person’s good is determined 
by what is for him the most rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favorable 
circumstances.”758  Rawls continues: “We are to suppose, then, that each individual has a rational 
plan of life drawn up subject to the conditions that confront him.”759  In other words, each person 
has, or will develop, their own conception of the good—a plan that is “designed to permit the 
harmonious satisfaction of his interests.”760   
It is here that Rawls introduces the necessity of “primary goods”—or things that “every rational 
man is presumed to want.”761  He writes: “Now the assumption is that though men’s rational 
plans do have different final ends, they nevertheless all require for their execution certain 
primary goods, natural and social.”  Thus, while each person’s “plans” or their conception of the 
good may differ significantly, Rawls assumes that primary goods are the necessary means to 
achieve these ends.
762
  Recall that Rawls defines these goods as rights and liberties, opportunities 
and powers, income and wealth, and he later adds the bases of self-respect.  Liberties and powers 
are to be defined by the rules of major institutions and the distribution of income and wealth is 
regulated by these institutions.
763
  Basic liberties include freedom of thought and liberty of 
conscience, freedom of association, and freedom defined by the freedom and integrity of the 
person.  Finally, liberty is to also include political liberties.
764
  Opportunities are defined as being 
fair and equal for all persons in society, and positions of responsibility in political and economic 
institutions best define the “powers” Rawls refers to.  Rawls notes that income and wealth are 
necessary to carry out one’s ends, and the social bases of self-respect—what Rawls has noted as 
being “the most important primary good”—includes a person’s sense of their own value (his 
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conception of the good is worth carrying out) and “implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as 
it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions.”765 
Regarding primary goods, Rawls raises an important question: “But on what basis do the primary 
goods come to be accepted?”766  He remarks that answering this question originates with his 
conception of the person.  First and foremost, persons in the original position possess what 
Rawls refers to as the “two moral powers”—he writes: 
Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having (and are 
assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and 
second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a 
normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a 
certain minimum degree.
767
 
These “moral powers” are also referred to as the two “highest order interests.”  According to 
Rawls, his conception of the person, possessing these two moral powers, helps to substantiate 
why the two principles of justice would be chosen.  Further, he writes: 
…free persons conceive of themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final ends 
and who give first priority to preserving their liberty in these matters.  Hence, they not 
only have final ends that they are in principle free to pursue or to reject, but their original 
allegiance and continued devotion to these ends are to be formed and affirmed under 
conditions that are free.
768
 
In addition to the capacity to have a conception of the good (open to revision) as well as a sense 
of justice, there is a third “higher” order interest—that persons are “determinate” persons who 
seek to protect and advance their conception of the good, whatever that conception may be.
769
  
Thus, the Rawlsian picture of the person—possessing these three “regulative interests”—
comprise the makeup of agents in the original position.  Yet they are not complete.  They are 
“free moral persons with fundamental aims and interests”—thus leading to the question of how 
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they are to attain “rational agreement” in the original position.770  Herein lies the necessity of 
primary social goods.  Rawls assumes that the parties in the original position prefer these goods 
which help to regulate agreement on justice amidst a variety of interests.  He writes: “by 
stipulating that the parties evaluate conceptions of justice by a preference for these goods, we 
endow them, as agents of construction, with sufficiently specific desires so that their rational 
deliberations reach a definite result.”771 
While much has been said about primary social goods, it is here that we can find the lynchpin of 
the intractable Rawlsian problems: relationship and communal cultivation.  The aforementioned 
picture of the Rawlsian person in the original position emphasizes, perhaps above all else, the 
autonomy of the person.  They are autonomous in two respects: 
[F]irst, in their deliberations they are not required to apply, or to be guided by, any prior 
and antecedent principles of right and justice.  This is expressed by the use of pure 
procedural justice.  Second, they are said to be moved solely by the highest-order 
interests in their moral powers and by their concern to advance their determinate but 
unknown final ends.  The account of primary goods and its derivation convey this side of 
autonomy.  Given the veil of ignorance, the parties can be prompted only by these 
highest-order interests, which they must, in turn, render specific by the preference for 
primary goods.
772
 
Indeed, autonomy is a central assumption in the Rawlsian project.  Not only is autonomy a 
central assumption, it is “indispensable.”  Sandel traces Rawls’ fidelity to autonomy through 
Kant.  If members of society are to think of themselves as free moral agents, altogether different 
from an agent governed by “heteronomous choice,” then they must assume that their will is a 
sort of “first cause”—not “the effect of some prior cause.”  Sandel quotes Kant: “When we think 
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of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize 
the autonomy of the will.”  Sandel remarks: “And so the notion of a subject prior to and 
independent of experience, such as the Kantian ethic requires, appears not only possible but 
indispensible, a necessary presupposition of the possibility of freedom.”773    
But is such autonomy, buttressed and driven by Rawls’ primary social goods, truly capable of 
assisting the Rawlsian person in achieving his ends?  This is questionable, depending upon one’s 
ends, as some might contest the claim that “the list of primary goods really is equally or nearly 
equally valuable to all ways of life.”774  In other words, if primary goods are necessary for men 
to “generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and advancing their 
ends…”—then we have to ask whether there are particular ends that such goods would not assist 
to advance.  An example of this is provided by Jonathon Wolff.  In an interview regarding 
Rawls’ theory of justice, Wolff, expounding on Rawls’ primary social goods, was asked the 
following: 
But surely there are people who [have] got completely different conceptions of the 
good—like a monk for instance, who wants to spend his spiritual life meditating.  He’s 
not concerned with money in the least.  Money wouldn’t enter into his world.775 
While Wolff points out the appropriate Rawlsian response to this suggestion—he does offer an 
additional “residual” concern relevant to the questions raised above:   
Money might even be an obstacle.  It is true there are some people who choose to be 
monks.  Rawls would say: “And they’ve chosen to be monks.”  They weren’t forced to be 
monks.  They had that decision…therefore, they valued liberty.  They valued liberty to be 
a monk [and] they valued the opportunity to be a monk.  If they weren’t given that 
opportunity [then] that would have been a problem for them.  It is true they may not want 
to have wealth, but nevertheless, they might still want to live in a society where the worst 
off are as well off as possible.  I mean monks do good works—they want to try to 
improve the material conditions of other people, even if they opt out themselves on the 
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whole.  So, Rawls I think could say: “Look, these are all purpose means.”  But I think 
there is a residual worry here.  The monk may value a type of community whereby 
there is a notion of social solidarity or collective or common good, and, it is less clear 
that opportunity, liberty, and money are ways of achieving common goods.
776
 
The problem raised here in the “monk” example is a problem with Rawls’ conception of the 
autonomous, rational man in the original position.  First, this depiction is biased toward a hyper-
individualistic conception of the good.  As mentioned above, this depiction casts man as an agent 
independent of his ends.  Far from utilitarian or other teleological conceptions of justice, the 
liberal conception of justice begins with the notion that “the state should not impose a preferred 
way of life, but should leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends, 
consistent with a similar liberty for others.”777  Thus, remarks Sandel, this requires an account 
that does not depend on any certain end or conception of the good, as “only a justification neutral 
among ends could preserve the liberal resolve not to favour any particular ends, or to impose on 
its citizens a preferred way of life.”778  Therefore, the “right is prior to the good.”  In other 
writing, Sandel suggests that the right is prior to the good in two primary senses for Rawls.  First, 
the right is prior to the good in the sense that individual rights have priority, or “trump” 
considerations of the common good.  Second, our rights do not require for their justification any 
particular conception of the good (members of society are free to choose their ends).
779
  This 
conception of the person is given greater consideration below. 
For now, we may ask: why is this conception relevant to the intractable problems found in 
Rawls?  First, the priority of rights, as regarded in the second intractable problem, is charged 
with deteriorating, not cultivating, an ethos of community and solidarity.  As was discussed, 
rights-based justice presumably begins with suppositions of fear, distrust, and conflict—
attributes that impede or prohibit altogether the communal bonds identified in the normative 
argument.  Second, and more straightforward, Rawls regards a communal, encumbered self as a 
                                                          
776
 Ibid. (Emphasis mine) 
777
 Sandel, 1998, p. 1 
778
 Ibid., page 3 
779
 This is in contrast with Aristotle’s conception of justice: “Before we can [investigate] the nature of an ideal 
constitution, it is necessary for us first to determine the nature of the most desirable way of life.  As long as that is 
obscure, the nature of the ideal constitution must also remain obscure.”  Aristotle as quoted by Sandel, 2009, p. 215. 
224 
 
“weakness”—not a strength—as he considers this antithetical to autonomy.  In a striking 
commentary, he writes: 
Were the parties moved solely by lower-order impulses, say for food and drink, or by 
certain particular affections for this or that group of persons, association, or community, 
we might think of them as heteronomous and not as autonomous.  But at the basis of the 
desire for primary goods are the highest-order interests of moral personality and the need 
to secure one’s conception of the good (whatever it is).  Thus the parties are simply trying 
to guarantee and to advance the requisite conditions for exercising the powers that 
characterize them as moral persons.  Certainly this motivation is neither heteronomous 
nor self-centered: we expect and indeed want people to care about their liberties and 
opportunities in order to realize these powers, and we think they show a lack of self-
respect and weakness of character in not doing so.
780
   
Thus, relationships stemming from personal friendships, associations, or communities are no 
different, according to Rawls, as other “lower-order” impulses such as indulging our appetite for 
food and drink.  Moreover, ties to others found in relationships are “heteronomous,”—or subject 
to external constraints in some fashion.  For Rawls, not only are relationships irrelevant to the 
rational Rawlsian person in the original position—they reflect a “lack of self-respect” and 
“weakness of character”—and stand as a hindrance to the autonomy necessary, according to 
Rawls, to fully “express our nature as a free and equal rational being.”781 
 
Arguments for a More Relational Rawls 
 
Rawlsian primary social goods have been referred to as a “thin” conception of the good.  In other 
words, the Rawlsian rational man in the original position is understood to be prior to his ends, 
thus unencumbered by prior aims and desires that may threaten his autonomous nature as a free 
and equal being.  However, Rawls endows him with minimal attributes that persons in the 
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original positions possess, and desire more of, to assist them in attaining the good they pursue 
and “evaluate the conceptions of justice available to them in the original position.”782  This 
conception is considered “thin” in the sense that “it incorporates minimal and widely shared 
assumptions about the kinds of things likely to be useful to all particular conceptions of the good, 
and therefore likely to be shared by persons whatever their more specific desires.”783   
Yet is this conception too “thin”?  In describing his theories of justice, their lexical ordering, and 
the primary social goods, Rawls concedes: “By way of comment, these principles and priorities 
are no doubt incomplete.  Other modifications will surely have to be made…”  Here, then, I 
argue for one such modification (although probably not of the sort Rawls had in mind).  More 
specifically, this thesis challenges the notion that affections for “persons, association, or 
community” are heteronomous, “lower-order impulses.” At this point, I shall provide two 
primary arguments to support this challenge and to support a modification of my own.  After 
this, the post-script to this chapter addresses the specific modification suggested to Rawlsian 
primary goods, the implications for subsequent features of justice, and the wider implications for 
the residential integration discussion. 
Argument #1—Disputing the Unencumbered Self:  Many scholars have taken issue with 
Rawls’ “conception of the person as a free and independent self, unencumbered by prior moral 
ties.”784  Most often, depictions of the “self” are offered in the context of justice.  To offer clarity 
to the argument against Rawls, it is necessary to spell out what is meant when the term justice is 
invoked. 
The term justice is, more or less, better understood as harboring a broad range of meanings.  
Further, the term can apply to individuals, outcomes, or social structures, and is often used in the 
context of describing a just society.  This is the approach that Rawls takes, as he offers a 
conception of justice understood in a social context.  He writes, “For us the primary subject of 
justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social 
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institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages 
from social cooperation.”785  G.A. Cohen, describing a contemporary vision of a just society, 
claims that it is “one whose citizens affirm and act upon the correct principles of justice.”786  And 
what are the correct principles of justice?  Perhaps the most oft-cited and clear example of what 
is meant by “justice” in both a classical and contemporary context is this: justice is “giving each 
their due.”787  Cohen himself verifies this definition as a guide to understanding what it means to 
achieve justice or to endeavor toward a just society.
788
  The origination of justice as “each their 
due” hails back to ancient Greek philosophers and finds its greatest development in Aristotle.789  
It was Plato who credited Simonides, as quoted by Polemarchus, as defining justice in this way: 
“it is to give each what is owed.”790 
Alasdair Macintyre (1988), whose work traverses various applications of justice over time, 
suggests that in the Aristotelian tradition, there is general agreement that justice as it relates to 
distribution must accord with desert of some kind.  The point of philosophical dispute, however, 
relates to what kind of desert it should be.
791
  Sandel (2009) puts it more succinctly: “For 
Aristotle, justice means giving people what they deserve, giving each person his or her due.  But 
what is a person due?”792  Thus, within this classical definition, we may understand the term 
“justice” in a two-fold manner:  Justice is a) rendering unto each their due and b) given the first 
premise, justice is undertaking the process of determining what is due individuals.  I shall refer to 
this first component as “formal justice”—that is, the formal definition of justice as the rendering 
of each their due.  The second component, naturally conceived from formal justice, will be 
referred to as “substantive justice” where we must determine the standard by which we can apply 
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the formal principle of justice.  It is here, in the substantive principle, where the locus of concern 
over what is “just” is taken up.  
Aristotle’s doctrine of justice is not only noted for his formal usage of the term, but also for his 
own attempt at defining substantive justice by determining what is “due” an individual.  
Aristotle, according to Lucas, attempts to “elucidate distributive, or social, justice…as requiring 
that each person’s share should be proportional to his deserts, rather than that fair shares were, of 
necessity, equal shares.”793  In his classical work Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes: “The 
just, then, is the proportionate, and the unjust is the counterproportionate.”794  For Aristotle, the 
calculation of what is “due” an individual was based on an idea of “equivalence.”795  Because 
humans have the capacity for identifying what is understood as “unfair,” based upon excess or 
deficiency, we can conversely assume, according to Aristotle, that what is fair is both 
conceivable and possible if excess and deficiency are properly identified and reigned in.
796
  In 
distributions, equality is not understood as equal human beings receiving equal amounts, but 
rather, unequal human beings receiving what is in accord with their worth.
797
  Thus, “doing 
injustice is having too much and suffering injustice is having too little.”798  Aristotle refers to the 
equilibrium in this social calculation as achieving the “mean” which is understood as an 
“intermediate condition.”799  Therefore, we can properly describe the classical vision of 
substantive justice as being one of suitability—not necessarily equality.  Kane writes: “The 
principle upon which such rights, penalties, or duties are calculated is the Aristotelian principle 
of proportionality: the more one has of a certain property X, the more one deserves of whatever 
treatment Y is relevant to it.”800 
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Thus, as it relates to substantive justice, proportion best represents Aristotle’s articulation of 
“fairness.”  Bell writes: “Fairness, one could say, [for Aristotle] is not a matter of strict equality 
in the modern egalitarian sense but of proportion.  Like are treated alike, but unlike are treated 
differently and this is just.”801  Another important aspect underlying Aristotle’s substantive form 
of justice was the notion that the “good is prior to the right.”  Bell describes this classical 
philosophical position: 
According to the classical vision, determinations of what is just are dependent upon a 
prior conception of the good of humanity, of a thick or substantive conception of the 
good that embraces both the community and individuals.  In other words, agreement on 
what justice is is only possible subsequent to agreement on what constitutes the proper 
end or good of humanity.
802
 
While contemporary society has not departed from the formal understanding of justice—
modernity and its philosophical attributes, often unique to the traditions before it, have led to a 
fundamental departure from Aristotelian proportion in favor of liberal notions of equality relative 
to individuals and their rights.  This is a major assertion of MacIntyre’s 1988 work: Whose 
Justice?  Which Rationality?  Here, MacIntyre traces western conceptions of justice from 
Aristotle to Aquinas and onto Hume, making the case that they each appeal to a particular 
tradition by which to engage moral theory.  Following Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment, 
liberal thinking emerged under the belief that practical reasoning can occur outside the boundary 
of a tradition and requires only the presence of facts in order to apprehend the correct principles 
of justice.
803
  While MacIntyre asserts that such a tradition-independent project is illusory, he 
outlines the “central features” that have emerged from this movement.  First is the idea that 
“society is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not presuppose any particular 
conception of the good,”804 or what MacIntyre describes as a commitment “to there being no 
overriding good.”805  Furthermore, this idea makes the pursuit of the common good difficult, if 
not impossible, as liberalism asserts that “individuals are free to pursue private goods, and this is 
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possible only by restricting the pursuit of the common good.”806  Rawls himself gives the 
justification for this anti-Aristotelian shift: “Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of 
the self are heterogeneous.”807  Society is now understood as a collection of rational subjects 
defined by their choices and preferences—a “central” value of liberal modernity.808  This has 
implications for the liberal rendering of substantive justice as I have defined it.  Formal justice as 
“each their due” must be expressed, in substantive terms, among the competing claims of 
individuals, bereft of any antecedent notions of what is ‘good’ for man or society, and this gives 
way to a form of egalitarian justice.  Individuals are understood as possessors of their own 
schedule of preferences which deserves equal respect.  Sandel (2005) defines the tenets of justice 
under the roof of liberal principles:  
This liberalism says, in other words, that what makes the just society just is not the telos 
or purpose or end at which it aims, but precisely its refusal to choose in advance among 
competing purposes and ends.  In its constitution and its laws, the just society seeks to 
provide a framework within which its citizens can pursue their own values and ends, 
consistent with a similar liberty for others.
809
 
This brand of justice is naturally undergirded, then, by the idea of individual equality, a clean 
departure from Aristotelian proportion.  Because principles of justice must assess and weigh the 
various preferences put forth by individuals in society, a standard for the “tallying and weighing” 
of preferences and choices must be presented and justified.  This, says MacIntyre, is the role of 
egalitarianism in modern justice.  He writes:  
The goods about which it is egalitarian in this way are those which, it is presumed, 
everyone values: freedom to express and to implement preferences and a share in the 
means required to make that implementation effective.  It is in these two respects that 
prima facie equality is required.
810
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In contemporary ethical vernacular, then, what is “fair” is no longer what is proportional, it is 
what is equal.  Further, this understanding is pervasive.  To take Sen’s flute example, we have 
evidence of competing traditions of utilitarianism, welfare egalitarianism, and libertarianism.  
While these traditions differ in their articulation of substantive justice, they do presuppose an 
idea of fairness as strict equality within modern liberal understanding, in contrast to Aristotelian 
proportion.  Lebacqz writes: “For all their differences, these three philosophical theories operate 
within a common ‘liberal’ tradition.  They share significant assumptions regarding the role and 
place of the individual as the bearer of moral value and the use of reason as the grounds for any 
theory of justice.”811    
In modern terms, then, justice in a liberal society means “ensuring equal opportunity, giving 
equal pay for equal work, guaranteeing equal protection under the law, or avoiding favoritism 
and scapegoating among one’s children or students.”812  What, we might ask, is wrong with this 
idea of equality?  What is lost in equating justice and equality?  Hochschild (1981) offers good 
reason for skepticism in the liberal hope of equality and impartiality as a means of determining 
what is just.  Recall that under the liberal project of justice, equality is based upon the equal 
nature of each individual to pursue their own good and author their own moral and social 
meanings.
813
  This is different from an equality of human dignity recognized in persons while 
also recognizing their inequality or their unequal nature as it relates to their history, culture, 
background, and personal attributes.  An equality of individuals, writes Hochschild, is a “more 
profound danger” because it is at risk of failing to treat individuals as inherently valuable.  She 
writes: “Equality does not reward—and may not even recognize—individual excellence or 
idiosyncrasy.  But scarce abilities or unconventional traits make people unique and of value to 
the community.”814  In other words, we impoverish ourselves when we view each other as equals 
at the expense of recognizing our differences, particularly as those differences contribute to a 
more unified whole within a community context.  Hochschild asks: “Can we endorse, then, a 
norm that authorizes society to ignore all individual characteristics in the name of respecting the 
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individual?”815  The answer, perhaps, depends upon an antecedent answer to the question: “What 
kind of community do I desire?”  Relative to the normative argument, it has been expressed that 
the “kind of community” desired through various residential dispersal programs is a community 
that is socially, not simply spatially, integrated.  Based upon this goal, I suggest that justice as 
“respecting the individual” is insufficient as equality without community becomes “mindless 
uniformity.”816  This is because, as MacIntyre states, liberal notions of justice re-imaged the self 
as the “individual qua individual” as opposed to the Aristotelian vision of the “individual qua 
citizen” or “individual qua enquirer into his or her good and the good of his or her 
community.”817  Thus, in the modern liberal rendering, respect for the other is given attention 
only insofar as that respect does not conflict with the primacy afforded to myself.  This places 
the prohibitive conjunction “if” on social relationships and makes justice—insofar as aspiring 
toward the achievement of what is “right” as opposed to what is “efficient”—illusory at best.   
We do not have to undertake an extensive search of Rawlsian theory to see this problematic 
influence of liberal justice and its contribution to the aforementioned intractable problems in 
Rawlsian justice as it relates to supporting the normative argument, and more specifically, its 
second consideration.  First, the idea of fairness, as impartiality, is most certainly present in the 
Rawlsian project.  The original position understood as a mechanism to achieve pure procedural 
justice is directly concerned with the removal of personal bias as well as natural and social 
contingencies.  It is only our “considered judgments in reflective equilibrium” that can truly 
articulate what is fair, thus making it just in Rawls’ view.818  This position was criticized in the 
description of the first intractable problem of Rawlsian justice above. 
Second, the notion of the individual qua individual makes justice, at best, a defense of rights.  In 
Rawlsian theory, we can only defend the right of another because we may very well end up as 
possessing the same natural and social contingencies as the other.  Thus taking up the concerns 
of the other is merely an informal way of securing my own liberties and utilities.  This is not 
surprising, however, since Rawls assumes the attribute of “mutual disinterest” in the original 
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position and gives primacy to rights and liberty above all other primary social goods.
819
  Thus, 
the original position as an “Archimedean point for assessing the social system without invoking a 
priori considerations” is a creative format to maintain the primacy of the self while only giving 
consideration to the other by virtue of being behind a veil of ignorance.
820
  This form of 
cooperation, however, while offering the appearance of “sharing one another’s common fate,” 
can hardly be understood as true community.
821
  This has been referred to as the “Rawlsian 
fallacy”—“that if something is an individual good it is ipso facto a collective good.”822  Rights-
based justice, a tenet of liberal substantive justice, assumes the presence of conflict as it relates to 
goods and is anathema to the idea of free and reciprocal exchange of individual goods for the 
sake of the whole. 
Therefore, the intractable problems of Rawlsian theory as it relates to supporting the normative 
argument can be traced to the liberal interpretation of substantive justice.  Devoid of community, 
this is a poor ethos to support the aim of social integration.  On top of this, this version of 
substantive justice seems to lack the consensus to recruit the moral, ethical, and social ethos 
necessary to support community and solidarity-based considerations.  This is due to a structural 
fault of liberal ideology where the self is proclaimed to be prior to its ends (thus assuming that 
the right is prior to the good).   
We may (rightly) praise Rawls for recognizing conflicting doctrines within society that, under 
the “good” of utilitarianism, would potentially leave large sectors of society in precarious social 
standing in the name of efficiency for the majority (however that is defined).  However, 
recognizing how social benefits as well as hardships are dispersed among its individual members 
(a moral consideration utilitarianism leaves unaccounted) does not necessarily mean we should 
abandon the aim of solidarity as a good worth pursuing.  Sandel recognizes this error: “If 
utilitarianism fails to take seriously our distinctness, justice as fairness fails to take seriously our 
commonality.”823  Thus, when Sandel critiques Rawls by saying: “What the difference principle 
requires, but cannot provide, is some way of identifying those among whom the assets I bear are 
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properly regarded as common, some way of seeing ourselves as mutually indebted and morally 
engaged to begin with,” his criticism extends beyond the scope of mere Rawlsian theory and 
more toward the direction of liberal substantive justice which endorses an atomistic, 
unencumbered view of individuals in society.
824
  Sandel concludes: “The constitutive aims and 
attachments that would save and situate the difference principle are precisely the ones denied to 
the liberal self; the moral encumbrances and antecedent obligations they imply would undercut 
the priority of right.”825 
We may conclude, therefore, that the liberal rendering of substantive justice, while still operating 
under the classical idea of formal justice, (“each their due”) is problematic as it relates to 
developing a robust, ethical component to the residential housing discussion.  Moreover, relative 
to supporting the normative argument, I submit that the two aforementioned intractable problems 
of Rawlsian justice originate from this articulation of justice.  Recall that the tenets of the 
normative argument appeal to the inclusion of ethical considerations regarding fair residential 
housing conditions for otherwise segregated minorities in addition to the aim towards social 
integration—an aim that requires a pluralistic approach toward understanding and valuing 
residential integration and black-white relationships within a community.  However, the modern 
liberal rendering of “what is due” someone, understood as a fair, neutral, and impartial 
mechanism for “self-interested individuals pursuing private goods”826 is insufficient to give full 
expression to these ethical considerations as evidenced by Rawls’ theory of justice.  Justice, in 
this sense, can only condemn the consequences of segregation; not segregation itself.  Similarly, 
how will the exercise of distributing what is due to individuals in society create or support 
integration?  “Each their due” is synonymous with a rights-based liberalism where each person 
not only makes a claim for themselves, but in essence makes their claim against other individuals 
thus presupposing an underlying conflict.  Thus, the intractable problems of Rawlsian theory 
insofar as supporting the normative argument are symptoms of a greater underlying ethos of 
justice as providing “each their due” in a liberal democratic understanding. 
In summary, the criticisms provided above reveal that Rawls’ depiction of the rational and 
mutually disinterested person behind the veil of ignorance reflects a distinct, liberal identity.  In 
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contrast, competing views of justice and moral engagement suggest that a thicker conception of 
the self is a more appropriate depiction of rational man.  A thicker conception locates persons 
within a certain time and place with moral ties and commitments that serve to identify, not 
alienate, them from others.  This rationale, therefore, suggests skepticism for the primary social 
goods “endowed” to persons in the original position.  However, there is another argument for 
skepticism: the primary social goods listed may not properly lubricate a path for the “good” I 
choose or the “ends” I endeavor toward.  Indeed, they may even be a hindrance—this issue, 
related to Argument #1, is taken up in Argument #2. 
Argument #2—Existing Primary Goods are Inadequate to Advance Communal 
Conceptions of the Good:  Schwartz (1973) and Nagel (1973) were early critics of Rawls’ 
index of primary goods.  Schwartz argued that the primary goods endowed to persons in the 
original position “favors a particular range of conceptions of the good” that are “not common to 
all rational individuals.”827  Moreover, she writes that the Rawlsian range of conceptions of the 
good misses aspects relating to the communal goods of life.  For example, she offers a picture of 
a socialist “whose plan of life does not involve a preference for more rather than less of Rawl’s 
primary goods.”828  More specifically, she states that the socialist will reject Rawls’ primacy of 
liberties because they “do not further the pursuit of his plan of life or the plans of most men.”829  
Regarding self-respect, Schwartz’ socialist would likely claim that a different set of liberties 
would best further self-respect than what Rawls has offered.
830
  Furthermore, Schwartz contends 
that the pursuit of wealth would occur up to the point that he is decently fed, housed, and 
clothed.  From here, he might suggest that he is “harmed” by living in a society that has a 
preference for greater rather than a lesser amount of wealth (as opposed to being more able to 
pursue his good in a society with a preference for a minimal amount of wealth).
831
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Similar to Schwartz, Nagel also argued that Rawls’ primary goods are not equally valuable in the 
pursuit of any and all conceptions of the good.  More specifically, while the Rawlsian index will 
serve to advance many different individual plans, they are less useful in implementing views that 
“hold a good life to be readily achievable only in certain well-defined types of social 
structure.”832  Why?  Because of the individualistic bias in the Rawlsian model, “which is further 
strengthened by the motivational assumptions of mutual disinterest and absence of envy.”833  To 
summarize, Schwartz and Nagel have been described as criticizing Rawls for “suggest[ing] that 
what people want in life is to maximize their share of social resources (rather than promote the 
good of others)…”834 
Kymlicka (1989), in reviewing Schwartz’ work, writes that while Schwartz may appear to be 
attacking the idea of “consequential neutrality” since she emphasizes that not all ways of life will 
fare equally well in a Rawlsian society, she is also criticizing that communal life will not fare 
well under Rawls because “primary goods (beyond a certain point) are only useful for 
individualistic ends” and, furthermore, Rawls’ “demand that society aim to increase the share of 
primary goods available to individuals reflects a decision that individualistic ways of life should 
be promoted at the expense of nonindividualistic ways of life.”835  Kymlicka, however, is 
skeptical of this position and the illustration of the socialist: “It is entirely wrong to suppose that 
the less materialistic someone is, the less of an interest she has in Rawls’s primary goods.”836  
Summarizing his critique of Schwartz, he writes: “Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a viable way 
of life which is genuinely harmed by, or even indifferent to, increases in the availability of 
material resources.”837  Indeed, Kymlicka argues that resources are necessary to pursue and 
protect one’s values, whether they are of an individualistic or communal nature.  Citing Dworkin 
(1983), he favors a position where humans, after securing their necessary resources (i.e., primary 
goods), can “deploy in accordance with our attachments and other concerns”—even if these ends 
are of a non-individualistic, communal nature.
838
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In many ways, Kymlicka may be more concerned with separating the idea of individualism as 
charged by Schwartz and Nagel from Rawlsian autonomy.  He notes that, for Rawls, people “are 
capable not simply of pursuing their given ends, but also reflecting on the value of those 
ends.”839  In reflecting on the value of one’s ends, they can equally revise and change their 
conceptions of the good which, according to Kymlicka, requires resources that are flexible and 
can be translated into the goods and services appropriate for other ways of life—including 
communal forms of living.
840
  Thus, Kymlicka defends the Rawlsian position that primary goods 
are not evidence of “possessive individualism”—but rather a reflection of our autonomous 
choice (thus requiring flexible resources) and responsible choice where “there must be some 
standard which teaches us what is available to use in accordance with our attachments.”841  He 
concludes: 
It is commonly alleged that liberals fail to recognize that people are naturally social or 
communal beings.  Liberals supposedly think that society rests on an artificial social 
contract, and that a coercive state apparatus is needed to keep naturally asocial people 
together in society.  But there is a sense in which the opposite is true—liberals believe 
that people naturally form and join social relations and forms in which they come to 
understand and pursue the good. 
842
 
Yet what Rawls, and thus Kymlicka, appear to leave undefended is a critical assumption related 
to the concept of autonomy: the belief that association and affiliation are goods we choose like 
any other good; not an attribute of who we are (i.e., our original makeup).  According to their 
position and the overall Rawlsian project, we can begin as detached, independent beings and 
utilize the primary goods afforded to us to pursue our conception of the good—whether those 
conceptions are individualistic or communal in nature.  Yet, the existing primary social goods 
presented by Rawls are misunderstood when presented as instruments to advance communal 
ends or, as Kymlicka puts it, to “naturally form and join social relations” should that be a given 
end.  Rather, and perhaps more appropriately, rights and liberty, powers and opportunities, and 
wealth and income do not necessarily lead to relational cultivation (if that were the good I was 
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pursuing) so much as they require it to avoid conflict and dysfunction.  The second intractable 
problem of Rawls is consistent with this claim. 
While an illustration will assist to make the point, prior to doing this, it is necessary to comment 
on how Rawls’ would have us weight the primary goods.  Rawls, anticipating this as a problem, 
remarks that it is “greatly simplified” based upon the assumption that the two principles of 
justice are serially ordered.
843
  Based upon this, Rawls concludes: 
The fundamental liberties are always equal, and there is fair equality of opportunity; one 
does not need to balance these liberties and rights against other values.  The primary 
social goods that vary in their distribution are the powers and prerogatives of authority, 
and income and wealth.  But the difficulties are not so great as they might seem at first 
because of the nature of the difference principle.  The only index problem that concerns 
us is that for the least advantaged group.  The primary goods enjoyed by other 
representative individuals are adjusted to raise this index, subject of course to the usual 
constraints.  It is unnecessary to define weights for the more favored positions in any 
detail, as long as we are sure they are more favored.
844
 
Rawls appears hesitant to confer particular weights to each good in the index, and opts for a 
more generalized weighting scheme consistent with the two principles of justice.  This flexibility 
allows for persons to adjust their conceptions of the good accordingly and thus the weights of 
primary goods necessary to achieve them.  He writes: “Of course, the precise weights adopted in 
such an index cannot be laid down ahead of time, for these should be adjusted, to some degree at 
least, in view of social conditions.”845  In other words, just societies bear “the responsibility for 
upholding the principles of justice and secures for everyone a fair share of primary goods”; 
conversely, persons in society bear the responsibility of utilizing these primary goods, in the 
appropriate way, to achieve their ends.
846
  For this reason, the index of primary goods is not a 
measure of “welfare”—rather, it is a measure of a just basic structure.  To summarize: how 
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primary goods are distributed is a matter of justice; what people do with them is a matter of 
personal responsibility.
847
 
However, according to Rawls, this does not preclude “constraints” on how one goes about 
weighting primary goods.
848
  One might assume this refers to the necessity of reigning in 
otherwise unrestricted liberty.  However, for Rawls, the opposite is true—the priority of the first 
principle of justice (liberty principle) serves as a device to ensure that emphasis is placed upon 
liberty as, in Sen’s terms, “a facility that complements other facilities”—with “other facilities” 
meaning other social goods such as income and wealth.
849
  Rawls notes that the principles of 
justice, in their general form, “assign weights to certain of the primary goods.”850  How are we to 
relate the principles of justice to a weighting of primary goods?  Rawls writes: 
Given the priority of the first principle over the second, and part (b) of the second 
principle [fair equality of opportunity] over part (a) [difference principle], all citizens in a 
well-ordered society have the same equal basic liberties and enjoy fair equality of 
opportunity.  The only permissible difference among citizens is their share of the primary 
goods in (c), (d), and (e) [powers, income and wealth, and social bases of self-respect 
accordingly].
851
 
This weighting scheme, however, has not gone unquestioned.  For example, Amartya Sen, 
commenting on the “unrestrained” priority of liberty, writes: “Why should we regard hunger, 
starvation and medical neglect to be invariably less important than the violation of any kind of 
personal liberty?”852  According to Rawls, such personal liberty is a key attribute for achieving 
one’s ends—even if they are communal.  This, I submit, is partially true.  Sen’s point is that 
unrestrained liberty is not so much a lubricant to choose community; rather, liberty requires 
community so as to be constrained and, thus, more appropriately exercised.  Here, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, whose work intersects ethics and politics, offers a compelling reason as to why liberty 
necessitates the “constraint” of community.  He writes: “The interests of individuals are, in other 
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words, never exactly identical with those of their communities.”853  While Niebuhr’s early work 
emphasizes the potential for morality in man and for immorality in groups, he recognizes what is 
required for social morality to flourish: “[No community can] achieve unity and harmony within 
its life, if the sentiments of goodwill and attitudes of mutuality are not cultivated.”854  This begs 
the question: can Rawlsian primary social goods and the unrestrained priority given to liberty 
achieve unity and harmony?  Do the primary goods allow me to simply “choose” this as Rawls 
(and Kymlicka) suggest?  Upon reading Rawls, there is great reason for skepticism as the 
Rawlsian rational person “desires to take part in social cooperation for mutual advantage.”855  
This “cooperation” originates not, however, from “goodwill”—rather, upon closer inspection, 
Rawls’ depiction of “mutual advantage” behind a veil of ignorance is less of an overture of 
goodwill and resembles something more akin to a romanticized “prisoner’s dilemma.”856  
To illustrate this claim, we may take the example of marriage.  If we were to survey Rawls’ list 
of primary social goods—rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth, and 
the social-bases of self-respect—and relate it to the institution of marriage,857 would these 
primary goods be “useful to advance all ends”?  Part of this answer would depend upon how one 
defines the purpose or nature of marriage.  If marriage consisted of nothing more than the 
maximization of utility or a platonic form of mutual advantage, then such goods may indeed be 
appropriate to advance these ends.
858
  Consider however, the pursuit of ends in a marriage 
                                                          
853
 Niebuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society: a Study in Ethics and Politics. Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2001. Print. (Pages 274-275) 
854
 Ibid., page 275 
855
 Rawls and Freeman, 2001, p. 365 
856
 Prisoner’s Dilemma is a subset of economic game theory.  For our purposes, it is the conflict (in the Rawlsian 
original position) of maximizing my social position by weighing considerations of self-interest and group rationality.  
Therefore, decisions—even if to the benefit of everyone—occur because they maximize my own personal situation.  
Thus, the “sharing in one another’s fate”—while appearing to be altruistic and relational—is more or less 
transactional and economical. 
857
 Regarding marriage, Rawls would consider the “family” a social institution (one of the many institutions his 
principles of justice are meant to impact).  This is important to mention as “primary social goods” are meant to relate 
to the institutions in the basic structure of society.  See Rawls and Freeman, 2001, page 454. 
858
 This is precisely what authors Jessica Bennett and Jesse Ellison suggest in a recent Newsweek article.  At one 
point in history, the authors argue, marriage made sense for women as it “ensured their financial security, got the 
fathers of their children to stick around, and [helped them gain] access to a host of legal rights.”  With changes in the 
workforce composition, however, the authors argue that marriage is no longer necessary “from a legal and practical 
standpoint” declaring that reason has triumphed over romance.  How do they operationalize reason?  The “icing on 
the cake” is that it is financially optimal to avoid marital commitments: “Federal law favors unmarried taxpayers in 
almost every case—only those whose incomes are wildly unequal get a real tax break—and under President 
Obama’s new health plan, low-earning single people get better subsidies to buy insurance.”  Thus the authors 
“reason” that marriage is outdated for financial, legal, and practical considerations.  The natural counter-argument is 
240 
 
consisting of trust, sacrifice, and self-giving love—characteristics often reflected in the 
pronouncement of marital vows.
859
  Would Rawlsian primary social goods assist in the 
cultivation and sustenance of these ends assuming they are “goods” one desires in their 
marriage?  While Kymlicka concedes that “there may be some ways of life which are not aided 
by increased amounts of Rawls’s primary goods”—he is quick to assert, however, that 
demonstrating this does not show that the primary goods harm communal ways of life.
860
   
Two immediate responses follow this assertion.  First, the burden of proof need not be drawn at 
the line of whether or not Rawls’ primary goods harm communal ways of life.  I submit that the 
locus of the argument hinges around whether or not the primary goods mentioned are sufficient 
or “flexible” enough to achieve the full spectrum of ends that Rawls and Kymlicka imagine 
possible—particularly as it relates to communal ends (e.g., trust in a marriage).  Thus, 
Kymlicka’s concession that the primary goods may not necessarily aid some ways of life (with 
emphasis on communal ends) is reason enough to substantiate potential supplementation to the 
existing index. 
This point aside—there is, however, an argument that the existing index of primary goods may 
indeed harm the pursuit of communal ends.  This thesis has argued that a “rights-based 
society”—commensurate with Rawls’ primacy to rights and liberty—is a “conflict” society.  For 
Rawls, the presence of liberty is the presence of justice.  But, as Niebuhr reminds us, “Society 
must strive for justice even if it is forced to use means, such as self-assertion, resistance, 
coercion and perhaps resentment, [measures that ] cannot gain the moral sanction of the most 
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sensitive moral spirit.”861  A just society, in Rawls’ view, may very well dispense the tools of 
justice—liberty included.  However, we must exercise caution before we assume that these tools, 
unchecked and unrestrained, can advance all ends.  Consider Rawls’ general description of 
liberty—“this or that person (or persons) is free (or not fee) from this or that constraint (or set of 
constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so.”862  Further, recall that one such “constraint” is to be 
found in “persons, associations, or community”—a desire considered to be a “lower-order 
impulse” that does not contribute to, but rather undermines, what it means to be a “moral 
person.”863  Rawls, then, submits that freedom is not found in the other, but is found by virtue of 
disassociating from the other.  Faulks (2000) helps to explain why “the other” may be a 
constraint, and not a resource, in liberal society: “The individualism of liberalism has encouraged 
a selfish and instrumentalist attitude to democracy and citizenship, which are not seen as 
expressions of communal life, but as methods for furthering self-interest.”  He continues—
“Rights are demanded, but no responsibilities accepted.  Liberty has mutated into license.”864  
Such an emphasis on autonomy, contends Faulks, makes liberals suspicious of notions of 
community.
865
  Given these remarks, it is questionable how the primacy of liberty, unfettered by 
constraints, can naturally allow for the advancement of communal ends. 
To return to the example of marriage—regarding rights and liberty, the marital partners have the 
right, for example, to a pre-nuptial agreement (often used as a mechanism to secure and protect 
personal property in the event of a divorce).  Indeed, given high US divorce rates, this would be 
a rational right to capitalize on and, moreover, persons in the original position should, according 
to Rawls, “assume that they have interests that they must protect as best they can.”866  But it is 
arguable that the primary goods of rights and liberties would advance the norms of trust, 
sacrifice, or self-giving love.  Moreover, rights—untethered from a relationally-based ethos—
would likely undermine such norms.  This is because capitalizing on this right (pre-nuptial 
agreement) potentially undermines trust, cooperation, and goodwill toward the marital partner as 
it presumes, in some manner, a lack of trust, sacrifice, or the potential of marital failure.  Thus, 
not only are the original ends sought not advanced, they are compromised.  A similar argument 
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can be made for opportunities and wealth as it relates to the institution of marriage.  In contrast, 
we might imagine that rights, liberty, opportunities and wealth, bounded or controlled for by a 
relational maxim, would provide the gravity necessary for these social goods to be available and 
present to pursue ends, even ends such as trust, sacrifice, and self-giving love, without 
undermining or compromising them.  While this may violate the greater Rawlsian (or liberal) 
fear of constraints upon individuality, it stabilizes the existing primary goods while still allowing 
for their healthy expression and use to pursue various ends. 
This simple illustration of marriage is meant to highlight the conflict between primary goods and 
forms of communal values.  On the surface, this conflict should not appear odd—relational 
flourishing and interaction are at the center of a healthy marriage just as human relationships and 
social capital are at the center of functional social institutions.  Beyond marriage, we might 
similarly remark that human interaction and relationships stand at the center of the concept of 
housing and neighborhoods proper.  For example, Massey (2004) describes social relationships 
in spatial terms as a form of “power geometry” or “a complex web of relations of domination 
and subordination, of solidarity, and co-operation.”867  Distilled to their most basic 
anthropological level—these institutions (marriage, housing/neighborhoods, etc.) are about how 
we relate to one another.   
Thus, the example of marriage, and its extrapolation to housing, illustrates a few notable points 
relevant to this thesis.  First and foremost, the primary social goods are considered “social” by 
Rawls because they are “social values.”868  These social values are to be distributed equally 
because they are “things that every rational human being is presumed to want.”869   However, 
this belies the very idea that persons are first relational beings, not abstract individuals endowed 
with the desire for primary goods in the original position.  Mizzoni (2009), in his book on ethics, 
provides a succinct account of this often “overlooked” fact: 
The claim that human beings are relational beings is a claim about the nature of human 
beings.  Each human being is in personal relationship with other human beings.  This is 
an inescapable fact of 99.99 percent of all human lives.  Without care, infants and small 
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children would not survive into adulthood.  At birth, a human infant has a brain that is 
only one-fourth the size of an adult brain.  Human beings are born into a state of 
helplessness and need intensive caretaking.  We are all born into families; our 
relationships to family members are our first relationships.  As we get older, we form 
relationships with persons outside our families.  At any moment in time, a human being is 
involved in countless relationships with others.  The range of personal relationship is 
broad: the parent-child relationship, sibling relationships, and relationships with cousins, 
with neighbors, with extended family, with friends, with other children at school, with 
teachers, with doctors, perhaps with shopkeepers.  As adults, humans have even more 
relationships: with co-workers, with bosses, with spouses, with spouses’ families, with 
business associates, etc.
870
 
Second, as Sociologist Amitai Etzioni has suggested, a good society requires both a moral order 
and a “bounded” autonomy.871  What is meant to “bound” autonomy according to Etzioni?  
Social order.  While the relationship between order and autonomy is not considered to be zero-
sum (i.e., more order ≠ less autonomy)—he does not consider the relationship to be “zero-plus” 
either (where “the factors complement one another”).  Nor do these “dual virtues” cancel each 
other out.  A better description, he writes, would be a symbiotic relationship where the two 
forces enrich one another “rather than merely work well together.”872  He is quick to describe, 
however, what he calls “inverting symbiosis”—where “if either element intensifies beyond a 
given level, it begins to diminish the other; the same two formations become antagonistic.”873  
To support this, he provides a helpful example related to housing: 
It is useful to engage in a mental experiment in which one starts from a very low level of 
community—e.g., in a recently completed high-rise building—and assumes that some 
social agents—community organizers, for instance—start to strengthen social bonds and 
to foster a culture among the new residents.  To a point, both social order and the 
individual members’ autonomy will be enhanced.  As the residents cease to be strangers, 
come to know one another as people and develop some measure of communal 
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attachments, they will feel less isolated, have a stronger sense of self and a more secure 
autonomy, and be voluntarily more mindful of their responsibilities, such as parking in 
the marked spaces and not littering in shared areas.  However, if the newly founded 
community continuously increases its expectations of its members, a point will be 
reached at which the two formations will start to undercut one another.  Thus, if the 
ordering formations grow stronger and stronger, not only will the members’ autonomy 
decline, but the communal bonds will fray as social responsibilities turn into imposed 
duties and opposition to the community will grow, which in turn will undermine the 
social order.
874
 
Etzioni’s work illustrates the necessity of some form of social mindfulness to the existing 
primary goods in Rawls’ exercise.  As I have argued, unchecked liberty does not necessarily aid 
and can even be prohibitive to some communally-based ends.  Therefore, including 
considerations of social order and responsibility can help to “secure autonomy” in healthy social 
ways.  However, a disproportionately large degree of order—similar to a disproportionate degree 
of liberty—may equally threaten the communal fabric of society.  Thus, in light of Etzioni’s 
remarks, I submit that supplementing Rawls’ primary goods with an additional good of a 
relationally-based nature will provide the proper balance to the existing goods—without 
excluding or crowding out their presence and contribution.  The forthcoming material will 
describe the nature of this supplementary good and its effect. 
To conclude, this chapter thus far represents an exploration in residential integration from an 
ethical paradigm.  I began the chapter by introducing the normative argument, supported in the 
language of justice as expressed by political philosopher John Rawls.  While we can assert that 
the Rawlsian exercise gives support to the first consideration in the normative argument, his 
framework offers little support for the second consideration.  This was made clear by explicating 
two intractable problems of Rawlsian justice.  Thus, after reviewing these problems, I have 
suggested that persons in the original position require a more “thickly” constituted understanding 
as opposed to the otherwise “thin” conception provided by Rawls.  This, as I will aim to show, 
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offers support to the second consideration in the normative argument and provides a more 
comprehensive and supportive architecture by which to explore the ethics of residential 
integration.  At this point, I shall reflect on the implications of this paradigm in the post-script to 
the chapter.  I will begin by giving a specific description of the additional primary social good I 
intend to “endow” the Rawlsian rational person with.  Given this adjustment, I shall outline three 
additional features of the Rawlsian exercise we can appropriately anticipate.  Finally, I shall end 
the post-script by analyzing the spatial implications of these features and the appropriate 
conclusions we can reach. 
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Chapter 4: Post-Script—Conclusions and Contributions 
 
The last section ended with two arguments for a more “relational” Rawls.  We can summarize 
the two arguments as follows:  Argument #1 disputes the liberal assumption that a just society 
should provide a framework under which citizens can pursue their own conceptions of the good; 
where citizens are understood to be free, independent, and unencumbered by prior moral ties.  
The Rawlsian answer regarding the question of substantive justice (“What is a person due?”) 
requires that a just society render unto each equally and impartially so as to allow them to author 
their own meanings (in contrast to Aristotelian proportionality).  Not only does this stress the 
conception of the autonomous self whose principle purpose is to define, defend, and capitalize on 
his ends without the consideration of others, but this notion of the person also undermines the 
concept of community as being valuable insofar as allowing for unequal persons to come 
together for a complementary whole or, to put it another way, incomplete persons finding 
completeness in each other.  Argument #2 considers whether the notion of the “right” being prior 
to the “good”—as a framework for justice—truly allows for the autonomous self to choose their 
ends.  I have argued that the endowments of Rawlsian primary goods to the autonomous 
individual in the original position are not only insufficient to advance any and all conceptions of 
the good—particularly of a communal nature—but may even harm or impede conceptions that 
favor ends such as trust, goodwill, affiliation, and solidarity: features of more communally-based 
conceptions of life.  The section ended with the suggestion that a relationally-minded conception 
of the person requires a healthy balance between individual rights and an individual’s 
responsibility to society and others (social order).   
Given these arguments, I will now introduce an adjusted, or refurbished, Rawlsian framework.  
Here I aim to “thicken” Rawls’ “thin” conception of the person in the original position to both 
recognize their relational nature and value relationships as a primary good necessary to advance 
all ends.  The move from thin to thick is a move from the person understood as an individual 
with interests to be satisfied to a person “whose identity and fulfillment are inextricably bound 
up with relations and communities.”875  If we accept the terms of this adjustment, this will have 
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significant implications for the support of the normative argument and our ethical interpretation 
of social integration in housing. 
Therefore, I submit that a minor addition to Rawl’s primary goods can have a major subsequent 
effect.  Moreover, this effect more appropriately captures the full range of human considerations, 
and not simply desires that tend to be emphasized in liberal depictions of justice.  The primary 
good I offer for inclusion is what I shall refer to as “meaningful relationships”—with a more 
specific definition forthcoming.  First, to understand this good, it is helpful to explore how Rawls 
understands the concepts of benevolence and love.  For Rawls, “love is guided by what 
individuals themselves would consent to in a fair initial situation which gives them equal 
representation as moral persons.  We now see why nothing would have been gained by 
attributing benevolence to the parties in the original position.”876  Indeed, the attribute of 
benevolence would violate the characteristic of mutual disinterest—a feature of persons whose 
aim is to secure their highest-order interests.
877
   Rawls writes: 
Thus we see that the assumption of the mutual disinterestedness of the parties does not 
prevent a reasonable interpretation of benevolence and of the love of mankind within the 
framework of justice as fairness.
878
 
Sandel is skeptical of this claim: “Given the limited role for reflection on Rawls’ account, the 
virtues of benevolence and love, as features of the good, are forms of sentiment rather than 
insight, ways of feeling rather than knowing.”879  In other words, given the features of persons in 
the original position, consideration toward other person’s “must be largely opaque” according to 
Sandel.
880
  As I have pointed out, Rawls considers association and affiliation to be lower-order 
interests that are heteronomous—threatening the autonomy of his rational person.  Thus, in 
adding the primary good of “meaningful relationship”—we change the nature of the otherwise 
autonomous person so that relationship and its myriad attributes are understood as a part of the 
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person, as opposed to being contrived and directed by what individuals themselves would 
consent to in a fair, initial situation.
881
   
Therefore, given these considerations, I define “meaningful relationships” as follows: the 
intrinsic desire for participation and membership in social networks consisting of the norms of 
reciprocity and trust whose object is the good of another.
882
  I understand this addition to be a 
general purpose means useful for tempering the existing primary goods in addition to carrying 
out the variety of ends people may choose (whether they be of a individualistic or communal 
nature). 
I have made my case for a more relationally-based person in the original position.  While this 
conception of the person is “thicker” than the “thin” conception Rawls offers, I have attempted to 
argue for its necessity in the Rawlsian project as a more appropriate means by which to construct 
agents in an original position of fairness, equality, and ignorance so as to envisage the social 
institutions in the basic structure of society.  This adjustment, I submit, allows for the benefits of 
the Rawlsian project while addressing the aforementioned intractable problems which find a 
common denominator in the depiction of the self that liberal articulations of justice imply.  
Therefore, at this point, my aim is to flesh out the implications of this addition.  If “meaningful 
relationships” were added to the list of primary social goods, we may now inquire as to what new 
outputs and outcomes would occur as a result of repeating this hypothetical exercise.  After 
answering these questions, I will articulate the implications as it relates to space, place, and 
neighborhoods, thus concluding the ethical paradigm in this thesis.  It should be noted that it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to deliberate as to each and every change the addition of this 
primary good may potentially have.  Rather, my aim is to focus on the implications that have 
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particular relevance for the normative argument in housing and the ethical paradigm of 
residential integration. 
 
A “Thickly” Constituted Self in the Veil of Ignorance 
 
Recall that in the original position behind a veil of ignorance, rationally autonomous persons 
endowed with the desire for primary social goods will choose Rawls’ two principles of justice.  
The chosen principles would stem from deliberations under ‘maximin’ to ensure that “no one 
should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice 
of principles.”883  Thus, in this deliberation process, questions arising may include: “If I was 
unaware of whether I was rich or poor, what system of taxation would I want in my society?”; 
“If I did not know my skin color, would I want to live in a society that allowed discriminatory 
practices?”; “Not knowing my religion (should I practice one), would I want to live in a society 
that was not tolerant of all religions?”  As these questions suggest, in the original position we 
“choose features that force the parties to consider which principles would be acceptable from 
every social position.”884  Moreover, these questions emanate from the nature of the person in the 
original position—understood as rational, mutually disinterested, but possessing the capacity for 
rational agreement because they are endowed with primary social goods that allow “their rational 
deliberations [to] reach a definite result.”885  In addition to possessing the knowledge that they 
want/need primary goods, “preference” for primary goods in the original position is considered 
“rational.”886  To summarize, persons want and prefer primary goods in the ‘thin’ sense and 
securing primary goods allows them to pursue their conception of the good in the ‘thick’ sense. 
Rawls asserts that these “conditions” incite such questions as provided above and define the 
principles of justice that rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent 
to.
887
  With this in mind, I have proposed an adjustment to the “conditions” to assume a more 
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thickly-constituted self—one who possesses a preference or desire for meaningful relationships 
in addition to the other index of primary goods.  Rawls writes that the list of primary goods rests 
upon “a particular conception of the person.”888  This thesis has suggested that this conception is 
cut from the cloth of an individualistic, liberal presentation of the human person—the thinly-
constituted or “unencumbered self.”  However, should we adjust the conception to reflect a more 
thickly-constituted, relationally-based self—what new questions may be asked?  What principles 
of justice would appropriately be arrived upon? 
Hypothesizing about the wide variety of changes that would occur by adding the primary good of 
meaningful relationships, as I have defined it, would be subject to debate.  However, I do wish to 
propose three areas of change that we could appropriately expect through this addition.  First, I 
submit that a thickly constituted self would desire additional qualities of the societies they are 
assumed to inhabit.  Second, I will argue that the addition of meaningful relationships changes 
the nature of the existing primary goods; i.e., they are “bounded.”  Finally, upon accepting the 
earlier areas of change, I will offer a modified version of Rawls’ first principle of justice that 
could be produced from this process.  Most importantly, in my addition of meaningful 
relationships to the existing primary goods, I am interested in the spatial implications of such an 
addition, which will be addressed at the end of the post-script. 
 
Refurbished Rawlsian Exercise: Additional Qualities Desired 
 
In addition to the range of questions that assist to determine the final principles of justice for 
Rawls, a rational person, in the thickly-constituted sense, behind a veil of ignorance would desire 
three additional qualities of the societies they would inhabit: 
a. Real, meaningful relationships with others  
b. Cultivation of identity through community and interaction  
c. Maximization of security; minimization of enmity  
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Before elaborating on these additional qualities, it is important to note a distinction often made 
by social theorists upon examining social networks.  When reflecting on human interaction and 
relationships, we might say the distinction relates to answering the question: “relationship with 
whom?”  Putnam (2000) writes: “Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, 
inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups.”889  This is 
referred to as “bonding” capital in social capital parlance.  Low-Mix Black, Low-Mix White, or 
“specialized neighborhoods” defined by Cheshire are examples of bonding capital.  Bonding 
social capital links groups that have much in common, and are often characterized by reciprocity 
and solidarity.
890
  This is different from “bridging” capital, characterized as being “outward 
looking and encompass[ing] people across diverse social cleavages.”891  Racially integrated 
communities, ecumenical religious organizations, or diverse work environments are examples of 
bridging capital.  Putnam notes that bridging capital is good for getting linked to external assets 
and information diffusion.  Bridging networks also play a valuable role as it relates to cultivating 
self-identity and reciprocity among a wider range of diverse networks.  Most social scientists 
whose work addresses social capital point out the importance of both bonding and bridging 
networks for a healthy society.  With this distinction in mind, we may now explore the additional 
qualities a thickly-constituted self in the original position would desire. 
First, they would desire real, meaningful relationships with other individuals.  This desire is a 
direct reflection of the newly endowed attribute of meaningful relationships, and makes a 
baseline assumption that individuals are not simply sensory beings whose aim is to author and 
fulfill various desires.  Rather, individuals are also relational and desire human engagement, 
social capital, affiliation, membership, and solidarity.  These goods can be achieved through 
various social and political institutions such as family, clubs and sports, work and educational 
environments, shared public resources, and neighborhoods. 
The desire for a real relationship has implications for both bonding and bridging capital.  As 
Walzer (1983) writes: “The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in 
some human community.”892  He goes on to assert that men and women without membership are 
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“stateless persons.”893  Individuals possess the desire to engage in meaningful associations and to 
cultivate a sense of belonging through group identity.  While meaningful associations can occur 
in a bonding or bridging framework, it is bonding capital that is most natural: “Bridging ties are 
harder to build than bonding ones.”894  Moreover, homogeneity often serves as the social 
lubricant for belonging and affiliation among individuals.
895
  Putnam writes: “For most of us, our 
deepest sense of belonging is to our most intimate social networks, especially family and 
friends” (i.e., our bonding networks).896  While real relationships may occur more naturally 
among similar individuals (i.e., homophily—“love of the same”), this is not to dismiss the 
importance of bridging capital in achieving real relationships.  Xavier de Souza Briggs writes: 
“Popular discussions of race in America often center on interpersonal relations [between white 
and black]—which relate so closely to the respect, security, and feelings of mutuality we all 
crave.”897 
Secondly, thickly-constituted persons in the original position would a) understand that their 
identity is formed and shaped through community and relationships (not self-derived) and b) as a 
result, actors in the original position would not desire strictly homogeneous relationships which 
would minimize the full scope of identity cultivation available to the agent.  To the latter point, if 
community and interaction are identity shaping mechanisms, thickly-constituted persons in the 
original position would not desire a society that was segregated and strictly homogeneous, 
although they may equally place a limit on the degree of heterogeneity they encounter as well.   
Many of the issues addressed in this chapter give support to point “a”: if we are, at our core, 
relational beings as opposed to individualist, unencumbered selves—then our relationships and 
the communities by which we develop our relationships serve as a formative mechanism in 
shaping our identity and cultivating our personhood.  This line of thinking reaches back several 
centuries, but it was given a clear social articulation in the work of George Herbert Mead (1863-
1931) who claimed that an individual experienced themselves only by means of reflection in a 
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social context
898—a position respected and held by many social theorists today.899  In this 
assertion, Mead “reversed the traditional assumptions underlying philosophical, psychological, 
and sociological thought to the effect that human beings possess minds and consciousness as 
original ‘givens,’ that they live in worlds of pre-existing and self-constituted objects, that their 
behavior consists of responses to such objects, and that group life consists of the association of 
such reacting human organisms.”900  In contrast, Mead maintained that “the process of self-
interaction puts the human being over against his world instead of merely in it, [and] requires 
him to meet and handle his world through a defining process instead of merely responding to 
it.”901  The shift, here, is that being an individual requires the presence, not absence, of others.  
As one author summarized Mead’s influence: “we are not ‘I’s’ who decide to identify with 
certain ‘we’s’; we are first of all ‘we’s’ who discover our ‘I’s’ through learning to recognize the 
other as similar and different from ourselves.”902  This is in contrast to agency-centered 
explanations of human identity and behavior found in liberal depictions of the rational, atomistic 
self.
903
 
Given this understanding of self-identity, point “b” has implications for bridging capital (linking 
of individuals across groups).  Putnam writes: “bridging social capital can generate broader 
identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves.”904  
Indeed, such “social bridges” are “uniquely important in social life.”905  Briggs (2007) writes: 
Bridging ties are particularly crucial where they help bind diverse societies, expanding 
social and civic identities, opening up insular communities of interest, containing ethnic 
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and other intergroup conflicts, and reducing status inequalities, for example, by widening 
access to valuable information and endorsements.
906
 
In other words, bridging capital would be attractive, particularly in a hypothetical state of 
ignorance, so as to ensure one’s self-understanding and identity were not limited to one 
particular group.  While bonding capital is a natural, and necessary, component of any society 
aspiring to community cohesion and social solidarity—there are disadvantages when bonding 
occurs bereft of bridging.  Indeed, one may appropriately claim that ours is a society where 
bonding capital is disproportionately higher than bridging capital as it relates to black and white 
relationships.  Emerson et al. (2000) write: “In the post-Civil Rights United States, the racialized 
society is one in which intermarriage rates are low, residential separation and socioeconomic 
inequality are the norm, our definitions of personal identity and our choices of intimate 
associations reveal racial distinctiveness, and where ‘we are never unaware of the race of a 
person with whom we interact.’”907  Emerson’s quote describes our present arrangement where 
the threat of limited identity looms amidst an otherwise diverse society.  In a racialized society, 
should one be born white or should one be born black, the risk is to be limited to the norms, 
traditions, and identities that accompany that race.  This has implications for path dependency 
and preference formation and therefore limits the full scope of human potential and self-
understanding (see conclusions to Chapter 3 post-script).  I submit that such an arrangement 
would be avoided by a thickly-constituted self in the original position. 
Limited identity, however, is not the only risk in a society where bonding and bridging capital 
are disproportionate.  Thus, thirdly, actors in the original position would desire more security and 
less enmity.  They would desire social arrangements that allow for human interaction and the 
advancement of given ends to flourish, unrestrained by the potential threat of forces that might 
jeopardize such goods.  Not only would they desire the maximization of security, they would 
equally desire the minimization of enmity, meaning that they would want to minimize structures 
that incite or exacerbate hostility between parties. 
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Rawls notes that “although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically 
marked by conflict as well as an identity of interests.”908  This thesis has argued that Rawls’ 
liberal conception of the self and the existing primary goods he aims to secure and utilize to 
achieve his ends is not only consistent with, but may very well contribute to, a society “marked 
by conflict.”  It is such conflict, though, that thickly-constituted persons in the original position 
would want to avoid insofar as it is possible.  Again, this has implications for the importance of 
bridging capital.   
We might think of the argument as follows—consider Putnam’s proposition: 
Here is one way of framing the central issue facing America as we become ever more 
diverse ethnically.  If we had a golden magic wand that would miraculously create more 
bridging social capital, we would surely want to use it.  But suppose we had only an 
aluminum magic wand that could create more social capital, but only of a bonding sort.  
This second-best magic wand would bring more blacks and more whites to church, but 
not to the same church, more Hispanics and Anglos to the soccer field, but not the same 
soccer field.  Should we use it?
909
 
The issue, writes Putnam, is that if we ignore this question, then “our efforts to reinvigorate 
community in America may simply lead to a more divided society.”910  There are two relevant 
remarks to be made about a “divided society.”  First, it has less capacity to foster a healthy 
democracy in contrast to a more integrated populace.  Gutmann (1998) observes that 
economically, ethnically, and religiously heterogeneous associations possess a greater capacity 
“to cultivate the kind of public discourse and deliberation that is conducive to democratic 
citizenship.”911  Second, a “divided society” has greater capacity to foster antagonism between 
homogeneous groups.  A strong presence of bonding capital bereft of bridging capital (closing 
gaps in social distance based on race, class, culture, etc.)—while creating strong in-group loyalty 
and membership—may equally produce strong out-group antagonism (i.e., animosity toward the 
“other”).912  Putnam warns of the potential for conflict among homogeneous groups when 
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bonding, and not bridging, capital is the societal norm: “a society that has only bonding social 
capital risks looking like Bosnia or Belfast.”913   
We may conclude, therefore, that a society bereft of the presence of bridging capital may serve to 
ensure that one is born into a society with enmity; born into conflict.  We may equally say that 
such a society would not be “secure.”  For the reasons above Briggs concludes that “social 
bridges resting on inter-group ties have important consequences for individuals and for society, 
for social equality as well as for democracy.”914 
 
Refurbished Rawlsian Exercise: Impact on Existing Goods in the Basket 
 
In addition to the aforementioned qualities thickly constituted selves would desire in the original 
position, I also submit that meaningful relationships, as an additional primary social good, would 
influence the nature and effect of the existing goods.  Most notably, by adding a relationally-
thick characteristic, we change the nature of how the other goods function by creating a “secure 
autonomy” as Etzioni has described it.915   
For example, we may return to Sen’s flute illustration, where three children present a legitimate 
claim for ownership of the flute based upon a particular, albeit impartial, conception of justice.  
Sen’s example, however, is not meant to definitively answer “who deserves the flute?”  Rather, 
the purpose of his thought exercise is to demonstrate that justice requires fairness, and fairness 
requires impartiality, and yet the presence of such attributes in matters of justice does not 
necessarily provide an unequivocal solution.  Sen writes: “The different resolutions all have 
serious arguments in support of them, and we may not be able to identify, without some 
arbitrariness, any of the alternative arguments as being the one that must invariably prevail.”916  
Recall that Sen refers to this as the “problem of a unique impartial resolution” and further notes 
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that this “problem” applies to the discipline of fairness in the Rawlsian original position.917  
However, the potency of this problem is diminished, I submit, through the addition of 
relationship.  To return to the flute example, we are given limited information and asked to 
consider the just distribution based upon impartial claims from utilitarian, welfare, and 
libertarian positions.  However, we might consider how the addition of relational information 
would influence our considerations.  For example, supposing the backdrop of this arrangement 
were an ethos of association and affiliation between the parties, then this would temper other 
considerations such as rights and liberties so as to ensure that their employment in the exercise 
would not compromise the integrity of the relationships between the members.  Anne (only one 
who knows how to play the flute) and Carla (spent months making the flute) might desire to 
preserve a certain relationship with Bob (poor and has no toys of his own).  Indeed, they may 
even gain great utility by denying their claim and conceding the flute to him thus experiencing 
some form of vicarious joy or satisfaction based upon Bob’s enjoyment of possessing the flute.  
The point to be made is that the addition of a relationally-based piece of information to this 
otherwise indeterminable question of justice offers the potential for a solution, and perhaps an 
undisputed one at that.  This is because such an addition changes the nature of the other attributes 
of justice that were given central consideration before—namely, rights and liberties. 
This same principle holds in housing.  Sandel describes those persuaded by Rawls and the 
difference principle as arguing for government to ensure the provision of certain basic needs.  
This, he contends, would include housing.  What this does not sort out, however, are the 
contemporary problems related to resolving where housing is secured for all citizens (or how 
citizens are residentially sorted).  Members behind a veil of ignorance, endowed with Rawls’ 
original desire for primary goods, would advocate for a society and social institutions that 
provide the right to housing because, according to Sandel, “all citizens will be able meaningfully 
to exercise their basic liberties.”918  However, the centrality given to rights and liberties does 
little to shore up disputes when this “right” is exercised.  A good example of this can be found in 
the Mount Laurel exclusionary zoning case and its subsequent land usage rulings in New Jersey.  
Holtman (1999) attempts to understand the Mount Laurel disputes through a Kantian framework 
(similar to the deontology that Rawls exercises).  However, this proves problematic when the 
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issue of rights and liberty are held paramount.  The employment of rights and liberty for equal 
citizens leads Holtman to conclude: “What renders the justice of exclusionary zoning a difficult 
question is that there are considerations basic to justice (fundamental interests) on each side.”919  
In other words, local municipalities had the fair right to establish their own land usage laws 
locally;
920
 they even went so far as to refer to them as an “undeniable good.”921  Similarly, low-
income minorities excluded to otherwise undesirable residential locations had the right to their 
share of housing so as to enjoy the same public resources and amenities as other citizens.  
Holtman summarizes the issue:  
One the one hand, if municipalities are allowed to enact exclusionary zoning ordinances, 
that effectively will prevent certain segments of the nation's population from residing 
within their boundaries.  This exclusion is especially troubling in areas where the 
ordinances are common, where nearly every well-to-do suburban town has enacted one.  
For in these areas, the less-well-off are excluded not just from a particular town in which 
they might, for whatever reason, wish to live, but from the quality schools and other 
municipal services, not to mention the safe and pleasant surroundings, that often are a 
benefit of suburban (as opposed to urban or rural) living.  On the other hand, to outlaw 
such ordinances is to prevent the municipality from taking steps it deems necessary to 
promote what we might well agree is the welfare of its citizenry.  And this is a legitimate 
municipal goal if ever there was one.  So there seems to be no way at all to decide which 
of these perfectly legitimate interests local zoning ordinances ought to serve.
922
 
Thus, rights and liberties were appealed to by those doing the “excluding” as well as the 
“excluded”—both in the name of fairness.  However, this was not enough to reach resolution 
(i.e., the flute problem).  To further illustrate the point, one result of the Mount Laurel rulings 
was the creation of fair-housing obligations by municipalities.  One way to circumvent this 
obligation, however, was to pay a fee to be used for rehabilitation and revitalization in poor 
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neighborhoods.  This payment was referred to as an RCA (Regional Contribution Agreement).
923
  
Thus, instead of building their own “fair share” of housing for the poor, municipalities could 
simply transfer that money to assist in rehabilitating poor neighborhoods.  Although this 
produced over 75 million dollars between 1983 and 1994 and 4,000 new units built or rebuilt in 
otherwise poor communities
924—it was difficult to label this strategy a success.  While 
economists supported the idea of RCAs for reasons of efficiency, it did not satisfy one of the 
principle goals of Mount Laurel: social integration in housing.  Kirp et al. write: “But those who 
read Mount Laurel as a civil-rights case that stands for a vital constitutional principle see this 
commerce in a darker, more Faustian light.  The RCAs have undermined one of the goals of the 
litigation, the racial and economic integration of the suburbs.”925  Therefore, while exercising the 
right to fund RCAs offered resolution, this strategy further divided racial households and 
undermined the goal of social integration—a central feature of the Mount Laurel legislation. 
To summarize, we see that with the limited criteria of rights, liberties, opportunities and wealth, 
such attributes have done little to solve the problem of various competing social actors claiming 
“fairness.”  It is no surprise that these disputes often found their resolution or quasi-resolution in 
a courtroom setting.  Consider, in contrast, an appeal to community made by one of the early 
figures in the Mount Laurel disputes who found herself among the excluded: 
The people that I feel sorry for are the powers-that-be in Mount Laurel.  They tell you 
they're Christian people, but they don't want to deal with poor people on earth.  They're 
going to have a hard time in the hereafter.  There's poor people in heaven and poor people 
in hell.  God meant for us to live in harmony on earth, or else he'd have made rich and 
poor communities in the hereafter.
926
 
This quote appeals to a deeper sense of solidarity and community reflected in her usage of the 
term “harmony.”  Thus, if agents in the original position were endowed with a sense or desire for 
meaningful relationships, we might rightly imagine that the “rights” exercised in Mount Laurel 
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would be bounded so as to avoid compromising communal goods such as harmony among 
community inhabitants.  One counter-response to this line of thinking would suggest that 
community and harmony were indeed visible outcomes of Mount Laurel—harmony among the 
white neighborhoods and harmony among the black neighborhoods.  However, as mentioned, 
actors in the original position would desire opportunities for bridging capital as well as bonding 
capital in order to secure a richer, fuller understanding of themselves, their identity, and their 
ability to interact and have real and meaningful relationships with various members of society.   
Further, thickly-constituted selves in the original position would desire security and the 
minimization of enmity—social features that also necessitate a proper balance of bonding and 
bridging capital.   
To summarize, primary goods such as rights, liberties, opportunities and wealth, while being 
sought after and exercised for a variety of ends, would be appropriately secured or bounded by 
the addition of meaningful relationships as a primary good.  For example, actors may construct a 
society where local municipalities can determine land usage—but not at the expense of 
segregation where social development and the cultivation of identity is limited to one group.  Or, 
actors may construct fair-share institutions such as Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs)—
but such an institution should not serve as a sorting mechanism for white and black 
neighborhoods risking increased out-group hostility (enmity with the other).  The relational 
nature of meaningful relationships and the social qualities this addition introduces limits the 
range of usage these various institutions may take on. 
These examples are meant to illustrate and suggest that not only would the addition of 
meaningful relationships to the existing basket of primary social goods offer additional qualities 
desired by the thickly-constituted self in the original position, but the addition would also secure 
and bound the existing goods.  This boundary would ideally provide for a “secure autonomy” 
that still allows for the expression and exercise of rights, liberties, and the other primary goods—
but in a healthy, functional way that would not trump, but rather support, relationally-based 
ideals and ends. 
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Refurbished Rawlsian Exercise: Additional Theory of Justice 
 
Thus far, I have submitted that the addition of meaningful relationships to the existing primary 
social goods would produce three additional qualities that members in the original position 
would desire of the societies they aim to inhabit.  Moreover, this addition would have a 
stabilizing effect on the existing primary social goods by allowing for their expression within the 
boundary of social participation and membership consisting of norms such as reciprocity, trust, 
and considerations for others.  Thus, finally, I propose one additional reasonable change that 
could be expected in the refurbished Rawlsian approach to justice which relates to Rawls’ two 
principles of justice that occur as a result of his hypothetical exercise. 
 
Recall Rawls’ first principle of justice: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”927  This principle is given 
lexical priority over the second because no rational person, according to Rawls, would give up 
basic liberties for social or economic gains.  Before exploring the implications of a more thickly-
constituted self on this first principle, I shall give attention to the second principle, which asserts 
the difference principle and the principle of equal opportunity.  Rawls emphasizes the 
importance of equal opportunity so as to control for the arbitrariness of social inequalities one 
might be born into.  Sandel describes the idea in the metaphor of a race: “Allowing everyone to 
enter the race is a good thing.  But if the runners start from different starting points, the race is 
hardly fair.”928  However, even if everyone were brought to the same starting line, Sandel 
contends, “it is more or less predictable who will win the race—the fastest runners.”929  But 
being a fast runner is based upon natural talents and abilities, and is an equally arbitrary factor in 
the determination of distributing social goods.  Hence, the necessity of Rawls’ difference 
principle.  However, as mentioned, the difference principle does allow for unequal shares and 
gains so long as they are to the advantage of the lowest members of society (“maximin”). 
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Rawls’ articulation of desert and the accompanying arbitrariness related to its use highlight one 
of the more valuable contributions of his theory.  Furthermore, the agreement to a rationality of 
“maximin” in the original position best mirrors a communally-minded principle, although it is 
proposed less from altruism and more as an avoidance of deprived conditions should one find 
themselves in a least-advantaged position when the veil is lifted.  Nevertheless, I submit that a 
thickly-constituted person behind a veil of ignorance would maintain Rawls’ second principle as 
a theory of justice.  We might think differently, however, about the first principle. 
 
One implication for the first principle related to the refurbished approach is that the principles of 
justice are to focus on the distribution of primary social goods.
930
  In other words, the idea is that 
the basic structure will “aim to eliminate structural inequalities in the distribution of primary 
goods except when a structural inequality works to everyone’s advantage.”931  Rawls asserts that 
this applies differently based upon the primary good.  For example, the first principle requires 
that everyone have a scheme of basic liberties and principle 2b mandates equal opportunities, as 
allowing for inequalities in the distribution of these goods would not work to everyone’s 
advantage.  However, inequalities in the other primary goods may serve to benefit all members 
of society. 
 
A second implication regarding the first principle relates to Rawls’ understanding of the person.  
While we may agree with Rawls that “if any principle can be agreed to, it must be that of equal 
liberty”932—it is important to recognize the trajectory of the freedom Rawls takes great pains to 
protect.  Rawlsian liberty, protected at all costs, is a mechanism to allow for one to author their 
own meaning and pursue their own ends.  We can imagine a society, however, completely 
segregated with little to no interaction across boundaries of race, place, culture, and ethnicity.  
However, assuming the two principles of justice are met, this would still be considered a just 
society, although a society of collected individuals free to pursue their given ends hardly 
resembles the desire for association and affiliation inherent in individuals.  Nor would it 
resemble the collective public intercourse necessary for a healthy democracy.  In addition to this, 
an early criticism of Rawlsian priority to liberty as a good does not account for whether members 
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of society can convert such goods into good living.  The stress here is not on the distribution of 
primary goods by societal institutions, but on the capability of societal members to capitalize on 
such goods.
933
  Finally, Sen (2009) points out that “The idea that people will spontaneously do 
what they agreed to do in the original position is Rawls’ own,”934 since Rawls declares that 
“Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.”935  This is 
the assumption that free people, unconstrained by obligations to other societal members, will “do 
their part” to uphold just institutions.  However, this is a peculiar assumption given the 
individualism stressed in the Rawlsian rational person.  So long as an individual’s possession of 
the primary social goods is satisfied, it is difficult to conceive why they would uphold the tenets 
of just institutions so that others may enjoy a similar satisfaction.   
 
Sen gives an appropriate summary, therefore, of how we should understand the liberty principle 
in Rawls’ theory of justice: 
 
It is indeed possible to accept that liberty must have some kind of priority, but total 
unrestrained priority is almost certainly an overkill.  There are, for example, many 
different types of weighting schemes that can give partial priority to one concern over 
another.
936
 
 
In a footnote, Sen elaborates on this suggestion: “There are many different ways of attaching 
some priority to one concern over another, without making that priority totally unbeatable under 
any circumstances (as implied by the ‘lexical’ form chosen by Rawls).”937  This more realistic 
approach, I submit, can be adopted in the refurbished Rawlsian exercise with the addition of 
meaningful relationships as a primary social good.  Given this additional feature, we might 
suppose that the first principle of justice would take on the following form:   
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First Principle of Justice (Refurbished): Institutions in the basic structure should be 
arranged so as to ensure equal rights to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all, insofar as such liberties foster social 
contact, collective mindfulness, and healthy community. 
 
Among other things, we can say the following about this principle of justice: First, it still 
operates with the second principle to distribute primary social goods (including the social good 
of meaningful relationships).  It should be noted that while rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, and wealth and income can be measurably distributed by social institutions, the 
good of meaningful relationships is not a similar facility as such, but an attribute that institutions 
should aim to encourage, foster, and distribute as a basic feature of social institutions.  Second, 
this principle of justice, by adding a relational undertone, would not allow for a completely 
segregated society partitioned along racial, class, ethnic or cultural lines.  Regarding capabilities, 
a just society would allow for equal liberties, but such liberties would be exercised in social 
arenas with mindfulness toward others and the cultivation of community.  Thus, while members 
of society may not be capable of employing an equal scheme of liberties and other primary goods 
to their advantage, this alternative theory of justice would suggest that they would receive 
assistance from others.
938
  Finally, while Rawls’ original theory made the assumption that 
members would uphold the theories of justice—this assumption is better supported by the 
revised theory of justice since upholding norms of justice is exercised out of reciprocity, 
consideration of the other, and for the purposes of sustaining communal norms.  In other words, 
when the veil is lifted, a stronger relational fabric would best protect the integrity of the society 
agreed upon in the original position. 
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Spatial Implications of the Refurbished Rawlsian Process 
 
 
The addition of meaningful relationships as a primary good to create a more thickly-constituted 
self in the original position could appropriately be seen to create, I have argued, three additional 
features in the Rawlsian exercise.  These features include additional qualities that persons in the 
original position would both desire and require, the tempering or “bounding” of the existing 
primary goods, and finally a modification to Rawls’ first principle of justice. More germane to 
this thesis, however, are the spatial implications of these features.  While the implications for 
space are broad, I will give specific attention to the implications for black-white housing 
arrangements.  To state it concisely: space matters. 
 
The spatial features of the refurbished Rawlsian exercise can best be expressed by examining 
more closely the qualities that persons in the original position would desire and require.  This, 
however, should not dismiss the importance of the other two aforementioned features (bounding 
of existing primary goods; modified theory of justice).  Rather, these two features help to support 
and substantiate the forthcoming spatial rationale of the three qualities. 
 
Thus, regarding the three qualities, it was first suggested that thickly-constituted persons would 
desire real, meaningful relationships.  This, by its very definition, requires the presence, or 
opportunity for, proximity.  Real and meaningful relationships, whether of a bonding or a 
bridging nature, require as a general baseline face-to-face engagement and shared space.  While 
work and school environments are “spaces” where such relationships may be built and sustained, 
housing would also provide space for building community, close-proximity, and opportunity for 
contact and interaction.  Indeed, neighborhood housing and the term “community” are often 
inter-changeable for this reason: housing offers the prospect of social proximity and subsequent 
engagement among residents. 
 
One may rightly protest that spatial proximity is a diminishing requirement for achieving real 
relationships in an age of cyber-technology and its various means for human interaction.  
Putnam, however, challenges this line of thinking.  He refers to computer-based communication 
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as a “shortcut to civic expression” and points to an array of challenges to “the hope that 
computer-mediated communication will breed new and improved communities.”939  In contrast, 
Putnam cites research suggesting that social capital is a pre-requisite for, as opposed to a 
consequence of, effective cyber communication.
940
  Computer-based interaction, as a substitute 
for community, must contend with the fact that there are inequalities in access to technology, 
social cues are more difficult to read between parties online, and the phenomenon of 
“cyberbalkanization” where our communication is often confined to people who share our own 
interests.  Further, the role of the internet is changing from a communication device to an 
entertainment mechanism—a shift that could potentially “crowd-out” face-to-face ties.941  
Wellman et al. (2000) provide a helpful summary: “Frequent contact on the Internet is a 
complement to frequent face-to-face contact, not a substitute for it.”942 
 
While spatial proximity is a natural requirement for developing real and meaningful relationships 
within a social network—this feature alone, however, may only serve to substantiate bonding 
networks and lead to homogeneous housing patterns.  If persons in the original position desire 
real relationships among themselves in society—and housing plays a key role in assuring the 
proximity necessary to cultivate those relationships—there is nothing to suggest that the housing 
arrangements under this criterion would not be racially segregated.  In other words, residential 
integration isn’t necessary to achieve this desired feature.  However, the same cannot be said 
upon considering the second and third feature. 
 
Therefore, consider the second feature, where it was suggested that thickly-constituted persons 
would understand their identity as being formed and shaped through community and, as a result, 
would not desire strictly homogeneous relationships which may prohibit the full range of identity 
cultivation available to them once the veil of ignorance was lifted.  Just as an artist desires a 
palette filled with a wide variety of colors so as to have a full range of expression and possibility 
in their painting, thickly-constituted persons in the original position would desire a society 
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offering a full range of social expressions so as to have the opportunity to form and develop their 
identity and self-understanding in unrestricted, healthy ways. 
 
Where the first feature (real relationships) would technically only require bonding networks for 
its realization in society, the desire for a full range of social expressions by which to build and 
shape one’s identity would require what social theorists refer to as “bridging capital”—or 
networks that “encompass people across diverse social cleavages.”943  To realize this desire in 
the basic structure, institutions should lubricate the grounds for contact among differing 
individuals on levels such as race, class, or culture.  Again, an appropriate arrangement for 
enhanced contact would likely involve housing.  Neighborhoods offer a natural platform for 
social intercourse through increased contact, shared amenities and goods, and collective 
responsibility.  Such diversity offers a practical means by which to widen my self-identity and 
understanding, in addition to establishing norms of trust and reciprocity along more diverse lines.  
Conversely, a segregated neighborhood may serve to limit my ability to aspire to a healthy 
balance of self-understanding and personality as I would be limited to social development within 
a limited, and potentially rigid, environment.
944
  There are social consequences for such an 
arrangement, as Stolle et al. (2008) write: “…social interactions among homogeneous 
individuals may actually make it much harder—or even impossible—for individuals to transfer 
their in-group trust to the outside world.”945  Not only would being born in a homogeneous 
community limit my own self-identity, understanding, and potential—but it would make it very 
difficult to socially navigate an increasingly diverse world. 
 
The second feature, therefore, supports a society that is residentially integrated.  The support of 
integrated neighborhoods on racial terms will have natural implications for socio-economic and 
cultural integration as well.  Thickly-constituted selves would desire the opportunity to identify 
with different races so as to have a fuller understanding of themselves and human beings in 
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general.  As Putnam writes: “Social distance depends…on social identity: our sense of who we 
are.  Identity itself is socially constructed and can be socially de-constructed and re-
constructed.”946  Navigating through identities, or what Putnam refers to as the “intentional 
transformation of identities” requires a “dynamic and evolving society.”947  Thus, exposure to 
different races in an integrated neighborhood setting provides a full palette of social expressions 
by which to identify myself with, which allows me to re-construct my own identity.  Putnam 
offers a practical advantage to this social flexibility: “…adapting over time, dynamically, to 
immigration and diversity requires the reconstruction of social identities, not merely of the 
immigrants themselves (though assimilation is important), but also of the newly more diverse 
society as a whole (including the native born).”948  In a society of ever-changing ethnic and racial 
composition—flexibility is a necessary attribute since “the most certain prediction that we can 
make about almost any modern society is that it will be more diverse a generation from now than 
it is today.”949 
 
Third, and finally, thickly-constituted persons behind a veil of ignorance would desire to 
maximize security and minimize enmity.  The connection between space and conflict is easily 
visible and the examples are legion.  Persons in the original position may offer the following 
question: “If I was unaware of my race, religion, ethnicity, culture, gender, etc.—would I want to 
enter a world where I could be born into conflict with a distinct person or group?”  For example, 
an African American born into southern US territory in the mid-1800s is born into conflict with 
white land-owners.   Equally so, being born into gang territory, political territory, or border 
territory among rival ethnicities or cultures is to inherit a conflict with a distinct “other” upon 
entering the world.
950
  Spatial tension is evident in residentially segregated areas as well.  Given 
our knowledge of the Mount Laurel disputes, one inherits a certain tension with a distinct other 
whether they are born in the Mount Laurel district or outside of its borders. 
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As these examples make clear, the “other” is often defined in spatial terms.  However, this does 
not presume that space is the problem—only a mechanism of identification.  Indeed, it would be 
wrong to assume that enmity is absent in integrated spaces.  Consider the remarks of Stolle et al.: 
 
A growing body of evidence suggests that localities, neighborhoods, regions or states and 
even countries with more ethnic, racial and socio-economic diversity experience 
substantially more problems with the creation of various kinds of social capital, 
cooperation, trust and support necessary for collective action critical to social welfare 
programs.
951
 
 
While this important point will be given more consideration below, there are two points to reflect 
upon here.  First, if there is enmity within space (i.e., integrated space), then it does not 
necessarily follow that segregation is the solution.  This may only make tensions worse by 
establishing a defined “we” in conflict with a defined “them” and exacerbating out-group 
hostility.  Second, as mentioned, we should not presume that space is the problem.  Rather, it 
may be a symptom of the problem, which is better understood as the absence of healthy contact 
thus creating more fear and a lack of rationality.  We can remark, however, that space and spatial 
integration is a part of the solution—although not the direct solution.  If thickly-constituted 
agents in the original position desire the maximization of security and the minimization of 
enmity—then we may say that they desire an integrated society constituted by shared norms and 
collective mindfulness and responsibility.  The achievement of integration of this sort requires, 
as a baseline, shared space and close proximity.  This is a necessary overture toward harmonious 
community relationships so as to introduce new social dynamics necessary for healthy 
integration to occur.  We may conclude, therefore, that this feature also supports the cultivation 
of bridging networks and would equally support residential integration as a means of achieving 
this strand of social capital. 
 
To summarize the three aforementioned features and their spatial implications—space is a 
necessary component for real relationships, a more comprehensive setting for identity formation, 
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and for the maximization of security and the minimization of enmity.  Moreover, among other 
things, the spatial implications of the aforementioned features allow for a more concise statement 
that thickly-constituted agents in the original positions would likely agree upon: they would 
desire a society that is socially integrated.  This term, introduced in Chapter 3, makes the 
important distinction that proximity does not equal acceptance or that shared space does not 
equal inclusion.  In other words, spatial integration does not equate with social integration.   
Karst (1985) remarking that there is a difference between physical inclusion and social inclusion 
(i.e., “belonging”), points out that the problem with racial segregation is that it “excludes 
[blacks] from full participation in society.”952  Thus, where spatial integration may refer to close 
proximity and shared space, social integration refers to close proximity, shared space, and 
inclusion, or the idea of social assimilation where trust, cooperation, and collective responsibility 
define the norms of such membership. 
 
Thus, we have concluded that space is a necessary component for the realization of the societal 
features agreed upon in the original position by thickly-constituted persons.  Second, we 
understand that these same agents would desire space as a means to achieve social, not simply 
spatial, integration.  Next, while it may appropriately be suggested that the desire for social 
integration would be pervasive through a variety of institutions in the basic structure, agents 
behind a veil of ignorance would concede that housing is a key structural mechanism by which to 
engender and sustain social integration.  This is intuitive, as housing has been described as being 
much more than shelter, it “provides social status, access to jobs, education and other services, a 
framework for the conduct of household work, and a way of structuring economic, social and 
political relationships.”953  Thus, housing provides a natural means to bring about proximity for 
the purposes of social enrichment or social integration.   
 
We may summarize by stating that thickly-constituted agents in the original position desire a 
socially-integrated society.  They recognize that this has spatial implications, and that housing is 
a necessary mechanism by which to employ the implications of space to achieve spatial 
integration.  However, the assertion that social integration requires proximity needs to be 
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handled with care, as it is at risk of being misinterpreted as suggesting that proximity leads to, or 
is a cause of, social integration.  To properly address this, it is important to make a distinction 
often presented in social science literature between “contact theory” and “conflict theory”—two 
opposing theories that have spatial ramifications.  Contact theory or “contact hypothesis” 
(introduced in the Chapter 3 Post-Script) posits that “diversity fosters interethnic tolerance and 
social solidarity.”954  In other words, as we have more contact with those unlike us (racially, 
economically, culturally, etc.), contact erodes some of the initial prejudices marked by fear, 
distrust, and overall ignorance and are replaced by trust, understanding, and a new sense of 
awareness.  In contrast, “conflict theory” argues that diversity “fosters out-group distrust and in-
group solidarity.”955  Disentangling these two theories is very important as both point to diversity 
and proximity as substantiating their competing claims.   
 
These theories have a long history with relevant research to substantiate the claims of each.  
However, recent work has provided more insight into what may actually be occurring.  Putnam 
(2007) asserts that the lack of consensus relates to a shared assumption held by both contact and 
conflict theorists: the assumption that bonding and bridging capital are inversely correlated in a 
zero-sum relationship (high bonding capital means low bridging capital, etc.).
956
  Putnam 
challenges this assumption:  
 
…once we recognize that in-group and out-group attitudes need not be reciprocally 
related, but can vary independently, then we need to allow, logically at least, for the 
possibility that diversity might actually reduce both in-group and out-group solidarity—
that is, both bonding and bridging social capital.
957
 
 
Putnam calls this phenomenon “constrict theory” and after engaging in an extensive multivariate 
study he concludes that “neither conflict theory nor contact theory corresponds to social reality 
in contemporary America.”958  In other words, increasing diversity in a given area seems to 
suggest increased social isolation as opposed to in-group or out-group division.  Putnam 
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summarizes his findings: “Diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all 
of us.”959  While these findings do not support “conflict theory”—they do seem to suggest that 
increased diversity in an area lowers social capital and engagement.
960
  However, this does not 
disprove contact theory—indeed, it may even support it.  In a study done subsequent to Putnam’s 
work, Stolle et al. found that actual degree of contact among neighbors was the key between 
contact theory and conflict theory.  They write:  
 
In short, and in line with the findings in both literatures [contact and conflict theory], 
while diversity itself (without contact) may push interpersonal trust downwards, 
interaction and actual experiences with members of other social or racial groups can have 
counteracting positive effects.  It is diversity without contact that is most problematic.
961
 
 
Thus, while their research confirms “recent findings on the negative effect of neighborhood 
diversity on white majorities”—they also found that social interactions occurring in a 
neighborhood have a mediating effect on the otherwise inverse relationship between trust and 
diversity: “Individuals who regularly talk with their neighbors are less influenced by the racial 
and ethnic character of their surroundings than people who lack such social interaction.”962  They 
point out that this does not necessarily positively promote trust among diverse households, but it 
does at least “neutralize the negative effect of diversity.”963  In short—contact defined by 
interpersonal interaction is the key.  And what is necessary to lubricate social interaction 
between diverse households?  This important question will be considered in the final chapter of 
this thesis.  Suffice to say, however, that whatever is necessary to fertilize the grounds for social 
interaction and eventual social integration—we can confidently assert that it must include 
considerations of proximity. 
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The Ethical Paradigm: What Do We Know? 
 
 
Given the considerations presented in this chapter regarding the normative argument for 
residential integration, the Rawlsian approach, the intractable problems with an unreconstructed 
Rawls, and the refurbished Rawlsian approach, it is appropriate to ask what can reasonably be 
concluded based upon the exploration of the ethical paradigm in matters of residential 
integration.  Upon reflection of these considerations and their implications, I submit that we can 
confidently assert, based upon ethical grounds outlined in the refurbished Rawlsian process, that 
“mix” is good.964  Secondly, we can assert that proximity matters.  The features of society that 
would be desired by a more relationally-oriented or thickly-constituted person in the original 
position requires, it has been argued, a society whose basic structure emphasizes and promotes 
racial integration through social institutions.  Persons in the refurbished Rawlsian original 
position recognize that this would support the qualities of real, meaningful relationships, a 
healthy presence of bridging capital so as to allow for the cultivation of identity through a 
diverse social environment (not a limited, homogeneous environment), and the maximization of 
security and the minimization of enmity through strong bridging and bonding networks where 
space is shared and defined by collective mindfulness, trust, solidarity, and reciprocity.  These 
qualities are supported through the additional primary good of “meaningful relationships” which 
“bounds” the other primary goods and provides for a modified theory of justice to include 
considerations of a more communally minded self.  If the output of this process represents a just, 
ethical society agreed upon in the original position (by thickly-constituted persons)—then we 
might say that such a society (1) values mix and (2) they recognize the importance of spatial 
arrangements, including the medium of housing, to promote the mix they value—and what they 
value is social, not simply spatial, integration where social interaction is marked by both physical 
and social inclusion. 
 
                                                          
964
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addressed in the next, and final, chapter of the thesis. 
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We can now make a comprehensive assessment of residential integration based upon the 
knowledge gained in Chapter 3 (the economic paradigm) and the knowledge gained in Chapter 4 
(the ethical paradigm).  This assessment shall make up the content of the final chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
In 2007, the University of North Carolina’s School of Law held a conference on housing and 
social justice.  In a discussion regarding residential integration, Charles E. Daye of the UNC 
Center for Civil Rights made the following statement: 
[There have been] two theories about social intervention to help people.  One is the 
welfare theory… the premise of which is to do something because it would be good for 
the people who are suffering these conditions.  The other is the social cost approach, 
which says we ought to do something about this because it is costing us a hell of a lot of 
money.  And I’m thinking those arguments have been around since the 30s, and they 
haven’t resonated very well.  And I’m trying to figure—is there something else we could 
talk about?  Could we change the terms of the conversation in any—ever so slight a 
way—that might make this outcome arguably different?965 
This thesis has endeavored to suggest two unique approaches to this complex social issue as a 
means to “change the terms” of the conversation for new insight.  The first approach is to explore 
residential segregation through “adverse impacts” occurring in the wake of the subprime 
financial crisis.  Among other things, this provides a unique lens by which to analyze the role 
“place”—defined in terms of segregated neighborhoods—plays in producing additional 
disadvantage for already disadvantaged black households.  The second approach is to provide an 
ethical framework by which to consider the issues inherent in residential integration.  This 
framework, described as the normative argument, provides ethical insight on two levels.  The 
first level considers general welfare and is best defined as aiming to achieve social equity among 
all citizens (both black and white).  The second level, more complex than the first, suggests that 
integration is morally right beyond considerations of the utility produced by integrating black 
and white households.  This second level reflects a plurality of valuation as it relates to 
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residential integration, allowing for residential integration to be valued both as a means to an end 
and as an end in itself. 
By exploring residential integration through an economic and ethical lens, this thesis makes a 
contribution to knowledge by providing, through these paradigms, a distinct and innovative 
perspective by which to approach this complex social issue (detail forthcoming).  After an 
extensive review of the economic paradigm (Chapter 3) and the ethical paradigm (Chapter 4), we 
are now ready to answer two questions subsequent to these chapters as a conclusion to this 
thesis.   
1) In exploring the economic paradigm through the lens of adverse impacts and the ethical 
paradigm through a refurbished Rawlsian model—what do we know?  What can we 
reasonably conclude? 
2) What are the implications of these conclusions?  What does this mean for the future of 
residential integration? 
 
Conclusions 
 
To begin, we may first appropriately conclude that mix is good.  Before elaborating on this point, 
it is important to point out a distinction between “mix” and “mixing.”  First, I understand mix to 
mean racial diversity occupying the same residential space where there is a broader sense of 
collective identity and inclusion among residents.   The sense of membership, present in 
communities that display mix, is a product of strong bridging capital which is necessary for a 
healthy sense of identity, a secure environment, and the opportunity for “reconciling democracy 
and diversity.”966  To have true mix is to have social integration, which is better understood as 
representing membership, reciprocity, solidarity and mutual advantage among black and white 
households within a given neighborhood.  Mix, we might say, is an ideal.   
“Mixing”—in contrast—is the practical means by which to achieve any or all of the ideals of 
mix.  As Logan (2001) explains it, mixing is a goal of public policy and popular opinion because 
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it is seen as the American “ideal” of equal opportunity.967  More specifically, we might 
understand mixing as efforts to socially engineer residential integration.  Examples of mixing are 
found in programs such as Gatreaux, MTO, and HOPE VI.  If mix reflects the ideal of social 
integration, mixing often represents the strategy of engineered spatial integration. 
Thus, mix, as defined above, is a social ideal worth endeavoring toward.  The refurbished 
Rawlsian exercise bears out this point.  Assuming one accepts the notion of the thickly-
constituted self, endowing members in the original position with the primary good of 
“meaningful relationships” produces additional outcomes with more relational features.  Most 
importantly, these relational features have spatial implications.  The implications, however, are 
not simply for shared space—but for shared space with a greater collective mindfulness toward 
others inhabiting the same space.  To summarize, thickly-constituted persons in the original 
position, ignorant of the natural and social contingencies they will inherit once the veil of 
ignorance is lifted, would likely favor an integrated society as an appropriate social and just 
arrangement.  Mix is good. 
Secondly, we may appropriately conclude that segregation is not good.  More specifically, our 
exploration of adverse impacts from Chapter 3 revealed that segregated black tracts in Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio, were more prone to receiving a subprime loan and subsequently foreclosing—a 
finding consistent with other literature regarding the disparity between segregated white and 
black residential outcomes in the wake of the subprime financial crisis.  However, it could not be 
proven that black households were targeted as a result of their neighborhood, as certain key 
variables were missing necessary to make such an assertion.  There are, however, two claims that 
can appropriately be made based upon the empirical study in Chapter 3.  First, we see that 
subprime lending and the inevitable foreclosures that followed were concentrated in Low-Mix 
Black neighborhoods.  Second, we see that the concentration of foreclosures creates a greater 
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asset-depreciating effect on home values.
968
  Thus, this represents an additional causal effect of a 
residential community on social outcomes (e.g., home values) as it relates to adverse impacts.
969
  
Thus, this study has provided a means by which to view segregation (in Cuyahoga County, Ohio) 
as exacerbating risk and vulnerability in the wake of a market failure such as the subprime 
financial crisis for segregated black residents.  Moreover, in Chapter 4, the first consideration of 
the normative argument suggests that such a phenomenon is not only a sub-optimal social 
arrangement, but it is unethical.  Finding support in the Rawlsian hypothetical exercise, rational 
and mutually disinterested persons in the original position would choose a society where they 
could maximize the minimum (“maximin”).  Therefore, it can appropriately be suggested that 
they would charge any arrangement where segregated sectors of society are more at risk and 
vulnerable to market failures as being unjust.  Moreover, as discussed in the refurbished 
Rawlsian exercise, we impoverish ourselves when we are socially segregated by virtue of 
limiting our contact with distinct and different individuals or groups who may otherwise serve as 
a source of self-identity and provide “virtuous circles of human connectivity” across a broader 
social spectrum.
970
  Residential segregation, we can conclude, is not good. 
Therefore, at the risk of colloquialism, the economic and ethical paradigms given attention in 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis lead to the suggestion that mix is good and that residential 
segregation is not good.  Prima Facie, these statements may not appear to offer much assistance 
in furthering the integration discussion.  However, I submit that they are necessary foundations 
by which to appraise “mixing.”  If mix is good—and residential segregation is not—does this 
lead to the suggestion that mixing is good?  Is residential “mixing” the bridge necessary to 
traverse from segregation to “mix?”  Not necessarily.   
Chapter 2 provided a range of skepticism as it related to residential mixing policies.  Such 
skepticism could be summarized into two primary lines of argument—what I referred to as the 
Cheshirian position.  The first line of argumentation suggested that there was little evidence to 
suggest that neighborhood effects exist.  The second line of argumentation suggested that there 
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was little evidence that mixing was beneficial or socially efficient.  Given these arguments, 
efforts to mix are seen as a waste of funds since the costs cannot be substantiated by the program 
outcomes.  As mentioned above, the lens of adverse impacts from the subprime financial crisis 
allows a counter-response, relating to foreclosures and their asset-depreciating effect when 
concentrated, to the first line of argumentation in the Cheshirian position.
971
  At best, this allows 
us to sponsor “mixing” on equity grounds.  However, as it relates to demonstrating that mixing 
offers socially efficient benefits, the evidence from Chapter 3 is left wanting.  This finding is 
consistent with the greater body of work in the social sciences given over to exploring benefits 
that might accompany mixing. 
Chapter 3 provided a hypothetical scenario where foreclosure-prone households (or households 
residing in foreclosure-prone areas) could be redistributed across other neighborhoods as a 
means to ameliorate the negative impact of foreclosures on property values.  While this strategy 
would benefit Low-Mix Black communities where foreclosures were concentrated, it would not 
benefit other communities within the region.  Moreover, it would provide great dis-benefit to 
them.  In other words, redistribution via mixing would be worse than a zero-sum arrangement—
it would magnify home-value losses when spread across space.  Further, we might imagine such 
an arrangement complicating interpersonal relationships between racial categories who occupy 
the same space.  Increased in-group identification and out-group hostility could drive additional 
enmity between groups, threaten security, and exacerbate conflict.  In addition to not meeting the 
criteria of social efficiency, engineered mixing must still account for the additional problems 
created as spelled out in the literature.  These problems include, but are not limited to, migrating 
out the best families in a neighborhood (leaving it in worse condition than before), the 
threatening of a group’s own identity (i.e., their “blackness”) as discussed by John Calmore, the 
threat of displacement or homelessness that may occur in rehabilitation projects under programs 
such as HOPE VI, or the phenomenon of social isolation by both black and white residents in 
diverse communities as evidenced by Putnam (2007).  Therefore, we can appropriately conclude: 
While mix is good and segregation is not, socially-engineered mixing is not necessarily good.  
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Implications 
 
After considering these conclusions, we can now reflect on their implications.  As Nancy Denton 
writes, “Scholarly work on segregation almost always has integration as its explicit or implicit 
goal.”972  In other words, where segregation is measured to be high—integration is given as the 
necessary solution.  Denton writes: “Consider, for example, the studies of the harmful effects of 
residential and school segregation on African Americans: They imply—even if they do not 
directly state—that integration would be better because white neighborhoods are safer, have 
better schools, higher housing values, [and] better amenities.”973  As intuitive as Denton’s 
suggestion appears, it is worth considering how we address residential integration with careful 
attention to the role mixing plays. 
To determine whether “mixing” is the answer or an answer, it is appropriate to first know the 
question being asked.  For example, consider a question posed in the MTO discussion: “Does 
residential mixing offer ‘better housing and safer neighborhoods?’”974 Or, consider questions 
relating to improved job opportunities or better schooling for children—would mixing enhance 
these opportunities?
975
  Further, we might consider Cashin’s (2004) assertion that the US should 
be an integrated society so that people of all races are seen as inherently equal and entitled to the 
full privileges of citizenship.
976
  Would mixing be the appropriate solution to this suggestion?  In 
addition to the aforementioned considerations, questions in the residential integration discussion 
have been raised regarding neighborhood effects, social efficiency, and a comprehensive set of 
social benefits that outweigh the public costs to mix. 
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These questions, while far from representative of all questions that arise in the residential 
integration discussion, show a degree of variation.  However, they have a common 
denominator—the underlying belief that “segregation is harmful.”  Here, this belief is not 
disputed and is supported as one of the conclusions of this thesis: segregation is not good.  
Indeed, it has been said that “few would dispute that racial segregation and concentrated poverty 
are ongoing challenges.”977  Naturally, it is suggested, this should lead to efforts for “more 
balanced, equitable development to replace the ghettos and patterns of uneven development [as 
a] desirable, if not essential objective.”978  Segregation is also noted as being “intricately linked” 
with poverty
979
 and, on a more general level, “Bad schools, unemployment, family instability, 
crime, violence, and decay are the hallmarks of the new segregation.”980  Thus, the assertion that 
segregation is not good holds nearly universal agreement among social scientists and a 
comprehensive review of the literature would only serve to verify this claim.  Yet the core of the 
issue has less to do with whether segregation is not good and more to do with whether mixing is 
good.  If segregation is the problem, is mixing the solution?  Here, there is near universal 
skepticism as it relates to mixing, and this skepticism is supported by the empirical work put 
forward in Chapter 3 and commented on above. 
There will, perhaps, never be a unified voice as it relates to residential integration and mixing.  
This thesis, however, offers a new window for discussion.  I have suggested that the residential 
integration discussion has been presented and understood under a guise of economic efficacy and 
the maximization of utility in an aggregate social context—or what I have referred to as the 
Evaluative Integration Framework.  The questions presented above are consistent with this 
framework, as they seek to de-concentrate citizens for reasons of security, better homes and 
schools, job opportunities, and a more equal expression of citizenship.  If we were only to view 
these outcomes in a vacuum, we might rightly understand residential segregation as solely an 
economic problem.  However, discussions of residential integration on strictly economic terms 
can be problematic in itself. 
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To illustrate, consider the following story offered by Michael Sandel.  He writes: 
In the 1970s, when I was a graduate student at Oxford, there were separate colleges for 
men and women.  The women’s colleges had parietal rules against male guests staying 
overnight in women’s rooms.  These rules were rarely enforced and easily violated, or so 
I was told.  Most college officials no longer saw it as their role to enforce traditional 
notions of sexual morality.  Pressure grew to relax these rules, which became a subject of 
debate at St. Anne’s College, one of the all-women colleges. 
Some older women on the faculty were traditionalists.  They opposed allowing male 
guests, on conventional moral grounds; it was immoral, they thought, for unmarried 
young women to spend the night with men.  But times had changed, and the 
traditionalists were embarrassed to give the real grounds for their objection.  So they 
translated their arguments into utilitarian terms.  “If men stay overnight,” they argued, 
“the costs to the college will increase.”  How, you might wonder?  “Well, they’ll want to 
take baths, and that will use more hot water.”  Furthermore, they argued, “we will have to 
replace the mattresses more often.” 
The reformers met the traditionalists’ arguments by adopting the following compromise: 
Each woman could have a maximum of three overnight guests each week, provided each 
guest paid fifty pence per night to defray the costs to the college.
981
 
Sandel’s point in offering this illustration is that the norms of the argument were given, not on 
moral terms, but on economic terms—and yet—the discussion had both moral and economic 
implications.  More importantly, by stating the problem in an economic context, they invariably 
received an economic answer and, moreover, changed the norms of the conversation thus 
marginalizing the moral implications they found to be important in the discussion.  Sandel notes 
that the parietal rules were predictably waived altogether and concludes: “The language of virtue 
had not translated very well into the language of utility.”982  While the content of this example 
appears unrelated, the principle has very relevant implications for our understanding and 
adoption of mixing. 
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This thesis has argued that the mixing discussion contains within it both an economic and an 
ethical paradigm.  However, as we see above, when segregation is presented solely as an 
economic problem, it in turn receives a variety of economic answers.  One of these answers has 
been “mixing” or engineered residential integration—and it is a solution found wanting within 
the economic paradigm.  However, this vantage point risks bracketing out the ethical 
considerations inherent in the argument.  In other words, there is not just an economic objection 
to segregation, there is an ethical objection as well—and both comprise the “real grounds” for 
the objection to segregation.  By including the ethical paradigm in this discussion, we have 
grounds to state that “mix”—not necessarily “mixing”—is good.   
This is important because mixing strategies have occurred as a result of segregation.  They have 
not occurred, however, from the premise that mix is good.  The inclusion of this premise (the 
ethical case for mix) has several helpful implications.  First, I would submit that the conclusions 
above represent an appropriate baseline for any approach to residential integration discussions.  
Policymakers should be clear on the goals of mixing.  If such goals are to increase opportunity 
and welfare among otherwise marginalized citizens, I would equally argue (based upon the 
support of Chapter 4) that an important goal of social policy is the achievement of social 
integration.  This is because a society where economic needs are met but black and white 
households are socially segregated is equally undesirable as a society where black and white 
households are integrated but there continues to be a stark socio-economic disparity between the 
two groups.  Indeed, social integration is not simply a lofty ethical ideal—it also offers numerous 
practical benefits and may even be viewed as a necessary element for a democracy with a 
populace of ever-increasing diversity. 
Second, while shared space cannot guarantee that social integration will blossom, it must be 
understood as a fundamental element.  As Putnam et al. remark: “Shared space may be a 
necessary condition for bridging, but it is not sufficient, as any observer of dining halls in 
formally integrated U.S. high schools and colleges knows.”983 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if shared space is a necessary condition, but is insufficient 
in itself, what needs to occur within that space for social integration to be realized?  As the 
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research of Stolle et al. makes clear, it is not simply shared space or diversity within shared space 
that leads to social integration—it is real, interpersonal contact among the various households 
within residential neighborhoods that will ameliorate fear and lubricate pathways to trust, 
collective responsibility, and belonging.  I shall refer to this as “the dynamics of space.”  While it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaust the implications regarding the dynamics of space—I 
conclude with a brief description of the more salient points of these dynamics, within space, 
necessary to build connectedness and interpersonal contact—hallmarks of a socially integrated 
community. 
First, such a dynamic requires commonalities among diverse individuals.  After reviewing 
numerous case studies of communities that display strong bridging capital, Putnam et al. 
conclude: 
Crafting cross-cutting identities is a powerful way to enable connection across perceived 
diversity.  That is, bridging may depend on finding, emphasizing, or creating a new 
dimension of similarity within which bonding can occur.
984
  
As Emerson and Smith (2000) write: “Friendships are formed primarily under two conditions—
similarity and proximity.”985  Similarity among community inhabitants is necessary to establish 
common interests as well as to presume equality with another.  As Wilkinson (2005) writes: 
“Social status differentials have a huge impact on whether people feel valued, appreciated, and 
needed or, on the other hand, looked down on, ignored, treated as insignificant, disrespected, 
stigmatized, and humiliated.”986  Thus, an ever-present cognizance of status differentiation 
between diverse residents will do little to promote authentic interpersonal engagement.  
Inequality of place, income, and opportunity naturally creates a hierarchical society, making it 
very difficult for a low-income, minority-segregated household to feel “at home” in a suburban 
neighborhood.  This speaks to the aforementioned point about spatial integration relative to 
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social integration, and implies that for social integration to occur through mix, an important pre-
requisite is a boundary of equality.
987
 
This argument coheres somewhat with Cheshire’s sentiment that concentrated poverty and 
residential segregation are simply a function of income inequality.  Further, Janet Smith writes: 
“While dispersal is clearly an easy way to quickly get poor minorities out of poor living 
conditions, it does little to help reduce poverty overall.”988  The implication is that poverty and 
overall income inequality fuel the segregation between black and white communities, making 
efforts to integrate more difficult by exacerbating differences and thus complicating social 
integration.  Cheshire summarizes the implications for policy: “The conclusion for policy is to 
reduce income inequality in society not build ‘mixed neighbourhoods’ or improve the built 
environment in such neighborhoods.”989  Here, in particular, I depart with this sentiment.  
Cheshire makes the point that we should not address integration but should rather address 
inequality.  I would reconstruct the statement to suggest that we cannot address integration 
without addressing inequality.  Moreover, if “mix” is good—this is a worthy social endeavor.  
However, to Cheshire’s point, endeavoring toward mix may require consideration toward the 
problem of income inequality (although it should not necessarily substitute for considerations to 
mix).   
Second, the dynamics of space require not only contact, but a redundancy of contact.  Putnam et 
al. write: “Again and again, we find that one key to creating social capital is to build in 
redundancy of contact.”  They continue: “Common spaces for commonplace encounters are 
prerequisites for common conversations and common debate.  Furthermore, networks that 
intersect and circles that overlap reinforce a sense of reciprocal obligation and extend the 
boundaries of empathy.”990  This speaks to the construction of local amenities and shared space 
where common interaction and interests can occur.  Parks, community centers, local newspapers, 
sports, and other shared venues provide “redundant multi-stranded” encounters.991  Putnam et al. 
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suggest that “webs of encounter” often need to be re-weaved, and this can take place through 
“innovative uses of technology, creative urban and regional planning, and political will.”992 
Moreover, shared spaces are often consumed (museum, theater, sports event, etc.).  Thus, this 
speaks to a tighter boundary of income equality, as mentioned above, so as to foster an 
environment with a more robust sense of equality and a community where shared spaces can be 
consumed by diverse individuals and serve as an environment for mutual engagement and 
relationship building. 
Third, and finally, the dynamics of space require a fundamental shift in the social ethos.   This 
shift involves not only viewing the norms of social integration as desirable for its economic 
efficacy and utility maximization (should those be outcomes)—but also viewing social 
integration as possessing ethical significance.  This suggestion, that there is something right 
about racially integrating neighborhoods, requires an ethical impetus to sustain the pursuit of 
such an ideal. 
This is, perhaps, the most important dynamic of space as it is a necessary starting point for 
discussions relating to social integration.  Moreover, it is the most salient outcome of the 
inclusion of the normative argument—an ethical ethos that complements the economic paradigm 
and changes the norms of the discussion.  Recall Cashin’s suggestion that integration is 
necessary for all races to be seen as equal and entitled to the full privileges of society.
993
  As 
important as equality is, however, it cannot be imposed.   
Philosopher G.A. Cohen refers to this as equality via “constitution making” and elaborates on the 
problem based upon justice conceived under the original Rawlsian framework: “[For Rawlsians] 
Democratic politics must institute principles of an egalitarian kind, or, to be more precise, 
principles that mandate equality save where inequality benefits those who are worst off in 
society.”994 
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However, Cohen calls such “faith” in constitution-building “misconceived.”995  Constitution-
building cannot create equality, but rather, “constitution-building presupposes a social unity for 
which equality itself is a prerequisite.”996  In other words, defining rules of public order cannot 
make us a “just” society.  If anything, perhaps, such rules make us more efficient.  This is why 
Cohen refers to Rawls’ theory of justice representative of the egalitarian-liberal tradition as being 
an “economic position.”  Cohen suggests that in his own conceptions of justice, he has moved 
from an economic point of view to a moral one.  It is here that he makes an unconventional 
prescription for the future of a just and equal society: 
I now believe that a change in social ethos, a change in the attitudes people sustain 
toward each other in the thick of daily life is necessary for producing equality.
997
 
Cohen provides a clear articulation as to what he understands to be necessary for distributive 
justice: “that both just rules and just personal choice within the framework set by just rules are 
necessary for distributive-justice.”998  In other words, “just” rules can only take us so far.  There 
must be a desire, an impetus, to mix as an underlying social ethos to find ourselves in territory 
resembling residential integration.  Moreover, the gap between just rules and personal choice 
mirrors the gap between mix and mixing.  We may rightfully ask: has this gap been widened by 
emphasizing the economic paradigm and not the ethical paradigm in residential mixing 
endeavors?  Would the inclusion and emphasis of the ethical impetus to integrate help to 
lubricate the otherwise frictional path between endeavors to mix (due to residential segregation) 
and integrated communities that display attributes of social integration? 
Mix is good.  It harbors the economic efficacy, the maximization of utility, and the sense of 
solidarity and inclusion necessary for a robust democracy with an ever-growing diversity of 
people.  “Mixing,” however, attempts to construct “mix” and this has failed.  The attributes 
necessary for social integration cannot be engineered; they cannot be imposed.  We can say with 
confidence, however, that requirements of space, a tighter boundary of equality, and a greater 
redundancy of contact is necessary to engender the interpersonal contact among residents 
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necessary to build trust, reciprocity, shared responsibility, and inclusion—features of a socially 
integrated society.   
Unfortunately, these are hardly features that the state can engineer or impose.  Just as we might 
expect a stark difference between an arranged marriage and a marriage freely and willingly 
engaged into—we cannot expect mixing to engender the beneficial social attributes of “mix” 
when imposed upon society through social construction.  The state can, however, fertilize the 
grounds for the healthy growth and development of these attributes (i.e., the “just rules” Cohen 
alludes to).   
If engineered “mixing” or state-imposed “just rules” are insufficient to bring about social 
integration, what is the appropriate role of the state?  What coordination is necessary to fertilize 
conditions for organic integration to occur and to prompt the aforementioned “dynamics of 
space”?  Indeed, what would intervention look like for Cuyahoga County, Ohio—a region mired 
by segregation and subprime damage among its Low-Mix Black segregated population?  As 
disheartening as our study of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, appeared in Chapter 3—there is a useful 
model of hope 250 miles southwest of the County.  Hamilton County, Ohio, was once one of the 
most segregated regions in the country throughout the 20
th
 Century.  From the early 1900s clear 
to 2000, the dissimilarity index in Hamilton County (containing the Cincinnati metropolitan 
area) reached excessively high figures—ranking the county among the most segregated in the 
country at various times.
999
 
However, after 1970, dissimilarity indexes in Hamilton County began to shift.  In a 
comprehensive report, Casey-Leininger (2007) found that otherwise white-segregated 
neighborhoods that, mid-century, began to slowly grow in their proportion of black households 
saw dissimilarity indexes drop from a high of 66 in 1970 to a low of 35 in the year 2000.
1000
  The 
report contained both a demographic study and an in-depth analysis of individual, integrated 
communities.  Among other things, the demographic study found significant correlations relating 
to socio-economic status and integration: “the smaller the difference between white and black 
                                                          
999
 Casey-Leininger, Charles F. Stable Integrated Communities: A Report to The Stephen H. Wilder Foundation—
Part I. Rep. Cincinnati: Cincinnatus Association, 2007. Print. (Page 4) 
1000
 Ibid., p. 6 
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SES indexes, the lower the dissimilarity index.”1001  This supports the aforementioned “dynamic 
of space” which suggests a tighter boundary of income equality for integration to prosper.   
Beyond the demographic study, a more in-depth study was undertaken for three communities 
that reflected racial integration in the Hamilton County region.  The authors summarized their 
findings into 8 key themes they found as a result of using a combination of research methods.
1002
  
These findings are as follows:
1003
 
1) Opportunity to Learn About Others—participants reported that one of the largest 
advantages to living in a diverse community was the opportunity to learn about other 
types of people (different points of view, wider perspective, group learning).
1004
 
2) Tolerant Citizen Base—diverse neighborhoods work best with neighbors who are open-
minded, accepting, friendly, and tolerant of others.  Moreover, there is a perception that 
the “next generation of tolerant citizens is being trained in these communities.” 
3) Community Pride—all neighborhoods reflected strong community pride.  Members spoke 
highly of their communities and had a desire to share the benefits with others.  Further, 
no one reported wanting to leave the area where they resided. 
4) Diverse Housing Stock—all residents reported that access to affordable housing was 
“crucial for their neighborhood to retain its diversity.”  Further, citizens reported having 
diverse options in attractive housing stock. 
5) Businesses and Support Services—the integrated communities reflected a wide diversity 
of businesses from food banks to strong private schools.  The author emphasized the 
importance of businesses and services being in the “immediate area” so residents would 
not look elsewhere. 
6) Partnerships with Faith Based Organizations—churches were reported as being 
segregated, but reinforcing the message of tolerance and acceptance in the community.  It 
was found that many of the participants reported living in the area because of an 
affiliation to a religious parish. 
                                                          
1001
 Ibid., p. 9.  They also found the same relationship when viewing median family incomes. 
1002
 These methods include community group discussions, a Photo-evidence method (images that represent diversity 
in the community) and follow up interviews with key members of the community.  See Green, Erinn L. Stable 
Integrated Communities: A Report to The Stephen H. Wilder Foundation—Part II. Rep. Cincinnati: Cincinnatus 
Association, 2007. Print. (Page 3) 
1003
 Green, 2007, pp. 24-25 
1004
 This has obvious implications for the aforementioned area of “preference formation.” 
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7) Crime—the residents cited crime as the largest barrier to living in a diverse community.  
They felt outsiders viewed their communities as “dangerous” because of blighted 
structures, abandoned homes, or negative media coverage.   
8) Citizen Involvement—a challenge all three neighborhoods faced related to bringing all 
citizens together to socialize and make decisions for the community.  The report called 
for increased opportunities for informal social mixing.   
In addition to challenging widely held notions that introducing black households in an otherwise 
white neighborhood creates a “tipping point” or that integration is associated with a decreasing 
socio-economic status—the Cincinnatus Association report offers important insights that 
reinforce the “dynamics of space” and suggest opportunities for state and local government to 
fertilize the grounds for residential mixing to occur and prosper.  Strategic policy decisions can 
assist to help lubricate the conditions for the dynamics of space to occur.  This may include 
addressing income inequality, proximity to businesses and services, bylaws for local public 
leadership to reflect the racial composition of its members, funds or subsidies for shared space to 
promote diverse participation, similar interests, and a redundancy of contact.  Further, state and 
local leadership can ban exclusionary policies, apply legal sanctions against discriminatory 
practices, and discourage public or private endeavors that promote segregation or disincentivize 
integration.  While these suggestions are general in nature, the point to be made is that strategic 
thought and deliberation can be applied to social structures, their arrangements, and the 
consequences.  Not only can such thought be applied, but it should be applied since healthy 
societies that possess strong social capital (bonding and bridging) generate positive 
externalities.
1005
   
State coordination and public “fertilization,” however, is not enough.  A fundamental shift in 
attitudes is necessary to lubricate the otherwise frictional transition from “mixing” to “mix.”  
This groundwork represents the “personal choice” Cohen mentions.  Sharing space, tighter social 
equity, and greater opportunities for contact best flourish when there is a uniform desire for such 
societal features.  This invites an ethical dimension to the discussion.  The discussion of 
residential integration is a discussion of what may be gained from a particular social 
                                                          
1005
 Putnam et al., 2003, p. 269.  According to the authors, these include, but are not limited to, lower crime, lower 
premature births, lower dropout rates, and less violence.  They conclude: “Society as a whole benefits enormously 
from the social ties forged by those who choose connective strategies in pursuit of their particular goals” (p. 269). 
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arrangement.  However, the discussions over social arrangements would be enhanced by not 
simply discussing what people desire from their society, but what they should desire and why 
they should desire it (the normative argument). 
Integration as an ethically right and socially just feature offers moral rationale as to why 
residential integration would be a suitable desire.  However, when the argument is 
communicated in the language of the economic paradigm, as we learn from Sandel, we change 
the norms of the argument and important ethical considerations and features are lost in the 
translation. 
To conclude, residential “mix” is good; residential segregation is not.  The solution of mixing, 
however, is difficult to justify based upon the evidence (or lack thereof).  Perhaps, then, a more 
helpful approach would be to invite ethical deliberation into the discussion.  An ethical 
dimension is important, we may even say necessary, to achieve the social integration (where mix 
is both a means to an end and an end in itself) that engineered or “imposed” efforts can only 
aspire to.  Citizens who find themselves morally impelled by the ethical argument to mix—in 
addition to conditions that accommodate the “dynamics of space”—may best cultivate the 
necessary means that allow for an organic progression of residential, and more importantly, 
social integration. 
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Appendix 1: Statistical Diagnostics for Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 (Chapter 3) 
It is important to validate the assumptions in a multiple regression model.  Outside of tests that 
determine the soundness of the model (r-squared and F-test), tests of significance in a regression 
model are based on assumptions about the error term (ε).1006  However, even with a large value 
of r-squared, the estimated regression equation should not be used until further assumptions 
regarding the model have been validated.
1007
  Thus, there are two important questions that we 
seek to answer from Analysis 1 and Analysis 2.  First, can the models be generalized to other 
samples?  Second, does the model fit the observed data well (or is it influenced by small 
numbers, etc.)?
1008
   
Regarding the first question, the data from Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 are not sample data meant 
to be a point estimate to a population mean or proportion.  Rather, when variables such as 
subprime rate, foreclosure rate, median income, etc., are provided, the observations comprise the 
population, not samples from the population.  The data was strictly analyzed for Cuyahoga 
County in Ohio and was not meant to be a proxy study for other metropolitan areas throughout 
the United States (although I have nowhere suggested that Cuyahoga County is unique to other 
metropolitan areas in America).  For these reasons, generalizability is limited to Cleveland.  To 
achieve generalizability in the estimators, a future research design would include random sample 
census tracts from other metropolitan areas in the United States. 
*Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 represent what would be considered “parametric” tests.  For output to 
be considered reliable, parametric tests must meet four primary assumptions—they are as 
follows:
 1009
 
1) Normally distributed data—hypothesis testing requires data that is normally distributed.  
Thus, if this is not met, assumptions underlying hypothesis testing may be flawed. 
2) Homogeneity of Variance—this simply means that the variances should be the same 
throughout the data.  A better description provided by Field (2009) reads: “This assumption 
                                                          
1006
 Anderson, David Ray, Dennis J. Sweeney, Thomas Arthur Williams, and David Ray Anderson. Modern 
Business Statistics with Microsoft® Office Excel®. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2009. Print. 
(Page 586) 
1007
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1008
 Field, 2009, p. 215 
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 I owe the exposition to Field (2009)—pages 220-221.   
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means that as you go through levels of one variable, the variance of the other should not change.  
If you’ve collected groups of data then this means that the variance of your outcome variable or 
variables should be the same in each of these groups” (page 149).1010  This is often tested by 
analysis of the error term, as OLS regression makes the assumption that the variance of the error 
term is constant.
1011
 
3) Interval Data—assumes a fixed unit of measurement between the data. 
4) Independence—for our purposes, this simply assumes that the explanatory variables are 
independent of one another (in other words, they are not highly correlated with each other).  
Most authors agree that there will always be some level of “collinearity” between independent 
variables, but if they are highly correlated, this could lead to problems insofar as interpreting the 
data. 
Recall that Analysis 1 consists of 14 separate regression models and Analysis 2 consists of 3 
(same regression equation stratified by racial category).  For each model, I will provide a 
summary of the aforementioned assumptions.  Prior to this analysis, a few important notes 
should be made up front: 
1) I will not comment on assumption #3 (Interval Data) as all elements used in A-1 and A-2 
meet this criterion.   
 
2) Often, transforming data (from regular data to natural log form) can correct issues related 
to normally distributed data and the homogeneity of variance, should those assumptions 
be violated.  Indeed, Analysis 1 utilizes transformed data for each model.  However, 
Analysis 2 does not.  Rather than apply various tests related to assumptions for each 
model of A-1 and A-2, I have chosen to use a “robust” test referred to as White Standard 
Errors.  To define this, Field writes: “If a statistical model is still accurate even when its 
assumptions are broken it is said to be a robust test” (page 155).1012 
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 Ibid., page 149 
1011
 The difference between the predicted outcome values and the observed values are known as the residuals.  The 
larger the residual, the more “error” in the model.   
1012
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In essence, heteroscedasticity can cause the estimated standard errors of the slope 
coefficients to be biased (not necessarily the slope estimates themselves).  This can make 
the t-tests and the F-test unreliable in a multiple regression model (both tests rely upon 
accurate standard errors in order to reject the null hypothesis).  Although 
heteroscedasticity does not cause bias in the coefficient estimates, the bias in the standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients (SEB-hat) is negative.  In other words, when 
heteroscedasticity is present, the model will underestimate the size of the standard errors 
of the coefficients.  Studenmund (2011) describes the consequence: “This tendency of 
OLS to underestimate the SEB-hat means that OLS typically overestimates the t-scores of 
the estimated coefficients.  Thus, the t-scores printed out by a typical software regression 
package in the face of heteroskedasticity are likely to be too high.”1013  
The larger the gap between observations values in the dependent variable (Y), the larger 
the likelihood “that the error term observations associated with them will have different 
variances and therefore be heteroskedastic.”1014  As the diagnostics below will show, the 
greatest evidence of heteroscedasticity is found in A-2.  Here, the dependent variable is 
house price (stratified by racial category).  Although separate regressions are run for each 
racial category (High-Mix, Low-Mix White & Low-Mix Black), there is still a great deal 
of variation in high and low values.  This is evident in the table A.1 below: 
Table A.1: House Price Variability by Racial Category
1015
 
 High-Mix Low-Mix White Low-Mix Black 
N (Block-Groups) 179 593 362 
Mean $96,385 $162,668 $51,834 
Median $80,623 $135,300 $39,404 
Standard Deviation $72,778 $1,098,008 $40,500 
Range $548,313 $1,404,166 $450,000 
Minimum Value $13,500 $31,667 $0.00 
Maximum Value $561,813 $1,438,533 $450,000 
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 Studenmund, 2011, p. 345 
1014
 Ibid., page 340 
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 NOTE: There were three block groups under the “Low-Mix Black” racial category that had values of $0.00.  
However, removing these three block groups had little effect on the mean, standard deviation, or range. 
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Finally, to correct for the presence of heteroscedasticity, I utilize below a form of 
“heteroskedasticity-corrected (HC) standard errors”, as mentioned above.  After using 
White Standard Errors, I compare the coefficients before and after the robust test.  
Studenmund writes: “The HC procedure yields an estimator of the standard errors that, 
while they are biased, are generally more accurate than uncorrected standard errors for 
large samples in the face of heteroskedasticity.”  He continues: “Typically, the HC SEB-
hats are larger than the OLS SEB-hats, thus producing lower t-scores and decreasing the 
probability that a given estimated coefficient will be significantly different from 
zero.”1016 
As the diagnostics below will make evident, t-scores were slightly lower in the A-1 and 
A-2 regression models after the HC test was applied.  However, no p-values were found 
to be insignificant in the HC regression output that were not already insignificant in the 
original OLS output.  All other values (particularly those of interest for the thesis) were 
found to be statistically significant at the 95% level and above. 
3) Regarding normality, as mentioned, the basic tenets of hypothesis testing (and OLS 
regression) rely on the assumption of normality in the data.  However, even where data is 
not normal, we can rely upon the Central Limit Theorem to help sustain this assumption 
(assuming the sample size is large enough).  The Central Limit Theorem, or CLT, says: 
“In selecting simple random samples of size n from a population, the sampling 
distribution of the sample mean x-bar can be approximated by a normal distribution as 
the sample size becomes large.”1017  Thus, the large sample sizes of A-1 and A-2 can 
appeal, in theory, to this mathematical principle, making the debate “academic in 
anything other than small samples.”1018 
 
                                                          
1016
 Studenmund, 2011, p. 352.  Studenmund mentions that the technique was created by Halbert White.  His article 
appeared in Econometrica in May, 1980, and was titled: “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix 
Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity.” 
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4) As mentioned, multicollinearity is the problem of having correlated predictor variables.  
While the diagnostics below will show that we can safely assume independence among 
the predictor variables in Analysis 1, Analysis 2, by its nature, should show a large 
degree of collinearity as the X1 and X2 variables are related.  The X2 variable, FR06to07
2
, 
is simply X1 squared.  Their correlation is revealed in the matrix below: 
Figure A.1: Correlation Matrix for Predictor Variables in Analysis 2 
 
As is evident, FR06to07 and FR06to07SQ are highly correlated to one another.  
However, there are a few important responses to this.  First, as Wooldridge (2006) points 
out, the presence of multicollinearity is not a violation of the assumption of 
independence.
1019
  The primary threat of collinearity among predictor variables, in a 
regression analysis, is inaccurate t-scores (which would affect interpretation of 
significance).  In contrast to the problem of heteroscedasticity, which can exaggerate t-
scores and thus p-values, multicollinearity threatens to understate these values (because 
the standard error is increased).
1020
  As Studenmund puts it: “Perfect multicollinearity 
ruins our ability to estimate the coefficients because the two variables cannot be 
distinguished.  You cannot ‘hold all the other independent variables constant’ if every 
time one variable changes, another changes in an identical manner.”1021  However, for the 
                                                          
1019
 Wooldridge, 2006, p. 102 
1020
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purposes of this thesis and, more specifically, for A-2—we need not be concerned with 
multicollinearity as a threat to the validity of the model.  This statement is made for the 
following reasons: 
1) Studenmund writes: “The first step to take once severe multicollinearity has been 
diagnosed is to decide whether anything should be done at all.”1022  This is because 
remedies for multicollinearity have their own drawbacks for interpretation or model 
validity. 
2) Most importantly, the collinearity among the quadratic regressor and its original form 
are still statistically significant at the 95% level.  Thus, the presence of 
multicollinearity has not reduced the t-scores for these predictors enough to make 
them statistically insignificant.  For this reason, Studenmund suggests that a remedy 
for multicollinearity “should be considered only if the consequences cause 
insignificant t-scores or unreliable estimated coefficients.”1023  As evidenced in the 
regression output and the forthcoming diagnostics, no t-scores still remain high 
enough to produce a statistically significant p-value less than , or .05 (for the 95% 
confidence level). 
Below is a diagnostic summary for each regression model.  The summary will include the 
following: 
1) Normality: 
a. A histogram of model residuals 
b. Sample Size 
2) Multicollinearity: 
a. Coefficient output with collinearity statistics 
i. Tolerance should be above .20 
ii. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) should not exceed 10 
b. Correlation coefficient matrix 
i. -1 is a perfectly negative relationship; +1 is a perfectly positive 
relationship.   
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ii. Values around 0 suggest no relationship 
3) Homoscedasticity: 
a. Scatterplot 
i. X-axis: Regression Standardized Predicted Value 
ii. Y-axis: Regression Standardized Residual 
b. P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
c. Normal Regression Output 
i. R-squared and Standard Error of the Estimate 
ii. Coefficient Table 
d. White Standard Errors Robust Test 
i. R-squared 
ii. Coefficient Table 
4) Narrative 
a. Summary of diagnostic findings for the regression model 
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Analysis 1 Diagnostics 
Model #1 
Normality: 
Sample Size=446 
Multicollinearity: 
 
301 
 
Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogSubpr 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .7511   317.2254     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     5.3050      .8588     6.1770      .0000 
LogIncom     -.4989      .0906    -5.5064      .0000 
LogEduca     -.2960      .0373    -7.9381      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.0393      .0533     -.7371      .4615 
LogPerce     -.1641      .0138   -11.9237      .0000 
303 
 
 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #2 
Normality: 
Sample Size=446 
Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogSubpr 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .7649   275.0907     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     3.2613      .9785     3.3330      .0009 
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LogIncom     -.3139      .1021    -3.0741      .0023 
LogEduca     -.3731      .0389    -9.5992      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.1094      .0506    -2.1630      .0312 
DummyWhi     -.4900      .0476   -10.2959      .0000 
 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #3 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
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Multicollinearity:
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogSubpr 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .7927   194.3936     7.0000   383.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     3.2866      .9452     3.4771      .0006 
LogIncom     -.3134      .0983    -3.1873      .0016 
LogEduca     -.3478      .0374    -9.3116      .0000 
312 
 
LogIncRa     -.0694      .0466    -1.4909      .1368 
RaceCatW      .0990      .0568     1.7437      .0820 
RaceCa_1     -.1335      .0888    -1.5025      .1338 
RaceCa_2     -.4046      .0515    -7.8607      .0000 
RaceCa_3     -.6240      .0553   -11.2894      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #4 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
Multicollinearity:
 
 
314 
 
Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogSubpr 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .8122   358.3246     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     1.7379      .9124     1.9047      .0576 
LogIncom     -.2464      .0932    -2.6436      .0085 
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LogEduca     -.3592      .0371    -9.6926      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.0698      .0467    -1.4951      .1357 
LogPerce      .1997      .0117    17.1174      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #5 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogSubpr 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .7715   274.8909     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     4.2957      .8696     4.9400      .0000 
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LogIncom     -.4696      .0891    -5.2728      .0000 
LogEduca     -.3151      .0352    -8.9495      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.0479      .0493     -.9730      .3312 
DummyBla      .5222      .0408    12.7890      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #6 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
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Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogSubpr 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .7954   174.6584     7.0000   383.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     3.5539      .8767     4.0535      .0001 
LogIncom     -.3897      .0900    -4.3301      .0000 
LogEduca     -.3639      .0364    -9.9978      .0000 
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LogIncRa     -.0569      .0467    -1.2183      .2239 
RaceCatB      .2277      .0719     3.1679      .0017 
RaceCa_1      .5409      .0685     7.8939      .0000 
RaceCa_2      .7028      .0573    12.2647      .0000 
RaceCa_3      .5176      .0476    10.8666      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #7 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogSubpr 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .6937   168.6407     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     6.0930      .8506     7.1635      .0000 
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LogIncom     -.5986      .0900    -6.6492      .0000 
LogEduca     -.3911      .0417    -9.3685      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.1520      .0543    -2.7978      .0054 
DummyMix      .0403      .0688      .5857      .5584 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #8 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogForec 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .5868   158.5709     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     4.5180      .8551     5.2836      .0000 
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LogIncom     -.5613      .0902    -6.2240      .0000 
LogEduca     -.2446      .0510    -4.7957      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.0779      .0773    -1.0081      .3140 
LogPerce     -.1791      .0196    -9.1373      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #9 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogForec 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .6431   166.4562     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     1.3619      .9311     1.4628      .1443 
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LogIncom     -.2660      .0974    -2.7310      .0066 
LogEduca     -.3250      .0474    -6.8557      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.1421      .0645    -2.2013      .0283 
DummyWhi     -.6887      .0641   -10.7431      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #10 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
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Multicollinearity: 
 
 
 
 
 
340 
 
Homoskedasticity: 
 
 
 
341 
 
 
Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogForec 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .6519   104.4764     7.0000   383.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     1.4128      .9309     1.5176      .1299 
LogIncom     -.2681      .0976    -2.7470      .0063 
LogEduca     -.3112      .0518    -6.0114      .0000 
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LogIncRa     -.1222      .0671    -1.8212      .0694 
RaceCatW      .1546      .0921     1.6779      .0942 
RaceCa_1     -.0900      .1375     -.6546      .5131 
RaceCa_2     -.3158      .0738    -4.2794      .0000 
RaceCa_3     -.7623      .0770    -9.9022      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #11 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
Multicollinearity: 
 
 
344 
 
 
Homoskedasticity: 
 
 
345 
 
Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogForec 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .7034   224.5559     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     -.5656      .8493     -.6660      .5058 
LogIncom     -.1886      .0872    -2.1626      .0312 
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LogEduca     -.3068      .0460    -6.6692      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.0903      .0597    -1.5122      .1313 
LogPerce      .2712      .0164    16.5076      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #12 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
Multicollinearity: 
 
 
348 
 
 
Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogForec 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .6082   145.9683     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
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Constant     3.3811      .9148     3.6958      .0003 
LogIncom     -.5267      .0952    -5.5350      .0000 
LogEduca     -.2641      .0505    -5.2278      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.0855      .0740    -1.1555      .2486 
DummyBla      .5795      .0600     9.6657      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #13 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
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Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogForec 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .6452   100.0399     7.0000   383.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant     2.3610      .8919     2.6473      .0084 
LogIncom     -.4165      .0935    -4.4530      .0000 
LogEduca     -.3324      .0520    -6.3927      .0000 
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LogIncRa     -.0987      .0691    -1.4273      .1543 
RaceCatB      .3387      .1283     2.6400      .0086 
RaceCa_1      .6427      .1222     5.2616      .0000 
RaceCa_2      .8905      .0812    10.9641      .0000 
RaceCa_3      .5607      .0669     8.3795      .0000 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Model #14 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 446 
Multicollinearity: 
 
 
357 
 
 
Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 LogForec 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .5391   103.6783     4.0000   386.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
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Constant     4.9678      .9329     5.3252      .0000 
LogIncom     -.6259      .0996    -6.2819      .0000 
LogEduca     -.3716      .0549    -6.7719      .0000 
LogIncRa     -.2129      .0778    -2.7358      .0065 
DummyMix      .1867      .0932     2.0022      .0460 
 
Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: No Tolerance below .20 and no VIF above 10.  Further, the correlation 
coefficient matrix does not show any relationship above or below .8 or -.8.   
 White Standard Errors Test shows similar output to original test and continues to be a 
significant model with the same statistically significant parameters as the original model. 
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Analysis 2 Diagnostics 
Model #1: High-Mix 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 179 
Multicollinearity: 
 
 
361 
 
Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
HC Method 
 3 
 
Criterion Variable 
 Med06to0 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .5987    78.9672     3.0000   175.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant 83709.5956 20847.5993     4.0153      .0001 
FR06to07 -12911.604  3249.6262    -3.9733      .0001 
FR06to_1   401.8409   139.0141     2.8906      .0043 
MedIncom     2.0574      .2272     9.0560      .0000 
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Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: Appearance of collinearity between foreclosure regressors (See 
Diagnostic Notes)   
 White Standard Errors Test shows higher Standard Error (meaning larger confidence 
interval) with slight decrease in power of t-values.  The t-values, however, remain 
statistically significant at the 95% level. 
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Model #2: Low-Mix White 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 593 
Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 MED06to0 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .6418   123.2021     3.0000   589.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant 44467.3875 30174.6723     1.4737      .1411 
FR06to07 -22758.311  4156.6385    -5.4752      .0000 
FR06to_1  1468.4502   402.1999     3.6510      .0003 
MedIncom     3.0623      .4924     6.2193      .0000 
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Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: Appearance of collinearity between foreclosure regressors (See 
Diagnostic Notes)   
 White Standard Errors Test shows slightly higher Standard Error (meaning larger 
confidence interval) with slight decrease in power of t-values (particularly in Median 
Income).  The t-values, however, remain statistically significant at the 95% level, 
although y-intercept is no longer statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
368 
 
Model #3: Low-Mix Black 
Normality: 
Sample Size: 362 
Multicollinearity: 
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Homoskedasticity: 
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Normal Regression Output: 
 
 
White Standard Errors Robust Test (Heteroscedasticity Corrected Test) 
HC Method 
 2 
 
Criterion Variable 
 MED06to0 
 
Model Fit: 
       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .3715    33.1278     3.0000   358.0000      .0000 
 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Regression Results 
             B(OLS)     SE(HC)          t      P>|t| 
Constant 86536.3387 30330.9475     2.8531      .0046 
FR06to07 -13276.365  5262.7141    -2.5227      .0121 
FR06to_1   481.1876   207.0019     2.3246      .0207 
MedIncom     1.6425      .2158     7.6115      .0000 
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Narrative: 
 Residuals have the appearance of normality (accompanied by a large sample size).  
 Multicollinearity: Appearance of strong collinearity between foreclosure regressors (See 
Diagnostic Notes). 
 White Standard Errors Test shows much higher Standard Error (meaning larger 
confidence interval) with significant decrease in power of t-values.  The t-values, 
however, remain statistically significant at the 95% level. 
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Appendix II: Segregation Parade  
The Segregation Parade 
 
As the data above suggest, the phenomenon of spatial isolation among African American 
households is well supported empirically.  Further, there is a significant body of evidence 
pointing to the perils of segmented housing arrangements among white and black households.  
However, Wolff (2006) reminds us that raw statistics, though useful, “often fail to sink in.”1024  
In other words, while raw data often speak to the existence and persistence of a particular 
phenomenon, the severity of the situation is often lost in the translation.  It was Jan Pen whose 
1971 work Income Distribution sought to convey, in a unique way, the disproportionate levels of 
income distribution in the United Kingdom.  To do this, he described an imaginary parade, where 
the entrants to the parade are ordered, single file, by income and proceed as such.  The low-
income earners are in the front of the parade while the highest income earners are in the back.  
The parade is to last exactly one hour.  As Wolff explains, “the peculiar feature of the parade is 
that everyone’s height is determined by their pre-tax income.  That is, the more one earns, the 
taller one is.”1025  Those who earn an average wage, therefore, will be an average height.  The 
skewed distribution of UK income is particularly evident when Pen begins to describe the details 
of the parade.  The procession begins with those who have a negative height (lost money), and 
moves on to parade entrants the size of cigarettes.  In the first half-hour, observers of the parade 
(of average height) would not be able to look the parade participants in the eye.  It is not until the 
parade is three quarters of the way to completion that a person considered to be of average 
stature would first enter the parade.  Finally, in the last six minutes (the arrival of the top 10 
percent), the height jumps to 6’6 and quickly gives way to giants upwards of 20 yards tall.  The 
parade concludes with persons whose height is measured in miles.
1026
  Wolf summarizes: “It is 
hard to read through the account without thinking that there must be something wrong with any 
society so unequal.”1027  Thus, we might describe Pen’s depiction of the income parade 
                                                          
1024
 Wolff, Jonathan. An Introduction to Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. Print. (Page 135) 
1025
 Ibid. 
1026
 Ibid., pages 136-137 
1027
 Ibid., page 137 (Italics his) 
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successful insofar as conveying the data of income distribution in the UK while punctuating the 
severity of its disproportion. 
In this spirit, the reader is invited to participate in a similar exercise: the segregation parade.  
This parade, however, varies from Pen’s in a few distinct ways.  First, where Pen’s parade 
included numerous participants, this parade is unique as it has only two floats.  One float is 
white, and one float is black.  Further, the floats are separated from one another based upon their 
level of residential segregation.  This is not a singular parade, but a parade that could take place 
in all counties or metropolitan areas throughout the United States.
1028
  Finally, while Pen equated 
average height to average income, the segregation parade begins with the assumption that the 
average distance between floats in a parade is 50 feet and is therefore characterized by an ideally 
integrated area, where the percentage of the minority group that would have to move to be 
distributed similar to the white population is less than 1%.
1029
   
With these assumptions in mind, segregation parades across the United States, based upon 2000 
census data, would produce varying results.
1030
  A parade of this nature in Pewaukee city, 
Wisconsin, would display a procession where the white float and a black float stand exactly 50 
feet apart.
1031
  However, this would be the only “normal” parade to speak of.  Of the 1091 
eligible “places” in the US, approximately 50 parades would have floats separated anywhere 
from 20 minutes to an hour.  Approximately 150 parades, however, would have floats with 
distances anywhere from three to six miles apart—making for an extraordinarily lengthy parade.  
Even more striking is the fact that nearly 200 parades across the United States would last 
anywhere from two to four hours, all based upon the distance between the white and black floats.  
Finally, over 60 parades would register float times ranging from four hours to over five and a 
half hours.  Naples City, Florida, tops the list as the longest parade.  The distance between the 
                                                          
1028
 Segregation Parade data and methodology can be found in the Appendix. 
1029
 Pen uses height as his average benchmark as stature, for a population, would be normally distributed.  However, 
the distribution of dissimilarity in the US would not be normally distributed (highly skewed).  Therefore, as opposed 
to height, I have chosen to use an ideally integrated area (dissimilarity index ≤ 1.0) as my reference point. 
1030
 While the US has over 3,000 counties, the US Census.gov data collection does not retrieve data for counties or 
areas that have less than 10 census tracts, a population of less than 10,000, or a minority population of less than 100.  
The areas that meet these criteria are referred to as a “place” by the census department.  The total is 1092 “places.”  
Data was initially retrieved from http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/excel_place.html.  
1031
 However, this may very well be attributed to the fact that Pewaukee city, according to the 2005-2009 American 
Community Survey, has a population less than 12,500 and only 1.1% of that population is African American.  Data 
retrieved from http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en.   
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floats in Naples City is nearly 17 miles apart and would equate to five and a half hours of time 
between white and black floats.   
In response to this, some might point to recent census work as evidence that the trend of 
residential segregation is changing; the “segregation parade” times are shortening.  Frey (2010) 
in reviewing interim census data drawn from 2005 to 2009, reports that progress has been made, 
although he refers to it as “slow and steady.”1032  Analysis of the 2005 to 2009 American 
Community Survey reveals that residential segregation between blacks and whites decreased in 
61 of the 100 largest metropolitan areas since the year 2000.  Further, in the 39 metropolitan 
areas where segregation increased, 15 of the 39 areas had no change.
1033
  As promising as these 
shifts appear, most major population centers in the United States would still be considered 
residentially segregated to an alarming degree.   
According to Frey’s findings, if we were to utilize the same “segregation parade” methodology 
on the largest 100 metropolitan areas in the United States based upon updated 2005-2009 data, 
we are likely to find little evidence of integration based upon the distance and time between 
white and black floats.  If a person wanted to attend the shortest parade (i.e., the least segregated 
metro) they would choose El Paso, Texas.  However, the time it would take the black float to 
catch up to the white float would still be over two hours as their distance would extend beyond 
seven miles.  The majority of the parades, however, would have floats distanced 10 to 12 miles 
apart.  Finally, we would see parades in Detroit, Michigan, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with 
floats separated by over 15 miles in distance and over five hours in duration. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1032
 Frey, William H. "Census Data: Blacks and Hispanics Take Different Segregation Paths - Brookings 
Institution." Brookings - Quality. Independence. Impact. 16 Dec. 2010. Web. 28 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1216_census_frey.aspx>. 
1033
 Frey, William H. "Segregation Scores: ACS 2005-9." Population Studies Center at the University of Michigan. 
2011. Web. 28 Apr. 2011. <http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dis/census/segregation.html>.  These scores were based 
on dissimilarity indices (referred to as “segregation indices”) where a score of 0 refers to complete integration 
between blacks and whites and a score of 100 where “the value indicates the percentage of the minority group that 
needs to move to be distributed exactly like whites.” 
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Appendix III: Segregation Parade Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steps: 
1) Stack Rank 100 Largest Metros by value of dissimilarity (smallest to largest). 
2) Assumption of ideal metro: .5 dissimilarity index 
3) Assumption of distance between floats: 50 feet.  Thus, 50 feet is expressed as .00947 miles 
(because we are converting to miles). 
4) Take dissimilarity figure for a given metro, and multiply by 50 feet (expressed as a mile).  Next, 
take this figure and divide by the “ideal” dissimilarity index of .05. 
a. Dissimilarity/Distance= .05/.00947 = 37.3/X 
5) Next, I want to convert distance (found in #4) to time.  I first do this by computing mph.  I am 
assuming that the average float will travel at 3mph…thus, I simply take the distance found in #4 
and divide by 3 (3mph). 
6) After finding mph—I next want to convert this into an hourly rate.  Suppose my figure is 2.35.  
While this would appear to be two hours and thirty-five minutes, actually, the .35 needs to be 
converted (.35)*60=21 minutes…thus, the time would actually be two hours and 21 minutes. 
a. The first step is to take the whole number (in the previous example, this would be 2) 
and separate it from the decimal portion (.35).  In a new column, I would use the 
formula “=INT(cell)” to split the decimal figure into an integer. 
b. In the next column, I would create a formula to take the original value and subtract the 
integer—this should provide the decimal amount in the column. 
c. Example:            
 
7) Next, I create a column to convert the decimal to minutes in an hour (decimal value x 60). 
8) Finally, in the last column, I add this value back to the original integer for the expression of time 
(In Bold). 
a. Example: 
 
Distance/3mph INTEGER DECIMAL
2.35 2.00 0.35
Time (Converted to Hours)
Distance/3mph INTEGER DECIMAL Convert to minutes per hour *Assumes Floats are going 3mph
2.35 2.00 0.35 0.2 2.21
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Appendix IV: Listing of Excluded Tracts from Chapter 3, Analysis 1 
 
Pre-Analysis DATA SCREENING: (Due to the nature of the study (mortgatge loans), the following data 
screening took place prior to analysis) 
1) Excluded Tracts where conventional mortgages were less than 75% of total loans.  Fortunately, there 
were no tracts where conventional loans were less than 75% of total HMDA loans for the years 2004-
2006 (both for home purchase and home refinance--the two categories I have chosen to explore in this 
study). 
2) Tracts with 35 originations or less were excluded as such a small sample of mortgages could skew the 
percentage of subprime loans to regular prime loans.  This number, 35, is the lower 10% of all 
conventional home purchase and subprime originations from 2004 to 2006. 
Pre-Analysis identified Outliers from points #1 and #2: 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Tracts where rental units comprised over 90% of the total available households were excluded. 
Pre-Analysis Identified Outliers from point #3: (Listing of those not already deleted for reasons #1 or #2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1047.01 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1078 1079 1081 1082 1085 1086 1091 1092 1096 1097 1098 
1099 1101 1102 1103 1104 1127 1131 1132 1139 1142 1147 1186.01 1191 1192.01 1915 1047.01 
1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1078 1079 1081 1082 1085 1086 1091 1092 1096 1097 1098 1099 
1101 1102 1103 1104 1127 1131 1132 1139 1142 1147 1186.01 1191 1192.01 1915 1037 1056.01 
1077 1083 1089 1093 1106 1111 1113 1129 1137 1143 1144 1148 1233 1954   
1033 1071 1088 1138 1410 1721.03 
1801.04 
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